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PREFACE.

BESIDES the many advantages resulting from the general knowledge of history, there are various inducements for the study of *ancient history* in particular. The interest naturally attached to the lives of remarkable persons, the revolutions, the civil or military transactions, manners and customs of remote ages, the connection which they have with the leading branches of polite literature, the facility which they afford for the understanding of the Greek and Latin classics, and of many historical books of the Old Testament, are surely reasons well calculated to convince every one of the importance of ancient history. Such at least, was the opinion of the author of this volume. Aware of the difficulties which attend historical compositions, he has taken every precaution not to introduce into its pages any thing incorrect, or not substantiated by some authority worthy of credit. To effect his purpose, he has spared neither time nor trouble, and has imposed on himself the task of assiduous research in the best sources of information, and consulted the most approved writers, both ancient and modern.

Equal care has been taken to avoid prolixity and excessive brevity; because, on the one hand, the generality of readers and students have not sufficient leisure for the perusal of lengthy works; and, on the other, excessive brevity strips history of its principal usefulness and interest, by crowding together, within a few pages, a multitude of events with but few particulars and circumstances, and, consequently, without adequate means to distinguish the facts with precision, and to state with accuracy their various degrees of importance. Whatever may be, in some respects, the utility of a mere compendium, it certainly cannot equal that of a more copious history, when written in a proper spirit; a history in which all prominent transactions, being accompanied with suitable developments, appear in a more striking light, and can thus be easily and duly appreciated from facts of secondary importance. For the same reason, and by the help of instructive details, the more copious history is susceptible of a degree of interest which can never be imparted to the mere abbreviation.

It has, likewise, been deemed far better (as in our Modern History) not to give a separate account of each nation, but to carry on the history of all the nations of antiquity together, by connecting its various parts as far as might be consistent with the nature and the succession of events. Not only has this method been adopted by the ablest historians, such as Herodotus, Polybius, Justin, Prideaux, Petavius, Rollin, etc., but it is manifestly more conformable to the course of nature: for, nations do not exist in an isolated manner; they live, act, and progress together in the succession of ages; they incessantly come in contact with one another, either by hostile or by friendly relations. Social and political pre-eminence belongs sometimes to one, sometimes to another. Now these essential features must either disappear, or be very imperfectly represented in a historical work which, professing to treat of all

the great nations of the earth, does not connect them in one narrative, but treats of every one separately. The mind, in this case, instead of taking a grand view of the whole, is confined to a consideration of desultory subjects; the memory becomes confused by the multiplicity of particular histories, and, in the end, is rendered almost totally unable to distinguish what belongs to each of them. Add to this the inconvenience of being obliged to resort continually to repetitions or references, whenever mention is made of events in which two or more nations are concerned, as is always the case in foreign wars, coalitions, and treaties of peace.

The truth of these remarks is strongly supported by the testimony of Polybius, a Greek historian, not less admired for the solidity of his judgment than for the extent of his learning. "Whoever," says he, (*General Hist.*, b. i. c. 1,) "is persuaded that the study of particular histories is alone sufficient to convey a perfect view and knowledge of the whole, may very properly be compared with one, who, on surveying the divided members of a body that was once endued with life, should persuade himself that he had thence obtained a just conception of all the comeliness and active vigour which it had received from nature. But let these broken parts be again placed in order, restored to all their first activity and life, and be once more offered to his view, he will then be ready to acknowledge, that all his former notions were as remote from the truth as the shadows of a dream are different from realities. For, though some faint conception of the whole may, perhaps, arise from a careful examination of the parts, no distinct or perfect knowledge can ever be expected from it. In the same manner, it must also be confessed, that particular relations are by no means capable of yielding any clear or extensive view into general history; and that the only method which can render this kind of study both entertaining and instructive, is that which draws together all the several events, and ranges them in their due place and order, distinguishing also their connection and their difference."

This method, then, (however common, at present, the opposite practice,) is by far preferable to any other. Should, however, any one still prefer to read and study the history of each nation separately, even that he may easily find in the present work, by perusing the table of contents, and selecting thence all the titles and pages which belong to the history of the same nation; e. g. as to the Carthaginians, pp. 60, 148, 214, 271, 274-302, and 377; and for Grecian history, pp. 35-43, 75-89, 125, 130-148, 164-207, 217-261, 304-310, and 319. The same for other nations, Persians, Romans, etc.

In order to render the whole work still more useful and easy, a few prominent facts called *epochs*, are selected, to which all the other events that immediately precede or follow, may be easily referred. For the same reason, care is taken not to perplex the mind of the reader with the various systems of chronology that are, or have been, in use among the learned. Throughout this volume that system is used which has been the most commonly adopted, and according to which there elapsed about four thousand years from the creation of the world to the coming of our Saviour. Thus, the years for Ancient History will be simply dated *before* the birth of Christ in their regular succession, as they are dated *from* the birth of Christ for Modern History.

The usual notice of the religion, government, laws, and manners of

the different nations of antiquity, will find its proper place in those periods of their existence in which any one of them acted a prominent part in the history of the world. By being thus distributed, and placed at certain intervals, particulars of this kind will not be tedious, and may rather contribute to the interest of the work, by introducing variety into the otherwise monotonous detail of political and military transactions. The same objects, besides, are treated of under a general point of view, and at greater length, in a separate part towards the end of the volume.

Should it appear to any one that too much praise for virtue is bestowed on the ancient heroes of Greece and Rome, we would beg leave to observe, 1. That we nowhere intend to represent their virtues as perfect; on the contrary, we repeatedly made the remark, that the best moral qualities of the ancients were often disgraced in the same persons by the co-existence of gross vices, and still more frequently tainted by the base motive of ambition or vanity. 2. It is nevertheless true, that many admirable actions of patriotism, justice, clemency, magnanimity, continency, temperance, etc., were performed by the Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans of old. This fact cannot be denied; but, while it should serve as a severe rebuke to those Christians who are not ashamed to be less virtuous than pagans, it merely shows, what is otherwise known from the principles of the true religion, that man is not universally and essentially corrupt; that he is free to do good or evil, and that the Almighty is ever ready to lend him a gracious assistance in the discharge of his duties. It shows, on the other hand, that social virtues and deeds of merely natural honesty can be found in false religions, even among the heathens, however far from the kingdom of God; and consequently, that they cannot, by themselves, afford any ground for hope, and much less for security, with regard to the future state of man's immortal soul.

Our work opens with a brief sketch of the history of our first parents, of their primitive innocence, their subsequent disobedience and fall, and of the awful catastrophe brought about by the crimes of their descendants, and which destroyed all mankind, with the exception of one virtuous family destined by Almighty God to repeople the earth after the deluge. We however leave the particulars of these momentous events to Sacred History, to which they peculiarly belong. Our object being the civil history of the ancient world, the present volume ought properly to begin with the dispersion of the sons of Noe, which was soon followed by the foundation of the first states and empires. From that remote period, our History proceeds as far as the change of the Roman republic into a monarchy, or the reign of Cæsar Augustus, when a new and still more important era began. This narrative includes an interval of about twenty-two centuries, divided into six parts or epochs, as follows:—

The first part extends from the dispersion of the sons of Noe (B. C. 2247), to the close of the Trojan war (1184), including 1063 years.

The 2d.....from the close of the Trojan war (B. C. 1184), to the building of Rome (B. C. 753),.....431 years.

The 3d.....from the building of Rome (B. C. 753), to the destruction of the Babylonian, and the rise of the Persian empire (B. C. 536),217 years.

The 4th.....from the rise of the Persian empire (B. C. 536), to its

overthrow, and the death of Alexander the Great (B. C. 324),..... 212 years.

The 5th.....from the death of Alexander the Great (B. C. 324), to the end of the Punic wars and of Grecian independence, or the destruction of Carthage and Corinth (B. C. 146),.....178 years.

The 6th.....from the destruction of Carthage and Corinth (B. C. 146), to the battle of Actium and change of the Roman commonwealth into an empire (B. C. 31),.....115 years.

A 7th part treats of the Laws and Polity, Arts, Manners and Customs, of Ancient Nations; and an appendix adds further information about their Literature, and some other points of great interest.

PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

This new edition of Ancient History has been prepared with much labour and care by the author. He has not only inserted various improvements into the body of the work, but he has also comprised, in a distinct part, a multitude of observations and facts taken from the best authors, which it was not possible to introduce into any other portion of the volume. This additional part will, it is hoped, be found very useful to give an insight into the condition, character, social life, and customs of early societies; the more so, as those objects principally have been made a matter of notice, which contribute, in a peculiar manner, to the welfare and prosperity of states, such as polity, agriculture, commerce, etc. Finally, an Appendix has been added, containing much information relating to ancient literature and some other important subjects.

This fourth edition of the Ancient is, moreover, accompanied with a tenth edition of Modern History, which has also been carefully revised, and improved by additions bearing on the late important events, till the year of our Lord 1854. Hence, the two works together present a complete history of the civilized world throughout the whole duration of its existence, from the creation down to our own time, a space of 5854 years. It is comprised in two large 12mo volumes, of nearly equal size, and containing, jointly, upwards of a thousand pages.

BALTIMORE, *August*, 1854.

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TABLE OF THE PRINCIPAL AUTHORS AND WORKS

RESORTED TO IN THE COMPOSITION OF THIS VOLUME.

THE HISTORICAL AND PROPHETICAL BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.
JOSEPHUS: *Jewish Antiquities*, in twenty books.

GREEK AUTHORS.

HERODOTUS OF HALICARNASSUS, the father of profane history: *Nine books* on the history of ancient nations, especially the Persians and Greeks.

THUCYDIDES: *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

XENOPHON: *Cyropædia—Retreat of the Ten Thousand—Affairs of Greece—and Memoirs on Socrates*.

Each of the writings of these three historians is, in its peculiar kind, a master-piece of narrative and style.

PLATO, the celebrated philosopher: *Some of his Dialogues*.

POLYBIUS: *General History*; remarkable for accuracy of research and depth of judgment. It was comprised in forty books, most of which are unfortunately lost.

PLUTARCH: *Lives of the illustrious Greeks and Romans*; a work which, notwithstanding its deficiencies in some respects, is perhaps the most useful history of Ancient Greece and Rome.

LATIN HISTORIANS.

JUSTINUS: *Historiæ Philippicæ*.

Q. CURTIUS: *De rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*.

TITUS LIVIUS: *Historia Romana*; with the supplements of Freinshemius.

FLORUS: *Epitome Rerum Romanarum*.

VELLEIUS PATERCULUS: *Epitome Historiæ*.

C. SALLUSTIUS: *Bellum Catilinarium et Jugurthinum*.

J. CÆSAR: *De Bello Gallico et Civili*; with the supplements of Hirtius, *De bello Alexandrino, Africano et Hispaniensi*.

SUETONIUS: *The lives of Julius Cæsar and Octavianus Augustus*.

CORNELIUS NEPOS: *Vitæ excellentium imperatorum*.

Most of the Latin works just mentioned are classical, and belong to the Augustan age.

S. AUGUSTINUS: *De Civitate Dei*; an elaborate and admirable work in twenty-two books.

HORATIUS TURSELINUS: *Historiarum ab origine mundi Epitome*. 1 vol. well and elegantly written.

ENGLISH.

Universal History. Use has been made chiefly of those volumes which treat of the ancient Egyptians, Assyrians, Greeks and Romans.

C. A. WISEMAN: *Lectures on the Connexion between Science and Revealed Religion*; 1 vol. 8vo.

PRIDEAUX: *The Old and New Testament connected in the history of the Jews and neighboring nations.* New York edition, 3 vols. 8vo.

FERGUSON: *History of the progress and termination of the Roman Republic,* in six books.

KENNET: *Antiquities of Rome*; Philad. 1822, 1 vol. 8vo.

TAYLOR: *Manual of Ancient History.* New York, 1845, 1 vol. 8vo.

FRENCH.

ANQUETIL: *Précis de l'histoire universelle*; 8 vols. 8vo. The first volumes, comprising the history of ancient nations, have been used.

BARTHELEMY: *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce.* Paris edition, 1789, 9 vols.

BOSSUET: *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, in three parts.

D. CALMET: *Dictionnaire de la Bible*; 6 vols. 8vo.

DRIEUX: *Précis de l'Histoire Ancienne et de l'Histoire Romaine*; 2 vols. 12mo.

GERARD: *Les Leçons de l'histoire, ou Lettres d'un père à son fils sur les faits intéressans de l'histoire universelle.* Paris, 1702-1712, 11 vols. 12mo.

GOGUET: *De l'origine des Loix, des Arts et des Sciences, et de leurs progrès chez les anciens peuples.* The sixth edition, Paris, 1820, 3 vols. 8vo.

JULLIEN: *Histoire de la Grèce ancienne.* Tours, 1840, 1 vol. 12mo.

LENGLET-DUFRESNOY: *Tablettes chronologiques*, the first vol.

LORQUET: *Histoire Ancienne et Histoire Romaine.* 1 vol. 12mo, or 2 vols. 18mo.

MONTESQUIEU: *Grandeur et Décadence des Romains.* 1 vol. 12mo.

ROLLIN: *Traité des Etudes*; especially the third and fourth vols., which treat of history.

.....*Histoire Ancienne.* Paris edition, 1769-1772, 13 vols. 12mo.

.....*Histoire Romaine*, continued by CREVIER, Paris, 1769-1781, 16 vols. 12mo.

VERROT: *Révolutions Romaines.* Besançon, 2 vols. 12mo.

ANCIENT HISTORY.

PART I.

FROM THE DISPERSION OF THE SONS OF NOE (B. C. 2247), TO THE
CLOSE OF THE TROJAN WAR (B. C. 1184).

BRIEF INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST AGES OF THE WORLD.

THE CREATION AND THE DELUGE.*

WE learn from the sacred pages that God created the world in the space of six days. The concluding part of this great work of his omnipotence was the creation of our first parents, Adam and Eve. God formed the body of Adam of the slime of the earth, and animated that body with a soul, or spiritual substance, which he endowed with understanding and free-will in order that man might know and love his Creator. The Lord then, having "cast a deep sleep" upon Adam, took one of his ribs, and with it he formed Eve, the first woman, and the mother of all men (B. C. about 4000).

Adam and Eve were created in the state of innocence, and placed in a most beautiful garden or earthly paradise. God allowed them to eat of all the fruits of that delightful abode, except the fruit of one tree, which he forbade them to eat, under the penalty of becoming subject to death and other evils.

This precept, although an easy one, was not long complied with by Adam and Eve. The devil, or fallen angel, whom pride had made an enemy of God, being jealous of their happiness, resolved to destroy it, by inducing them to transgress the divine command. Under the form of a serpent, he addressed

* From the Book of Genesis, i.—ix.

Eve, as the weaker of the two, and suggested to her that, if they should eat of the forbidden fruit, "their eyes would be opened, and they would be as gods, knowing good and evil." Eve, seduced by the promises of the tempter, not only ate of the fruit, but offered some to Adam, who, through a criminal condescension for his wife, shared in her disobedience. Their eyes were indeed opened, but in a manner quite contrary to their expectation; they saw the good which they had lost, and the abyss of evils into which they had culpably fallen.

The Lord summoned them before him; and, after pronouncing his malediction against the serpent, the occasion of their fall, he condemned the woman to bring forth children in sorrow, and to be subject to man; and man himself to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow, till his body should return into its original dust. He then drove them from the earthly paradise, and placed at the entrance an angel with a flaming sword, to prevent their return. Thus did Adam and Eve lose, in a moment, both for themselves and for their posterity, the state of primitive innocence, and, besides bringing a train of spiritual evils into the world, doomed themselves and their descendants to hard labor, misery, disease and death.

God, however, did not leave our first parents without hope. He promised to them, that of the woman would one day be born a Saviour, who should crush the serpent's head, that is, destroy the empire of the devil, rescue mankind from the slavery of sin, and become, "to all that obey him, the cause of eternal salvation."*

Adam had many children; but the Holy Scripture mentions only three in particular, viz., Cain, Abel and Seth. Cain, perceiving that the sacrifices of Abel were more acceptable than his own in the sight of God, and yielding to the influence of jealousy and hatred, became his brother's murderer. In punishment of this crime, he was condemned to be a fugitive and vagabond upon the earth, and became the father of a posterity wicked like himself.

On the contrary, piety was preserved among the descendants of Seth, the third of the three brothers. When Adam died, Seth succeeded him in the capacity of patriarch, and imitated the virtue of Abel. His son Enos began to use solemnity in the worship and invocation of God; and Henoah, the sixth patriarch after Adam, deserved for his eminent piety to be taken by God from this world, and be reserved to come in the end of ages, to prepare men for the second coming of Christ. The posterity

* Heb. v. 9.

of Seth continued long in their adherence to virtue and religion, and for that reason were called the sons of God; whereas the descendants of Cain, following in the footsteps of their father, were called the children of men. The former having, at length, begun to contract marriages with the latter, were gradually perverted, and forgot their allegiance to their Creator.

The corruption infected all mankind, except Noe and his family. Almighty God, to use the astonishing expression of Scripture, repented that he had created men, and resolved to destroy them by a general deluge, with the exception of the just Noe, who had found grace before him. He therefore commanded this holy patriarch to build an immense ark or vessel, the form and dimensions of which he himself specified. Noe spent a hundred years in its construction, and entered it with his three sons, Sem, Cham and Japheth, his wife and the wives of his sons. He also, in compliance with the divine command, took within some animals of every kind of those which move in the air or upon the earth.

God then caused an incessant rain to fall during forty days and forty nights; and the sea overflowed till it rose fifteen cubits above the summit of the loftiest mountains. When the waters began to subside, the ark rested upon Mount Ararat, in Armenia, and Noe left it, having remained in it during a whole year.

His first care was to offer a solemn sacrifice to God, in thanksgiving for his wonderful preservation from the general destruction of mankind. The Almighty accepted the sacrifice. He blessed Noe and his children, promised them that the earth would never again be wasted by a general flood, and set the rainbow in the clouds as a sign and pledge of his promise.

Immediately after the deluge, the duration of man's life began to be much shorter. A multitude of causes, more or less connected with this great catastrophe, greatly impaired the original strength of his constitution, and the various alterations undergone by nature itself continually warned men how far, even in regard to this visible world, the justice of God had been provoked by their crimes.

Such was the beginning of the world; most happy, at first; then a prey to countless evils; but, viewed in reference to God, always admirable. In the history of these extraordinary events, we see men always under the ruling hand of their Maker, created by his word, preserved by his goodness, governed by his wisdom, punished by his justice, delivered by his mercy, and constantly subject to his power.*

* See Bossuet's *Discourse on Universal History*, Part II, ch. 1.

DISPERSION OF MEN AFTER THE DELUGE—BEGINNING OF ALL CIVIL HISTORY.—B. C. 2247.

A NEW order of things had commenced. Noe with his family, consisting of eight persons, had once more taken possession of the earth lately covered with the waters of the deluge. They began to cultivate those arts which are necessary for the support of human life, and which had been known from the beginning of the world, that is, agriculture, the pastoral art, and that of procuring clothes and dwellings. Having established their residence in the fertile plains of Sennaar, they continued to live together as members of one family, as long as their limited number and the unity of their language permitted. This situation of mankind after the deluge lasted at least one hundred years.

When their number became so great that it was very difficult for them to dwell any longer together, they unanimously resolved to build a city and a tower of extraordinary height, so as to render their names famous, before they should be scattered abroad into all lands. They used for that purpose brick instead of stones, and slime instead of mortar; and they appeared determined fully to carry out their design. But this project, inspired by vanity, highly displeased Almighty God. He confounded their language, and by thus preventing them from any longer understanding each other, compelled them to abandon their undertaking. This caused the place to be called *Babel*, that is, *confusion*, "because there," says the Scripture,* "the language of the whole earth was confounded; and from thence the Lord scattered them abroad (according to their kindreds and tongues) upon the face of all countries."

As the various branches of Noe's family became more numerous, they gradually reached and peopled the different parts of the globe. Mountains and forests, rivers, and afterwards seas, were crossed, and new dwellings continually rose on the face of the earth. Many of these colonies, owing to peculiar difficulties, fell into a state of profound ignorance and barbarism. Others, on the contrary, especially such as settled in the vicinity of the spot from which they had originally departed, laid the foundation of well-organized societies. Shortly after the first dispersion of men, we begin to see the polish of manners, the building of towns and cities, the formation of political states, the enactment of laws, and the introduction of new arts or the improvement of those already known, together with the fruits of commerce and industry. This is then the beginning of all

* Gen. xi, 1—9.

civil history. There is, in fact, no *authentic* record of early times which does not date the first origin of nations or civil societies from this important epoch.

The Egyptians, the Chaldeans, the Indians, the Chinese and others may have, in order to gratify their vanity, freely indulged in the dreams of their imagination, and claimed an antiquity of ten thousand, thirty-six thousand, seventy thousand, and even two or four hundred thousand years. These absurd pretensions, the offspring of ignorance or national pride, are not only destitute of all proof, and contrary to the inspired and only certain record of primitive times,* but are likewise opposed to each other, to facts, and to every document worthy of credit. Many learned critics, who have applied to the serious investigation of ancient chronology, after separating authentic and well-connected historical traditions from false and spurious ones, have unanimously come to the conclusion that the origin even of the most ancient states cannot be traced farther than to a time when, according to the chronology of Scripture, the earth had already been for a long time inhabited.†

The case has been repeatedly proved to be the same with regard to the astronomical monuments of early nations. The Egyptian zodiacs, whose pretended antiquity was re-echoed by infidels as irreconcilable with sacred history, have been found, upon closer examination, to be scarcely as ancient as the beginning of the Christian era. The Chinese calculations could not have been made at an earlier period than the seventh or eighth century before the coming of Christ; the Indian tables are of a still more recent and much later date; and the famous observations of the Chaldeans, even admitting them to be perfectly authentic, do not suppose a higher antiquity than the year B. C. 2233, which is nearly the date of the tower of Babel. It is indeed probable that this tower, although left unfinished in consequence of the confusion of tongues, served, under the beautiful and serene sky of Chaldea, for the astronomical observations of those who remained in the adjacent country. Thus the veracity of Moses' narrative, instead of being impeached, is sustained by the researches of true science, and by whatever is authentic in the history of the primitive world.†

* The books of Moses, Genesis, etc.

† See Dr. Wiseman's *Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*, lect. vii and viii; Duclot, *Bible vengée*, vol. i, *Observations Préliminaires*; Goguet, *De l'Origine des Lois, des Arts et des Sciences*, vol. iii, *Dissertation sur les Antiquités des Babyloniens, des Egyptiens et des Chinois*; Gérard, *Leçons sur l'Histoire*, vol. i, lettre ix; Fréret, *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, vol. xviii—4to, p. 294, et vol. xxxix—12mo, p. 490.

Another circumstance connected with the dispersion of men must not be omitted. Notwithstanding their separation and increased multitude, they always preserved many proofs of the identity of their origin. Whatever shades of difference were introduced in the development of their mental powers, and in the colour, strength and other external qualities of their bodies, it was not difficult to account for these changes or apparent diversities, by the difference of education, habits, manners, dress, diet, country and climate, especially where they were under the continual influence of a tropical sun. In other respects, there always remained in them all the same essential organization, the same propensities and feelings, the same internal and external faculties, in a word, a multitude of indelible features manifestly denoting the unity of the source from which all descended.*

The languages themselves, notwithstanding their surprising variety, give ample testimony to the same important fact. Vast and profound researches of latter times have shown, first, that all the languages of the earth may be reduced to three great families; secondly, that these three, notwithstanding their wide difference, bear however so many signs of affinity to each other, that they must have been originally united in one, from which they drew those essential elements common to them all;† and, thirdly, that the separation was effected by some extrinsic and sudden cause. All this perfectly agrees with every circumstance mentioned by Moses in connection with the confusion of tongues at the tower of Babel.

Hence it also happened that all the great events previous to the dispersion of men, were preserved in the notice and recollection of the different nations which owed their immediate origin to that separation. The creation of the universe, and particularly of man; the division of time into weeks of seven days; the golden age, or state of primitive innocence and happiness; the iron age, or subsequent period of misery, disorder and crime; the long life of the earliest generations; the boldness and impiety of the giants; the justice of God displayed in the deluge; the preservation of a just man and his family: in a word, all the

* For this and the following remarks, see again Dr. Wiseman, Duclot, Gérard, in the works above cited, besides many other publications, to which they themselves refer.

† This is what the ablest men in the study of languages now unanimously acknowledge. "It is," says Schlegel in one of his memoirs, "my full impression, produced by the affinity of languages, that the various tribes and families of the human race descend from one parent stock; and my conclusion on this point will appear to every one the more exact, as it is the more thoroughly examined."

important transactions which occurred before the confusion of tongues, remained conspicuous in the remembrance of posterity, and vestiges of this remembrance were left in the history, monuments, writings and poetry, of almost all nations. Events, on the contrary, which happened after this period, however remarkable in themselves, were not universally known: a manifest proof of the fact, that there no longer existed a general bond of communication between men, whereas they had before constituted but one family, descending from one common parent.

RISE OF THE EARLIEST STATES.

BABYLONIANS, ASSYRIANS, PHENICIANS, &c.

THE ancient world was therefore divided among the three sons of Noe, Sem, Cham, Japheth, and their descendants. Cham's family occupied Palestine, Egypt and other parts of Africa. The posterity of Japheth peopled nearly all Europe, and the north of Asia. Central Asia was occupied by the children of Sem.* The names of these first founders of all the nations of the earth were for a long time remembered and preserved in the countries in which they originally settled.

Among the cities which they built, the most remarkable were Babylon, Ninive and Sidon.†

Babylon, situated on the banks of the great river Euphrates, was founded by Nemrod, a grandson of Cham; and *Ninive*, on the left bank of the Tigris, by Assur, a son of Sem, whence came the name of *Assyrians*. We will speak, in another place, at greater length, of these two famous cities, and of the extraordinary degree of splendor and magnificence they subsequently attained.

Sidon in Phenicia, on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean sea, was probably built by Sidon, the eldest son of Chanaan, and a great-grandson of Noe. On the same coast was also founded the city of Tyre, a colony of Sidon, which it afterwards greatly surpassed in celebrity, wealth and power. The inhabitants of that country, confined in a narrow tract between the sea on the one side and a ridge of mountains on the other, and finding in the soil but few resources for their subsistence, directed their attention to navigation and commerce. Their exertions, con-

* See Genesis, ch. x, which, independently of the divine inspiration, is the most admirable monument of ancient history and geography.

† Same ch. ver. 10, 11, 15 and 19.

stantly aided by experience, were so successful, that they passed for the most skilful seamen and the most industrious merchants of the ancient world, nay for the very inventors of maritime trade.

Nor was their industry confined to commerce and navigation. Mankind was indebted to them for a variety of other useful inventions or discoveries, for instance, of the purple, glass, weights and measures, arithmetic, and perhaps of the art of writing, which is, however, ascribed by some to the Egyptians or the Assyrians. Cadmus, who, about the year B. C. 1519, carried the alphabet into Greece, was a Phenician.

The book of Genesis mentions, not only other cities, but even principalities and kingdoms founded in that remote period. There were among others, the kings of Sodom and Gomorrha, of Gerara and Salem, of Sennaar or Chaldea, and of the Elamites or Persians. Most of these sovereigns were far from being powerful monarchs, and frequently their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the limits of one district or city; a proof, however, that a settled form of government was already known and adopted in many countries.

Until men had considerably multiplied, they continued under the authority of their fathers or chiefs of families, called patriarchs, as Noe, Sem, Abraham, &c. But subsequently, diversity of interests and the necessity of providing for the common security and welfare, induced them to seek the powerful protection of one person or more, possessed of the necessary qualifications and invested with full authority for the discharge of so important a trust. The remembrance and favorable idea which they had of the patriarchal power, led them to imitate it in their political organization, and in most cases to choose the monarchical form of government. Hence we find in both sacred and profane writers, that most of the nations of antiquity were monarchical, though not despotic states. The despotic authority seems to have taken its rise only with great and powerful empires, such as could not exist from the beginning.

It is very probable that, towards the commencement of civil societies, ambition and intrigue had little to do in the promotion and accession of sovereigns. As far as may be gathered from the earliest documents, they were persons who enjoyed a reputation of beneficence and integrity, or who had previously rendered great services to their fellow men by their prudence and courage. Monarchs of this character were more inclined to preserve their dominions in peace, than extend them by conquests.* Unfortu-

* "*Principio rerum, gentium nationumque imperium penes reges erat: quos ad fastigium hujus majestatis non ambitio popularis, sed*

nately, these pacific reigns were not of long duration. Disputes and quarrels almost unavoidable between neighbors, jealousy against a superior power, desire to enlarge one's dominions or to acquire glory, restless and warlike inclinations, etc., gave rise to different wars which could not be otherwise terminated than by the entire defeat of the weaker party. The first advantages gained over an enemy, while they flattered the ambition of the conqueror, increased his resources, gave a new stimulus to his courage, and inspired him with a desire to subdue other countries. It was thus that small states gradually became powerful kingdoms.

This was the case chiefly with the Assyrian and Babylonian empires. Although Ninive and Babylon, their capitals, were at no great distance from each other, they for a long time preserved their respective independence. Each formed a state of moderate extent. At length, the Assyrian monarchs availed themselves of certain favorable circumstances to attack the Babylonians, defeated them, and taking their sovereign prisoner, added the kingdom of Babylon to that of Ninive. From that period, the Assyrian empire acted a considerable part in the world, and enjoyed a formidable power throughout all Upper Asia. Hence several historians and critics* place its origin about the time of the Trojan war, and think that, until the death of Sardanapalus, it lasted no more than five hundred and twenty years; whereas others† allow it a duration of thirteen or fourteen centuries, which is also very true, if we take into consideration its very beginning and the whole period of its slow progress. Thus the two opinions may be easily reconciled; the more so, as they both seem equally to agree with the Scripture, which, although it gives to the cities of Ninive and Babylon the remotest antiquity, does not speak of the Assyrian empire as extensive and powerful till a much later period.

In consequence of the still greater darkness in which the early history of Arabia, India, China, and, with still greater reason, America, is involved, we purposely omit the history of these countries till the times of modern history, when they came in contact with European nations.

spectata inter bonos moderatio provehebat Fines imperii tueri magis, quam proferre, mos erat; intra suam cuique patriam regna fiebantur."—Justin, *Hist. lib. i.*, cap. 1. See likewise the judicious remarks of *English Univ. Hist.*, vol. i., pp. 314, 315.—Rollin's *Ancient Hist.*, vol. i., *avant propos*;—and Goguet, *Origine des Lois*, etc. vol. i., b. i., *Preliminary Observations*.

* E. g. Herodotus, Usher, Bossuet, D. Calmet, etc.

† Ctesias, Justin, Diodorus Sic., Petavius, Rollin, Gérard, etc.

EGYPTIANS.

EGYPT, on the contrary, claims for the present our undivided attention. Among all the nations of remote and profane antiquity, the Egyptians were the most remarkable for the stability of their government, the wisdom of their laws, and the high degree of civilization and proficiency in the arts and sciences which they attained. Whatever is to be said here of this celebrated people and country, shall be placed under four separate heads. The first head or section will treat of the fertility and monuments of Egypt; the second, of her civil and political history; the third, of the government, laws and manners of her inhabitants; the fourth, of their religion, and of the origin and progress of idolatry.

§ I. FERTILITY AND MONUMENTS OF EGYPT.

FOR the fertility of its soil and the number of its monuments, Egypt was almost without a rival. This fertility depended, as it still depends, on the annual overflowings of the river Nile, which traverses and waters the valley of Egypt in all its extent, from the confines of Nubia in the south to the shores of the Mediterranean sea in the north. These inundations are produced by the heavy rains that fall in Upper Ethiopia during the summer season. The rivers of that country, pouring their swollen waters into the Nile, cause it to overflow its banks, and, by covering the lands on each side for several months, to fertilize them by the alluvion which it deposits on their surface. When the waters subside, a few months are sufficient to till the ground, sow the grain, and reap an abundant harvest. Nay, the same soil will, in one year, yield three or four different kinds of fruit, corn or vegetables.

To produce this wonderful effect on the land, the overflowing of the Nile must reach a certain height. If it remains below eighteen or nineteen feet, or if it exceeds thirty-one or thirty-two, there is an equal danger of sterility and famine. The favorable height is twenty-five or twenty-six feet.

In order to counteract these irregularities in the annual overflow of the Nile, Moeris, one of the first kings of Egypt, dug at some distance from the river a deep and vast basin, connected with it by a canal. This basin, or rather lake, received the superabundant waters when the inundation was excessive, and gave of its own abundance when the Nile had not swollen to the desired height.

Egypt was, moreover, intersected by a great number of other canals, of a length and breadth proportioned to the situation and wants of the lands. Through them the river bore fertility in every direction; opened an easy communication between cities, and even between the Mediterranean and the Red seas; facilitated inland commerce as well as foreign trade; and finally served as a barrier against the attacks of an enemy: thus affording, at the same time, nourishment and protection to Egypt. The lands were left to be occupied by it for a season; but the towns, situated on more elevated ground, stood like islands in the midst of the waters, and seemed to look down with joy on the plains overflowed and enriched by the Nile.

Even at the present time, according to many grave authors,* no scenery surpasses in beauty that of Egypt at two seasons of the year. In the month of July or August, a spectator from the summit of a mountain or the top of one of the pyramids, beholds a vast inland sea, in which several towns and villages appear, with several causeways leading from place to place, the whole intersected with groves and fruit-trees forming a delightful prospect; in the distance he beholds woods and mountains, terminating the most beautiful horizon that can be imagined. The scene is changed in the months of January and February. The whole country then appears to be one continued and splendid meadow, whose verdure enamelled with flowers charms the eye. The spectator beholds, on every side, flocks and herds scattered through the plain, with numbers of husbandmen and gardeners busy at their respective occupations. The air also is then perfumed by the great quantity of blossoms on the orange, lemon, and other trees; and is so pure that a more wholesome or agreeable climate could hardly be found in the world: so that nature, which, at that season of the year, is in other regions apparently lifeless, seems to live only in this delightful abode.

If all this be true of Egypt at the present day, how magnificent a spectacle it must have formerly presented, when it contained, according to some historians, twenty thousand villages and cities, and was covered with monuments of every description!

The principal monuments were: 1. *The obelisks*, or quadrangular pyramids hewed out of a single block of granite, raised perpendicularly, and covered with inscriptions and hieroglyphic or mysterious symbols. Some of those obelisks were one hundred and fifty, or even two hundred feet high, and are still one of the chief ornaments of Rome, whither they were transported by sea under the emperors.

* *Engl. Univ. Hist.* vol. ii, p. 20; Rollin's *Ancient History*, vol. i, p. 45.

2. *The pyramids* are still more lofty and astonishing structures. Three of them deserved to be reckoned among the seven wonders of the world,* and their enormous bulk and strength enabled them to triumph over time and the inroads of barbarians. The largest of the three forms a perfect square, each side of which measures about seven hundred feet at the base. Its perpendicular height is five hundred feet; and its summit, which from below seems to be nothing more than a sharp point, is however a square platform measuring nearly twenty feet on each side. This amazing structure is composed of stones of extraordinary size, many of them being not less than thirty feet long, three feet wide and four feet high. According to Herodotus, the building of this pyramid occupied a hundred thousand workmen at the same time, and even more, according to Diodorus and Pliny. They were succeeded, at the end of three months, by an equal number, and so on in succession. It took thirty years to complete the stupendous work, and the cost of the single item of vegetables furnished to the workmen amounted to sixteen hundred talents, or nearly one million seven hundred thousand dollars; from which we may conjecture how great must have been the total expense of the structure.

3. Next to the pyramids, *the labyrinth* of Egypt deserves to be mentioned as one of the most considerable and extraordinary works ever contrived and executed by men. If we give credit to Herodotus, who had seen it, it surpassed the pyramids themselves.

This edifice comprised within the same enclosure three thousand rooms, twelve of which were so beautiful and magnificent as to be justly called palaces. Of the three thousand apartments, fifteen hundred were above, and fifteen hundred underground. They all indeed communicated with one another, but by such a complication of circuitous passages, that in order to avoid being lost in them, it was absolutely necessary to have a skilful guide. All the parts of the edifice, the ceilings and the walls, were of white marble embellished with a variety of carvings, and the twelve palaces just spoken of were supported by pillars of the same material. Nothing now remains of this magnificent building.

4. Among the splendid monuments of ancient Egypt, may be also reckoned the *Mausoleum* of Osymandias, one of its kings. It

* The other reputed wonders of the ancient world, were: the Pharos of Alexandria, in Lower Egypt; the Colossus of Rhodes; the Tomb of Mausolus, king of Caria; the Temple of Diana in Ephesus; the Statue of Jupiter Olympian, and the Labyrinth of Crete.

was encompassed with a circle of gold, having in breadth one cubit (or a foot and about eight or ten inches), and in circumference, three hundred and sixty-five cubits, on every one of which were marked the rising and setting of the sun, of the moon, and of the constellations. So far back as this remote antiquity, the Egyptians divided the year into twelve months, consisting each of thirty days; and at the end of the twelfth month, they added five days to complete the total number of three hundred and sixty-five, very nearly the whole of the solar year: a circumstance which alone is enough to show the great progress that they had already made in astronomy. At the sight of this costly and superb monument, the beholder knew not which most to admire, the costly nature of the materials, or the skill and genius of the artists. It was carried away by Cambyses, king of Persia, when he conquered Egypt.

5. The city of Thebes, in Upper Egypt, was by itself, its extent and its magnificence, a world of wonders. We may, it is true, suspect exaggeration in the statement of some ancient writers, that it had a hundred gates and could send forth through each of them, and at the same time, two hundred chariots with ten thousand combatants; a number which would suppose four or five millions of inhabitants. But no one can question the detailed and impartial account of several modern travellers, who have visited the spot once occupied by Thebes. The ruins with which it is covered are so stately, and exhibit to the astonished beholder so prodigious a variety of gigantic statues, columns, obelisks and porticoes, that they alone may suffice to give the highest idea of the splendor, glory and riches of the ancient Egyptian monarchy.

The various monuments which have been just mentioned, were erected at different times and by different princes. We will now give a brief history of the principal among those ancient Egyptian kings, as far as the obscurity of so remote a period will permit.

§ II. KINGS OF EGYPT.

Menes or *Mesraim*, towards the year B. C. 2200.—When the dispersion of men took place, Cham, one of the three sons of Noe, settled with his family in Egypt and the neighboring countries, where, after his death, he received divine honors, under the name of Jupiter Ammon. Mesraim or Menes, his son, founded the kingdom of Egypt, and was the first sovereign of that country. Hence Egypt, in the Hebrew text of Scrip-

ture, is commonly called Mesraim, and sometimes the land of Cham.

Busiris. Mesraim, after a short interval, was succeeded by Busiris, who built the famous city of Thebes, and surrounded it with strong walls, to protect it against the attacks of the Ethiopians.

Mæris, who seems to have reigned a little before Abraham's time, that is, about the year B. C. 2000, immortalized himself by the construction of the celebrated lake which bears his name.

Osymandias, (believed by some to have reigned at a later period, and to have been one of the successors of Sesostris). It is related of him that, with an army of four hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, he waged a successful war against the Bactrians, a people of Asia. Not less conspicuous for his civil than for his military abilities, he embellished Thebes with a variety of splendid monuments, among others, with a magnificent library, the first recorded in history, and his own mausoleum, which has been already described.

Uchoris, whose date is likewise uncertain, built or at least considerably enlarged the city of Memphis, in that part of Middle Egypt where the Nile divides itself into several branches. Besides extending it to nearly twenty miles in circumference, he raised, on the southern side, a very high mole, and built on the right and left strong causeways, to secure the town both against the overflowings of the river and the attacks of invaders. A city so well fortified and so advantageously situated soon became the usual residence of the Egyptian kings. It continued in the possession of this honor, until Alexandria was founded by Alexander the Great.

Egypt had been so far governed by its native princes, when it passed for a time under the sway of foreign kings, usually called (in profane history) *Shepherd-kings*. The history of this foreign dynasty of sovereigns is involved in the greatest obscurity, both as to their origin and to the duration of their power until their final expulsion. This, however, appears certain, that they never occupied Upper Egypt, and that the inhabitants of Thebais not only preserved their independence, but even succeeded at length in expelling those foreigners from all Egypt.

A much more authentic account of this part of Egyptian history is found in the corresponding part of Scripture. During the interval which elapsed between the years B. C. 1900 and 1500, there reigned in Egypt a long series of monarchs designated by the common name of Pharaohs. It was under this dynasty that the Israelites, or chosen people of God, obtained an advantageous

settlement in the best part of that kingdom. Being at first highly favored, they afterwards experienced a cruel persecution, until the Almighty was pleased to deliver them from their bondage by unheard-of prodigies, through the ministry of Moses.

Shortly after, and probably during the forty years' sojourn of the Israelites in the desert, the Egyptian sceptre was wielded by Sesostris, whom historians represent not only as one of the most powerful kings that ever reigned over Egypt, but even as one of the greatest conquerors of antiquity. His father, called Amenophis, seemed to have a presentiment of the future greatness of his son, and omitted nothing that might be conducive to it.

He ordered all the male children who were born on the same day with Sesostris, to be brought to the court. Here they were raised as if they had been his own children, receiving the same attention as the young prince himself, with whom they always remained. The chief part of their education consisted in training them, from their infancy, to a hard and laborious life, in order that they might one day be able easily to bear the fatigues of war. They were never permitted to take their meals, till they had gone a considerable distance on foot or on horseback. Hunting was their usual exercise; and when they had grown sufficiently strong for more violent exertions, they were made to attend several military expeditions against the neighboring tribes. Just at this juncture, Amenophis died, leaving his son well prepared to attempt with success the greatest and most arduous enterprises.

Sesostris, having ascended the throne, thought of nothing less than the conquest of the whole world. However, before leaving his kingdom, he endeavored with great care to provide for its interior tranquillity, and particularly to win the affection of his subjects by his equity, affability and beneficence. He divided the whole country into thirty-six provinces, and intrusted the government of them to persons of undoubted uprightness and fidelity.

In the meanwhile, he was making adequate preparations for the execution of his vast designs. He assembled troops, and appointed over them able and brave officers, such as the young men whom his father had caused to be educated with him, and whose number amounted, it is said, to seventeen hundred. His whole army consisted of six hundred thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand cavalry, besides twenty-seven thousand chariots armed for war.

He began by subduing Ethiopia, a country situated at the south of Egypt. He rendered it tributary, and compelled the inhabitants to pay him every year a certain quantity of ivory and gold.

With a fleet of three or four hundred vessels, he conquered various islands and maritime cities or provinces contiguous to the Arabian gulph, and along the shores of the Indian Ocean. His conquests by land were still more considerable. Placing himself at the head of his troops, he overran Asia with astonishing rapidity, and advanced farther into Eastern India than even Hercules or Alexander the Great at a subsequent period. Towards the north, the Scythians were likewise subdued by him, as well as Armenia and Cappadocia. Near the Euxine sea, in the ancient kingdom of Colchos, he left a colony which preserved the Egyptian manners long after its foundation; various monuments of his victories also remained in Asia Minor, where, after the lapse of many centuries, they were seen by Herodotus. In several countries there were found columns with the following bombastic inscription: "Sesostris, king of kings and lord of lords, subdued this country by the power of his arms." Pillars of this kind had been erected even in Thrace; Sesostris had penetrated as far as the Tanais; and his empire extended from the Ganges to the Danube.

Want of provisions prevented him from advancing farther into Europe. This prince did not seek, like other conquerors, to maintain his power in the countries he had subdued, but contenting himself with having once taken possession of them, and having overrun the world during the space of nine years, he in the end appeared satisfied with the ancient limits of Egypt; nor do we find in history any clear vestige of this new empire, whether under himself or his successors.

Sesostris returned to his kingdom, loaded with spoils and crowned with glory; if indeed *glory* consists in ravaging the earth, depopulating provinces, and reducing an infinite number of persons to misery and distress. He spent the remainder of his life in the peaceful government of his people. There were still extant, under the first Roman emperors, monuments that testified the high degree of splendor and opulence to which he had raised his kingdom. Having become blind in his old age, this great conqueror of numberless nations had not the courage to conquer himself, and to bear that infirmity with patience; he is believed to have put an end to his own life, after a brilliant reign of thirty-three years.

Little will be said about the successors of Sesostris, most of

whom did nothing very remarkable. Moreover, the history of Egypt will henceforth be found usually blended with that of the Israelites, the Assyrians and the Persians, till the destruction of her national independence.

§ III. GOVERNMENT, LAWS AND MANNERS OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS.

EGYPT was, from the beginning, governed by kings. The crown was hereditary, but the sovereign was under the control of the law, as well as the least of his subjects; there existed a variety of regulations for the employment of his time, the order of his actions, and even the quantity and quality of the aliments to be served up at his table. Every day, during the public worship at which he had to attend, he was put in mind of his duties. The high-priest exhorted him to the practice of all royal virtues, pronounced maledictions against wicked counsellors, and closed the ceremony by the recital of the best moral maxims, and of such parts of history as could be of the greatest service to the monarch for the right government of his people.

The chief obligation and usual function of the sovereign, was to administer justice to his subjects. The trial and decision of cases which could not easily be brought before his tribunal, were committed to a court of thirty judges taken from the three principal cities of the kingdom, viz.: Memphis, Heliopolis and Thebes. The most upright citizens were selected to discharge this important function, and placed under the presidency of that one of their own number who enjoyed the highest reputation for learning and integrity. They received suitable salaries from the king, in order that, being freed from domestic cares, they might spend their whole time in promoting the execution of the laws, and render to every one more impartial justice.

This select assembly, to avoid prejudice, treated and examined affairs in writing. They feared nothing so much as a false eloquence, which moves to excess the feelings of the heart by glowing expressions, and dazzles the mind by artful sophisms; the truth could not be presented to them with too much plainness, since it was to be the only rule of their judgments. As an emblem of that truth, the president of the court wore a collar of gold set with precious stones, at which hung a figure without eyes. He touched with it the person whose claims had been judged valid, and this was the usual manner of passing sentence.

The civil laws of the Egyptians, enacted at different times of their monarchy, commonly evinced a great spirit of wisdom.

The population was divided into three classes, priests, warriors and people. The two first were the most respected; still, the last, consisting of husbandmen and mechanics, enjoyed due regard and consideration, and agriculture especially was held in high esteem, as an inexhaustible source of public prosperity. Professions, as well as the royal dignity and power, were hereditary, and invariably passed from fathers to sons. No citizens were allowed to lead a useless life, but every individual was obliged to declare before the magistrates his name, his residence, and his profession.

The criminal code of the Egyptian nation was plain and precise. Voluntary murder, though committed only on a slave, was punished with death, as also perjury and a culpable refusal to defend a person attacked by assassins. False and slanderous accusers underwent the same chastisement which would have been inflicted on the accused person, if found guilty.

Those who made false coins, or used false measures, had both hands cut off. Soldiers who deserted their standard or otherwise failed in their duty, were punished with degradation; but they could redeem their honor by greater courage and better conduct. Great infamy was likewise attached to insolvency. No one was allowed to solicit and obtain a loan, unless by delivering his father's embalmed body as a pawn to the creditor; not to redeem it was considered infamous and a sort of impiety, which deprived the person that died without fulfilling this obligation, of the usual honors of burial.

Every Egyptian, from the monarch to the private individual, underwent after his death a solemn and most extraordinary judgment. A public accuser was heard. If proof was adduced that the conduct of the deceased had been wicked, his memory was condemned, and they interred him without honor. But, if the judgment proved favorable to him, his encomium was publicly delivered, and the body carefully embalmed and returned to his family and relations, who placed it in an erect posture, in a niche prepared for the purpose. The bodies, thus embalmed are called in history Egyptian mummies; many of them still exist, being perhaps some thousand years old.

From what has been said, we may gather the chief moral qualities of the ancient Egyptians. They manifested great zeal for the public good, a relish for a serious manner of life, gravity of deportment, respect towards persons of an advanced age, and gratitude for benefits received. The chief trait, perhaps, in their national character was that they imbibed, from their youth, a deep spirit of reverence and submission for the civil and moral

laws of their country; hence very few nations can be found who preserved their social manners and customs as long as the Egyptians did, throughout the various dynasties of their native sovereigns.

As to their proficiency in the arts and sciences, it everywhere shone forth in the variety and magnificence of their public monuments. We will merely add that Egypt was considered by other nations as the best school of learning and wisdom; Greece, in particular, was so fully persuaded of this, that her greatest geniuses, such as Homer, Pythagoras, Herodotus, Plato, Solon, Lycurgus, and others, went purposely to Egypt, and dwelt there for a time, in order to improve themselves in the different branches of knowledge. The Scripture itself gives a remarkable testimony in behalf of this celebrated nation, by saying that "Moses was instructed in *all the wisdom* of the Egyptians; and he was powerful in his words and in his deeds."*

§ IV. RELIGION OF THE EGYPTIANS—ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND EXTENT OF IDOLATRY.

BUT Egypt did not possess, on the subject of religion, the wisdom which she displayed in political matters, civil laws, and the arts and sciences; on the contrary, no nation was ever so blind and superstitious as the Egyptian people. They not only admitted the absurdities of Polytheism, adoring the sun and moon under the names of Osiris and Isis, but they also reckoned among their gods a great variety of animals; for instance, the ox, as being the emblem of husbandry; the dog, as the guardian of houses and flocks; the cat, as the destroyer of rats, with which the country was filled; the ibis, a kind of stork, and the enemy of serpents; the ichneumon, a sort of lizard, which waged a terrible war against the monstrous crocodile, etc. Even noxious animals, owing to the terror which they inspired, received divine honors from this deluded people. The very plants and vegetables, onions and leeks for instance, partook of these honors; which made the satiric poet ironically exclaim:

O sanctas gentes, quibus hæc nascuntur in hortis numina!†

Of all the animals in which a deity was thought to reside, the most renowned was the ox called Apis or Onuphis. To this pretended god magnificent temples were erected. Extraordinary

* Acts vii, 22.

† O sanctimonious nations, whose gods grow in their gardens!—Juvenal, *Sat.* xv, l. 10.

honors were bestowed on him during his life, and still greater ones after his death, which was for the Egyptians a subject of general mourning; and his obsequies were solemnized with a degree of pomp almost incredible. The next care was to provide a successor to the deceased deity. He was to be recognised by certain signs, which distinguished him from every other animal of his kind, viz. : a white spot on his forehead, the figure of an eagle on his back, and upon his tongue that of a beetle. As soon as he was found, mourning gave place to exultation, and nothing was heard in all parts of Egypt but festivity and rejoicing. The new god was led to Memphis, and there, with a great number of ceremonies, put in possession of his dignity.*

Although the Egyptians agreed as to the substance of this gross idolatry, which made them bow down in adoration before beasts, they did not all agree as to the particular objects of their worship. Whilst some revered one kind of animals as gods, their neighbors held the same animals in abomination; a circumstance which gave rise to many civil wars between the different cities. Their zeal for the honor of their respective gods was truly astonishing; it was deemed a crime punishable with death, to have killed, even involuntarily, a cat or an ibis. Diodorus, the historian, relates an incident to which he himself was an eye-witness, during his stay in Egypt. A Roman once inadvertently killed a cat; the exasperated populace ran to his house, and neither the authority of the king, who had sent a body of the royal guard, nor the high respect generally entertained for the Roman name, could rescue the unfortunate individual from their fury. Such was the reverence which the Egyptians bore to those animals, that, in a time of extreme famine, they chose to eat one another, rather than feed upon the flesh of their imaginary deities.

Thus this polished and enlightened nation became the votaries of the most ridiculous superstition. Nor was the evil confined to Egypt. In proportion as the various branches of the human family were more remote from their origin, the more they forgot their Creator, and, with the single exception of the Hebrew people, adopted the deplorable errors and practices of idolatry. The Babylonians had their false god Belus; the Phenicians and

* For any one acquainted with the history of the Bible, it is easy to recognise the imitation of the Egyptian god Apis, in the golden calf cast and worshipped by the Israelites in the desert, *Exod. xxxii. 4, 6*; and in the two golden calves afterwards set up for adoration by the impious king Jeroboam, at the two extremities of the kingdom of Israel, *3 Kings xii. 28—30*.

Chanaanites, their Astarthe and their Moloch or Saturn; in later times, the Greeks and Romans had their Jupiter, and a vast number of other pretended deities. Not only the temples, but also the houses, the cities, the country, the air, the forests, etc. were supposed to be filled with them. "Every thing was (*held as*) god, except God himself; and the universe, which the Almighty had created for the manifestation of his power, seemed to have been changed into a temple of idols."*

Men were not even satisfied with worshipping the creature instead of the Creator, the sun, the moon, and the stars, as well as heroes and benefactors; they went so far as to deify, under the disguise of various names, their very vices and passions. They so utterly lost sight of the true God that they thought they could make gods for themselves, cause a deity, the offspring of their imagination, to reside in vain idols, and pay divine honors to the works of their hands.† These honors frequently consisted in human sacrifices, degrading actions, impure rites, and other excesses, which everywhere showed how very low man had fallen beneath the dignity of his first origin.

This great evil daily made an alarming progress. Lest it should at last infect all mankind, the Almighty determined, in the decrees of his eternal wisdom, to set apart a whole people, among whom the true worship and doctrines of religion might be preserved, until the coming of the great Redeemer of the world and the beginning of his church.

BARRIER OPPOSED TO IDOLATRY.

HEBREWS OR ISRAELITES.

ABRAHAM, a descendant of Sem, was the father of this chosen people.‡ The Lord called him from the place of his birth, Chaldea, to the land of Chanaan or Palestine, where he intended to establish at first the true religion together with the posterity of this holy patriarch. Abraham readily obeyed the divine call. Although possessed of immense riches, he always preserved the

* Bossuet, *Discourse on Univ. Hist.* part ii, ch. 3.

† See Psalm cxlii; Isa. xlii and xlii; Dan. v, 4, and xiv, 5, 23; 3 Reg. xii, 28, 29, etc.

‡ A particular and detailed account of what concerns the Israelites, properly belongs to Sacred History, and therefore does not come within the scope of the present work. Yet, since they also were a nation, and their history is often very closely interwoven with that of their neighbors, Egyptians, Assyrians, etc., mention will be made of them, when required by the nature, importance or connection of events.

simplicity of ancient manners, and led, with his family, a pastoral life united with a certain magnificence, which he displayed chiefly in exercising hospitality towards strangers. He had the honor to receive and treat as guests, heavenly messengers under a human shape. The angels acquainted him with the designs of God upon his descendants and upon himself; he believed them with unshaken faith, and showed in all things his piety and submission to the divine will.

Abraham was succeeded by Isaac, his son, and Jacob, his grandson, the faithful imitators of his virtues and pastoral life. The Almighty reiterated in their behalf the promises which he had made to their pious parent, and was their constant protector. Jacob, moreover, received from an angel the name of *Israel*, whence his descendants, previously called *Hebrews*, were likewise called *Israelites*. He had twelve sons, who became the fathers of the twelve tribes of Israel, and the most remarkable of whom were Juda, the ancestor, according to the flesh, of the promised Messiah; Levi, from whose tribe the priests and other ministers of sacred things were to be chosen; and Joseph, so well known for his innocence and purity of life, his misfortunes caused by the jealousy of his brothers, the special protection of God over him, and his subsequent elevation to the summit of power among the Egyptians, whose favors he also conciliated for his family.

It was by this series of wonderful events, that Divine Providence brought about the settlement of the Israelites in Lower Egypt. Shortly after the death of Joseph, they became exceedingly numerous. This provoked the jealousy and fears of the Egyptians, particularly of their monarchs, and the Hebrews were subjected to a persecution equally inhuman and unjust, till Heaven, moved by their miseries, gave them a deliverer in the person of Moses. This great man awed nature itself by the splendid prodigies of which he was the instrument in behalf of a cruelly oppressed people. The Hebrews were at length, in compliance with his earnest request, permitted to depart; and their miraculous escape through the Red Sea, which opened to leave them a free passage, whilst it swallowed up in its waves the Egyptians who pursued them, completed their happy deliverance, B. C. 1491.

Fifty days after the departure of the Israelites from Egypt, Almighty God gave them his written law through the ministry of the same Moses; for which reason, it is also called the *Mosaic law*. This great event was followed by their residence during forty years in the deserts of Arabia, and by a series of painful

wanderings to which they were condemned in punishment of their repeated revolts, obstinacy and ingratitude. At the expiration of this term, they arrived in sight of the land of promise. They were at last put in possession of it by Josue, the worthy successor of Moses both as to the government of the people, and the prodigious power over nature with which God had likewise invested him for the execution of his designs.

After the death of Josue, and during the space of more than three hundred years, the Israelites were commonly governed by judges, or chiefs established to rule them in the name and by the authority of God, whether, as was commonly the case, they were expressly appointed by the Lord himself, or, as it sometimes happened, were chosen by the people. The most illustrious of these judges were Gedeon, Jephthe, Samson and Samuel, by whom the Hebrews were successively delivered from the oppression of their enemies, the Madianites, the Ammonites and the Philistines.

It was during the government of Jephthe, that the Greeks and Trojans carried on the obstinate struggle, which terminated in the entire destruction of Troy. In order to have a correct idea of this event, it is necessary to know the state of the Greeks and the Trojans before that period.

RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE GRECIAN STATES.

KINGDOM OF TROY.

JAVAN or Ion, one of the sons of Japhet and grandson of Noe, is to be considered as the common father of all those tribes that went under the general denomination of Greeks. For, although he has been considered by some as the father only of the Ionians properly so called, who were but one particular nation of Greece; yet the Hebrews, Chaldeans, Arabians, and others, give no other appellation to the whole body of Grecian states than that of Ionians.* For this reason Alexander the Great, in the prophecy of Daniel, is mentioned under the name of King of Javan, that is, of the Greeks.†

Javan had four sons, Elisa, Tharsis, Cetthim and Dodanim, who became the heads of the chief Grecian families. Their names were for a long time preserved in various parts of the

* See *Engl. Univ. Hist.* vol. ix, pp. 5, 6.—Rollin's *Ancient History*, vol. ii, pp. 437—440;—Gérard, *Leçons sur l'Histoire*, vol. i, pp. 203—207.

† Dan. viii, 21.

country. But when the original tribes were either subdivided, or blended with new settlers, or driven away and succeeded by an enemy, those of more recent origin adopted various appellations, according to the names of their most renowned sovereigns or founders of their dynasties. Such were the denominations of Pelasgi, Hellenes, Danai, Graii or Græci, Argives, Dorians, Ionians proper, Æolians, Achæans, etc.

Nothing is more intricate and obscure than the early history of those petty original tribes, which afterwards became so conspicuous among all nations of the earth, for the glory of their arms, the refinement of their manners, and the high degree of perfection which they attained in the arts, sciences and polite literature. What we know with greatest certainty concerning the primitive inhabitants of Greece is, that they lived a wretched and miserable life, warring against each other, wandering in forests, and feeding, like brutes, upon roots and acorns. The whole country, in that infant state, was one continued scene of disturbances and revolutions. As the people had no settled government, and there existed no common authority to enact laws and enforce their execution, every thing was determined by mere physical force. The strongest invaded the lands of their neighbors which they thought more fertile and productive, and dispossessed the lawful owners, who were thus obliged to seek new settlements in other countries.

It is, however, probable that the weakest tribes soon perceived the necessity of living together, or at least of assisting each other, the better to protect themselves against violence and oppression. But the mere fact of an alliance based on a defensive treaty was not sufficient to civilize a people whose moral condition was in the highest degree deplorable. It was reserved to Phenicia and Egypt to produce this desirable effect. Both these nations, by the colonies which they sent into Greece, contributed most to spread the advantages of social life among its early inhabitants. The former taught them writing, navigation and commerce; the latter instructed them in the arts and sciences, made them adopt a regular form of government, subjected them to laws, and founded many of the earliest cities and kingdoms of Greece.

The most conspicuous among these ancient states were those of Sicyon, B. C. about 2000; Argos, B. C. 1856; Athens, 1582; Thebes, 1519; Lacedæmon or Sparta, 1516; and Corinth, 1376. The kingdom of Macedon was of much more recent date, although it had already lasted several centuries when Philip and Alexander the Great raised it to the highest pitch of power and glory. That of Thessaly derived its origin from Deucalion,

during whose reign there happened, about the year B. C. 1500, a great inundation, which many profane writers have confounded with the universal deluge described by Moses.

The first Grecian states were independent, and had no common tie, no common centre of unity in their government. This might have been a great hindrance to their progress in civilization, or a subject of temptation for some powerful neighbor to attack and subdue them successively; but the evil was remedied by a man of great prudence and genius. Amphictyon, a king of Athens, according to some,—but according to many others, a king of Thessaly,—conceived the happy idea of forming one mighty nation out of so many small states, without altering any thing in the political constitution of each. He effected his design by establishing a confederacy of twelve tribes, whose deputies assembled twice a year at Delphi or at Thermopylæ, and, after offering public sacrifices, deliberated under the auspices of religion about the common interests of Greece. This celebrated institution was called the *Amphictyonic council*, from the name of its founder. The members who composed it had full powers to propose and carry out whatever they thought necessary or advantageous to the public good; nor was their authority restricted to the enacting of laws; they could likewise raise troops to enforce their execution, and to chastise rebels and disturbers of the public tranquillity.

Hence, the sessions of the Amphictyonic council should be considered as the states-general or congress of the Hellenic tribes, having authority to provide for the general welfare. This was a master-piece of skill and policy; it diffused a spirit of patriotism among the Greeks, and laid the foundation of their future greatness. Its salutary effects were seconded by a variety of circumstances, chiefly by the invaluable services of several persons endowed with a generous and indomitable courage, such as Theseus, Perseus, Hercules, Meleager, Jason, and a host of others, so much celebrated by the poets. Their chief exploits consisted in delivering the country from wild beasts, or from pirates and banditti. For these exertions, grateful though superstitious Greece not only praised them as her heroes and benefactors, but even honored them as demi-gods.

This display of patriotism and warlike emulation, combined with national concord and unanimity of views, seemed to portend something great for the future, and to forebode the probable downfall of those who should dare to attack or provoke a nation of this character. Such was invariably the result, whenever the

honor of all Greece was concerned, and first of all, in the famous event which gave rise to the Trojan war.

Troy was a large, rich and well fortified city, situated on the western coast of Asia Minor, opposite to the northern part of Greece. Towards the beginning of the twelfth century before the Christian era, it was under the sway of Priam, who embellished it, and made it the capital of an extensive territory subdued by his arms. Unfortunately for that prince and his kingdom, he had a son, called Paris, whose unruly passions, not sufficiently restrained by a too indulgent father, provoked a bloody struggle that led to the ruin of the whole nation. This young prince, in his travels through Greece, happened to stay for some time in the palace of Menelaus, king of Sparta. Here he received a very courteous and friendly welcome. In return for so much hospitality, he had the baseness, at his departure, to carry off the wife of Menelaus, the famous Helen; nor could the deputations and remonstrances of the offended monarch prevail upon the court of Priam to make due reparation.

SIEGE AND DESTRUCTION OF TROY.—B. C. 1184.

UPON the intelligence of this refusal of justice, all Greece flew to arms, in order to avenge the base insult offered to one of its sovereigns, and, in his person, to the whole nation. Their combined fleet amounted to nearly twelve hundred vessels, and the army consisted of about a hundred thousand men, under the command of their respective princes. The most conspicuous among their leaders were Agamemnon, king of Mycena and Argos, who was appointed commander-in-chief, and Menelaus, his brother; Mnestheus, king of Athens; Idomeneus, king of Crete; the wise Nestor, king of Pylos; the prudent Ulysses, king of Ithaca; the brave Diomedes, king of Ætolia; the intrepid Philoctetes, a friend of Hercules; the two undaunted warriors called Ajax, one the son of Oileus, and the other of Telamon; the invincible Achilles with his friend Patroclus; and a multitude of others equally eager to distinguish themselves in so noble a cause, the cause of injured hospitality and morality.*

* The most valuable and authentic account of the Trojan war comes from Homer, whose inimitable works are not to be looked upon as the mere sport of imagination, but as an excellent portion of the history of ancient Greece. The established rule of epic poems is to admit a variety of poetical fictions and embellishments, and still to be based on the truth of the main facts which they describe. Hence, should antiquity supply us with no other evidence than Homer's testimony, even then we could have no reasonable doubt as to the reality of the Trojan

Ten years had been spent in equipping and collecting this powerful armament. At length, it sailed from Aulis, a town of Bœotia, and after a happy passage across the Ægean sea, landed the troops on the coast of Asia, not far from the walls of Troy. The Trojans, on their side, had called to their assistance and obtained a large number of auxiliary troops from Lydia, Lycia, Paphlagonia, and even from Assyria and Thræce. Their chief commanders and warriors were Hector, a son of Priam; Æneas, the chief hero of Virgil's *Æneid*; Sarpedon, a Lycian prince; and Memnon, the leader of the Assyrians. Their forces, protected by the ramparts of the city, were nearly a match for those of their opponents.

Here these two exasperated nations began a long and terrible war. Want of experience in the attack of fortified places, the difficulty of procuring provisions in a hostile country, the occasional ravages of pestilence among the troops and dissensions among their leaders, detained the Greeks for more than nine years on the Asiatic shore, and prevented them from obtaining any decisive advantage. Their manner of attack upon Troy was, properly speaking, neither a blockade nor a regular siege. They contented themselves with intrenching their camp, and leaving between its fortifications and the walls of the city an extensive plain, which served as a battle-ground for the two parties, and in which they daily performed many daring exploits, not without the loss of several among the bravest warriors on each side. In the tenth year of the war, the assailants redoubled their energy, concentrated their forces, and resolved by a last effort to bring the protracted struggle to a successful issue. Troy, now deprived of its best defenders, at last yielded to the repeated attacks of the Greeks, although it seems impossible, from the contradictory accounts of historians, to decide whether the place was carried by storm, treason or stratagem.

The victorious Greeks destroyed every thing with fire and

war and its result; but there is, moreover, concerning this great event, 1. The testimony of the best historians, such as Herodotus, Thucydides, etc., and, 2. A sure additional voucher in the Arundelian Marbles, one of the most authentic documents and sources of ancient history. This curious monument consists of a series of marbles containing a chronology of the principal events of Greece, during a space of about twelve hundred years, from the year B. C. 1582, to the year B. C. 855. This chronology, it is said, was drawn up by public authority and for the use of the Athenians, shortly after the death of Alexander the Great. These marbles were found in the island of Paros, and sold to the earl of Arundel, who had them transported to England towards the beginning of the seventeenth century.

sword in that unfortunate city. King Priam perished with all his family; the other inhabitants, with the exception of a few who escaped by timely flight, were slaughtered or led away captives, and the town itself was reduced to ashes. This happened, according to the ablest chronologists,* in the year B. C. 1184; a highly important epoch in the annals of the Greeks, as it included the chief exploit of their heroic times, and proved what their valor could effect, when their forces were united. It must, however, be admitted that the Trojan war, in its immediate consequences, proved nearly as disastrous to the victors as to the vanquished.

* Scaliger, Usher, Petavius, Bossuet, the learned authors of English Universal History, etc.

PART II.

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE TROJAN WAR (B. C. 1184), TO THE BUILDING
OF ROME (B. C. 753).

POLITICAL SITUATION OF GREECE AFTER THE TROJAN WAR.

GRECIAN COLONIES AND DIALECTS.

THE divine vengeance seemed to pursue the Greeks on their return from Asia, in punishment of their merciless and inexorable fury towards a vanquished enemy. Few only of their leaders were allowed to revisit their homes. Patroclus and Achilles had been slain a little before the close of the war, under the ramparts of Troy. Mnestheus died before he arrived at Athens. Of the two Ajaxes, the one killed himself in a fit of rage; the other, having suffered shipwreck, perished in the sea. Ulysses was not able to reach his island of Ithaca, till he had undergone countless dangers and hardships in his voyage. Finally, most of the others, as Agamemnon, Nestor, Idomeneus and Diomedes, either met with a violent death at home, or were obliged to quit their kingdoms and go in search of a new residence in distant countries.

Several other emigrations took place during this turbulent period. A spirit of jealousy and animosity now seemed, with redoubled strength, to arm the Grecian tribes against one another. The Heraclidæ, or descendants of Hercules, had already made two unsuccessful attempts towards the subjugation of southern Greece or *Peloponnesus*, thus called from *Pelops*, one of its former settlers, and which they claimed as their inheritance; eighty years after the Trojan war, they together with the Dorians renewed their efforts, and at length succeeded in obtaining entire and permanent possession of the country. The vanquished tribes, in their turn, attacked and dispossessed others weaker than themselves, so that nearly all Greece was a theatre of continual vicissitudes and utter confusion.

So unpleasant and perilous a situation prompted a large num-

ber of families to leave the country altogether. Most of them belonged to the Dorian, Æolian and Ionian nations. They passed over to the neighboring islands, and reaching even the Asiatic continent, founded there along the coast many cities, which soon rose to a high degree of prosperity and splendor, by their rapid improvement in the arts and sciences, commerce and civilization. Such were, among others, Halycarnassus, Phocæa, Clazomena, Smyrna, Ephesus and Miletus. All continued for a time, after the example of the mother country, to be free and independent cities; still, deputies from each leading colony occasionally assembled to offer solemn sacrifices, and to deliberate on their common interests. But, as there existed among them no other tie than this loose confederation, they could not long maintain their independence, and were, sooner or later, compelled to submit, first to the Lydian, and afterwards to the Persian power.

The preceding, though brief, description of Grecian states and colonies may enable the reader to appreciate the difference of dialects in use among them. There was indeed, as to the substance, but one language (the Greek tongue) common to them all; but that language, undergoing in various places alterations more or less considerable, gave rise to four principal forms or dialects, the Attic, Ionic, Doric and Æolic. This variety of forms in the mother-tongue should not appear surprising in a country parcelled out, as Greece was, into many states independent of each other, and each possessing its peculiar government, laws and customs.

The Attic dialect belonged to that part of Greece called Attica, which had Athens for its capital. This dialect was used in its purity by the dramatic poets Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes; by the historians Thucydides and Xenophon; and by Plato, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and other orators of the same age.

The Ionic was nearly the same with the ancient Attic. Having passed, together with the Ionian tribe, from the continent of Greece to several cities of Asia Minor, it there underwent peculiar changes, and never possessed the refined delicacy subsequently attained by the pure Attic. It was followed by the ancient poets Homer and Hesiod, with a mixture of some other forms; also, by Anacreon, in his odes; and in all its purity, by the prose writers Herodotus and Hippocrates.

The Doric was first used among the Lacedæmonians and Argives, and generally among the inhabitants of Peloponnesus or southern Greece. From thence it passed to the islands of

Rhodes, Crete and Sicily; to Epirus, and to that part of southern Italy settled by the Greeks. It was used by Pindar, the poet; by Theocritus and Archimedes, both natives of Syracuse in Sicily; and by the Pythagorean philosophers.

The Æolic, which bears a striking resemblance to the Doric, was at first spoken by the Bœotians and their neighbors. It afterwards accompanied the Æolian colonies into the particular district of Lesser Asia which they occupied along the coast, and into some of the neighboring islands, such as Lesbos. This dialect was used by Alcæus and Sappho, who have left, it is true, but few writings; but a mixture of it is found in Homer, Pindar, Theocritus, and many others.

From the Doric and Æolic dialects blended together was formed, in great part, the Latin language

ASSYRIAN EMPIRE UNDER NINUS AND SEMIRAMIS.

NINIVE and Babylon had already existed for centuries, without carrying their domination to any great extent.* Shortly before the Trojan war, this aspect of affairs was quite changed under Ninus, an enterprising, ambitious and warlike prince, who first of all reigned over the two cities when united by the conquest of Babylon. Besides this important achievement, he subdued, within the space of seventeen years, many other countries, Armenia, Media, Persia, etc., and extended his empire towards the east as far as India.

After this first series of conquests and before undertaking new wars, Ninus applied himself to render Ninive, the capital of all his dominions, the greatest city in the world. He enlarged it to such a degree as to give it a circumference of about four hundred furlongs, or fifty miles; an extent which will not appear incredible, if we recollect that, according to Holy Writ itself, "Ninive was a great city of three days' journey,"† and that the number alone of its little children not knowing yet how to distinguish between their right hand and their left, amounted to more than a hundred and twenty thousand.‡ This prodigious

* The early history of Assyria is concealed in almost impenetrable darkness. There are scarcely to be found two or three authors who entirely agree, either as to the facts, or as to the circumstances and particulars, or at least as to the chronology of this empire. We give, therefore, the present narrative as being more commonly adopted by historians, but without in the least presuming to vouch for its perfect accuracy.

† Jonas iii, 3.

‡ Ib. iv, 2.

extent of the place corresponded with the strength of its fortifications. The walls were a hundred feet in height, and so wide that three chariots might drive on them abreast; and they were, moreover, flanked with fifteen hundred towers, two hundred feet high.

Having completed these great works, Ninus undertook a new expedition against the Bactrians, a powerful nation of central Asia. He led against them a formidable host, with which he subdued many towns and fortresses, and finally laid siege to Bactria, the capital of the country. Here all his efforts might have failed, had it not been for the assistance which he received from Semiramis, the wife of one of his officers, a woman of exalted genius and masculine courage. Owing to a bold and well-directed attack which she led on in person, he was enabled to make himself master of the citadel, and afterwards of the whole city, in which he found immense riches.

Ninus then returned to Ninive. He married Semiramis after the death of her former husband, and dying shortly after, left to her the government of his vast empire. After his example, she determined to immortalize her name by magnificent structures and extensive conquests. Under her rule Babylon became the successful rival of Ninive, and being more and more embellished by some of her successors, was, in all probability, the most beautiful and splendid city that ever existed.

DESCRIPTION OF BABYLON.

THE principal monuments which rendered Babylon so conspicuous, were its walls and gates, its bridge and quays, its palaces and gardens, and the temple of Belus. Although they were built and completed at different epochs, we shall speak of them all in this place, in order to convey at once a just and well-connected idea of this famous city.

1. *Walls and Gates.*—Babylon was a perfect square, measuring one hundred and twenty furlongs or fifteen miles on each side, and consequently four hundred and eighty furlongs or sixty miles in circumference. The walls, made of brick cemented with bitumen, were at least two hundred (according to Herodotus, more than three hundred) feet high, and protected by towers of still greater height. They were moreover surrounded by a deep ditch, and had a hundred gates, twenty-five on each side of the square, and all made of solid brass. From the twenty-five gates on each side went as many streets, which, by extending fifteen miles in a straight line, reached the twenty-five gates on the opposite side. These, besides the four half streets that fronted the

walls, made fifty splendid streets, crossing each other at right angles, and dividing the whole city into six hundred and seventy-six squares.

It should, however, be remarked that not all of these squares were occupied by inhabitants. Nor did the houses stand contiguous to each other; but they were separated by gardens, which served both as productive lands and as embellishments to the city.

2. *Quays and Bridge*.—As the great river Euphrates flowed through Babylon, a thick and high wall was built on each bank, of the same materials with the walls that surrounded the city. In this wall, at every street that led to the river, were gates of brass, and from them easy descents to the river itself, which the inhabitants crossed in boats, before a bridge was constructed. These brazen gates were always open during the day, but shut during the night.

The bridge was not surpassed by any of the other works, either in strength or beauty. The arches were made of huge stones, fastened together with chains of iron and melted lead.

3. *Ditches and Canals*.—These works, which elicited so much admiration from succeeding ages,* were still more useful than magnificent. As in the beginning of summer the sun melts the snows that cover the mountains of Armenia, an unusual quantity of water flows into the Euphrates, and annually occasions an inundation similar to that produced by the Nile in Egypt. In order to avoid the injury which both the city and the neighboring plains were apt to sustain from those inundations, at a considerable distance from the town and in an elevated situation, two artificial canals were cut which turned the excess of the water into the Tigris, before it reached Babylon.

But, to facilitate the construction of the preceding works, the course of the river itself had to be turned for a time in another direction. This was indeed an arduous undertaking; but the Babylonian kings spared neither trouble nor expense to secure the welfare of their capital. They caused to be dug, at some distance west from Babylon, a prodigious lake, having, according to the lowest calculation, a circumference of one hundred and forty miles, and a depth of thirty-five feet. Into this lake the whole river was turned through a canal out at the western side of it, till the works above mentioned were completed, when it was made to flow again in its former channel. Lest however the

* See Herod. b. i;—Pliny, b. v;—Strab. b. xvi;—Prideaux's *Connections*, vol. i, pp. 197, 198;—Goguet, *De l'Origine des Lois*, etc. vol. iii, b. iii, ch. iii, art. i;—Rollin, vol. ii; etc.

Euphrates might still, in times of extraordinary inundation, overflow the city, this lake was preserved as well as the canal from the river. The superabundant water which those overflowings caused to run into it, was kept there as in a common reservoir, to be let out at proper times, by means of locks and sluices, for the watering of the lands below. The lake therefore was equally useful in protecting the country against inundations, and rendering it fertile.

4. *Palaces and Hanging Gardens.*—At one extremity of the bridge, on the eastern side of the river, was the old palace of the Babylonian kings, and on the opposite side stood the new palace built by Nabuchodonosor II. It was, according to the custom of those times, strongly fortified, surrounded by three walls, and, together with the enclosures, it covered a space of eight miles. Within its precincts were the hanging gardens, so much extolled by the generality of historians, although by some passed over in silence or called in question. According to the former, these gardens consisted of several large terraces, raised above one another, so as to be on a level with the ramparts of Babylon. They were supported by strong walls and pillars, well floored with cement and lead, and covered with a great quantity of earth in which the most beautiful trees and shrubs were planted.

5. But the most wonderful structure of Babylon was *the temple of Belus*. There was in the midst of it a lofty tower more than six hundred feet high, and consequently higher than the largest of the Egyptian pyramids, although not so broad at its base. Many learned men believe it to have been the same with the tower of Babel; and this is the more probable, as besides the resemblance of the names *Babel* and *Babylon*, the materials in the two structures were exactly the same, bricks and bitumen.

On the top of the tower was a kind of observatory in which the Babylonians or Chaldeans made, from the earliest period, astronomical observations, and became expert in that science, perhaps beyond all other nations of antiquity. It is related that when Alexander took Babylon (B. C. 331), Callisthenes the philosopher, who accompanied him, found that these scientific observations of the Chaldeans had begun 1903 years before; which carries the account as far back as the 115th year after the deluge, or the 14th after the building of the tower of Babel.

The other wonders of the temple of Belus consisted chiefly in an immense quantity of statues, tables, cups, and other vessels which it contained, all of solid gold. Among the statues, there was one forty feet high, and weighing a thousand Babylonian talents. The whole value of these different articles amounted,

according to the calculations made by Diodorus Siculus, to six thousand three hundred Babylonian talents of gold, probably more than a hundred millions of dollars.

This famous temple stood until the time of Xerxes, who, on his return from his unhappy expedition into Greece, first stripped it of all its treasures, and then razed it to the ground (B. C. 478).

Such were the mighty and splendid works that rendered Babylon, as it were, the queen of the east. Some of them, as we have already said, were attributed to Semiramis, to whose reign it is now time to return.

SEMIRAMIS CONTINUED. NINYAS.

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE FIRST ASSYRIAN EMPIRE.

SEMIRAMIS did not confine her attention and care to the city of Babylon. She visited all the parts of her empire, and everywhere left monuments of her magnificence, by the many noble structures which she caused to be reared for the convenience or the ornament of cities. She applied herself particularly to have water brought by aqueducts to such places as needed it, and to improve the roads, by cutting through mountains and filling up valleys. In the time of Diodorus the historian (shortly before the coming of Christ), there were still monuments to be seen in many places with her name inscribed upon them.

Not satisfied with the vast extent of her dominions, she enlarged them by new conquests. Her last and greatest expedition was against India, which she invaded with numberless troops assembled from all the provinces of her empire. At the news of this invasion, the Indian king sent ambassadors to ask her who she was, and what right she had to attack his territory; adding that her boldness would soon meet with the punishment which it deserved. "Tell your master," answered the queen; "that in a short time I myself will let him know who I am." She immediately advanced towards the great river Indus, from which the country takes its name, and having prepared a large number of boats, attempted the passage. It was vigorously opposed; still the Indians were put to flight after a sharp conflict; about a thousand of their boats were sunk, and more than a hundred thousand of their troops taken prisoners.

Encouraged by the success of this first attempt, Semiramis left a body of sixty thousand men to protect a bridge of boats which she had built over the river, and prepared to advance still farther

into the enemy's country. This determination was precisely what the Indian monarch desired. To inspire her with still greater confidence and security, he feigned a flight at her approach; but no sooner did he perceive that she had advanced sufficiently far into the heart of his dominions, than facing about he attacked her with a great multitude of men and elephants. Here the engagement proved disastrous for Semiramis and her troops. Notwithstanding all her exertions to animate and rally them, they were thrown into disorder, and either routed or crushed under the feet of the elephants; and the queen herself, having received two wounds, was indebted for her preservation to the swiftness of her horse.

This signal defeat obliged her to retrace her steps, and to recross the river; but at this juncture also, on account of the precipitancy and confusion unavoidable on such occasions, many of the Chaldeans perished. As soon as the survivors had effected their passage, the queen ordered the bridge to be destroyed, in order to prevent any farther pursuit from the enemy. Having then proceeded to the city of Bactra, where an exchange of prisoners took place, she put an end to this unhappy expedition which had cost her two-thirds of her army.

The failure of this undertaking did not prevent Semiramis from leaving behind her a great reputation for skill and courage. It is said that, on a certain day, when a serious disturbance had arisen, her presence alone suppressed the sedition. Less successful against the intrigues of her son Ninyas, she resigned the crown in his behalf, and placed the government in his hands; a fact, however, still more uncertain than the rest of her history, and very differently represented by authors. Whatever may have been the case, this celebrated queen is believed to have lived sixty-two years, during forty-two of which she occupied the throne.

Ninyas reigned in the place of his mother. An unworthy successor of both Ninus and Semiramis, he became indolent and effeminate, seldom showing himself to his people, but maintaining his authority by a large number of troops stationed about him in Ninive, and placed under the command of a general on whose fidelity he could depend. His successors for thirty generations imitated his example; so that Assyrian history offers little during all that time but an uninteresting list of names.

The last of these insignificant monarchs was Sardanapalus, the very personification of effeminacy and luxury. His degrading conduct provoked to the highest pitch the indignation of Arbæes, governor of Media, and of Belesis, governor of Babylon; they

entered into a confederacy against him, and placed themselves at the head of numerous troops whom they persuaded to second their views. The king, being obliged to take up arms, gained at first some advantage over the insurgents; but he was entirely defeated in a decisive battle, and compelled to confine himself within Ninive his capital, which was soon besieged by the victorious army.

It happened at this time that an extraordinary swelling of the Tigris destroyed a considerable part of the city wall, as if to open a free passage to the assailants. Sardanapalus, judging it inexpedient or impossible to resist any longer, shut himself up in his palace, and voluntarily perished in the flames with his wives and treasures, towards the middle of the eighth century before the Christian era.

Thus ended the first Assyrian empire, after a duration of five hundred and twenty years according to Herodotus, and thirteen or fourteen hundred years according to Ctesias, Diodorus and Justin. We will see, in the next part, what mighty states arose from the wrecks of this ancient monarchy.

LEARNING, INDUSTRY, RELIGION, AND MANNERS OF THE ASSYRIANS AND BABYLONIANS.

THE stupendous walls, palaces, fortifications and other buildings of both Ninive and Babylon, bear ample testimony to the progress which the Assyrians had made in architecture. This art however was confined among them, as among the Egyptians, to one kind of remarkable monuments, viz.: to such as were grand and imposing by their height or size, but without those elegant forms and proportions that architecture afterwards received from the Greeks and the Romans.

The objects in which the industry of the Assyrians and Babylonians chiefly appeared, were the manufacturing of cloth, the casting of metals, and the production of specimens of splendid workmanship in gold, silver, brass, wood and stone. Their commerce is generally believed to have been extensive, and very actively carried on, through the Persian gulf with the eastern, and through the Euphrates and Tigris with the western and northern countries.

Music was not unknown to the Assyrians, but it would be difficult to ascertain how far they excelled in it. Generally speaking, it may be said that they yielded only to the Greeks in those arts which are conducive to ornament or comfort. Their medical science consisted less in theory than in practice. Sick

persons were publicly exposed; they who passed near them, inquired into the nature of the disease, and, if they had experienced any such infirmity, mentioned the remedy with which they had effected a cure. When the application of the remedy proved successful, the whole process was made the object of a report which they deposited in a temple for the benefit and instruction of others. It is said that Hippocrates, the author of the first books on medicine, availed himself of these observations and experiments.

The Babylonians or Chaldeans probably advanced farther in the knowledge of astronomy than in any other science. Being favored with a vast horizon where the sight was obstructed by no mountain, and with a constantly serene sky which invited them to an exact observation of the heavenly bodies, they discovered, from an early period, that the solar year is composed of 365 days and nearly 6 hours. To them is also ascribed the invention of the dial. Unfortunately, their astronomical science soon degenerated into the follies of astrology, an art (falsely so called) which presumes to know and foretell future contingencies from the site and motions of the stars. Hence Chaldea was, if not the parent country, at least the principal seat of the superstitions of *magic*; this last word is derived from *Magi*, the name given to the Chaldean doctors.

The religion of the Assyrians and Babylonians was downright idolatry. They had a number of temples consecrated to their different idols, such as those of Nesroch,* of Belus, one of their ancient kings;† of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies, etc. They honored these pretended deities by every kind of superstitious, degrading, and cruel or impure homages; and the natural consequence of this impious worship was that its abettors set no bounds to the licentiousness and profligacy of their manners. It was this, indeed, as we learn from the writings of the prophets,‡ that justly provoked the indignation of Heaven against so perverse a nation, and finally drew down the heaviest strokes of divine justice on the cities of Ninive and Babylon.

* 4 Kings xix, 37.

† Dan. xiv, 2.

‡ Jonas, Nahum, Isaias, Daniel, and several others.

THE ISRAELITES UNDER THEIR KINGS.

REIGN OF SAUL.—B. c. 1095—1055.

THE history of the Israelites during the same period is highly interesting. In a political point of view, it certainly was the most brilliant part of their national existence.

After the wise and prosperous administration of Samuel, the last of their judges, they asked to be governed like other nations by a king. In compliance with their wishes, Saul, the son of Cis, a man of the tribe of Benjamin, was anointed by Samuel to be their sovereign, according to an order which the prophet had received from God himself, B. c. 1095. The majestic appearance of Saul, his courage, and his moderation in the beginning of his reign, soon gained him the respect and affection of all the people. Being informed that the city of Jabes was closely besieged by the Ammonites, he raised a valiant army, approached their camp during the night, and attacked them on three different sides with so much resolution, that nearly all were cut to pieces; the remnant fled, and the town was gloriously delivered. In consequence of this happy event, Samuel, whose ascendancy over the people was still very great, convened another general assembly at Galgal, to confirm the election of Saul. This was done with great solemnity and gave universal satisfaction.

Two years after, the king engaged in a still more important war. The Philistines, a powerful tribe near his frontiers, and the most persevering enemy of the Hebrews, had invaded their territory with a large body of infantry, cavalry and charioteers. Saul marched against them, and with the help of his intrepid son Jonathan and God's special protection, he gained over them a signal victory.

He likewise conquered several other tribes in the neighborhood of his kingdom, but none so completely as the nation of the Amalecites, which was nearly all destroyed. Unfortunately, he began about this time to degenerate from his former virtue, and by repeated acts of disobedience to the divine will, to lose for himself the fruit of so many victories. On one occasion, he presumed to offer a sacrifice without the co-operation of Samuel; and on another, he spared the life of Agag, king of Amalec, with the most valuable portion of the booty, against the express order which he had received from God. For this reason the Almighty rejected him, and destined his crown to pass to David, a youth of the tribe of Juda; Samuel, by the divine command, anointed

David king, in the midst of his brethren. The prophet died shortly after this event.

Saul however won another great victory over the Philistines. For this new advantage, he was principally indebted to the valor of David, who with a mere sling defeated and slew the famous giant Goliath, the most formidable champion of the Philistines. This exploit raised David exceedingly in the estimation of the army and people; but the honor paid on this occasion to the young hero, excited the anger and jealousy of Saul against him.

The last part of this unhappy monarch's reign was but one continued series of evils and crimes. He now persecuted David and those whom he suspected to be his adherents, and sought by every means to deprive him of life. To this relentless hatred and animosity he added superstition; contrary to the severe edicts lately published by himself against magicians, he consulted the sorceress of Endor, for the purpose of knowing, through her impious art, what would be the result of a new battle which he was preparing to fight against the Philistines.

The power of God, anticipating the wicked practices of necromancy, caused Samuel to appear, and to announce to the king his final defeat and approaching death.* The prediction was verified; the army of Saul was cut in pieces; three of his sons were slain in battle; and he himself, grievously wounded and dreading to fall alive into the hands of the enemy, requested his armor-bearer to despatch him with a sword. On the refusal of that officer, the king destroyed himself by falling on his own sword, after a reign of forty years, B. C. 1055.

REIGN OF DAVID.—B. C. 1055—1014.

THE Jewish sceptre passed into the hands of David. He was again publicly anointed king at Hebron, a city of the tribe of Juda; yet, for seven years and a half, he was acknowledged by that tribe only, whilst the other Israelites acknowledged for their sovereign, Isboseth, a son of the late monarch. This occasioned a long war between the two families, and some conflicts took place, in which the house of Juda always had the advantage. At last, Isboseth and Abner, the general of his troops, having both lost their lives, David was proclaimed king over all Israel.

His first care, when he saw his power fully established, was to attack the fortress of Sion or Jerusalem, which was still occupied by the Jebusites, a Chanaanite nation. Notwithstanding the

* 1 Kings xxviii, 11—19.

strength of the place, he took it, added to it many new buildings, and made it the capital of his kingdom and the seat of his residence; hence it was also called, from that time, *the city of David*. Hither he had the ark of the covenant transported with great solemnity. He even thought seriously of rearing a magnificent temple for the divine worship; but Almighty God told him by a prophet that this great work was reserved to his son Solomon.

David was thus left to follow his warlike ardor against the enemies of his people. Constantly favored by the divine assistance and well-seconded by the natural bravery of his nation, he conquered all his foes, whether they fought separately, or combined their forces against him. The Philistines, in particular, experienced from him so many signal defeats, that they ceased to be formidable to the Israelites. The next campaigns witnessed the successive overthrow of the Edomites, the Moabites, the Ammonites, and especially of the Syrians, who lost, in a first battle, twenty-two thousand men, and no fewer than eighty-seven thousand in another.* The Hebrews, whether led to the field of battle by the king in person or by his general Joas, were everywhere victorious, and they pushed their conquests as far as the river Euphrates.

David had now reached the height of power and glory. All his enemies had been humbled and subdued; all the neighboring states had sought his alliance, or become his tributaries; he was besides surrounded by valiant troops, excellent officers, and a numerous offspring: in the midst of this prosperity, the king, as too often happens in similar circumstances, forgot himself and his duty towards both God and men: he suffered an evil passion so far to prevail upon him as to become guilty of adultery and homicide. Being rebuked for this double crime by a man of God, he became sensible of its enormity, and wept bitterly for the evil that he had committed. Upon this, the same prophet, in the name of God, assured him of his pardon as to the removal of his guilt; still a severe retribution awaited him, as a just punishment of his iniquity and a reparation of the scandal which he had given to his people.

* This whole number is not thus expressed in any part of Scripture, but is deduced from two different verses, the second of which mentions what had been partly, though not without reason, omitted in the first; (see 2 Kings x, 18, compared with 1 Paralip. xix, 18.) As we read moreover (2 Kings x, 19), that, on the same occasion, fifty-eight thousand of the enemy fled away before Israel, it follows that the combined army of the Syrians and their auxiliaries amounted, before the battle, to one hundred and forty-five thousand soldiers.

This prediction was speedily verified. Misfortunes and afflictions of every description began to assail David: his days were embittered by the premature and unhappy death of some of his children, by the wicked lives of others, and especially by the ingratitude, revolt and tragical end of his son Absalom. This rebellion was no sooner suppressed than it was followed by another, which renewed the king's anxiety; and afterwards by the plagues of famine and pestilence that raged among his subjects.

These domestic and political trials were at length terminated; tranquillity was restored to the nation, and prosperity to the king. He died in an advanced age, after a reign of forty years, leaving behind him the well-deserved reputation of a great monarch, a great conqueror, a great prophet (in his admirable psalms), and although for a time a slave to a criminal passion, yet a model for all sincere and humble penitents.

REIGN OF SOLOMON.—B. C. 1014—975.

SOLOMON was the successor of David. Under this new sovereign, the Hebrew nation enjoyed an almost uninterrupted peace, opulence and prosperity. As the late civil feuds had lasted too short a time to deprive it either of its power or of its conquests, the strength of the state appeared to be the same as under the vigorous administration of David. The population was immense; the people lived contented and happy; "Solomon had," moreover, "under him all the kingdoms from the river (Euphrates) to the land of the Philistines, even to the border of Egypt: and they brought him presents, and served him all the days of his life." Finally, he established, in concert with the Tyrians, an extensive maritime trade, the profits of which, added to the vast amount of treasures he had inherited from his father, put him in possession of immense riches. Thus was perfectly fulfilled the promise which the Almighty had made in his behalf, when he, in the beginning of his reign, having asked only for the gift of wisdom, received in addition to it, the assurance of extraordinary wealth and glory.*

Solomon availed himself of so many advantages, to build in Jerusalem a temple worthy, by its magnificence, to be the house of solemn worship and the special residence of the Most High. This wondrous structure occupied upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand workmen, and required full seven years for its completion. It was made of the most costly materials, and

* See 3 Kings iii.

adorned with the most beautiful specimens of art. Its dedication took place in the eleventh or twelfth year of Solomon's reign, B. C. about 1000.

The king built also a palace of unrivalled splendor, and founded many cities in various parts of his dominions. One of them called Tadmor, but afterwards Palmyra, subsequently rose to a degree of prosperity, that made it one of the most conspicuous places of all the east.

Finding that there were yet in Palestine some remnants of the ancient Chanaanites, Solomon subdued them and made them tributary. To these great achievements, he added the reputation of an extraordinary prudence, which gained him the admiration of both subjects and foreigners, and of extensive learning, not only in matters connected with morality and religion, but likewise in the various branches of natural history.*

Still, however splendid were the gifts of nature and grace which Solomon had received, he had towards the end of his life the misfortune to be seduced, by foreign alliances, from God's service into the impious practices of idolatry. He died after a reign of forty years (B. C. 975), leaving behind him a serious doubt whether he ever rose from his fall, and did penance for his infidelity; a most terrible example of the frailty of the human heart, showing that neither talents, nor wisdom, nor advanced age, nor even the long practice of virtue, can give perfect security against its attacks.

SCHISM OF THE TEN TRIBES.

KINGS OF JUDA FROM ROBOAM TO ACHAZ.—B. C. 975—742.

PROPHETS.

THE death of Solomon was followed by the separation of the two kingdoms of Juda and Israel. As he had during the last years of his administration laid heavy taxes on the people, all Israel came to Roboam, his son and successor, earnestly petitioning for their suppression. The new sovereign, rashly preferring the advice of his young to that of his old counsellors, answered the request of the people by a stern and threatening refusal. Ten of the twelve tribes immediately withdrew from the assembly, and chose for their king Jeroboam, a man of great natural talents and of still greater ambition, who fearing lest his

* 3 Kings iv.

subjects should, by going to adore in Jerusalem, return to their former allegiance, made them offer their worship to two golden calves which he set up at the two extremities of his kingdom. Thus was the crime of idolatry added to the guilt of separation and schism.

It is true, however, that the impious orders of Jeroboam were not obeyed by all the Israelites. The whole tribe of Levi and various families from the other tribes went to join those of Juda and Benjamin, which had remained faithful to the royal family of David. This additional force greatly increased the power of Roboam; still, he could not succeed in bringing back his former subjects to obedience. On the contrary, in punishment of his own personal infidelities and those of his people, he had the new mortification to see the country invaded, Jerusalem taken, and the public treasure carried away by Sesac, king of Egypt. He died after an inglorious reign of seventeen years, and was succeeded on the throne by his son Abias, B. C. 958.

Under the last reign, hostilities had been carried on between the kingdoms of Juda and Israel; but they were now renewed with greater fury than ever. Abias marched at the head of four hundred thousand chosen men against Jeroboam, who himself had an army of eight hundred thousand soldiers full of resolution and courage.* When these two powerful hosts approached each other, the Jewish monarch, from an eminence, began to deliver an animated exhortation to the Israelites, urging them not to fight against their brethren, nor to resist the God of their fathers. In the meanwhile, Jeroboam was extending his army, with a view to surround the Jews on all sides. The latter perceiving their danger earnestly implored the divine assistance, and after the priests had sounded their trumpets, fought with such valor and success that there fell, on the side of Jeroboam, five hundred thousand men.† This is the greatest number upon record of slain and wounded in any battle, whether of ancient or modern history.

This decisive engagement exceedingly weakened the kingdom of Israel, and gave a great superiority to that of Juda. Yet, by

* The vast multitude of troops in these armies might, at first, appear almost incredible, especially if we take into consideration that the united kingdoms of Israel and Juda did not equal, in extent of territory, one of our largest States. But our surprise will disappear, if we call to mind, first, that every man capable of bearing arms, was, in cases of necessity, obliged to perform military service; and, secondly, that the country was very thickly inhabited. See 3 Kings iv, 20; and 2 Paralip. i, 9.

† 2 Paralip. xiii, 17.

a new and deplorable instance of the frailty of man, so great a blessing of God's providence could not induce Abias to persevere in the way of virtue. He imitated the infidelity of his father Roboam, and died when he had scarcely completed the third year of his reign.

Asa, his son and successor, was more faithful in the service of God, and constantly evinced great zeal for the extirpation of vice and idolatry; in return, the Almighty blessed him with prosperity and success above all his immediate predecessors. He availed himself of the peace which his kingdom at first enjoyed, to build and fortify cities, and to raise an army of five hundred and eighty thousand valiant men. These precautions were not useless. Shortly after, Asa was attacked by Zara, the Ethiopian king, who marched against him with a million of soldiers and three hundred chariots. The religious monarch was not dismayed by the sight of this amazing multitude of enemies, but trusting in the divine protection, fearlessly went to meet and fight them in the plains of Maresa. His hopes were fully realized; the Ethiopian king was completely overcome, and although the troops under his command endeavored to escape by flight from the fury of the Jews, they were pursued with immense slaughter as far as Gerara. Their defeat not only rescued the country from a formidable invasion, but also put the conquerors in possession of an immense number of cattle and camels, and other articles of booty; many cities, likewise, fell into their hands. After this glorious expedition, Asa and his army returned in triumph to Jerusalem.

This prince is reproached for having in the end failed to place full confidence in God, and for having become suspicious and irascible. Being afflicted with the gout, he died after three years of great sufferings, B. C. 914. He had occupied the throne during the space of forty-one years, generally with great advantage to the nation; and in return, the people paid extraordinary honors to his memory.

The reign of Josaphat, which lasted twenty-five years (B. C. 914—889), was still more glorious and happy. Under him, the kingdom of Juda reached a degree of splendor and strength approaching to that which it had possessed under Kings David and Solomon, when the twelve tribes were yet united under the same government. Josaphat had a large number of fortified places; and besides the garrisons of these fortresses or cities, he had at his disposal an army of eleven hundred and sixty thousand men.* His alliance was eagerly solicited by the kings of

* 2 Paralip. xvii, 14—18. See p. 56, note.

Israel; his power was respected at home and abroad; the Philistines, those ancient enemies of the Jews, paid him tribute, and the Arabs brought him considerable presents.

Josaphat deserved this high state of prosperity by his valor, his constant fidelity to God, his exertions against wicked and idolatrous practices, his great zeal for the religious instruction of his subjects and his impartial administration of justice. He sent priests and levites throughout the various cities of Juda, to instruct the people in the divine law; and recommended to magistrates and judges the greatest care, disinterestedness and equity in the discharge of their important functions.

Towards the end of his reign, Josaphat was unexpectedly attacked by the Moabites, Ammonites and Edomites. In this terrible emergency, he had recourse, as usual, to the divine assistance which had never failed him, and endeavored to secure it by public prayer and fasting. When he approached the camp of his enemies, he found that they had turned their arms against themselves, and destroyed each other to the last;* the whole plain, far and wide, was strewed with their dead bodies. The Jews had nothing to do but to carry off their spoils, which were so great, that three days were not sufficient for that purpose.

After this new miraculous mark of God's favor to his people,† Josaphat redoubled his works of zeal and piety. This great prince enjoyed, to the close of his career, the respect both of foreign nations and of his own subjects. He died at the age of sixty, after a reign of twenty-five years, and is justly considered as one of the most religious monarchs that ruled over the Jewish nation.

He however impaired, in some degree, the splendor of his reign, by entering into a close connection with the family of Achab, king of Israel. His son Joram married Athalia, the

* Paralip. xx, 22—24.

† Temporal prosperity is not of itself, and independently of God's promise or special interference, a sign of the divine favor, nor an approval of the religion and conduct of those to whom it is granted. We see it, on the contrary, to be frequently the lot of sinners. Nay, we learn from almost every page of profane history, that human glory and human happiness were possessed in a high degree by several idolatrous nations, such as the Assyrians, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans, assuredly without implying at all the divine approbation of their general conduct and religious worship. But the case is altogether different, when liberation from imminent dangers, a signal victory, or any other temporal blessing is evidently the effect of the special intervention or miraculous assistance of Heaven. Such was the case with the pious princes who have just been mentioned, David, Asa and Josaphat.

daughter of Achab; this marriage produced little or no advantage to the reigning dynasty of Israel, and occasioned innumerable evils in the royal family of Juda. Whilst the former kingdom, by its perseverance in idolatry, provoked more and more the just indignation of Heaven, and rapidly tottered to its fall; the latter also, by frequently falling into the same disorder, considerably declined. For three or four successive reigns after the death of Josaphat, the history of the Jewish monarchs presents little else than a series of prevarications, murders, conspiracies and revolutions. It was only during the better administration of Kings Azarias (otherwise called Ozias) and Joatham, his son (B. C. 810—742), that the state partly recovered from its losses and again enjoyed some degree of happiness.

The reign of Ozias beheld also the commencement of that wonderful succession of prophets, whose writings form a considerable portion of the Old Testament. During the space of more than three hundred years, these holy men, filled with the spirit of God, foretold the greatest events of both profane and sacred history; the destinies and revolutions of empires; the vicissitudes of their own nation; the sublime mysteries of the New Law; the Incarnation of the Son of God and his coming among men, together with the various circumstances of his life, death and resurrection; the foundation, progress, qualities and perpetuity of his church on earth till the end of the world, and his eternal kingdom in heaven. Some of these predictions are expressed in so clear and obvious terms, that their inspired authors seem to have been historians rather than prophets.

Even the kingdom of Israel often enjoyed the presence of similar holy personages, possessed in a high degree of the twofold gift of prophecy and miracles, which they exercised to recall the Israelites from their evil ways. Such, among others, were the prophets Elias and Eliseus, in the time of King Achab and his immediate successors. Nay, one of the prophets (Jonas) went by God's command to the idolatrous city of Ninive, to invite its inhabitants to penance. His preaching there was accompanied with great success, and furnished a striking figure of the future vocation of the Gentiles to the light of the true faith.

EGYPT DURING THE SECOND PERIOD.

RISE OF CARTHAGE.

LIKE the Jews after the death of Josaphat, Egypt, ever since the reign of Sesostris, had greatly degenerated from her former glory. Of all the Egyptian kings of that period, not more than two or three deserve even a cursory notice. The first is Sesac, of whom mention has already been made in the history of the Jewish kings, and who, under the reign of Roboam, the unwary son of Solomon, waged war against Judea and plundered Jerusalem. His army consisted of twelve hundred chariots, sixty thousand cavalry and an incredible multitude of infantry, including Libyans, Ethiopians, and Troglodites or inhabitants of the countries in the neighborhood of the Red Sea. His empire therefore, (unless all these were mere auxiliary troops), must have extended beyond the natural boundaries of Egypt, and comprised also several neighboring nations.

This power of the Egyptians was but transient. Under the reign of Anysis, their country was subdued by Sabacos, the king of Ethiopia, who, however, used his success with moderation. He reigned with great clemency, and built several magnificent temples, among others, one in the city of Bubaste, of which Herodotus gives a long and splendid description. After a reign of fifty years, Sabacos voluntarily abdicated the throne and returned to Ethiopia, about the time when the first Assyrian empire was overthrown by the Medes and Babylonians.

But, in another country of Africa, there arose during the same period a new state which, though weak in the beginning and slow in its progress, was destined to shine with great splendor for a long time, and to rival even Rome itself in the mastery of the world. This was the celebrated city of Carthage, founded by Dido, a Tyrian princess, towards the year B. C. 880. That princess had escaped from Tyre, with her adherents and treasures, to avoid the cruel avarice of her brother Pygmalion; this fugitive colony reached by sea the part of northern Africa opposite to Sicily, and having purchased a certain extent of ground from the natives, built upon it a city which received the name of Carthage.

Its inhabitants were obliged, at first, to pay tribute to the princes of their neighborhood. But when their strength had increased, they shook off this yoke, and even began to extend their power abroad by the subjection of the native tribes, and

the foundation of new settlements along the coast. Although there were in the country still more ancient colonies from Phenicia, such as Utica and Leptis, these, instead of being jealous of the rising preponderance of Carthage, formed a sort of confederation of which the new city was acknowledged the head. This was the commencement of Carthaginian greatness. It leads us to the epoch of the building of a still more illustrious city, viz.: the city of Rome, the future and successful rival of Carthage.

PART III.

FROM THE BUILDING OF ROME (B. C. 753), TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
BABYLONIAN AND RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE (B. C. 536).

BUILDING OF ROME.—B. C. 753.

THE peninsula of Italy had been gradually peopled by settlers from various countries, chiefly Greeks, Gauls, and also, if we may believe the Latin historians and poets, by Trojans led by *Æneas*. Among the descendants of the latter, were reckoned the kings of Alba in the province of Latium. One of them, called *Procas*, had two sons, *Numitor* and *Amulius*, the first of whom succeeded his father on the throne; but *Amulius*, having obtained a strong party, dethroned his brother and reduced him to the condition of a private citizen. The more surely to deprive him of all hope of ever being re-established, he put to death *Egestus* or *Lausus*, the son of this unfortunate prince, and compelled *Ilia* or *Rhea-Sylvia*, his daughter, to become a vestal virgin, that is, a priestess of the heathen goddess *Vesta*, in which state of life it was forbidden to marry.

All these precautions of the usurper proved useless. *Rhea-Sylvia*, having secretly married, gave birth to twin brothers, who were called *Romulus* and *Remus*. *Amulius*, it is true, in compliance with his former scheme of cruel policy, gave orders that they should be drowned in the *Tiber*; but the helpless infants were saved through the commiseration of *Faustulus*, one of the royal shepherds, and nursed in his family. When they had grown up to adolescence, he acquainted them with the secret of their birth. They immediately assembled a band of valiant shepherds and hunters like themselves, added to them a body of their grandfather's adherents, and marching at their head against the usurper, slew him in his very palace, and replaced *Numitor* on the throne.

After this bold achievement, the two brothers resolved to build a city on the same spot on which they had been rescued from

death, and so to perpetuate the memory of their dangers and their deliverance. They began speedily to accomplish their design; but jealousy set them at variance with each other before its full execution. Having an equal right and urged on by equal ambition, they soon formed parties against each other, to decide who should possess the principal authority in their rising state; a violent contest arose, and the result of this unnatural struggle was the death of Remus, who received a mortal wound, perhaps from the hand of Romulus himself.

Freed from a rival, but probably guilty of fratricide, the surviving brother completed the building of the new city, and gave it the name of Rome. To supply it with a sufficient number of inhabitants, he made it an asylum for every one whom guilt or misfortune might compel to fly from his native country. In this manner, there were soon assembled around him troops of insolvent debtors, fugitive slaves, discontented people, and friends of novelty. Such were the first inhabitants of Rome; and this motley band of adventurers laid the foundation of an empire which was one day to conquer the world, to astonish posterity at the mere recital of its stupendous achievements, and to produce a countless number of profound politicians, able generals, accomplished orators and scholars, and great men of every description.

All the circumstances just related are not equally certain; but there seems to be no doubt as to the principal facts. Rome was built, according to Varro,* the four hundred and thirty-first year after the destruction of Troy, and the third year of the sixth Olympiad;† which corresponds to the year B. C. 753. Some, it is true, place the foundation of the city a few years later; yet Varro's opinion is more commonly adopted.

The beginning of Roman history being totally unconnected

* Marcus Terentius Varro lived in the last age of the Roman republic. He was a friend of Cicero, and, for a long time, one of Pompey's lieutenants. As a scholar and a writer, he is thought to have been the most learned of the Romans, and is often quoted as such by St. Augustine in his admirable work *De Civitate Dei*, e. g. lib. iv, ch. i; vi, 2; xviii, 2; xix, 22; etc.

† An *Olympiad* is a period of four complete years, so called from the Olympic games, which the Greeks celebrated at the end of every four years at Olympia or Pisa, a city of Peloponnesus, in honor of Jupiter Olympian. These games, instituted by Hercules, were after some interruption re-established by Iphitus (B. C. 884). However, their regular return was not yet adopted as a system of chronology by the Greek historians; the first Olympiad mentioned by them in the computation of time, was that in which Corœbus won the prize over all his competitors (B. C. 776).

with that of contemporary empires, we will give here, without interruption, an account of nearly all the kings of Rome, from Romulus its founder to Tarquin the Proud, under whom royalty was abolished.

ROMULUS.—B. c. 752—715.

NOT less cunning than ambitious, Romulus succeeded in having himself acknowledged king by the unanimous consent of the people, and began to exercise the functions of a sovereign, though not of an absolute monarch. Whenever he appeared in public, he was preceded by twelve lictors, or officers carrying axes bound up in a bundle of rods, to signify that in him resided the greatest executive authority, and the right of enforcing the observance of the laws.

From the beginning of his reign, Romulus divided the people into three *tribes*, having men of distinguished merit at their head; and he subdivided every one of the tribes into ten *curiæ*, with a priest in each curia to offer the sacrifices. This division and subdivision of the people was extended to the partition of the Roman territory. Thirty equal portions were allotted to the thirty *curiæ*, and so distributed as to provide every citizen with two acres of land; two other portions were set apart, one to defray the expenses of religious worship, the other to form a public treasury.

Romulus afterwards established a permanent body of counsellors, to share with him in the direction of affairs of state. He himself chose its first member, leaving to each of the three tribes and each of the thirty *curiæ* the election of three members, to be chosen from among the most distinguished citizens. The whole number of senators thus amounted to one hundred; it was afterwards doubled under Romulus himself, and increased to three hundred under his fourth successor. This body, so conspicuous in the history of Rome for its wisdom, prudence, magnanimity and firmness, was called *Senate*, from the Latin *senex*, which means "advanced in age;" and those who composed it were called *patres*, either for the same reason, or because they were expected to watch with paternal care over those in an humble station. The epithet *conscripti* (*conscript* or *enrolled*) was added in the course of time, and, after being peculiar to senators recently elected, became finally common to all.

Besides the institution of a Senate, Romulus founded a royal body-guard of three hundred horse. The *curiæ* were directed to choose them from the most conspicuous families, ten from each

curia. They were to be always ready, not only to accompany the king, but also to march at the first signal for the defence of the state. For this reason, they were called *celerēs* (*alert*), and afterwards took the name of *Equites* (*cavaliers* or *knights*); but they formed a distinct order of citizens only towards the latter days of the republic. For many centuries there were but two classes of people among the Romans, viz.: that of the *patricians* (*patres*), or hereditary nobility and descendants of the senators originally appointed by Romulus and his successors; and that of the *plebeians* (*plebs*), which comprised all the other citizens.

The patricians were exclusively invested with the honors of priesthood, the care of sacred things, the administration of justice, all civil and military preferments, and the right to pass a final decision upon every affair that might be referred by the king to their tribunal. But the plebeians shared with them in the power to make laws, to declare war and peace, and to elect the sovereign, the magistrates and the pontiffs. In all these matters the people voted by curiæ, but the resolutions of the majority had no force till they received the confirmation of the senate.

From all this it appears that the original constitution of Rome was neither purely monarchical, nor entirely republican. The king, the senate and the people were, in some measure, placed in a state of dependence with regard to each other. This mutual dependence produced a balance of power, which, keeping within bounds the royal prerogative, secured at the same time the rights of the senate and the liberty of the people.

To prevent as much as possible all cause of dissensions between the patricians and plebeians, Romulus undertook to establish a bond of union between the two orders, by a reciprocity of services and corresponding obligations, under the name of *patronage* and *clientship*. Every plebeian was allowed to choose, from the body of patricians, a *patron* or protector, and to become his *client*. This contract was placed under the sanction of the civil as well as religious laws; and, when thus sanctioned, strictly bound the two parties to benefit, help and defend each other, according to their relative condition and to the nature or exigency of the case; and so sacred was this mutual obligation in the eyes of the Romans, that patrons watched over the interests of their clients, and clients over those of their patrons, as if they had been respectively parents and children.

When the empire of Rome had become extensive, patricians had clients, not only in the city, but also in other Italian towns, and even in distant provinces. The nations that had been conquered sought to place themselves under the protection of some

illustrious Roman family, and commonly chose that of their very conqueror; a practice not less advantageous to the vanquished, than honorable to the victorious party.

Romulus made several other regulations for the improvement and benefit of his people. Some, it is true, savored of inhumanity or despotism; but many evinced great wisdom and foresight. He encouraged agriculture by every possible means, and adopted such measures for the stability of marriages that not a single divorce occurred in Rome during the space of five hundred years, from the time of its foundation till after the close of the first Punic war.

The more surely to increase the power and population of the city, he did not content himself with offering to strangers a free asylum within its precincts; he made it a rule to spare the conquered nations, to establish a social intercourse with them, and sometimes to grant them the rights and privileges of Roman citizenship. By this wise conduct he succeeded, after defeating his enemies, in rendering them allies or citizens of Rome, and transforming within a few years his little original colony into a state of considerable importance. In the beginning, his army consisted of only three thousand infantry and three hundred horse; but at his death the infantry amounted to forty-six thousand, and the cavalry to one thousand. The kings, his successors, and after them the leaders of the republic, followed the same rules of government and obtained similar results, so that Rome gradually advanced till it became the capital of the world.

But there was at first a serious difficulty in the way of its progress; most of the Romans had no wives, and the neighboring nations, through contempt for them or through fear of their rising power, were unwilling to enter into any matrimonial alliance with them. Romulus had recourse to stratagem: he proclaimed a great festival and solemn games in honor of Neptune, to which he invited the inhabitants of the towns situated near the Roman frontier. Both men and women, particularly the Sabines, ran in crowds to the promised spectacle. Whilst their whole attention was directed to what was passing under their eyes, at a preconcerted signal, their maidens were seized by an armed band of Romans, who, partly by force, partly by kindness, prevailed upon them to become their wives.*

* We relate these matters as they are found in the generality of historians. Still, it should be observed that the truth of several incidents belonging to the early history of Rome, for instance the rape of the Sabines and the various wars of Romulus or their circumstances, is questioned by many able critics.

In the mean time, the fathers of these virgins had left the city, fired with indignation and breathing nothing but vengeance. First of all, the Cecinians took the field, with their king Acron at their head. Romulus marched out against them, and, slaying their leader with his own hand, put them to flight and took their city at the first onset. Equally capable of performing great exploits and enhancing their value, he retraced his steps in triumph towards Rome, vested in purple, wearing a crown of laurel on his head, and holding in his hand the arms of Acron as a trophy; the troops, arrayed as for a battle, chanted hymns in honor of their gods, and by their military songs celebrated the praises of the conqueror. In this order he advanced towards Rome, where he was received with every demonstration of joy, and having designated a spot on the Capitolian hill to build a temple, deposited in it the splendid spoils which he had gained. This was the origin as well as model of these triumphs subsequently celebrated by the Romans with so much pomp and solemnity.

Romulus defeated with equal ease two other tribes, the Antemnians and the Crustumers; but the war against the Sabines proved a much more arduous and perilous undertaking. This nation, besides, having a larger number of troops than their incautious neighbors, acted too with much greater prudence and energy. Encouraged by the presence of their king Tatius and by the example of Mettius Curtius, a general of undaunted bravery, they succeeded so far as to make themselves masters of the Roman citadel. To dislodge them was not an easy task. Romulus fearlessly made the attempt, and the two armies engaged in a furious combat, the issue of which appeared doubtful for a long time, although the advantage, after incredible efforts on both sides, began to incline in favor of the Romans.

At that terrible moment the Sabine women, who had now been three years in Rome, ran to the field of battle, and, rushing between the combatants, entreated them to desist from an unnatural conflict; or else to turn their weapons against those whose misfortune it was to have been the occasion of so great an evil. They were willing, they exclaimed, rather to suffer death themselves, than become widows by the death of their husbands, or orphans by the fall of their fathers.*

So moving a spectacle, and words so impressive, could not

* *Hinc patres, hinc viros orantes, ne se sanguine nefando soceri generique respergerent Si affinitatis inter vos, si connubii piget, in nos vertite iras: nos causa belli, nos vulnere ac cædium viris ac parentibus sumus. Melius peribimus, quam sine alteris vestrum viduæ aut orbæ vivemus.*—Livy, b. i, ch. 13.

fail to go to the heart. The weapons fell from the hands of the combatants; a deep silence ensued, which was followed by the conclusion of a truce between the Romans and the Sabines, and soon after the two kings passed a definitive treaty, by which it was agreed that the two nations should be blended into one people, over whom Romulus and Tatius would reign together with equal authority; that the seat of government should continue in Rome; and that the city should therefore be enlarged to receive its new inhabitants. All the conditions of this treaty were punctually observed. Their fulfilment gave increased strength to the state; so that a war which had threatened Rome with entire destruction in its very cradle, proved one of the chief causes of its future greatness.

Six years after the conclusion of this treaty, Tatius was killed in a private encounter by the inhabitants of Lavinium, to whom he had refused to do justice. By his death, the whole power of royalty again devolved exclusively on Romulus. He made use of it to enlarge the Roman territory, and to conquer all his enemies around, whenever by their attacks or depredations they provoked hostilities. The powerful tribes of the Fidenates and Veientes at this time felt the strength of his arms; the former he entirely subdued, the latter he compelled to sue for peace.

Thus Romulus prospered in every undertaking; but his very prosperity was the first cause of his ruin. If we may rely on the vague account of historians, he became haughty and despotic in the exercise of his authority, to the great displeasure of the senators, to whom he now allowed but an insignificant share, if any, in the government of the state. It appears also that he was killed in the senate; but a rumor was industriously circulated among the people, that he had been taken up to heaven during the horrors of a dreadful storm. The senators took advantage of this popular belief to decree that religious worship should be paid to his memory, and caused *him* to be honored as a god after death, whom they had detested during life. Romulus had lived fifty-five and reigned thirty-seven years.

NUMA-POMPILIUS.—B. c. 714—671.

AFTER an interregnum of one year, during which the senators governed the state, each of them during five days by turn, Numa-Pompilius, a Sabine by birth, was chosen to succeed Romulus. He was a man of remarkable moderation, and did not accept, without much reluctance, the high honor conferred upon him. Having at last been persuaded to acquiesce in his election, he

practised upon the throne the same virtues which had characterized his private conduct, and directed them to the welfare of his people. He constantly endeavored to inspire them with a relish for social principles, respect for the laws, feelings of humanity, clemency, and other virtuous dispositions. His efforts supported by his example had an excellent effect, and greatly contributed to form the moral character of the Romans. It was he, above all, who gave them so high an esteem for agriculture, that, for many centuries after him, magistrates and generals were often called from the employments of a country life to the highest station in the commonwealth, or to the command of armies, whence they cheerfully returned, after their term of office had expired, to cultivate their small farms with the very hands which had saved the state and put its enemies to flight.

One of the chief cares of Numa-Pompilius was to settle the laws relating to property. He divided among the poor citizens the lands which his predecessor had conquered, and placed the limits of estates under a religious sanction. But his greatest labor was about the national worship: he framed the entire ritual of the Romans, and enacted a variety of regulations for the priesthood, prayers, sacrifices, and other similar objects. His zeal for whatever could promote good order, prompted him to procure a calendar less deficient than the one then existing; still his own, owing to the imperfection of science among the early Romans, stood itself greatly in need of reformation. This was done only after the lapse of several centuries, first by Julius Cæsar, and much more successfully, at a later period, by Pope Gregory XIII.

The reign of Romulus had presented an almost uninterrupted series of military expeditions; that of Numa was entirely pacific. The temple of Janus, which he had erected with the intention that it should be open in time of war and shut in time of peace, remained constantly closed under him; nay, the influence of his example diffused the blessings of tranquillity through the other parts of the Italian peninsula.

Numa-Pompilius died without any apparent disease, at the age of eighty-three, after a reign of forty-three years. He left a grandson, named Ancus Martius, who succeeded Tullus Hostilius the immediate successor of Numa.

TULLUS HOSTILIUS.—B. C. 671—639.

AFTER the death of Numa, the throne was for a short time vacant; at the ensuing election, the choice of the senate and people fell on Tullus Hostilius, a distinguished citizen. During his reign, an open rupture took place between the Romans and the Albans. The armies of both nations soon took the field, and, advancing against each other, met at the distance of five miles from Rome. Here, in order to avoid an unnecessary effusion of blood, it was agreed that, instead of a general battle, there should be a combat between three champions from each party, with the condition that the issue of this contest should decide the fate of the two armies.

There were at this time in each army, three brothers of great strength and valor, the Horatii and the Curiatii. According to the more common opinion held by ancient authors and adopted by Livy, the Horatii belonged to the Roman, the Curiatii to the Alban side. On these devolved the honor of the important conflict. They advanced from their respective camps with equal resolution, and carrying within themselves, as the historian expresses it, the courage of two great armies.* As soon as the clashing of their swords was heard, all the beholders were struck with awe, and awaited the result with breathless anxiety.

Soon after this terrible onset, the three Curiatii were wounded, but two of the Horatii fell dead. The Albans at this spectacle shouted for joy, whilst the Romans were dismayed, and trembled for the surviving brother now surrounded by his opponents. Fortunately for him, he was not wounded; and although unequal to the task of fighting the three together, was more than a match for them singly. To separate them, he retreated, and as the Curiatii, unable to keep up with him, were soon at some distance from one another, he rushed upon the nearest and slew him on the spot,—and successively despatched the other two. Thus almost the same moment which had witnessed the despair of the Romans, saw them in the enjoyment of a complete victory won by the prudence and intrepidity of their warrior.

But the victorious youth sullied the glory of his achievement by the murder of his own sister. Whilst he was returning in triumph at the head of the Roman troops, she presented herself before him bewailing with bitter tears the death of one of the Curiatii, to whom she had been betrothed. In a burst of indig-

* *Infestis armis, terni juvenes magnorum exercituum animos gorentes, concurrent.*—Livy, b. i, ch. 25.

nation, he pierced her with his sword, saying: "Thus perish every one that shall deplore the death of an enemy." Whatever provocation had been given, this action was justly pronounced an atrocious deed; Horatius was condemned to die, but the tears of an aged father and the commiseration of the people rescued him from the severity of the law.

In the interim, the Albans had acknowledged their defeat and professed their submission to the Romans. They however bore the yoke with great reluctance. With a view to shake it off, their leader, Mettius Fuffetius, prevailed upon two neighboring tribes, the Veientes and the Fidenates, to declare war against Rome, promising, if they would make the attack, to pass over to their side during the engagement. In consequence of this promise, hostilities began, and a battle took place between the Fidenates and Veientes on one side, and the Romans and their supposed auxiliaries on the other. Mettius gradually withdrew his forces from the field, leaving, by this treacherous movement, the flank of the Romans uncovered: Tullus, informed of this act of perfidy, cried out with a voice loud enough to be heard not only by his soldiers, but even by the enemy, that the movement of the Albans was made by his command, and for the purpose of attacking the Fidenates in the rear. The stratagem had its desired effect; the confederates were terrified, and fled; the Romans fought with redoubled ardor, and obtained a complete victory.

At that moment the Albans returned with their leader. Mettius, not having dared to carry out his treasonable project, and seeing a result so different from what he had expected, congratulated Hostilius upon his signal success. The king dissembled his resentment, but, on the following day, caused the unsuspecting Albans to be surrounded by his armed troops, and arresting their general, immediately put him to death. He then razed the city of Alba, and transferred the inhabitants to Rome, where, by being blended with the mass of the Roman population, they lost every feature of national existence.

Tullus Hostilius undertook many other expeditions, in all of which he was victorious. As warlike at least as Romulus himself, he considerably extended the power and territory of Rome, but was carried off in the midst of his successful career, some say, by a thunderbolt, others by the dagger of an assassin. He died after a glorious reign of thirty-two years.

ANCUS MARTIUS.—B. C. 638—614.

THE next king was Ancus Martius, a grandson of Numa; he held the sceptre twenty-four years, and yielded to none of his predecessors in ability and patriotism. Equally brave and religious, he repelled all the attacks of his restless neighbors, nay, succeeded in taking many of their cities; whilst he was not less successful at home in reviving the respect of the Roman people for religion, the laws and useful institutions. He was the first to build a public prison in the midst of Rome, for the more easy and efficacious repression of crime.

Another enterprise, equally honorable to the wisdom of Ancus Martius and conducive to public utility, was the foundation of the city and harbor of Ostia, near the mouth of the Tiber. This important undertaking was the first step of the Romans towards the establishment of their maritime commerce.

Ancus Martius evinced as much prudence and equity in his conduct towards the enemies of Rome, as he displayed activity and zeal for the government of Rome itself. It was his practice to send them an embassy before hostilities commenced, and not to declare war against them, until they obstinately refused to give satisfaction for attempted inroads and the wrongs which they had inflicted. This moderation appeared so wise, that it was subsequently imitated and became a national custom among the Romans.

A premature death carried off Ancus Martius, in the midst of his many schemes and occupations for the good of his people.

TARQUINIUS PRISCUS, OR TARQUIN THE ELDER.—B. C. 614—578.

ANCUS MARTIUS, before his death, had intrusted the care of his sons to Lucius Tarquinius, a Grecian by descent, but by birth an Etrurian, who had come towards the year B. C. 632, to settle in Rome, whither he brought immense treasures, numerous clients and all the Etrurian magnificence. By his courage in war, his prudence in counsel, and the generous use which he made of his revenues, he soon endeared himself alike to the king and to all the citizens; hence after the death of Ancus, he was, in preference to the sons of that prince, chosen by unanimous consent to succeed him on the throne.

Tarquin, anxious to reward his ancient and to acquire new partisans, increased the number of the Roman knights. He also

appointed a hundred new senators, and ingratiated himself more and more with the citizens at large by instituting the annual games of the circus.

Having thus secured his power, he directed his attention to works of still greater utility. The most conspicuous of those constructed by his orders, were magnificent aqueducts to provide the city with water, and vaulted sewers to convey the filth of the streets to the river; these sewers were so stupendous that Rome had reason to boast of them even in the time of her greatest glory, and such was their solidity, that they have subsisted till the present day, during the space of more than two thousand four hundred years. The exterior wall of the city, and many other buildings equally conducive to its advantage and ornament, likewise owed their existence to Tarquin.

Rome was thus rapidly rising in power and strength, appearing more and more like a queen in the midst of the neighboring cities and states. Jealousy soon armed them anew against her; but she found an adequate resource against their attacks, in the ability of her sovereign and the bravery of her people. The Latins seemed to have renewed the struggle only to supply the Romans with an opportunity to subdue several of their cities; the Sabines, in their turn, were prostrated after a long and obstinate resistance; lastly, a powerful confederacy of twelve Etrurian cities was compelled by a series of heavy losses and defeats to acknowledge the superiority of Rome. The successful termination of each of these three wars procured for Tarquin the honors of a triumph.

He had now reigned with great glory for thirty-six years, when, according to a general opinion, he was murdered by two vile assassins at the instigation of his former wards, the sons of Ancus Martius. This, their tardy vengeance, is by some reckoned among fables, or at least doubted. But if the crime was really committed, it proved of no avail to its authors, and the throne, after the death of Tarquin, was again occupied by a foreigner.

SERVIUS TULLIUS.—B. C. 578—534.

THE rumor of the king's assassination no sooner spread through the city, than crowds from all quarters ran towards the palace. Tanaquil, the widow of Tarquin, spoke to them, and said that he was not dead nor mortally wounded, and would recover in a few days; but that, in the meanwhile, he directed them to obey the orders of Servius Tullius, his son-in-law, who would exercise provisionally the functions of royalty. This was a mere stratagem,

intended to conciliate respect and obedience to Servius, and by this means to secure his election. So it really happened. After the lapse of a few days, the death of Tarquin was divulged, and Servius, though not of Roman but of Latin parentage, was proclaimed king by the assembly of the people.

It would have been, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult to find one more worthy of this honor. Talent and experience, generosity and valor, all combined in Servius Tullius to render him one of the best and greatest of sovereigns. Forced to engage in a new and protracted war against the Etrurians, he baffled all their efforts, repeatedly defeated their troops, and compelled them to abide by the treaty of peace which they had accepted under Tarquinius Priscus. As to the Latin tribes, whose jealousy so often prompted them to take up arms against the Romans, he obtained complete control over them, by inducing them all, with equal mildness and skill, practically to acknowledge Rome as the head of the Latin confederacy.

Servius Tullius was still more admirable in objects of purely civil administration. He instituted the census which was to be made every five years; proposed the most equitable distribution of charges and taxes; established the easiest and safest way of giving votes in the general assemblies of the people, and published or framed a variety of enactments held in the highest esteem by the Romans. Under him also, and by his direction, the city was enlarged to such a degree as to enclose within its precincts the seven hills so famous in the history of Rome.

After having devoted his long reign to the promotion of the public good, Servius resolved to give a still more striking proof of his disinterested patriotism, by resigning the royal power into the hands of two supreme magistrates, to be elected annually. His death prevented the execution of his generous design. He was cruelly murdered in the midst of Rome by Lucius Tarquin, his son-in-law; and his own daughter, Tullia, whose wickedness was still more atrocious than that of her husband, carried her inhumanity so far as to make her chariot pass over the bleeding corpse of her unfortunate parent. Such were the two monsters who deprived the Roman people of an excellent monarch, to prepare the way for their own tyranny. He had reigned forty-four years. But though his death was in itself a great misfortune, yet, through a special dispensation of God's providence, it did not occur till the greatness of Rome was permanently established.

It is certainly remarkable that all the kings who reigned in Rome until Tarquin the Proud, were eminently qualified

for the duties of their high station. All of them rendered signal services to their nation, and even the difference of their genius and dispositions wonderfully contributed to strengthen that state as yet in its infancy, and which might otherwise have been very much distressed and confined within narrow limits by the jealousy of its hostile neighbors.

The first of these kings, Romulus, prompted by inclination as well as necessity to wage almost incessant wars, succeeded in forming a warlike and hardy race of people. His immediate successor, Numa Pompilius, naturally inclined to peace, applied himself with equal success to the task of softening, humanizing and civilizing the rude and wild manners of his nation. Tullus Hostilius revived their martial spirit. Ancus Martius and Tarquinius Priscus, with dispositions equally adapted to war and peace, promoted at once the different institutions and views of their predecessors. Finally, Servius Tullius, during the course of a long reign, framed a new plan of government which appeared so wise and advantageous that it was shortly after adopted by the Romans, and lasted as long as the commonwealth itself.

GRECIAN COLONIES IN ITALY, SICILY AND GAUL.

THE same epoch which beheld the rise and early progress of Rome, witnessed also the foundation of many other celebrated cities in Italy, Sicily and Gaul. The spirit of colonization still continued among the Grecian states; but the tide of emigration, that had before directed its course principally towards the east, was now turned almost exclusively towards the west. So great indeed was the number of colonies which they established in the southern part of Italy, that it was called from them Great Greece, *Græcia Magna*.

Among these colonies and the cities to which they gave rise, the principal were the following:

1. *Sybaris*, founded by the Achæans, and built towards the year B. C. 720. This city enjoyed for some time a high degree of prosperity; it extended its jurisdiction over four neighboring states and twenty-five towns, and was able to raise an army of three hundred thousand men. But it was still more noted for the effeminacy of its inhabitants, which became proverbial. They were moreover divided into opposite parties, and frequently fell into violent disputes. At last, one Telys, the leader of a faction, obtained possession of the chief authority and expelled five hundred of the most distinguished citizens; these exiles fled for refuge to the Crotonians, their neighbors, by whom they were

kindly received, and as the Sybarites were highly displeased, a war broke out between the two nations. A decisive battle was fought, in which the Crotonians with a far inferior number of troops completely overthrew the Sybarites, and pursuing their advantage, captured and destroyed their city, after it had stood more than two hundred years.

2. *Crotona* had been founded also by the Achæans, in the year B. c. 710. It must have increased very rapidly in power and population, since within the second century of its existence it could send to the field a hundred thousand or a hundred and twenty thousand troops. After many revolutions and vicissitudes, Crotona fell under the Roman power about the time of the war against Pyrrhus.*

3. *Tarentum*, situated near the gulf of that name, was built by a colony of Lacedæmonians in the year B. c. 707. It became one of the most wealthy and powerful maritime towns of the continent; but after three centuries, it began to decline, and was finally subdued by the Romans.

4. *Locrium* and *Rhegium*, although less considerable than the

* This city gave birth to many famous athletes, among others to Milo surnamed the Crotonian. Several facts are recorded of him, showing that he was possessed of extraordinary strength. He would, without breaking it, hold a pomegranate so tight in his hands, that no force could possibly wrest it from him. He would stand so firmly on a discus which had been oiled to render it more slippery, that it was impossible to move him from his position. When he fixed his elbow on his side and stretched forth his right hand fully expanded, with his fingers close together, except his thumb which he kept erect, the utmost strength of man could not separate his little finger from the others.

These instances were, it is true, nothing more than a vain show of Milo's muscular strength; but he had much more important occasions to display it for the benefit of his country and fellow-citizens. In the great battle which the Crotonians fought against the Sybarites, he was in the first ranks of the former, and by his herculean exploits greatly contributed to the victory of his nation. On another occasion, as he was with many other persons attending a lecture of the celebrated philosopher Pythagoras, the pillar that supported the ceiling of the room happened by some accident to be shaken. Milo, by a vigorous effort, supported the tottering column for some moments, and after all had left the room, himself succeeded in making his escape.

The end of this famous athlete, if we may rely on the narrative, was very distressing. Seeing, one day, as he was travelling alone, an oak tree partially split with wedges, he attempted to split it in two by his bare strength. But after forcing out the wedges, his hands were caught in the trunk of the tree, owing to the violence with which the parts closed; in this situation, unable to extricate himself, he was devoured by wolves.

cities already mentioned, still were important colonies. The former was founded by the Locrians in the year B. C. 683; and the latter, by the Chalcidians in the year B. C. 668. Their political existence underwent nearly the same vicissitudes as that of Crotona and Tarentum.

Several of these Græco-Italian states were greatly benefited in their manners, laws and governments, by Pythagoras, Charondas and Zaleucus, three able legislators, who flourished during the sixth and fifth centuries before the commencement of the Christian era.

5. All the colonies just described occupied the southern and south-eastern portions of the Italian peninsula. On the opposite or western coast was the very ancient colony of *Cumæ*, established by the Cumæans of Lesser Asia, which also gave rise to many considerable settlements, among others, to Neapolis or Naples, the present capital of the Neapolitan states.

6. But no city of Grecian origin could at that time rival in fame and power, *Syracuse* in Sicily. It was built by the Corinthians in the year B. C., according to some, 709, according to others, 730 or 735. An admirable position, extensive commerce, excellent harbors, walls and fortifications, besides the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, rendered Syracuse one of the most flourishing and powerful cities of the ancient world. Its name will frequently recur in the following pages.

7. *Marseilles*, in the southern part of Gaul, was not at that time to be compared for its importance to Syracuse, yet it held a conspicuous rank among the western colonies of Grecian origin, and was always highly esteemed by the Romans, those excellent judges of social and political merit. The greatest men of antiquity, such as Tacitus and Cicero, bear ample testimony in their writings, to the wisdom of its government and institutions.

It was, indeed, generally considered an excellent school, not only of the arts and sciences, but likewise of politeness, temperance and other civil virtues.* It was founded by a colony of Phocæans (inhabitants of Phocæa in Asia Minor), according to some, six hundred years, but according to others, only five hundred and forty years before the Christian era.

* See Tacit. *Agric.* cap. 4:—Cicer. *Orat. pro Flacco*, n. 65;—Justin, b. xliii, c. 4; 5;—Valer. Maxim. b. ii, c. 6;—Strabo, and Livy *passim*.

GREECE DURING THE THIRD PERIOD.

WE must now return from the Greek colonies in the western part of Europe, to the country by which they were founded. Greece will now, for a considerable time, claim our undivided attention. What we have particularly to notice about that famous country, is the political situation and form of government, 1. Of Sparta or Lacedæmon, and, 2. Of Athens; both of which began, about this time, to appear the most conspicuous and influential of all the Grecian states.

SPARTA OR LACEDÆMON.—LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS.

NOT long after the Trojan war, the throne of Sparta was occupied by two brothers called Eurysthenes and Procles, of the house of the Heraclidæ, and both families continued in possession of the royal prerogative; indeed, this new sort of royalty, however strange and variously restricted in the exercise of its power, lasted several centuries. The nation was composed of three classes of people, the Spartans properly so called, the Lacedæmonians, and the Helotes or Ilotes. The *Spartans* were the inhabitants of the city and the principal class, having at their disposal all the privileges of the state and directing the affairs of government. The *Lacedæmonians* were the inhabitants of the surrounding province, or district of Laconia, bound to pay a tribute and to do military service. The *Helotes* were slaves. When the Spartan kings undertook to impose a tribute on the inhabitants of Laconia, those of Helos, a maritime town, openly resisted; being subdued by the force of arms, they were, in punishment of their resistance, reduced to slavery, and doomed, with their posterity, not only to every species of hard labor, but also to the most rigorous and frequently inhuman treatment, from their fierce and merciless masters. Their name of *Helotes* was afterwards extended to the other Spartan slaves.

The political condition of Lacedæmon was attended with frequent disturbances and much confusion. This state of things inspired Lycurgus, a prince of the royal family, with the desire of undertaking a thorough reformation of the state. To qualify himself for this important and arduous task, he at first travelled through those countries of the east most renowned for the wisdom of their laws, such as Crete, Asia and Egypt. On his return to Sparta, having obtained the general assent of the citizens, he vigorously set about the execution of his views.

The hereditary succession of the two sovereigns was retained, and they were vested with equal authority; but in order to prevent the evils of despotism on the one hand, and of excessive liberty on the other, Lycurgus instituted a Senate, composed of twenty-eight members chosen for life, to hold the balance of power between the kings and the people. At a later period, the authority of the senate itself appeared too great, and it was thought necessary to counterbalance it by the institution of a court of five magistrates, chosen annually and called the *Ephori*, whom the law invested with a coercive jurisdiction even over the persons of their kings, in case of misdemeanor.

Lycurgus undertook next to banish from the state both excessive poverty and excessive wealth, with all the disorders which are their usual attendants. For this purpose he persuaded the landholders to put all their property together, and allow a new division to be made among all, in order that they and their fellow-citizens might afterwards live on a footing of perfect equality.

This scheme, extraordinary as it may appear, and impracticable in any other than a small state and district, was unanimously adopted. The lands of the surrounding district were divided into thirty thousand portions, and distributed among its inhabitants; those properly belonging to the capital were divided into nine thousand portions, and distributed among an equal number of citizens.* It is said that, some years after, as Lycurgus was passing in the time of harvest through the Laconian plains, and observing, as he went along, the perfect equality of the quantity of corn just reaped by the different proprietors, he turned towards those who accompanied him, and said with a smile: "Does it not seem as if Laconia were an estate possessed by many brothers, who have just partitioned it among themselves?"†

The better to sap the very foundation of avarice, he prohibited the circulation of gold and silver, and ordained that there should be no other current money than iron coin, the value of which he fixed so low, that it required a whole room to contain a sum equivalent to one hundred dollars, and a cart drawn by two oxen to transport the same from one place to another.

* By *inhabitants* and *citizens* must be understood heads of families. Reckoning, on an average, five persons for each family, the number of portions of land supposes the population of Sparta to have been forty-five, and that of Laconia one hundred and fifty thousand. The number of slaves alone is thought to have exceeded the aggregate amount of the two other classes.

† Plutarch in *Lycurg*.

The Spartan legislator gave a deadly blow to intemperance and luxury by the institution of public repasts, at which all the citizens were to partake together of plain and common food specified by law. Black broth was their favorite dish, and men advanced in age preferred it to every thing else on the table. Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, being present at one of those meals, found it on the contrary very insipid: "I do not wonder at your dislike," said the cook, "for the seasoning is wanting." "What seasoning?" asked the prince. "Running, perspiration, fatigue, hunger and thirst," answered the cook; "these are the ingredients with which we season all our food."

No one was allowed to take other or better nourishment, before coming to the public dining-room. All the persons present took particular notice whether any one failed to eat and drink like the other guests, and never failed to reproach him with intemperance or excessive delicacy, to which they ascribed his dislike for the common diet. The kings themselves were obliged to attend these public meals. A long time after the enactment of this regulation, King Agis, on his return from a glorious campaign, having taken the liberty to eat at home and thus to dispense himself with the general law, was reprimanded and punished.

—The young men and the very children were allowed to be present at those public repasts, as being a real school of temperance and wisdom. Here they heard discourses on grave and interesting matters, and saw nothing but what tended to their instruction and improvement. The conversation was often enlivened with ingenious and sprightly raillery, but never disgraced by coarse or insulting expressions; nay, if any thing seemed to wound the feelings of a guest, the matter was immediately dropped and the raillery ended.

The education of youth was one of the chief objects of Lycurgus' legislation: he would have all children brought up under the eyes of prudent and experienced persons, who, being present at their diversions and other exercises, might have occasion to observe with exactness the spirit and temper of each. But this regulation was accompanied by another of a most shocking and inhuman nature, on the subject of tender infants. As soon as a child was born, it was examined by the elders of each tribe: if they found it strong and well proportioned, they gave orders for its education; but if it appeared deformed and weakly, the unfortunate being was condemned to die, and thrown into a deep cavern near Mount Taygetus.

At the age of seven years, the Spartan boys were joined into

companies, where they had their exercises in common, and were trained up together under strict discipline. Their education, properly speaking, was only an apprenticeship to obedience. While at table, they were asked different questions, and obliged to give prompt and appropriate answers, conveying in few words the reason and proof of their opinion; hence arose the *laconic*, that is, concise and pithy style for which the Spartans were so remarkable.

As Lycurgus chiefly desired to form a robust and manly people, the principal object in the education of youth was to accustom them to a hard manner of living. From their early years, children were obliged to be frugal and temperate in their diet, to go barefoot, to lie on beds made of reeds gathered with their own hands, to wear the same clothes in winter and summer, etc. This kind of training continually inured them to heat and cold, labor and fatigue. They were also taught not to give way to peevishness nor to be afraid of darkness, and not to complain of bodily hardships and sufferings.

Their patience and fortitude were most severely tested in a certain festival, celebrated in honor of Diana, where, before the eyes of their parents and in presence of all the people, they suffered themselves to be whipped till their blood flowed on the altar of this cruel goddess. They sometimes expired under the lash without a groan. Plutarch informs us that he himself had seen many young Spartans die under this cruel flagellation; and he relates of one, that, having stolen a young fox and concealed it under his garment, he suffered this animal to tear out his bowels with his teeth and claws, choosing rather to die than be detected.

It plainly appears from what has been said, that, although Lycurgus did not aim at making the Spartans a conquering nation, yet his regulations mostly tended to render them a race of hardy men and excellent soldiers. Hence, it naturally happened that the science of war seemed to be their only study, and war itself their favorite exercise. Instead of a hardship, it was considered by them as a relaxation; for then, and at no other time, the severity of their usual course of life was in some measure relaxed.

Their first maxim with regard to warfare was to conquer or die, and never to retreat, how great soever the number of the enemy. They who fled during an engagement were rendered infamous for life, and might be insulted by any person with impunity.

The Spartan women themselves partook of the stern courage

of their nation. One of them was known to have told her son to return from the battle with or upon his shield, that is, rather to be borne back dead upon it, than to throw it away in flight. Another having heard that her son had been killed whilst fighting for his country, very coolly answered, "I brought him into the world for no other end." This was the ordinary disposition of the Spartans. After the famous battle of Leuctra, the result of which proved so fatal to their power, the parents of those who were slain in the action congratulated one another, and went to the temple to thank the gods because their children had done their duty; whereas the relatives of those who survived the defeat, were inconsolable. Such was, then, the distinguishing feature of that stern nation, a readiness to sacrifice not only every thing, however dear, but even every natural feeling on the altar of patriotism.

Another singular though very politic rule followed by the Lacedæmonians in war, was never to pursue a vanquished enemy beyond the field of battle. For this reason, their adversaries, certain of finding safety in flight, were induced to combat with less obstinacy.*

When Lycurgus had completed his work of political and civil reformation, he declared to the people that he had to undertake a journey, and made them promise upon oath that they would be faithful to the new regulations until his return. He then withdrew and condemned himself to perpetual banishment from Sparta, which in fact he never revisited. Thus his fellow-citizens remained pledged by their own promise, never to depart from the laws that he had enacted for them and their posterity.

These important changes in the government and institutions of Sparta were effected more than a hundred years before the period which our narrative has already reached; but it seemed

* We have entered into considerable details on the laws of Lycurgus, as the only means of conveying an idea of this extraordinary legislation, and of its effect on the character of the Spartan people. Lycurgus was certainly a man of great genius, and his laws must have been, in many respects, wise and excellent, since a faithful adherence to them, during four or five hundred years, gave to the Lacedæmonians a great influence and ascendancy among the Grecian nations. Yet this same legislation was, on several points, faulty and unnatural in the extreme; for instance, with regard to the wretched condition in which it left the slaves, the inhuman treatment of children, and many other regulations contrary either to parental feeling or to common decency. These instances, not to mention others, tend to show the weakness of human reason when not guided by the light of revelation, and the immense distance between the best code of human laws, and the soundness, mildness and purity of Christian principles.

to us proper to mention them in connection with the time when their exterior effects began to appear. Favorable occasions were necessary to show how hardy a race the Lacedæmonians were under the discipline established by Lycurgus; these occasions presented themselves in the different wars they undertook, first against the Argives, and next against the Messenians.

CONTEST BETWEEN THE SPARTANS AND THE ARGIVES.

UNDER the reign of king Theopompus, or, according to others, under Zeuxidames, his successor, (towards the year B. C. 723), a dispute arose between the Argives and Spartans concerning the limits of their respective states. When the two armies came in sight of each other, through a desire of avoiding a general battle and considerable bloodshed, a proposal was made and adopted, that the quarrel should be decided by three hundred champions on each side. The combat which took place between these brave soldiers was so fierce and conducted with such animosity, that three only of the whole number survived, two Argives, and one Lacedæmonian; nor did they desist, until forced to do so by the darkness of the ensuing night.

The two Argives, considering themselves victorious, went back in great haste to carry the glad tidings to their fellow-citizens. The Lacedæmonian soldier, however, remained on the field, and occupied himself in carrying to the Spartan camp the arms of the Argives who had fallen in the bloody conflict. On the following day, when both armies reappeared, a new subject of dispute arose, to which side victory belonged. The Argives claimed it in virtue of the greater number of surviving combatants on their side; and the Lacedæmonians claimed it, under the plea that their champion had remained master of the field.

These conflicting pretensions could not be adjusted but by coming to a general engagement. Victory declared for the Spartans, and the limits contended for were consequently settled to their advantage.

MESSENIAN WARS.

THERE were several bloody wars between the Spartan people and the Messenians their neighbors. The first lasted twenty years, from the year B. C. 743 to 723. It produced a variety of obstinate engagements, in which success was nearly equal on both sides; still, as the Messenians could not so easily recruit their forces as their enemy, the result at length turned against them,

and they were obliged to conclude a very disadvantageous peace.

Their submission, being a forced one, could not be considered permanent. These unhappy people, goaded to desperation by the inhuman treatment and oppression of their conquerors, again took up arms to free themselves from so galling a yoke. They were now the more firmly resolved to make every exertion in their power, as they had only to imitate the heroic example and dispositions of their present leader Aristomenes, a prince of their royal family, of generous and noble feelings, exalted patriotism, and a sagacious, bold, enterprising and intrepid mind, whom no reverse could subdue, no danger appal, no obstacle deter from vindicating the freedom of his country.

The struggle was renewed with increased animosity. The Argives and Arcadians, alarmed at the growing pretensions and ascendancy of Sparta, joined the Messenians against this ambitious city, and the energy with which they made their first attacks seemed destined to be crowned with success. Three times in succession the Lacedæmonians were signally defeated. They had lost almost all courage, when their drooping spirits were again revived by the animated exhortations of the poet Tyrtaeus, the only succor they had been able to obtain from the Athenians. In a fourth battle they were completely victorious. The loss of the Messenians was immense; and all the exertions of Aristomenes, at the head of a few warriors, all his undaunted courage and frequent partial successes, could not save his beloved country from entire subjection. He then resolved to visit foreign courts, probably for the purpose of everywhere raising up enemies against the oppressors of Messenia; but this great man, the Annibal of his age, died before he could accomplish his design. The remnant of the Messenians were either reduced to the condition of slaves, or went over to the island of Sicily, where they occupied the city of Zancles, afterwards called from their name Messina or Messana.

The second Messenian war lasted fourteen years from the year B. C. 684 to 670. Its final result confirmed the preponderance of Lacedæmon in all southern Greece.

ATHENS: ITS REVOLUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT.

SOLON—PISISTRATUS.

THERE could be nothing more completely at variance with the rude, stern, uniform character of the Lacedæmonians, than the lively, polished and naturally humane, though inconstant spirit of the Athenians. Athens, their capital and the great rival of Lacedæmon, had subsisted for a long time as an hereditary, though limited monarchy. After the reign of Codrus, who in a war devoted himself to death for his subjects, the Athenians abolished royalty, and instead of kings, appointed mere magistrates to govern them under the name of *archons*. The authority of these rulers was first intended to last for life, but was afterwards made to last ten years, and finally confined to one year only.

The power of these magistrates proved insufficient to control the minds of a restless people. The disturbances and factions which continually agitated the state, prompted the Athenians to seek liberty and happiness in a new legislation; the task of framing a code of laws was committed to Draco, a person of acknowledged wisdom and integrity (B. C. 624). He indeed performed that task; but the laws which he enacted were so severe,* that they either could not be put in execution, or soon fell into disuse, and the disorders of the state continued as great as ever.

To remedy this train of evils, the Athenians had recourse to Solon, a descendant of Codrus, the last Athenian king. His well-known talents and insinuating manners had already won for him the respect and affection of the whole city. He was appointed archon by the unanimous consent of all parties, and was desired at the same time to be their common arbiter and legislator.

Invested with full authority, Solon annulled first all the statutes of Draco, except the law which inflicted capital punishment for the crime of murder. It may not be amiss to remark that this crime was held in such horror by the Athenian magistrates, that they would not pardon any thing that appeared to have the remotest tendency to its perpetration. On one occasion particularly, their famous tribunal, called the Areopagus, pro-

* According to the laws of Draco, small offences as well as great crimes were to be punished with death. His reason for this strange legislation was, that the former faults appeared to him worthy of death, and he had no heavier penalty to propose for the latter.

nounced sentence of death on a young boy who had been seen to take pleasure in cruelly pricking the eyes of birds; this cruel disposition made them fear lest he should afterwards become a scourge in society. However no enactment was made against the still more enormous guilt of parricide, because Solon considered it a crime hitherto unknown and virtually impossible, of which it was better therefore to make no mention.

The legislator of Athens did not think it advisable, as Lycurgus had done at Lacedæmon, to divide the lands of Attica equally among the citizens; but he took efficient measures of another sort, to deliver the poorer classes from the state of misery and bondage to which their debts had reduced them. In Sparta, the almost exclusive occupation of youth consisted in bodily and military exercises, and naturally led to a life of warfare; but Solon endeavored to inspire the Athenians with other sentiments. Without damping the martial ardor which they so often evinced on the battle-field, his principal aim was to give them a relish for commercial enterprise, works of industry, and all the arts of peace. His exertions were perfectly successful. No city was ever more distinguished than Athens for masterpieces in all the fine arts; no people of antiquity more sagacious, more polished and more refined than the Athenians. The delicacy of their taste, feeling and language was astonishing, and could be traced even in the lowest classes of society; as an instance, it is related that a market-woman discovered the celebrated Theophrastes to be a stranger, merely on account of a slight accent in his pronunciation.

Solon divided all the citizens of Athens into four classes, three of the rich, and one of the poor. He left the rich in the exclusive possession of all state offices, employments and magistracies; but, to make up for this exclusion of the poor from the executive government, he gave them the right of voting in public assemblies. This privilege might, at first, be deemed of little consequence; yet, on account of the great number of persons who composed this fourth class, it happened to be the most important of all, since the greatest affairs of state, those connected with war and peace, the choice of magistrates, important trials and judgments, etc., were to be decided in the assemblies of the people. But in order to preserve a sort of equilibrium and to prepare the way for prudent decisions, a council of four hundred members was established, with senatorial authority and a proviso that no subject could be discussed in the general assemblies of the citizens, which had not previously received the sanction of the four hundred.

Solon, moreover, greatly improved the constitution and enlarged the powers of the Areopagus. He made it a supreme court of judicature, with a right of censorship on public morals, and the momentous charge of enforcing the execution of laws, of which it was constituted the guardian. As in compliance with the Athenian legislation, none were admitted as members of this tribunal, except men of superior integrity, wisdom and experience, it soon became the most respectable and the most respected body in the world. Such was its reputation for justice and sagacity, that the Romans themselves referred to its decision certain cases which seemed too intricate and difficult for them to solve. The only object which this august senate had in view, was to ascertain the truth. That external objects might not distract the attention of the judges, they held their sessions during the night, or at least in a dark place; and the orators were not allowed to make use of any exordium, peroration, or digression.

The various duties or transactions of domestic and social life, had also a considerable share in Solon's code of laws. He enacted on these interesting objects, a great number of regulations, most of them showing great ability and foresight, and if not the best in themselves, and in their intrinsic worth, at least the best, said he, that the Athenians were capable of receiving. Having completed his laws, he caused the people to swear fidelity to them for a hundred years, and in order that their various enactments might acquire additional strength from usage, withdrew for a time from his country. He remained absent during ten years, which he spent in travelling, increasing his knowledge and experience, and making some stay in the most renowned kingdoms of the east, Lydia, Egypt, etc.

On his return, he found Athens again distracted by civil feuds and factions. Soon after, he had the grief to see its liberties subverted by the usurpation of Pisistratus, himself an Athenian, who, under the veil of moderation and beneficence, cherished an unbounded ambition. This artful man, possessed of great riches, distributed presents among the poor citizens with lavish munificence. His liberality, his eloquence, and the affability of his manners, won for him the favor of the common people; and he had the art to persuade them that the popularity which he enjoyed had so far rendered him odious to the nobles, as to make a body-guard necessary for his personal safety.

The more surely to obtain what he desired, Pisistratus inflicted on himself several wounds, and whilst his body was covered with blood, caused himself to be transported in a chariot to the market place, where he roused the beholders to indignation, by giving

them to understand that he had been thus treated by his enemies on account of his earnest zeal for the good of the people. A numerous assembly was immediately convened, who resolved, in spite of all the remonstrances of Solon to the contrary, that fifty guards should be allowed to Pisistratus for the security of his person. The crafty usurper soon increased the number to six hundred, and having with their assistance taken possession of the citadel, made himself absolute master of Athens (B. C. 561).

Solon did not survive this new revolution more than two years. Unable to prevent the usurpation, he endeavored, at least, to avert its evil consequences, and in this respect he was far more successful.*

Pisistratus sincerely and perfectly agreed with him about a moderate use of the sovereign authority, no matter in whom it might happen to reside. The power which he had illegally acquired, was administered with equity and mildness. Literature and industry, agriculture and commerce, received from him every encouragement. The city was greatly embellished by his care; the distress of the needy and afflicted was relieved by his prudent liberality. In a word, like Solon himself, though by different means, he ceased not to promote, by his exertions, the splendor of Athens and the happiness of the Athenian people.

The important changes and events that followed in Greece the death of Pisistratus, will be related at full length in another place, when we have mentioned those which happened about this time in other parts of the eastern world.

* Such is the account given by Plutarch, Rollin, etc., of the latter years of Solon; but others say that he went into voluntary exile, where he died at an advanced age. His great political wisdom, far more than his private conduct, gave him a conspicuous rank among the seven sages of Greece. The six others, all of them his contemporaries, were Thales of Miletus, a distinguished philosopher and astronomer; Chilo of Lacedæmon; Pittacus of Lesbos; Cleobulus of Caria, or of the island of Rhodes; Bias of Priæna; and Periander of Corinth, or Anacharsis the Scythian, whom the Greeks themselves admired for his prudence, experience and learning.

SECOND ASSYRIAN, AFTERWARDS BABYLONIAN EMPIRE:

COMPRISING ALSO THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF THE MEDES,
ISRAELITES, JEWS AND EGYPTIANS.

THE dismemberment of the first Assyrian empire, subsequent to the capture of Ninive, (see page 49), gave rise to three great states, namely, Media under Arbaces, Babylon under Nabonassar, and Ninive itself, which, notwithstanding the terrible blow it had received from the two other powers, continued still, or at least soon became again the most formidable of the three. Its sovereigns, as their names are known from Holy Writ,* were in succession Theglathphalasar, Salmanasar, Sennacherib, Ashaddon, and Nabuchodonosor I, or Saosduchinus. To these may be added Saracus, called also Chinaladanus, under whose reign Ninive was finally destroyed.

KINGS OF NINIVE.

THEGLATHPHALASAR.—B. C. 747—728.

THIS prince, otherwise little known in history, is mentioned in Scripture as having given assistance to Achaz, king of Juda, against the kings of Syria and Israel. The Assyrian monarch promptly availed himself of this opportunity to extend his dominions. He advanced towards the west with a numerous army, took Damascus and put an end to the kingdom of which that city was the capital. He then proceeded against the Israelites and subdued a considerable portion of their territory; but sparing neither friend nor foe, he made Achaz pay very dear for the benefit of his assistance. This strange protector demanded of him in return so large an amount of money that, in order to raise the requisite sum, the Jewish king stripped both the temple of God and the royal treasury of all the gold and silver which they contained.†

Thus the profane alliance so eagerly sought by Achaz, proved detrimental to this wicked prince. It served only to exhaust his

* See 4 Kings xvi—xix; 2 Paralip. xxviii—xxxii, etc.

† 4 Kings xvi, 8; 1 Paralip. xxviii, 20, 21.

kingdom, and to place near its frontiers the powerful monarchs of Assyria, whom Almighty God afterwards used as so many instruments for the chastisement of his people.

SALMANASAR.—B. C. 728—714.

THIS sovereign was destined by Divine Providence to punish the schismatic Israelites for their sins and idolatry. He at first contented himself with obliging them to pay tribute. But, when he perceived that their king Osee was endeavoring to shake off the yoke, and had, with this view, taken measures to contract an alliance with the king of Egypt, Salmanasar returned at the head of his troops, besieged Samaria, and captured it at the end of three years. Osee was bound in chains, and imprisoned. His subjects also were led away captives, to Assyria, and replaced in their own country by colonies sent from the Assyrian states to inhabit the Samaritan cities; this new population formed what was subsequently called the Samaritan people. As to the kingdom of Israel or of the ten tribes, it never was revived, but, in compliance with the threats of God's holy prophets, it totally disappeared from the earth. It had lasted two hundred and fifty-four years, since the time of its unhappy separation from the kingdom of Juda (B. C. 975—721).

Shortly after the reduction of Samaria, Salmanasar died, leaving the crown of Assyria to his son

SENNACHERIB.—B. C. 714—710.

EZECHIAS, king of Juda, was not deterred by the sad fate of the Israelites from refusing to pay to the Assyrians the tribute which they had imposed by force on his father Achaz; Sennacherib therefore immediately declared war, and entering Judea with a formidable host, subdued all the fortified towns on his way. Ezechias, moved by the sight of their misfortune and the danger of his capital, sent ambassadors to ask peace of Sennacherib, on any terms that he might prescribe. The haughty conqueror exacted an enormous sum of money that was instantly paid; still he would not desist from hostilities. Having been informed that the armies of Ethiopia and Egypt were marching to the assistance of the Jews, he wrote to Ezechias letters full of insults, blasphemies, and threats of vengeance, which he intended to accomplish after returning from his expedition against the Ethiopians and Egyptians.

The danger seemed to be on the increase. The allies in whom

the Jews, contrary to the advice of Isaias and the opinion of their pious king, had placed their confidence, were defeated, and Egypt was laid waste by the victorious Sennacherib. He then returned with still greater fury than before against Judea and Jerusalem. But here divine justice awaited him to punish his pride, his arrogance and his impiety: one hundred and eighty-five thousand of his troops fell in one night by the destroying hand of an angel.*

At the sight of this dreadful havoc of his soldiers, the proud monarch was terrified, though not moved to repentance; he fled in haste to Ninive, where he vented his rage against the Israelites, putting many of them to death and stripping others of their possessions. His tyrannical conduct rendered him odious to his own family; he was murdered by two of his sons in the temple and near the idol of his god Nesroch.

The two parricides fled to Armenia, and left the throne of Ninive to be occupied by their younger brother

ASARHADDON.—B. C. 710—668.

THIS prince availed himself of the anarchy then prevailing in Babylon, to conquer that great city and reunite it to the Assyrian empire. He likewise obtained great success in his wars against the Jews, who had again provoked the justice of God by their signal prevarications; their impious king Manasses, the unworthy son and successor of Ezechias, was defeated, taken prisoner and led in chains to Babylon. Here, seeing himself reduced to the utmost distress, the unhappy monarch began to reflect on the enormity of the crimes that had brought upon him so terrible a punishment. He humbly acknowledged his guilt, and having appeased the divine anger by his sincere and lively repentance, obtained not only his liberty, but even his restoration to the throne of Juda, and endeavored to atone by his zeal and piety for the evils which he had previously committed.

Asarhaddon continued to govern his vast empire with great success and prosperity. He reigned twenty-nine years over the Assyrians alone, and thirteen over the Assyrians and Babylonians together, in all forty-two years (B. C. 710—668).

During this whole period, Egypt, already much weakened by the arms of its enemies from abroad, experienced many disturbances at home. After the death of Sevechus or Sethon and of Tharaca the Ethiôpian, the very two kings who had been defeated

* 4 Kings xviii, xix; 2 Paralip. xxxii, and Isaias, in various chapters, from the 18th to the 37th inclusively.

by Sennacherib, the country fell into a state of anarchy and great confusion for the space of two years. All that time the Egyptians were unable to make choice of a sovereign. At length twelve of the principal nobility conspiring together seized the kingdom, and dividing it among themselves into twelve parts, began to govern it by a joint confederacy (B. c. 685).

Strange as this form of government was, it lasted fifteen years: as a monument of the perfect harmony which existed among them, the twelve kings built at their common expense the famous labyrinth consisting of twelve palaces, having as many apartments beneath as above the ground. It has been already described. (Page 24).

Jealousy or fear occasioned the fall of this administration. Eleven of these kings, for some superstitious notion, began to entertain suspicions of their twelfth colleague, whose name was Psammiticus, and drove him into banishment. Stripped of his share of the supreme power, Psammiticus anxiously waited for a favorable opportunity of retaliation; it soon presented itself. A storm having driven bands of Ionian and Carian soldiers to the Egyptian shore, he took them under his banner, levied other troops, and marched at their head against his former colleagues, whom he completely defeated, thus making himself sole and absolute master of all Egypt.

Psammiticus had no sooner established and secured his authority, than he undertook a new war against the Assyrians for the purpose of securing the eastern frontier of his kingdom. This war was of long duration. Not till after a siege of twenty-nine years, the longest mentioned in history, could he succeed in taking Azotum, one of the most important places in Palestine.

SAOSDUCHINUS, OR NABUCHODONOSOR I.*—B. c. 668—648.

At this time Asarhaddon was no longer seated on the throne of Assyria. It had been occupied after him by his son Saosduchinus, or Nabuchodonosor I, who inherited the warlike dispositions of his predecessors. This prince being attacked by Aphraartes, or Arphaxad, king of the Medes, gained a complete victory over his incautious aggressor. He even took Arphaxad prisoner and mercilessly put him to death. Pursuing his advan-

* This last name is written *Nebuchadnezzar* by many recent authors. It seems however that *Nabuchodonosor* having been used so many ages before, ought to have been retained, unless it be proved that modern Hebraists and rabbins know better the true spelling of Hebrew names than S. Jerom and the Septuagint interpreters.

tage, he carried his conquests as far as Ecbatana, the capital of Media, laid siege to that superb city, and conquered it, notwithstanding the strength and number of its fortifications.

This great success raised the hopes and flattered the pride of Saosduchinus: he aimed at nothing less than the conquest of all western Asia, nor did the first effects of his attempt disappoint his ambitious expectations; Mesopotamia, Cilicia, Syria, in a word, all the countries from the banks of the Tigris to the borders of Palestine yielded to his victorious arms. One nation only, the Jews, placing their confidence in Heaven, prepared to resist him, and to stem that impetuous torrent which had hitherto swept every thing in its way.

Their efforts proved successful. Holophernes the Assyrian general had undertaken the siege of Bethulia, a strong city built on the summit of a mountain. When the place was reduced to the utmost distress, Holophernes himself perished by the hand of a woman, the courageous Judith; and his troops, consisting of more than a hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, were either put to flight and dispersed, or fell by the hands of the Jews. So great an overthrow delivered the country for a considerable time from foreign invasion.

Nor was this the only disaster which the Assyrians then experienced; their defeat before Bethulia was of itself a terrible blow inflicted on their power, and it served also to rouse against them the nations whom they had lately conquered. Cyaxares, a courageous prince and heir of the royal family of Media, improved the favorable circumstance to wrest the whole kingdom from their hands. Ardently desiring to revenge the death of his father Aphraartes, he fearlessly attacked the Assyrian troops that came against him, overthrew them in a great battle and pursued the vanquished to the very walls of Ninive. The destruction of that city seemed inevitable; but the time had not yet come, which the Almighty had marked out for its final chastisement.

Precisely at this period, a formidable army of Scythians descending from the north under the conduct of their king Mardyes, began to invade the Median provinces: Cyaxares hastened to the scene of this most pressing danger, marched against the invaders and gave them battle; in spite of all his efforts he was defeated. The conquerors meeting no further obstacle overran without opposition both Media and the other countries of Upper Asia, and so established their power throughout this vast territory, as to maintain it during the space of twenty-eight years. They even advanced through Syria and Palestine to the confines

of Egypt; but here Psammiticus prevailed upon them by entreaties and presents to proceed no farther, and thus saved his country from their unwelcome visit.

The other states which at first yielded to the arms of the Scythians, began likewise to make efforts and devise measures to rid themselves of these dangerous guests. Many of them were slain by the natives; the others withdrew from the scene of their conquests, and Cyaxares again recovered his kingdom.

SARACUS, OR CHINALADANUS.—B. c. 648—626.

THE Median prince now thought more seriously than ever of pursuing his projects of revenge, the execution of which had been only suspended by the Scythian invasion. The reigning king of Ninive was not, it is true, the same who had given him so many subjects of complaint; but the chief object of Cyaxares was to chastise the grasping ambition of the Assyrians, and this was for him a most favorable opportunity to do so, as his present opponent, Saracus or Chinaladanus, was not a warlike monarch like Saosduchinus, but a weak, effeminate and contemptible sovereign. The king of the Medes, besides, did not neglect to avail himself of other means of success. He entered into a close alliance with Nabopolassar the governor of Babylon, exactly as his predecessor Arbaces had done with Belesis or Nabonassar against Sardanapalus.

Ninive therefore was again attacked by the joint forces of the Medes and Babylonians, and again fell under their combined efforts. These new conquerors did not treat it with the clemency which it experienced at the hands of its former captors; on the contrary, they completely destroyed it, put its king Saracus to death, and enriched their armies with its innumerable spoils.

After this important conquest, Cyaxares easily subdued the other cities and provinces of the kingdom of Assyria, with the exception of Babylon and Chaldea, which continued in the possession of Nabopolassar. Hence the Assyrian empire, notwithstanding these terrible convulsions, was not really destroyed, but transferred from Ninive to Babylon.

KINGS OF BABYLON.

NABOPOLASSAR.—B. C. 626—605.

By the conquest and destruction of Ninive, the Babylonians became so formidable as to raise alarm or excite jealousy in the neighboring nations. Pharaoh Necho, king of Egypt and successor of Psammiticus, attempted to oppose a barrier to their farther progress; for this purpose, he advanced with a numerous army towards the Euphrates. As he was marching through Palestine, King Josias, fearing the evil consequences that might result for his country from the presence of so many troops, and wishing to check them, attacked the Egyptians near Mageddo, but was conquered, and unfortunately received a wound, of which he died after his return to Jerusalem. This was the last worthy successor of David on the throne of Juda. His three sons, Joachaz, Joachim and Sedecias, who reigned after him, instead of imitating the great examples of virtue and piety so conspicuous in their father, fell together with their subjects into so many disorders and crimes, that the justice of God was at length provoked to punish their ingratitude by the Babylonian captivity.

As to Necho, encouraged by his victory over Josias, he pursued his march towards the Euphrates, defeated the Babylonians and took Charcamis, a considerable city. He used such measures to secure its possession as his circumstances permitted, and withdrew, after leaving in it a strong garrison. Passing again through Palestine, and indignant that the Jews had, without his consent, chosen for their sovereign Joachaz, the younger son of the late king, he sent that prince captive into Egypt, and appointed in his place Joachim, another son of Josias. After so many great achievements, Necho triumphantly re-entered his kingdom.

In the meanwhile, Nabopolassar, king of Babylon, was very much grieved not only by the loss of Charcamis, but also by the coincident secession of Syria and Palestine. Unable, on account of his infirmities and advanced age, to retrieve in person the glory of his arms, he associated to himself his son Nabuchodonosor as a colleague in the empire. This young prince fully answered his father's expectations. He put himself at the head of the Babylonian troops, defeated those of Necho, retook Charcamis, and everywhere, from the banks of the Euphrates to the borders of Egypt, re-established the ascendancy of his country.

Jerusalem itself fell into his power. A large number of Jews, several of whom belonged to the royal family, were sent to Babylon as prisoners, or as hostages for the fidelity of the rest of their nation (B. c. 606). Thus commenced the famous Babylonian captivity, so often predicted and pathetically described by the prophets Isaias, Jeremias, etc.

Nabopolassar died about this time, probably before his son had left Judea; Nabuchodonosor was no sooner apprised of this event, than he set out in great haste for Babylon, leaving behind him the main body of the army, with the booty and captives. When he arrived in that city, he assumed the reins of government, and succeeded to all the dominions of his father, comprising Assyria, Chaldea, Syria, and some other countries, to which he subsequently added many new conquests.

NABUCHODONOSOR II, OR THE GREAT.—B. c. 605—562.

THE Jews had been humbled, but not entirely subdued by their defeats and losses, and not even by the capture of Jerusalem; they continued to provoke the justice of God by their crimes, and the fury of Nabuchodonosor by their frequent rebellions. This monarch, exasperated at so many revolts, arrived at the head of a fresh army, for no other apparent object than to vindicate his claims by acts of the utmost rigor, but in reality as the instrument of divine vengeance against a wicked and most ungrateful people.

All opposition was crushed by the vigor of his measures and the efforts of his arms. The Jewish capital, which the Egyptians vainly endeavored to assist, was taken after a siege of two years. Sedecias, the last king of Juda, beheld his children slaughtered by his side; he himself, having his eyes torn out, was with the rest of the inhabitants led into captivity. All the sacred vessels and royal treasure fell into the hands of the Babylonians. The city was entirely demolished, and its magnificent temple consigned to the flames (B. c. 588).

Nabuchodonosor, upon his return to Babylon, erected a golden statue of sixty cubits or about a hundred feet in height, with an order to all his subjects to adore it, under penalty of death. Three noble young men among the Jews, viz.: Ananias, Misael and Azarias, courageously refused to obey the impious command of the king. They were, for this imaginary crime, thrown into a burning furnace; but the Almighty, whose service they had preferred to every human consideration, prevented them from being at all injured by the fire. The monarch, astounded at this

prodigy which he himself witnessed, forbade, under the severest penalties, all blasphemy against the God of Israel, and raised the three young men to high dignities in the empire. Not less astonished at the eminent gift of prophecy imparted to Daniel, another distinguished Hebrew captive, he promoted him to a still higher rank, appointed him governor of the whole province of Babylon, and chose him for one of his chief counsellors.*

A new war called Nabuchodonosor to new exploits and conquests. He took the celebrated city of Tyre, which had never been subdued by any foreign power; but the siege cost his troops incredible fatigues, for which they received no compensation in the riches or spoils found in the town, the Tyrians having previously retired with their treasures to a neighboring island. Here they built, at a very short distance from the continent, the new city of Tyre, that was destined even to surpass the former in celebrity. The conqueror, unwilling or unable to pursue them in this retreat, led his soldiers into Egypt, where they captured an immense booty, and made so many ravages that this unfortunate kingdom, formerly so flourishing but now distracted by civil feuds and weakened by foreign wars, could not recover any sort of prosperity till after the lapse of forty years, under the reign of Amasis.

When Nabuchodonosor had brought this long series of expeditions to a successful issue, he returned to Babylon and devoted his chief attention to the embellishment of that capital, so as to render it beyond comparison the most magnificent city in the world. He now seemed to have reached the zenith of temporal glory and happiness. But God, who had decreed to humble his pride and practically teach him the vanity of all human grandeur, foretold by the mouth of Daniel that this mighty king would be reduced for seven years to a state of insanity, driven from the company of men, and obliged to live like the beasts of the field. The event verified the prediction. "At the end of twelve months," says the sacred writer (Daniel iv, 26, 30); "the word was fulfilled upon Nabuchodonosor: and he was driven away from among men, and did eat grass like an ox: and his body was wet with the dew of heaven; till his hairs grew like the feathers of eagles, and his nails like birds' claws."†

* For these and other facts belonging to the reign of Nabuchodonosor, see the last chapters of Kings and Paral.; Ezechiel xxix; Daniel i—iv, etc.

† What happened to King Nabuchodonosor, was, according to the common opinion of interpreters, an effect of that strange disease, called Lycanthropy, Cynanthropy, or the like, in which one, imagining

When the time previously appointed for the duration of his punishment had elapsed, the king recovered his senses, humbly acknowledged the sovereign dominion and justice of God, and being re-established on his throne, published a solemn edict to the praise and glory of HIM who is supreme Master of kings as well as subjects.

Nabuchodonosor died one year after his happy restoration (B. c. 562). He had, since the death of his father Nabopolassar, reigned during forty-three years, and he is justly considered as having been one of the greatest monarchs of the East.

DECLINE OF THE BABYLONIAN EMPIRE.

DURING the reign of Nabuchodonosor we behold Babylon in all her splendor; from his death we may date the commencement of her decline. The throne was occupied, after him, by a series of princes who rapidly succeeded each other, performing no achievement worthy of their illustrious predecessor. Most of them, on the contrary, undermined their own power, and brought contempt on themselves by their indolence and profligacy.

On the other hand, we learn from the prophets* that the Babylonians, after having been an instrument in the hands of God to chastise the ingratitude and infidelities of his people, were themselves to be severely punished for their cruelty, their pride and their domineering spirit.

The storm was already gathering over them from every quarter. They endeavoured, but in vain, to avert it, by entering into a close alliance with the mightiest nations of the west against those of the north and east, by whom they were threatened; the very measure which they adopted to support their tottering monarchy, served only to accelerate its downfall.†

himself to have become a wolf, a dog, or any other animal, feels, moves and acts in conformity with this morbid affection.—See D. Calmet, *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, article *Nabuchodonosor*; Duclot, *La Sainte Bible vengée des attaques de l'incrédulité*, Note 4^{ème} sur *Daniel*, etc. But if the disease which afflicted the Assyrian monarch was of itself a natural one, the time, the manner, the circumstances, and especially the clear prediction of it, certainly belonged to a higher order of Providence.

* Isa. xiii, xiv, xlvii; Jerem. xxv, l, li.

† See § 1 of the Appendix.

CRÆSUS.—THE LYDIANS.

THE most illustrious and powerful of their allies was Cræsus, king of Lydia, a province of that part of the Asiatic continent called *Asia Minor*. This kingdom, at first very inconsiderable, gradually increased in extent and power by the prudence or bravery of its sovereigns, till it reached, under Croesus (B. C. 562—548), the height of prosperity. The riches of this monarch, obtained by conquest and produced by his gold mines, were so great that they became proverbial. The possessor of that immense fortune was not on this account the less brave and enterprising; his life was little else than a continual warfare, and he was the first who succeeded in subduing the Grecian cities of *Asia Minor*, having conquered nearly the whole extent of that famous peninsula.

What is still more surprising, is that a prince possessed of such warlike dispositions and such enormous wealth, found his chief delight in literature and science. His court was the usual residence or resort of the learned men of his age, such as *Æsop*, the fabulist, *Anacharsis* the Scythian, *Solon*, the celebrated Athenian legislator, etc.

A succession of domestic afflictions for a time depressed the spirit of Cræsus. He was roused from his lethargy by the increasing fame of *Cyrus*, the Persian conqueror. The Lydian monarch began to fear for his own dominions; still, as he was a religious prince after the manner of the Gentiles, he would not declare war, nor engage in any enterprise, without having previously consulted his gods. He therefore sent ambassadors, with magnificent presents, to consult the famous oracle of *Apollo* at *Delphi*, whether it would be expedient for him to undertake a war against the Persians. The answer was, that if the king of Lydia crossed the river *Halys* at the head of his army, he should overthrow a great empire. Cræsus, interpreting this ambiguous answer in his favor, determined without further hesitation to come to open hostilities; and, in order to comply with another direction of the oracle, he strengthened his party not only by concluding a friendly alliance with the *Babylonians* and *Egyptians*, but also by calling to his assistance the *Lacedæmonians*, at that time the most powerful people of Greece.

This important step of the king was not equally approved of by all his subjects. A certain Lydian, highly esteemed for his prudence, addressed him thus on that occasion: "What prompts you, great prince, to turn your arms against the Persians, a war-

like people, who, inhabiting a rugged country, are inured from their childhood to fatigue and to every sort of hardship; who, accustomed to a coarse dress and the plainest food, are satisfied with bread and water, and are total strangers to the delicacies and conveniences of life; who, in a word, have nothing to lose if you conquer them, but every thing to gain if they conquer you; and whom it will be difficult to remove from our frontiers, if they once happen to know from experience the great advantages of our climate and country? Far then from attacking them, we ought, I think, to thank the gods that they have prevented the Persians from attacking us." (Herod. b. i. ch. 71).

The remark was certainly judicious; but Crœsus had taken his resolution, and was not to be diverted from it by any consideration or advice.

CYRUS.—THE PERSIANS.

THE Persians, who were commencing to act a conspicuous part in the world, had subsisted a long series of ages without being a numerous and powerful nation. They at first possessed and inhabited only one province of that extensive country which afterwards received and still retains the name of Persia; and they could number no more than one hundred and twenty thousand men. Being successively under the sway of the Assyrians, the Babylonians and the Medes, they practised in obscurity those manly virtues of sobriety, patience and fortitude, which prepare a people for grand and successful exertions. It only required a more extensive theatre to make them appear to the greatest advantage. This began to open before them when their king or chief, Cambyses, married Mandana, the daughter of the Median monarch Astyages, and by her had a son called Cyrus, the same whom Isaias had long before expressly mentioned as destined by Divine Providence to be the conqueror of the Babylonian and the founder of the Persian empire.

This prince, one of the most accomplished heroes of profane antiquity, was born in the year B. c. 599. From his infancy he manifested the happiest disposition. He was full of meekness and affability as well as energy and courage, never permitting himself to be shaken in his resolution by any hardship nor frightened by any danger, when honor and duty were at stake. He was educated with other boys of his age, according to the Persian laws, then highly esteemed and well calculated to improve both mental and bodily faculties.

Throughout the whole course of study and exercise to which young Cyrus was subjected, he easily surpassed his companions by his talents, dexterity, obedience and wisdom. What did him still greater honor was, that instead of provoking jealousy or discontent, he, on the contrary, by his virtuous conduct and obliging manners, gained the respect and affection of every one. He did the same at the court of his grandfather Astyages (the son and successor of Cyaxares I), where he resided for five years; and, even at the early age of sixteen, he contributed more than any one by his activity and valor, to a victory which the Medes obtained over the Babylonians. On his return to Persia, he willingly resumed his former exercises, till his education was completed by his father Cambyses, whose intimate acquaintance with the principles of war and of government, enabled him to cultivate the talents of Cyrus with complete success.

FIRST CAMPAIGNS OF CYRUS AT THE HEAD OF THE PERSIANS AND MEDES.—B. C. 560—549.

ASTYAGES after a reign of thirty-five years, was succeeded on the throne of Media by Cyaxares II, his son, the brother of Mandana and uncle of Cyrus. At this juncture Neriglissor, king of Babylon, formed with Croesus, king of Lydia, a powerful confederacy against the Medes; he had sent ambassadors even to the Indians for the purpose of rendering that nation favorable to his cause. Cyaxares, on his side, was not slow in making due preparations for the approaching conflict. His first care was to ask the help of the Persians, and to beg that his nephew should be the leader of the troops who might be sent to his assistance. Both requests were granted: an army of thirty thousand chosen men was speedily assembled, and Cambyses willingly placed it under the command of Cyrus, who set out at their head to join his allies in Media.

On his arrival, it was found, upon accurate information, that the combined army of the two nations was not half that of the Babylonians and Lydians, whose number amounted to sixty thousand cavalry and two hundred thousand infantry. The discovery of so great a disparity filled the Median king with considerable uneasiness; but the genius of Cyrus, his courage and resolution, soon made up for this inequality of forces. In the first place, by a short campaign which preceded the grand expedition, he secured the valuable assistance of the Armenians and of some other nations in the neighborhood. He then introduced useful changes in the military tactics of the time, and

particularly applied himself to excite great emulation and courage among the troops. His efforts were the more successful, as he set an example of perfect compliance with his duties, and did not seek to distinguish himself by the luxury of his table, the magnificence of his dress or the splendor of his retinue, but by his kindness, liberality and incessant care to reward good actions.

When Cyrus was assured of the devotedness and bravery of his troops, he proposed to lead them into the enemy's country : all readily assented to the proposal, and followed him with full confidence of victory. It required several days to reach the Assyrians. At last he met them, at a great distance from the Median frontier, encamped in an open plain and protected by a large ditch, under the command of the two allied kings, Neriglissor and Croesus. After some hesitation they came out of their intrenchments in order of battle, and soon commenced an attack by the discharge of their arrows ; but the Persians, animated by the presence and example of Cyrus, immediately rushed on their opponents and charged them with irresistible fury. The Assyrians, unable to stand so terrible a shock, fled in confusion, in spite of the efforts of their leaders to encourage and rally them. The Median cavalry pursued the fugitives with such vigor, that a great number of them perished ; King Neriglissor himself fell among the slain, and Croesus, seeing or believing that all was lost, made his escape by a precipitate retreat. The defeat of the Assyrians was complete. A new and bold attack rendered Cyrus master of their camp, and his troops found in it an immense quantity of spoils, which he caused to be so judiciously distributed that all remained satisfied.

But the most important result of this great victory for the conqueror was the surrender of several fortresses, and the gaining over to his party of some among the most influential and powerful of the Babylonian lords. Moreover his kind treatment of his prisoners of war, whom he set at liberty on the simple condition that they should never more bear arms against him, spread in every direction the fame of his clemency. Numbers of people readily submitted to him, and became useful auxiliaries. The Assyrians, having a second time presumed to attack him, were again defeated with great slaughter.

This new advantage enabled Cyrus to penetrate still farther into the enemy's country ; and although he did not yet think it prudent to besiege their capital, he took at least all the measures and information that might afterwards be serviceable for the success of this great undertaking. To provide for the security of his new allies during his absence, he concluded with the

Babylonian king, now Baltassar or Nabonides, a kind of truce, by which it was agreed that the husbandmen on both sides should not be molested, but have full liberty to cultivate their lands and reap the fruit of their labors. Having in this manner obtained a solid footing in a vast extent of country, having also examined the situation of Babylon, acquired a considerable number of friends and greatly increased his army, he returned to Media.

When he approached the frontier, he sent a messenger to inform Cyaxares of his arrival. This prince, somewhat jealous of the glory of his nephew, and imagining that he might be guilty of ambitious designs, received him in a very cold manner, so far as to turn away his face from him, and even weep through vexation. Cyrus, whose prudence and modesty were equal to his valor, entered into a private conversation with his uncle. He spoke to him with so much mildness, submission and reason; he gave him such strong proofs of respect, fidelity and attachment to his person and interest, that he soon dispelled all his suspicions, and completely recovered his favor.

Cyaxares, being now perfectly satisfied, nay more and more charmed with the great qualities of Cyrus, offered him his only daughter in marriage, with Media for her future dowry; for he had neither son nor brother to succeed him on the throne. Cyrus felt highly flattered by so advantageous a proposal; yet he would not accept it, till he had obtained the consent of his father and mother, leaving in this conduct an admirable example to all future ages, of the respectful deference which children, whatever may be their age, their qualifications or their standing in the world, should pay to their parents on the like occasions. Cyrus did not marry the princess till his return to the court of Cyaxares, after a visit to his family in Persia. This marriage was for him the most advantageous he could desire, since it rendered him, by his wife, the heir of the powerful monarchy of the Medes, being already, by his father, the heir of the Persian kingdom.

DECISIVE BATTLE OF THYMBRA OR THYBARRA BETWEEN CYRUS AND CRÆSUS.—B. C. 548.

IN the mean time, the two hostile parties were making stupendous preparations to carry on the war upon a still greater scale than before. During this period, Cræsus was the commander-in-chief of all the enemy's forces; he assembled them about the river Pactolus, whence he advanced towards Thybarra or

Thymbra, a city of his kingdom not far from Sardis the capital. Here he was met by the Persians under Cyrus, who had hastened from Media with a view to surprise his foe by the rapidity of his march, and disconcert him by the boldness of his attempt.

Both armies were formidable by their number, discipline and valor. It is however generally admitted that the army of the Lydians and their allies was more than double that of the Persians and Medes, as the former amounted to four hundred and twenty thousand men, sixty thousand of whom were cavalry; whereas the latter consisted of no more than thirty-six thousand horse, with one hundred and sixty thousand foot, in all one hundred and ninety-six thousand combatants.*

So many troops drawn up in battle-array, with their glittering cuirasses, bucklers, helmets, axes or swords, presented a spectacle at once magnificent and terrible. The forces of Crœsus, having their infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the two wings, formed a line of nearly five miles. The army of Cyrus, arranged in nearly the same order though with fewer men in depth, occupied only four miles, and consequently was, at each extremity of the line, about half a mile short of the enemy's front. But Cyrus, perfectly aware of the circumstance, had taken such precautions and so well disposed his plan of attack, that he confidently stated in presence of his officers that these two extremities would be the very spots in which victory would begin to declare in his favor. The result was precisely as he had predicted.

The plan of Crœsus, upon which he principally rested his hope of success, was to surround the army of Cyrus, and attack it simultaneously in front and on the flanks. For this purpose, he ordered the two wings of his own army to advance with greater rapidity than the centre, so as to enclose the Persians at each extremity of their line. This movement did not in the least alarm Cyrus, who had expected it. He rode through all the ranks, giving his orders and encouraging his troops; and he, who on all other occasions was so modest, so free from every appearance of ostentation, now appeared full of confidence, and spoke as if certain of victory.

At the first signal, the Persians faced their foes on every side. Cyrus himself, wheeling round at the head of a choice body of horse backed by a band of infantry, rushed against the flank of

* That this was the probable amount of troops on each side, may be deduced from a comparison of various passages of Xenophon. See, for this and other circumstances and particulars of the battle, the *Cyropædia*, and of the 6th and beginning of the 7th book.

the enemy's left wing, and thus turning their very design against themselves, threw them into great disorder. Immediately the chariots armed with scythes, being driven furiously among them, completed their defeat. The same was done against the right flank of the Lydians, and with equal success; so that the two wings of their army were, in a short time, completely routed.

Their centre offered a much greater and more protracted resistance. It was chiefly composed of one hundred and twenty thousand Egyptians, fighting in twelve square battalions, of ten thousand men each. Here the conflict was so furious, that it cost the lives of many among the bravest warriors of each army; nay, the Persian infantry were compelled to give way, and gradually to retreat towards their engines. However, the combat was soon renewed, and became more fierce and bloody than ever. Cyrus, who had hastened to the assistance of his infantry, attacked the enemy on their rear; the other bodies of the Persian horse came up about the same time, and the Egyptians were now closely pressed on every side. They still resisted, and notwithstanding the dreadful losses which they had sustained, defended themselves with heroic bravery. Cyrus himself was in great danger; his horse being killed under him, he fell in the midst of his enemies, and must have either been slain or taken prisoner, had he not been quickly rescued by the devoted intrepidity of his troops.

He could not but admire the persevering valor of the Egyptians. Desirous that such brave men should not perish, he offered them honorable conditions, if they would surrender. They did so; but, as their fidelity was equal to their courage, they previously stipulated that they should not be obliged to bear arms against Cræsus, in whose behalf their services had been once enlisted. They ever after remained faithful to the Persian monarch. Cyrus, on his part, besides the valuable acquisition which he then made, enjoyed the merit of having added generosity to the other superior qualities that he evinced both before and during the battle.

The engagement had lasted till the evening. The field at length was entirely won, and the remaining allies of the Lydians retired in all directions, endeavoring to reach their own country as quickly as possible. Cræsus with his troops retired to Sardis, whither, on the following day, he was pursued by the conqueror. Cyrus immediately ordered military engines to be raised against the walls, and scaling-ladders to be prepared, as if he intended to make an assault; but, whilst he engaged the attention of the besieged with these preparations, the next night he introduced

his soldiers into the citadel through a secret passage with which he had been made acquainted by a Persian slave. At break of day, he entered the city without resistance.

Thus did prudence, united with activity and courage, render Cyrus master of this important place, without effusion of blood; even Crœsus hesitated no longer to surrender himself, with all his treasures, into the hands of so great a conqueror. Cyrus, moved to compassion at the misfortune of a king who had in a moment fallen from so great an elevation, treated him with becoming generosity and kindness. He suffered him to enjoy, not only the title, but even, according to many, the authority of a sovereign, under the mere restriction of not having the power to make war; thus relieving him, as Crœsus himself acknowledged, from the most burdensome duty of royalty, and enabling him to live much more happily, exempt from painful cares, and less exposed to the vicissitudes and reverses of fortune.

Herodotus and several after him have filled the history of Crœsus with a variety of extraordinary incidents, either almost destitute of credibility, or scarcely reconcilable with the usual moderation of Cyrus; the circumstance, for instance, of Crœsus' only son, who was dumb, but who, by a violent effort loosed the strings of his tongue, and forced himself to speak in order to prevent his father from being killed by a soldier. We may mention also the report, that the vanquished monarch was first placed on a pile of wood to be burned alive, and was already on the point of being consumed by the flames, when the loud repetition of the name of Solon, with whom he had formerly conversed on human happiness, moved his conqueror to pity and rescued him from danger.* Incidents like these savor too much of fiction. The narrative of Xenophon, which we have adopted, is much more natural, more consistent, and consequently more deserving of credit.

Cyrus henceforward took Crœsus with him in all his expeditions, either through esteem for his person and a desire to profit by his counsels, or perhaps through motives of prudence and policy, and in order to guard against future contingencies.

We have already mentioned, that Crœsus was induced to engage in a war against the Persians by an ambiguous answer of the oracle of Delphi. After his defeat, he sent a messenger to reproach the oracle for having deceived him. The pretended god justified his answers by saying that, when he foretold the destruction of a great monarchy, he meant the overthrow, not

* Herod. b. i, ch. 85—87.

of the Persian, but of the Lydian empire! It was by predictions of this kind, that the evil spirit, the real author of these deceitful oracles, imposed on his deluded votaries, by concealing his meaning under such ambiguous expressions, that, whatever the event, the prediction might be verified.

NEW CONQUESTS OF CYRUS.—FALL OF BABYLON.—FOUNDATION OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.—B. C. 547—536.

THE victory of Cyrus over Croesus, and its immediate consequences, had given to the former of these monarchs a decided superiority over all his enemies. Lesser Asia, nay rather the whole continent between the *Ægean* sea and the river Euphrates, was obliged to acknowledge his laws. Conquest followed conquest. Phenicia, Syria, Palestine and a portion of Arabia were subdued; Egypt shared the same fate, or was at least rendered tributary. The Babylonian empire crumbled on all sides; there remained only its proud capital, which still defied the power of Cyrus; but this conqueror had now deprived its inhabitants of almost all foreign assistance. Having therefore completed his measures, he re-entered Assyria, and driving before him the hostile parties that presumed to oppose his march, at last laid siege to Babylon.

This was the most arduous task that he had ever undertaken. The height of the walls, the strength of the fortifications, and a supply of provisions sufficient to support the garrison and inhabitants for twenty years, seemed to render the place impregnable. So many obstacles did not discourage Cyrus, nor deter him from his design. Judging it however impossible to carry the city by storm, he ordered a line of circumvallation to be drawn, and a deep and wide ditch to be dug about it, apparently with the hope of reducing the Babylonians by famine; and to avoid excessive fatigue among his soldiers, he divided the whole army into twelve bodies, and assigned to each its month to guard the trenches. The besieged, who thought themselves perfectly secure against every danger whether of assault or famine, insulted Cyrus from the top of their walls, and laughed at his various exertions as waste of time and unprofitable labor.

The siege continued in this manner for two years, at the end of which it was or seemed to be no more advanced than on the first day. But just at this time Cyrus was informed that the Babylonians were preparing for a great feast, and that they would celebrate it by spending the whole night in revelling and debauchery. He seized upon this favorable opportunity to execute

the bold scheme he had formed. Having posted two bodies of his troops in the two places in which the Euphrates entered and left the city, he commanded them to penetrate into Babylon by marching in the channel of the river as soon as they found it fordable. In the evening he caused the canals to be opened that led to the vast ditches which had lately been dug, to make the waters flow into them, or as Herodotus says, into the great lake situated at some distance in the country; by this means, the channel of the Euphrates was in a short time sufficiently emptied to afford an easy passage. The two bodies of troops just mentioned entered it about midnight, under the command of two Assyrian lords who had long since become the faithful allies of Cyrus. They advanced towards each other without meeting any obstacle.

Through surprising negligence or rather providential forgetfulness on the part of the Babylonians, they had left open the brazen gates of the wall built within the city along each side of the river. These gates, had they been shut, would have sufficed to defeat the whole enterprise of the besiegers; but the inhabitants were blinded by their pride, and, notwithstanding the proximity of the danger, perceived not the precipice yawning beneath their feet. The Persians therefore easily penetrated into the very heart of Babylon. Having in consequence of their previous agreement met near the palace, they surprised the guards and cut them to pieces; then rushing through the doors, they quickly took possession of the whole palace and put King Baltassar and all his attendants to the sword. With this prince fell the Babylonian or second Assyrian empire, after it had lasted two hundred and ten years from Nabonassar, and eighty-eight years after it had been transferred from Ninive to Babylon. On the following day, the citadel surrendered without resistance, and Cyrus saw himself the undisputed master of the strongest and most powerful place in the world (B. c. 538).

This momentous event, with all its leading circumstances, had been clearly foretold by the Hebrew prophets. Nearly two hundred years before it happened, Isaiah had declared it in these words: "The burden of Babylon, which Isaiah the son of Amos saw. Upon the dark mountain lift ye up a banner, exalt the voice, lift up the hand, and let the rulers go into the gates. . . . Behold I will stir up the Medes against them (the inhabitants of Babylon). . . . Thus saith the Lord to my anointed Cyrus, whose right hand I have taken hold of, to subdue nations before his face, and to turn the backs of kings, and to open the doors before him; and the gates shall not be shut. I will go before thee, and

will humble the great ones of the earth: I will break in pieces the gates of brass, and will burst the bars of iron. And I will give thee hidden treasures, and the concealed riches of secret places, that thou mayest know that I am the Lord who call thee by thy name, the God of Israel.”*

The prophet Jeremias had also expressly foretold the ruin of the Babylonian city and people.† But the most solemn and impressive warning of God’s justice against Babylon was given in that city itself.

In the very night which beheld its downfall, whilst King Baltassar was feasting with his nobles and profaning the sacred vessels of the temple of Jerusalem, “there appeared fingers, as it were of the hand of a man, writing over against the candlestick upon the surface of the wall of the king’s palace.” The words written by this miraculous hand were: MANE, which means *number*; THECEL, *weight*; PHARES, *division*: to signify, as Daniel interpreted them by the light of heavenly inspiration, that the Babylonian monarchy was at an end, having now *completed the number* of her days, being *weighed* in the scale of divine justice, and *divided* among or given over to the Medes and Persians. “The same night, Baltassar the Chaldean king was slain; and Darius, the Mede” (the same as Cyaxares II), “succeeded to the kingdom.”‡

As to the subsequent fate of Babylon, it had been thus foretold by Isaiah: “That Babylon, famous among kingdoms, the famous pride of the Chaldeans, shall be even as the Lord destroyed Sodom and Gomorrha. It shall no more be inhabited for ever, and it shall not be founded unto generation and generation: neither shall the Arabian pitch his tent there, nor shall shepherds rest there. But wild beasts shall rest there, and their houses shall be filled with serpents. . . . And I will make it a possession for the ericius and pools of waters, and I will sweep it and wear it out with a besom, saith the Lord of hosts. The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying: Surely as I have thought, so shall it be; and as I have purposed, so shall it fall out.”§

This astonishing prediction was literally, though gradually fulfilled. Babylon, much neglected by its new sovereigns, who preferred other cities for their residence, became, after the lapse of some ages, entirely deserted. Its walls, houses and public buildings falling to decay, whilst no one took care to repair them, were by degrees reduced to a heap of ruins, and finally

* Isa. xiii, 1, 2, 17; and xlv, 1—3.

† Jerem. xxv, 1, li.

‡ See the whole narrative in Daniel, v.

§ Isa. xiii, 19—21; and xiv, 23—25.

changed into a wild solitude, the receptacle of noxious beasts, owls and reptiles. So it has continued to the present day. Rubbish and nitre cover the spot formerly occupied by its amazing towers and palaces; the ground, everywhere intersected with marshes, barren and dreary, presents nothing to the eye of the traveller but scenes of death and desolation. The just chastisement of God visited this impious and proud city, and it disappeared from the earth.

Cyrus had achieved, by the reduction of Babylon, the grand object of all his enterprises, and brought a formidable conflict of twenty-one years to a most prosperous issue. As his modesty was equal to his abilities, he left the principal share of power to his uncle Cyaxares, king of Media. They divided the vast empire just conquered by their united armies into one hundred and twenty provinces, and intrusted the government of them to those who had most distinguished themselves by their services during the war. Appropriate rewards and honors were likewise bestowed on the whole army. After these important regulations, Cyrus made a general review of his forces: they were found to consist of two thousand chariots armed with scythes, one hundred and twenty thousand horse, and six hundred thousand infantry. When he had supplied the cities or castles with garrisons, and the various parts of the empire with a sufficient number of soldiers for their defence, he marched with the remainder into Syria, where he regulated the affairs of that province, and afterwards subdued many other nations, pursuing his victorious career even as far as Ethiopia. But the particulars of these expeditions are unknown.

Cyaxares II died two years after the overthrow of the Babylonian monarchy, and Cambyses, king of Persia, also died about the same time. Cyrus, having returned to Babylon, took the reins of government into his own hands. Being the successor of both these princes and the conqueror of so many countries, his accession to the throne (B. C. 536) was the real epoch of the foundation of a new empire, more extensive than any that had hitherto existed.

RELIGION, GOVERNMENT, LAWS AND MANNERS OF THE
ANCIENT PERSIANS.—CAUSES OF THEIR RAPID PROGRESS,
AND OF THEIR SUBSEQUENT DECLINE.

1. *Religion*.—The religion of the ancient Persians was idolatry, not, it is true, under so gross a form as that of most other nations of antiquity, but still real heathenism. The usual objects of their worship were the sun, and, as a natural consequence, fire.

They had no temples, and rather seemed to hold them in detestation, as they consigned to the flames all the temples which they found in Greece, during their expedition in that country under Xerxes. Cicero relates (lib. 2, *De Leg.*) that this work of destruction was attributed to the advice of the Magi, or Persian philosophers, whose sect had been founded or re-organized by Zoroaster, a famous legislator of Persia. This country also, more than any other, admitted the false doctrine of two creators and principles, the one good, the other evil, a doctrine which became, at a later period, the capital dogma of the Manichean heresy.

2. *Government*.—The government among the Persians, as among the other oriental nations, was an absolute and hereditary monarchy. Yet, the authority of the Persian kings, from the time of Darius Hystaspes, was kept within certain bounds by a state-council of seven members, who were still more commendable for their wisdom and abilities than for their high birth and social elevation. The provinces were placed under the immediate control, not of viceroys, who at a great distance from the court might have too easily abused their power, but of governors of an inferior rank called Satraps. Their number was from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and twenty-seven, according to circumstances which may have occurred in the division of the empire; it was afterwards reduced to twenty. These satraps were obliged to give an account of their administration and conduct to three general superintendents, who themselves had to make their report to the sovereign. The prophet Daniel, being no less esteemed by Cyaxares and Cyrus than he had been by Nabuchodonosor, was appointed by them to be one of the three superintendents, and even, it appears, the first of the three, and the highest of all in the royal confidence.

3. *Laws*.—The Persians had excellent laws to secure an exact distribution of justice. It was frequently administered by the king himself. Ordinary cases were tried before judges, whom the law appointed to that important office only when they had

attained great maturity of judgment, and at least fifty years of age. One of their essential rules was, never to condemn any one until he should have a fair opportunity and sufficient time to answer, if he could, all the charges brought against him; and then, if the accused person was found innocent, the penalties which he himself would have suffered, if he had been convicted, were inflicted on his accuser. The government, as may be gathered from certain facts, watched with great care over the integrity and disinterestedness of the judges. One of them having permitted himself to be bribed, was condemned to death by the king, and his skin was fastened to the chair in which his son and successor in office had to sit, to remind him continually of his duty.

4. *Manners and Customs.*—One of the most striking features in the customs of the ancient Persians was the manner in which they conducted the education of their children. They did not, says Xenophon (Cyrop. b. i, c. 2), as many other people do, wait till their sons had reached an advanced age, to deter them from vice and teach them the practice of virtue: young boys were placed, from the beginning, under the care of experienced, virtuous, and vigilant masters, equally capable of instructing them by word and example. They were subjected to a rule which settled every thing that they had to do, the duration of their exercises, the time of their meals, the quality of their food and drink, etc. To accustom them early to sobriety and temperance, their food was bread and cresses, their beverage water; this plain diet, excluding spices and dainties, strengthened their bodies, and contributed to give them a vigorous constitution, well calculated to bear afterwards the severest labor and fatigue. As to their moral education, they were particularly trained to the duties of justice, frugality, and thankfulness for benefits received; and, as a matter of course, they learned to detest intemperance, ingratitude, and lying, as degrading vices. Such were the Persians, until the full establishment of their empire.

5. *Progress.*—What has already been said may partly explain their rapid progress, victories and conquests under Cyrus. Being a sober, healthy, courageous and warlike people, they easily defeated and subdued nations which had been long since enervated by the possession of great riches and an indolent life, or by effeminacy and dissolute manners. Another great cause of their success was the transcendent genius of Cyrus, who proved himself far superior in ability to all his adversaries, and who carried the science of war and government to a higher degree of perfection than any previous conqueror or monarch.—Far above

these particular causes, we ought to recognise in the rapid rise of this new monarchy, the action of God's providence, choosing, preparing and enabling the Persians to destroy the proud empire of Babylon, and to be the protectors of his chosen people.

6. *Decline.*—But when the Persians, in their turn, permitted themselves to be weakened and corrupted by their prosperity; when their former virtuous dispositions and moral qualities were partly superseded by the opposite vices, and especially when they began to indulge in all the excesses of sensuality, effeminacy and luxury, they soon brought their monarchy to its decline.*

It is, indeed, well known that this was not the case with the Persians only. The most enlightened statesmen, philosophers and historians have unanimously taught as an incontestable truth, that luxury carried to a certain degree never fails to cause the ruin of the most flourishing states; and constant experience has ever proved the accuracy of this maxim. But never did it so strikingly appear as among the Persians. They were no longer the same warlike nation that they had been before and under Cyrus; they raised innumerable troops, but had few soldiers. On account of these numerous armies, and a certain natural bravery which they possessed, they might still appear formidable to the degenerate nations of the East; but, when they came in contact with the martial tribes of Europe, they experienced nothing but defeats and disappointments, till at length they were entirely overthrown by the bold attacks of the Macedonian conqueror.

* See on this subject, the judicious remarks of Xenophon, in the last book and last chapter of his *Cyropædia*; and those of Bossuet, in his admirable *Discourse on Universal History*, part iii, ch. 5.

PART IV.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE (B. C. 536), TO ITS OVERTHROW, AND THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT (B. C. 324).

REIGN OF CYRUS.—B. c. 536—529.—DEATH AND CHARACTER OF THAT PRINCE.

THE first care of Cyrus after he began to reign alone over the vast monarchy which he had founded, was to set the captive Jews at liberty and restore them to the land of their fathers. He published a solemn edict permitting them all to return thither, carry back their sacred vessels and rebuild the temple of Jerusalem (B. c. 536).*

They set out from Babylon to the number of about forty-two thousand under the conduct of Zerobabel, a prince of the royal family of Juda. Owing to the jealousy of their neighbors, the Samaritans, they experienced great difficulty in carrying out the benevolent intentions of Cyrus and his successors; at length, repeated decrees in their favor from the court of Persia, enabled them to reassume their former civil position and rebuild not only the temple, but also the walls and fortifications of Jerusalem. From that time, they long continued happy in the faithful observance of their law under the constant protection of the Persian monarchs.

As to Cyrus, the chief instrument and executor of God's designs in behalf of the chosen people, he now peacefully enjoyed the fruit of his labors and victories. "To those who were subject to him," says Xenophon, "he showed all kindness and regard as to his children; and they returned to Cyrus duty, affection and respect as to a father."† A man of truly superior genius, he displayed in the government of the vast dominions under his sway, the same consummate prudence and successful

* See the end of the second book of Paralipomenon and the beginning of the first book of Esdras.

† *Cyrop.* b. viii, ch. 8.

ability that he had so long evinced at the head of armies. His empire extended from the river Indus to the *Ægean* shore, and from the *Euxine* and *Caspian* seas to the *Arabian* sea and the boundaries of *Æthiopia*. He usually resided, during autumn and winter, in *Babylon*, on account of the greater warmth of the climate; he spent the spring in *Susa*, and the summer season, or the greater portion of it, in *Ecbatana*, under a more northern and cool temperature.

To a very advanced age Cyrus enjoyed excellent health, the fruit of his sober and temperate life. The manner of his death is not certainly known. If we may believe *Herodotus* and *Justin*,* he fell into an ambuscade, and was slain with two hundred thousand men of his troops, in a battle against the *Scythians*. According to the more credible account of *Xenophon*,† Cyrus, having undertaken a new journey to *Persia*, died there very calmly in his bed, surrounded by his family and friends.‡

* *Herodotus*, b. i, ch. 214.—*Justin*, b. i, ch. 8.

† *Cyrop.* b. viii, ch. 7.

‡ "This is," says *Prideaux*, "by much the more probable account of the two; for it is by no means likely that so wise a man as *Cyrus*, and so advanced in years as he then was, should engage in so rash an undertaking as that *Scythian* expedition is described by those who tell us of it. Neither can it be conceived how, after such a blow, his new-erected empire could have been upheld, especially in the hands of such a successor as *Cambyzes* was, or how it could be possible that he should, so soon after it, be in a condition to wage such a war as he did with the *Egyptians*, and make such an absolute conquest of that country as he did. That such a wild-headed man could settle himself so easily in his father's new-erected empire, and hold it in such quiet at home, and so soon after his coming to it, enlarge it with such conquests abroad, could certainly be owing to nothing else, but that it was founded in the highest wisdom, and left to him in the highest tranquillity. Besides, all authors agree, that *Cyrus* was buried at *Pasargada*, in *Persia*; in which country, *Xenophon* saith he died, and his monument there continued to the time of *Alexander*: (*Strabo*, lib. 15, p. 730; *Plutarchus in vita Alexandri*, *Q. Curtius*, *Arrianus*, aliique). But if he had been slain in *Scythia*, and his body there mangled by way of indignity to it, in such a manner as *Herodotus* and *Justin* do relate, how can we suppose it could ever have been brought thence out of those enraged barbarians, to be buried at *Pasargada*?"—*Prideaux's Connections, or History of the Jews and neighboring nations*, vol. i, b. iii, ad ann. B. C. 530.

In another place (ad ann. B. C. 559), the same author shows with equal perspicuity, that *Xenophon's* account at large of the life and actions of *Cyrus* is highly preferable to that given by *Herodotus* and his copiers; contrary to the opinion of those who consider the *Cyropædia* of the former, not as an authentic history, but as an historical romance and a description, not of what that prince really was, but of

He lived about seventy years, thirty of which had elapsed since the beginning of his public and military career; nine from the taking of Babylon; and seven from the time when he commenced to reign alone, after the death of his uncle Cyaxares II.

Cyrus had the misfortune not to know and worship the true God, by whom he was favored with so much prosperity. Be-

what a just and virtuous prince ought to be. The words of the English historian of the Jews, are as follows:

"It must be acknowledged, that Xenophon, being a great commander as well as a great philosopher, did graft many of his maxims of war and policy into that history, and to make it a vehicle for this, perchance was his whole design in writing that book. But it doth not follow from hence, but that still the whole foundation and groundplot of the work may be all true history. That he intended it for such, is plain," (from the work itself, especially from the beginning, where he testifies his labor and diligence of research); "and that it was so, its agreeableness with the holy writ doth abundantly verify. And the true reason why he chose the life of Cyrus before all others for the purpose above-mentioned, seemeth to be no other, but that he found the true history of that excellent and gallant prince to be, above all others, the fittest for those maxims of right policy and true princely virtue to correspond with, which he grafted upon it. And therefore, bating the military and political reflections, the descants, discourses, and speeches interspersed in that work, which must be acknowledged to have been all of Xenophon's addition, the remaining bare matters of fact I take to have been related by that author, as the true history of Cyrus. And thus far I think him to have been of much better credit in this matter than Herodotus. For Herodotus, having travelled through Egypt, Syria, and several other countries, in order to the writing of his history, did as travellers use to do, that is, put down all relations upon trust as he met with them, and no doubt he was imposed on in many of them;" the more so, as he appears, in many parts of his narrative, to have been over-credulous and fond of marvellous stories. "But Xenophon was a man of another character (Diog. Laertius in *vita Xenophontis*), who wrote all things with great judgment and due consideration; and having lived in the court of Cyrus the Younger, a descendant of the Cyrus whom we now speak of, had opportunities of being better informed of what he wrote of this great prince, than Herodotus was; and confining himself to this argument only, no doubt he examined all matters relating to it more thoroughly, and gave a more accurate and exact account of them, than could be expected from the other, who wrote of all things at large as they came in his way."

Thus far Prideaux, whose views not being biassed in this by any sectarian spirit or national prejudice, seem decisive in favor of Xenophon. For these reasons, a multitude of judicious writers and critics do not hesitate to follow the *Cyropedia*, rather than any other account of Cyrus' life and actions, that differs from it. Such, among others, are the learned authors of *English Univ. Hist.* vol. vii, pp. 290—292, and 313;—Bossuet, *Discourse on Univ. Hist.* part i, ad ann. b. c. 536;—Rollin's *Ancient Hist.*, vol. ii, pp. 278—282;—Gérard, *Leçons sur l'Histoire*, vol. v, pp. 402, 403; etc.

sides what profane history repeatedly tells us of his sacrifices to the gods, we read in the Scripture, "Thus saith the Lord to my anointed Cyrus. . . . I am the Lord, and there is none else; there is no God besides me; I girded thee, and thou hast not known me.*" He is also reproached for not having taken that care of the education of his sons, which had been taken of his own. But, in other respects, how many qualifications and moral virtues adorned the character of Cyrus! He united all the requisites of a true hero, a great conqueror and an excellent monarch, such as courage, wisdom, clemency, magnanimity, and a liberality that made him value riches only so far as they enabled him to do good; a wonderful ability in conducting men by insinuation and mildness; a thorough knowledge of the military science of his time, which he even greatly improved among the Persians; an inventive genius, astonishing activity and consummate prudence in prosecuting the greatest and most arduous designs.

It is easy for some persons to appear great on public occasions, for instance, on the field of battle, whilst their private life may be mean and contemptible. Not so Cyrus. Chaste, modest and temperate, he always appeared the same, that is, always great, even in the most ordinary actions of life. Notwithstanding the superiority of his talents, he was never ashamed to ask advice, and to prefer, whenever circumstances required it, the judgment of others to his own. Easiness of access, kindness of manners, affability and moderation, ever shone conspicuous in him, and without weakening the respect, gained him the affection of every one; Cicero makes the remark that this prince, during the whole time of his government, was never heard to speak one harsh or angry word.† This is certainly one of the highest encomiums that can be bestowed on a monarch raised to the summit of power and greatness; and yet there was something in him still more praiseworthy, viz.: his intimate and practical persuasion that all his labors and efforts ought to tend to the happiness of his people. Hence, the same illustrious author does not hesitate to say that the reign of Cyrus is justly proposed by Xenophon as a model of an excellent government.‡

It was by the happy union of so many moral qualifications and so much ability, that this great prince founded in a short time a

* Isa. xlv, i, 5.

† Cujus summo in imperio nemo unquam verbum ullum asperius audit. Lib. i. Epist. 2. *ad Quint. frat.*

‡ Cyrus a Xenophonte scriptus est ad justı effigiem imperii.—*Idem, Epist. ad Quint. frat.*

very extensive empire; governed it with great facility during the remainder of his life; enjoyed the esteem and love, not only of his native subjects, but also of the nations whom he had subdued, and, after his death, was universally regretted as the common father of all.

FIRST SUCCESSORS OF CYRUS—CAMBYSES AND SMERDIS.

B. C. 529—521.

THE most accomplished monarch of profane antiquity left his place to be filled by a wretched prince, a very madman; for such was Cambyses, the son and successor of Cyrus. He did not seem to be naturally deficient in talent, much less in courage; but, being irascible in the extreme, violent, revengeful and prone to cruelty, he commonly followed no other guide than the impulse of the moment and the dictate of passion.

In the fourth year of his reign, Cambyses declared war against Egypt, which country had probably shaken off the Persian yoke. He first attacked Pelusium, the key of that kingdom on the eastern frontier, and to accelerate the conquest of this place had recourse to a singular and cunning stratagem. By his command, the Persians, in going to the assault, placed just before them a large number of cats, dogs, sheep and other animals held sacred by the Egyptians: as the soldiers of the garrison, for fear of killing some of these animals, would not hurl their darts nor make use of their weapons against the assailants, the city was carried without opposition.—A numerous army of Egyptians, who came forward to arrest the progress of Cambyses, was defeated with nearly the same facility; Memphis, their capital, was taken by storm, and in a short time the whole country submitted to the Persian monarch.

King Psammenitus himself had fallen into the hands of the conqueror. He at first experienced a kind and even honorable treatment; but, as he repaid this kindness and generosity only by exciting fresh disturbances, he was made to suffer the punishment of death. The Egyptians may be said to have lost from that time their national existence. Frequently, it is true, they endeavored to recover it; but they could never obtain entire and lasting success, and all their efforts to this purpose served only, sooner and later, to rivet their chains more closely.

Cambyses, greatly animated by the advantages which he had obtained, resolved to pursue his career of conquest. Ethiopia and that part of Africa inhabited by the Ammonians, were now the principal objects of his ambition; he sent a detachment of

fifty thousand men against the latter, and he himself led the main body of his troops against the former. No expedition could have been more rashly undertaken, or more fatally concluded. The detachment, after having passed the city of Oasis, was, it is believed, buried in the desert under heaps of moving sand; and famine destroyed so great a number of soldiers in the rest of the army, that Cambyzes was obliged to go back in shame and disgrace.

On his way, he again entered Memphis, and found that city in the midst of rejoicings. Imagining that the ill success of his enterprise was the cause of this great joy, he fell into a rage, and caused the magistrates to be put to death. Being then told by the priests, that the source of the public exultation was the discovery of their god Apis, he expressed a desire to see him; when, instead of a god, he saw a calf, he again gave way to his fury, and killed the animal with a dagger.

Still greater were the excesses perpetrated by Cambyzes against the members of his own family. Having with him in the army his brother Smerdis, he began to entertain a silly and base jealousy on his account. For this reason, he first sent him away to Persia, and then after a dream which renewed his apprehension, despatched an executioner to behead that unfortunate prince. He killed his sister Meroe in a still more shocking manner, namely, by a violent blow with his foot. These and other crimes rendered him so odious, that another Smerdis, strikingly resembling the prince of that name, caused himself to be proclaimed king as the true son and successor of Cyrus.

Cambyzes was apprized of this event, whilst on his way from Egypt. He immediately prepared to march at the head of his troops against the usurper; but, as he was mounting his horse for this expedition, his sword slipped out of the scabbard, and so seriously wounded him, that he died in a few days, after he had reigned seven years and eight months (B. C. 522).

The premature death of Cambyzes, and the previous murder of his brother which had been generally kept secret, secured for a time the possession of the throne to the counterfeit Smerdis: he endeavored, by many benefits and favors, to gain the affection of the people, taking at the same time every precaution to conceal his imposture, which was, however, strongly suspected by the chief lords of the court. Through a confidential person who lived in the palace, they fully ascertained the fraud, from the fact that the very man who now reigned over the Persians had formerly had his ears cut off by order of Cyrus.

Upon the verification of this important fact in the person of

Smerdis, the lords unanimously resolved to deliver their country and themselves from the sway of that usurper. Before their design could in any way come to notice, they obtained admission into the palace, and having, either by persuasion or open force, reached the royal apartments, they killed Smerdis; then severing the head from the body, they immediately showed it to the people, in order to make the whole imposture universally known. On the following day, Darius Hystaspes, one of the seven lords who had carried out this bold attempt, was saluted king by the other six; and he, on his part, showed his gratitude by conferring on them ample privileges, and raising them to the highest dignities.

This revolution happened in the year B. C. 521. It was the beginning of a long and celebrated reign, of which we will have much to say, after having taken a view of the contemporary transactions at Rome and Athens.

TARQUIN THE PROUD, THE LAST OF THE ROMAN KINGS.—
B. C. 534—509.

THE crafty ambition of an impostor had, within a short time, occasioned in Persia a double change of dynasty; at Rome, the pride and cruelty of a tyrant led the way to a change of the monarchical into the republican form of government. Lucius Tarquin, justly surnamed the *proud*, after having usurped the sovereign power by the murder of his father-in-law Servius, retained possession of the throne by the same odious means to which he owed his elevation. His whole reign presented a series of cruelties and acts of injustice. Hence, neither his victories and conquests over the enemies of Rome, nor the splendid edifices which he undertook or finished in the city, could wipe away the stain of his usurpation, and obliterate the remembrance of his crimes. His power was upheld by numerous bands of soldiers and satellites; but his subjects were his enemies, and readily availed themselves of the first opportunity to overthrow his oppressive domination.

During the siege of Ardea, a rich city of the Rutuli, Sextus Tarquinius, the king's son, offered violence to Lucretia, the virtuous wife of his cousin Collatinus. This lady, in the deepest affliction, called in her husband, her father, and their intimate friends Valerius and Brutus, and, having entreated them to punish her oppressor, stabbed herself with a dagger and fell dead in their presence. Brutus, raising the bloody weapon, swore on the spot that he would pursue the tyrant and his family with

fire and sword, until royalty should be abolished in Rome. His three friends took the same oath. Their indignation was soon communicated to the other citizens; the people and the army joined in their views, and a decree was passed, with unanimous consent, to banish from among them not only the Tarquins, but even the title and the name of king. This decree was immediately enforced, and its execution put an end to the regal power in Rome, after it had lasted, under seven successive kings, for the space of two hundred and forty-four years (B. C. 753—509).

ROME A REPUBLIC.—CONSULS.—WAR AGAINST PORSENNA.—
BATTLE OF REGILLUS WHICH INSURED THE EXISTENCE
OF THE COMMONWEALTH.—B. C. 509—496.

THE Roman people now directed their attention to the adoption of a new form of government. After several debates, it was unanimously agreed that two supreme magistrates, under the name of *Consuls*, should be annually chosen from the patrician order by the suffrages of the citizens, for the administration of the commonwealth. These magistrates were to be invested with full power to convene public meetings, to preside over the senate, to levy troops, and select their officers, to administer the revenues of the state, and impart justice to private persons, etc. Hence their authority might, in some respect, be deemed equal to that of kings; but, besides its being divided between two, it was not to extend, in virtue of each election, beyond the term of one year, and the modest appellation of *consuls* constantly reminded them that they were, not the sovereigns, but the *counsellors* and guardians of the republic.

The first Romans whom the choice of the people raised to this dignity, were Brutus and Collatinus. The latter did not possess it long. Although the most deeply injured in the tragical affair of Lucretia, he became somewhat odious to the citizens, merely by evincing less energy than his colleague against the exiled family of the Tarquins, and for this reason he was earnestly exhorted, and at last prevailed upon to resign his office, which was immediately conferred on Valerius.

In the mean time, Tarquin, the dispossessed monarch of Rome, was devising every measure to recover his throne. He had retired among the Etrurians, from whom he was descended on the maternal side; they agreed, at his earnest request, to send an embassy to Rome, for the purpose of recovering his movable property. But the ambassadors were also directed to make every exertion to prepare the way for his return. They fulfilled both

commissions with great zeal and every appearance of success: the senate granted their first request; and, as to their second and much more important object, many young men of the first nobility in Rome did not hesitate to adopt their views concerning the re-establishment of royalty in the person of Tarquin.

The momentous plan was already arranged, and measures adopted for its accomplishment, when the whole conspiracy was detected by a slave called Vindicius, who had overheard the conversation of the accomplices. They were immediately arrested, and their letters to the tyrant having fallen into the hands of the consuls, removed every doubt as to the reality of the plot. It was a distressing sight for Brutus to find his two sons among the conspirators; the more so, as his office of first consul obliged him to act as their judge. That stern Roman, not shrinking from the duty, without hesitation sacrificed parental affection to the liberty of his country; and the two unhappy young men, with their accomplices, suffered capital punishment.

So terrible an execution raised to the highest pitch the animosity of the two parties. When Tarquin shortly after attacked Rome at the head of an army, the battle was obstinately disputed, and the loss nearly equal on both sides. The Romans, it is true, remained masters of the field, but they had to deplore the loss of Brutus, who fell during the conflict by the hand of Aruns, one of the sons of Tarquin, after having inflicted a mortal wound on Aruns himself. He was honored by the people with magnificent obsequies; and the Roman ladies, with unanimous consent, wore mourning for him during a whole year, in order to show their gratitude for the zealous avenger of chastity.

Not long after, the Romans suffered another great loss by the death of Valerius, the friend and colleague of Brutus. This great man, notwithstanding the numerous proofs he had given of patriotism and devotedness to the commonwealth, was once suspected of aspiring to royalty, chiefly because he inhabited a house of difficult access and built upon a hill, as if he had intended to make it a citadel. He was no sooner apprized of this unjust suspicion, than he caused the house to be entirely demolished. He moreover passed many laws highly favorable to public liberty; among others, one which permitted every citizen condemned to any severe punishment, to appeal from the sentence of the magistrate to the judgment of the people. For this reason, Valerius was surnamed *Publicola*, and is still known in history under that popular title. But what did him still greater honor, was his perfect disinterestedness: although he passed through the highest offices of the state, and had for a long time

the management of the public revenues, he never sought to enrich himself, nor even to increase his little fortune. He died so poor that he did not leave enough to meet the funeral expenses. They were, of course, amply defrayed by the government, and the same honors were paid to him that had been paid to the memory of Brutus.

The authors and chief defenders of Roman liberty were gradually disappearing; but the spirit which animated them still lived, and others, endowed with the same indomitable energy of soul, arose in their stead, to support and strengthen the fabric so successfully begun. A fresh attack directed against them by their former sovereign, required once more the display of their courage. The army of the assailants was headed at this time by Porsenna, king of the Etrurians, a prince justly renowned for his conduct and valor, and an ally of the Tarquins. In a first battle fought near the Tiber, the Roman generals were wounded, and their troops put to flight after a sharp and bloody conflict. The conquerors would have entered the city together with the fugitives, had it not been for the wonderful intrepidity of a Roman called Horatius Cocles. This brave warrior placed himself at the entrance of the bridge over which the pursuers had to pass, and defended it in spite of all their efforts, till the bridge was entirely broken down behind him by his fellow-soldiers. He then leaped with his arms into the Tiber, and swam safely to his friends, "having," says Livy, "achieved an exploit which posterity will find it more easy to admire than to believe."*

A second engagement proved more favorable to the Romans, and cost Porsenna no less than five thousand of his soldiers; this made him take the determination to change the siege into a blockade, and endeavor to reduce the city by famine. Starvation began to rage fearfully among the inhabitants, whose number being about three hundred thousand soon exhausted their provisions. In this distress, the Romans were again rescued from further danger by the daring and desperate act of one of their citizens, a conspicuous youth named Mucius, and afterwards surnamed *Scævola*: that young man entered the Etrurian camp unperceived, and penetrating into the very tent of Porsenna, killed the secretary whom he mistook for the king. Porsenna generously spared his life; but, alarmed at the danger to which he had been exposed, and struck at the obstinate courage of the Romans, he entered into a treaty with them. On the single con-

* *Armatus in Tiberim desiluit, multisque superincidentibus telis incolumis ad suos tranavit, rem ausus plus famæ habituram ad posteros, quam fidei.*—Livy, b. ii, ch. 10.

dification that a certain extent of territory formerly belonging to the Etrurians should be restored, he put an end to the siege, and left the royal exiles to their own resources.*

The aged Tarquin did not yet think his case entirely hopeless. Notwithstanding the failure of so many exertions, he still preserved sufficient influence over the Latin tribes, to make them unite with him in a league against the Romans. The armies took the field and met near Lake Regillus, whence the decisive action which followed took its name. Never was a battle fought with greater animosity. The chief leaders of both parties animated their troops still more by example than by words, and were found in the hottest part of the conflict; hence, nearly all of them were killed or wounded — among others, a brother and two sons of the illustrious Publicola on the one side, and on the other, a son-in-law and the two remaining sons of Tarquin, lost their lives whilst performing prodigies of valor. At last, the Romans by desperate efforts caused victory to declare in their favor. About twenty-seven thousand men had been engaged on their side, and forty-three thousand on that of the Latins, nearly seventy thousand in all; of the latter, only ten thousand escaped. Their terrified countrymen immediately sent ambassadors to sue for peace. It was granted on moderate terms, and the Romans established more firmly than ever their noble political maxim, to conquer the proud and spare the vanquished.†

This important victory most effectually secured the commonwealth of Rome. Tarquin, being now left both without a family and without resources, retired to Cumæ in Campania, where he died shortly after in grief and misery, at the advanced age of ninety years.

Of the natural abilities of this prince there can be no doubt. If we consider attentively his successful exertions for the splendor of Rome, his courage in war, his constancy in misfortune, his powerful, incessant and almost successful efforts for the recovery of this throne, and above all, the skill with which he knew how to interest so many cities and nations in his behalf, we cannot withhold from Tarquin some tribute of admiration. Still, his name has come down to posterity justly loaded with disgrace; and even during his lifetime, his pride, ambition and cruelty rendered him an object of public hatred. So true it is,

* Such is the ordinary account, founded on Livy's narrative, (b. ii, ch. 13), of the termination of the war against Porsenna. Some maintain that Rome was surrendered, and that the Romans were, for a time, tributary to the Etrurians.

† *Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.*—Virgil, *Æneid*, b. vi, l. 853.

that the most exalted talents without virtue cannot make a man truly great, nor save him from the detestation of his contemporaries and the well-merited contempt of future ages.

REVOLUTIONS IN ATHENS.—B. C. 528—501.

By a singular coincidence, the same epoch, and perhaps the very same year that beheld the abolition of the regal power in Rome, witnessed a similar change in Athens. This last city, after undergoing many revolutions, had finally submitted to the sway of Pisistratus; he governed it with great moderation and wisdom, till the year of his death (B. C. 528). His authority was transmitted, without opposition, to his sons Hippias and Hipparchus, who seemed likewise to have inherited from their father a singular esteem for learning and learned men. Their court was the residence of the best scholars of that age, among others of the famous poets Anacreon and Simonides. The arts and sciences were cultivated with increased ardor; care was taken of the moral instruction of the people; civilization was rapidly progressing. Still, under these promising appearances, there lurked a spirit of new political revolutions. Some acts of arbitrary power on the part of Hipparchus, soon led to the most serious consequences: two young Athenians, finding themselves insulted, resolved to take ample revenge by the death of the two brothers.

The first victim of their resentment was Hipparchus, the author of the insult; they boldly attacked and slew him during the celebration of a certain festivity. They themselves, it is true, were put to death for this daring attempt, but this did not save the family of Pisistratus from entire ruin; for Hippias, having also become a tyrant and rendered himself extremely odious to the people, was compelled to leave the city in or about the year B. C. 509. His expulsion from Athens was followed by the revival of the popular government.

Hippias fled for refuge to the Persian satrap Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, and endeavored by every means in his power to involve that officer in a war against Athens. He represented to him the many advantages of such an expedition, and the great services which he himself, if repossessed of the sovereign authority, might render to the Persians: Artaphernes, moved by these considerations, summoned the Athenians to reinstate Hippias among them; but the summons met with no other answer than a peremptory refusal. This was the first cause of the famous war which very shortly after broke out between the Persians and the Greeks.

PERSIAN EMPIRE.

REIGN OF DARIUS HYSTASPES TILL THE BEGINNING OF HIS WAR AGAINST THE GREEKS.—B. C. 521—500.

WE have already related how Darius arrived at the sovereign power among the Persians. One of his first cares, after his accession to the throne, was to regulate the government of the provinces, of which he made a suitable division, under their governors or satraps; and then he applied himself to the regulation of the royal finances. Before him, Cyrus and Cambyses had contented themselves with receiving such gifts or contributions as the conquered nations offered, and exacting a certain number of troops, as the state of affairs required. But Darius began to think that he would not be able to maintain peace in so many countries, without standing armies to whom a certain pay should be allowed, and the punctual payment of which would require the imposition of taxes on the people. He therefore determined to adopt this measure, but in adopting it, he evinced, at the same time, great wisdom and moderation. Sending for the chief inhabitants and most experienced persons of the various provinces, he asked them whether certain sums, which he specified, would be too great a tax for their respective districts. All answered that the sums were very moderate, and could not be burdensome to the people. The king, however, struck off one half of the amount, preferring rather to remain below the mark, than to incur in the slightest degree the imputation of oppressing his subjects.

Still, as taxes are always odious, the Persians, who had given the surname of *father* to Cyrus and of *master* to Cambyses, gave to Darius that of *merchant* or *broker*.

This prince, however, had displayed great foresight with regard to the future exigencies of his empire. No later than the fourth or fifth year of his reign, Babylon was the scene of open revolt, the repression of which occasioned an expensive levy of troops.

That city, formerly the capital of the east, soon grew impatient of the Persian yoke, especially after the removal of the seat of government to Susa, a circumstance well calculated to diminish its own wealth and splendor. The Babylonians took advantage of the late revolutions in Persia to prepare in secret for war, and now boldly setting up the standard of rebellion, they shut themselves up within their impregnable walls. Darius was

obliged to besiege them with all his forces. He used every means of attack which the art of war could suggest, to make himself master of the place; nor did he fail to put in practice the method formerly employed under Cyrus, that is, the turning of the river from its natural course. All his efforts and exertions were baffled by the experience and vigilance of the Babylonians: so that, having already spent twenty months in a tedious and fruitless siege, he began to despair of success, when a novel stratagem opened to the Persians the gates of Babylon.

One of the chief commanders of the army, Zopirus, following no other impulse than the ardor of his zeal, cut off his ears and nose, and wounded his whole body in a frightful manner. Thus disfigured and covered with blood, he fled to the Babylonians, whom he easily persuaded that Darius had reduced him to this shocking condition, for having exhorted this monarch to desist from so unprofitable a siege. He at the same time offered to assist them in taking revenge on Darius. The Babylonians, overjoyed at the acquisition of so able an officer, readily accepted his offer; they gave him a sufficient number of troops to make vigorous sallies, and so well did he conduct them, that three times in succession he defeated the Persians. At the sight of this constant success, the confidence of the Babylonians knew no longer any bounds. In the fulness of their security, they intrusted Zopirus with the command of all their forces and the defence of the walls of their city. This was precisely what he desired. When Darius, according to previous agreement, approached with his troops as if to make an assault, Zopirus opened the gates to him, and put him again in possession of a city which it was impossible to reduce by any other means.

The conduct of the king towards the vanquished, though rigorous, was tempered with clemency. He condemned three thousand of them to death, as having been the most deeply involved in the late rebellion; the rest he pardoned. He likewise ordered the powerful walls of Babylon to be partly demolished, and its hundred gates of brass to be pulled down, that it might never again be in a condition to rebel.

As to Zopirus who, at his own expense, had rendered him so signal a service, Darius bestowed on him all the rewards and honors that a sovereign can possibly confer on a subject. He granted him for the remainder of his life the whole revenue of this opulent city, and was often heard to say that, if he had twenty Babylons, he would readily give them up to repay the cruel treatment which so devoted a friend had inflicted on himself; it is even added by some that mingled feelings of compas-

sion and gratitude made him shed tears, whenever he happened to fix his eyes upon Zopirus. Sentiments like these do greater honor to a sovereign than the conquest of an empire.

After the reduction of Babylon, Darius made great preparations to attack the Scythians of Europe. This nation inhabited the vast regions lying between the Ister or Danube, and the Don or Tanais. It is commonly described by ancient historians and poets, as having been remarkable for the simplicity and innocence of its manners; what other authors assert to the contrary, ought very probably to be understood of tribes of Scythians different from those of whom we are now speaking.

The ostensible reason of this prince for attacking them, was to be revenged on them for the invasion of Asia made by their ancestors more than a hundred years before; but his real motive was ambition, and his chief object to extend his conquests. He set out from Susa with an army of seven hundred thousand men, and crossed at their head the Thracian Bosphorus, by a bridge of boats. Subduing the countries through which he advanced till he reached the Danube, he crossed that river in the same manner, and entered the Scythian territory.

To defeat so formidable a foe, the Scythians prudently agreed to retire as he advanced, and at the same time to fill up all their wells and consume all the forage and provisions of the places through which their enemies were to pass. It is easy to imagine how much the Persian army had to suffer, both from famine and the other difficulties of such a campaign. In vain did the king, through his messengers, urge the submission of the Scythians, or challenge them to a battle; they despised equally his summons and exhortations, and continued to retire at his approach.

When they knew or suspected their incautious aggressor to be reduced to the utmost distress, they sent him a herald with the following extraordinary present: *a bird, a mouse, a frog and five arrows*. Darius at first considered the gift a token of submission. But Gobryas, one of the principal lords who accompanied him, gave a very different and far more plausible interpretation of its meaning: "Know," said he to the Persians, "that unless you can fly in the air like *birds*, or hide yourselves in the earth like *mice*, or swim in the water like *frogs*, you shall not escape the *arrows* of the Scythians."

The whole Persian army, marching over a vast and barren country, was in so deplorable a condition that it had constantly before it the prospect of almost inevitable ruin. Darius himself at last became sensible of the imminent peril which threatened his troops in case he should still go forward, and clearly saw

that there was not a moment to be lost in effecting his return. He therefore gave them immediate orders to retrace their steps towards the Danube with all possible speed. This they could not do without encountering new dangers and losing many of their number; yet they succeeded in reaching that river and re-crossing it, before they were overtaken in their flight by the Scythians. The king then, leaving a part of his army in Thrace to complete the subjugation of this country, went with the remainder to Sardis, where he gave them time to take all the repose they needed, after the hardships which they had endured in that ill-concerted and unfortunate expedition.

Darius was much more successful in his attempt upon India. Here indeed he acted with much greater prudence, and before venturing an attack, caused the country on both sides of the river Indus to be carefully explored. When this was done, he led an army into India, and in a short time this rich and extensive territory was added to his dominions.

But the most earnest desire of the Persian monarch, a desire which accompanied him to the grave, was to extend his conquests in Europe. His chief aim was to invade Greece, and especially to humble the Athenian people. We have already seen (page 125), that Hippias, when expelled from Athens, took refuge near Artaphernes the governor of Sardis for Darius, and incessantly urged him to a war against his countrymen and former subjects. The Athenians on their side were incensed against Artaphernes, for taking under his protection a man whom they had banished from their city; hence, shortly after, when the Ionians or Greeks of Lesser Asia revolted against the Persian government, the Athenians readily espoused their cause, and furnished the insurgents with such aid in vessels and men, as enabled them to attack Sardis and reduce it to ashes (B. C. 500).

This event was the immediate cause of the war which Darius undertook against Greece. He had it so much at heart, even after the entire suppression of the Ionian revolt, that he ordered an officer to remind him daily of the Athenians. Thus, the burning of Sardis may be justly considered as the commencement of that astonishing struggle, so famous in history, between a small country that now would deserve no more than the name of a province or district, and a vast, powerful and formidable empire; a struggle in which the reader will repeatedly see a small number of men, jealous of their liberties, put to flight innumerable armies of invaders, destroy their mighty fleets, pursue them into their very territory, and compel the *great king* (the usual appellation of the Persian monarch) to accept degrading conditions of peace.

As this memorable war between the Greeks and the Persians was of long duration, we shall divide its history into three sections, to answer the number of the kings of Persia, by whom or under whom it was successively conducted.

§ I. WAR BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND PERSIANS, COMMENCED UNDER DARIUS.—B. C. 500—485.

THE first expedition of the Persians against Greece was placed under the command of Mardonius, Darius' son-in-law. This general, having crossed the province of Thrace, marched through Macedon, which he easily subdued; but his fleet was assailed near Mount Athos by so furious a tempest, that three hundred of his ships were destroyed and nearly twenty thousand of his men perished. About the same time, the land army also met with a very severe loss. As the Persians were encamped in a place not sufficiently guarded, a party of Thracians attacked them during the night, slew many of them, and wounded Mardonius himself. This catastrophe obliged him to return to Asia, with the terrible disappointment of having failed in his enterprise against Greece both by land and sea.

Darius, perceiving that he had placed too much reliance on the abilities of his son-in-law, recalled him from the command of the army, and substituted in his place two more experienced and able generals, called Datis and Artaphernes; he caused them to be preceded by messengers, having charge to ask of all the Grecian states, land and water, as a mark of their submission. Many of the small cities of Greece, dreading the Persian power, literally complied with the summons. Not so Sparta and Athens, where, on the contrary, the law of nations was violated in the persons of those ambassadors; some of them were thrown into a well, the others into a deep ditch, where, they were told with irony, they might take the land and water which they desired.

This new insult roused to the highest pitch the resentment of the Persians. Setting sail from the shores of Asia with six hundred vessels, they first attacked and conquered many islands of the *Ægean* sea; then directing their course towards Attica, they landed one hundred and ten thousand men near Marathon, a small town about twelve or fifteen miles from Athens. To this numerous force the Athenians could oppose only ten thousand soldiers, with an additional body of one thousand men, whom the *Platæans*, their neighbors, through gratitude for past services, readily sent to their assistance. The Spartans too had prepared to send them a body of troops; but not daring, through

some superstitious notion, to begin their march before the full moon, they could not arrive in time for the battle.

The Athenians, thus left almost entirely to their own resources, did not lose courage; on the contrary, patriotism and the love of liberty seemed to make them superior to the ordinary feelings of nature. Their little army was under the command of ten generals, who exercised the chief authority by turn, each one a day. There were among them Miltiades, Aristides and Themistocles, three men of extraordinary merit and a most exalted mind: when the turn of Aristides was come to take the command, he resigned it to Miltiades, as the more skilful general; his colleagues did the same, and this generous conduct helped Miltiades to form his plan, for the approaching conflict, with equal energy and judgment.

Like an able commander, he endeavored to make up, by the advantage of his position, for his deficiency in number and strength. To secure this object, he drew up his troops at the foot of a mountain, in order that the enemy might not be able either to surround them, or to attack them in the rear. He had also large trees cut down and thrown on both sides of the army, for the twofold purpose of rendering the Persian cavalry useless, and of covering his flanks; the Athenians waited in this order for the signal of battle. As soon as it was given, they rushed on the enemy with all the fury which national honor, courage and the dread of oppression can inspire. The Persians at first thought it an act of folly and madness on the part of their opponents, to begin the combat in this extraordinary manner; the more so, as they perceived neither archers nor cavalry. But they were quickly undeceived: their two wings were simultaneously attacked by the Athenians and Plateans with such vigor as to be soon broken and put to flight. This first success was expected by Miltiades, who, in order to procure it, had purposely chosen to weaken his centre, that he might strengthen his wings, and enable them to make from the beginning an irresistible attack.

But the Persians, on their side, seemed to have taken notice of the comparative weakness of the Athenian centre. They directed their greatest efforts against that point, and, by their bravery as well as superiority of numbers, began to obtain considerable advantage. Aristides and Themistocles, who led this portion of the army, displayed the most intrepid courage in withstanding the shock, but were obliged to give way, and beheld their battalions in danger of being entirely dispersed. Just at that moment, in accordance with the skilful plan of the commander-in-chief, their two wings came up, having already com-

pletely routed those of the enemy. The fortune of the day was soon decided; the Persians, finding themselves not only opposed in front, but also attacked on both flanks, lost courage, and were entirely driven from the field. To ensure their escape, they fled, not towards their camp, but towards their vessels; the victorious Athenians closely pursued them, and, besides capturing seven ships, set many others on fire (B. c. 490).

Such was the battle of Marathon, one of the most memorable ever fought, whether we consider the disproportion of the forces or the importance of the result. The Persians lost in it upwards of six thousand men, besides those who perished in their burning vessels, or who were drowned in the sea, whilst endeavoring to effect their escape.* The Athenians lost no more than one hundred and ninety-two men, with two of their generals.

All had fought like heroes. Among other instances of their undaunted courage, the intrepidity of Cynegirus, a brother of the poet Æschylus, shone conspicuous. Having pursued the fugitives as far as their vessels, he seized one of the ships first with his right hand, which was severed by the stroke of an axe; then with the left, which shared the same fate. He then held the vessel with his very teeth, until he expired.

Immediately after the battle, another Athenian soldier, still reeking with the blood of the enemy, ran to Athens with all possible speed, to gladden his fellow-citizens by the happy tidings of victory. When he reached the house of the magistrates, he uttered the words, "Rejoice, the victory is ours," and fell dead at their feet.

On the following day, the succor of troops promised by the Lacedæmonians arrived. They had set out immediately after the full moon, and marched with such expedition, that, in the short space of three days, they had travelled about one hundred and thirty miles. They were too late for the combat; still, they proceeded to Marathon, where they saw the fields covered with the spoils and dead bodies of the Persians. After having congratulated the Athenians on the happy success of the battle, they returned to their own country.

The battle of Marathon was of immense advantage to Greece.

* The historian Justin (b. ii, ch. 9) makes the number of the Persians who fought at Marathon amount to six hundred thousand, and their loss upon the field of battle, or in consequence of the following shipwreck, to two hundred thousand. These numbers are so very different from those given by Herodotus, b. vi, ch. 117, and Cornelius Nepos, in *Miltiad*. ch. 6, that Justin's narrative deserves to be considered as a great exaggeration and inaccuracy.

It dispelled the terror hitherto inspired by the Persian name, and clearly proved that military success does not depend so much on numbers, as on the bravery of the troops and the prudence of their general. It taught the Greeks their real strength, and, by raising their courage to the highest degree, was one of the chief causes, and, as it were, the prelude of all the signal victories that followed.

To honor the memory of those who perished in the battle, three monuments were erected on the very spot on which it was fought; one for the Athenians, another for the Platæans, and a third for the slaves that had been enrolled among the soldiers on that occasion. As to Miltiades, the chief author of the glory won on the plains of Marathon, he was allowed the privilege of occupying the first place in a splendid picture of the battle drawn by order of the state, and of being represented at the head of the ten generals of the army, exhorting his soldiers and setting them an example of courage.

This was the only recompense which this great man received. Shortly after, having partially failed in an expedition against the islands of the *Ægean* sea, he was, on his return, impeached for his want of success, as if he had been bribed, and for the useless expense he had brought upon the state. He escaped capital punishment, but was condemned to a fine of fifty talents (fifty or sixty thousand dollars), and, being unable to pay so considerable a sum, was thrown into prison, where he died of a wound that he had received in the island of Paros. Cimon, his son, then very young, displayed his filial piety on this occasion in a remarkable manner. He obtained leave to procure an honorable burial for the remains of Miltiades, and reinstated his memory, by paying the fine of fifty talents, which he collected among his relations and friends.

Aristides also, whose services were scarcely inferior to those of Miltiades, experienced in his turn the fickleness of his countrymen. Although his wisdom and integrity were so conspicuous that he acquired from them the surname of *Just*, yet the intrigues of Themistocles, his rival in the administration, caused him to be condemned by the Athenians to a temporary exile. This kind of punishment was called ostracism, from the word *OSTRAKON*, *shell*, and is thus described by Plutarch, in his life of Aristides: Every citizen took a shell or a potsherd, on which he wrote the name of the person whom he desired to have banished, and carried it to a part of the market-place which was enclosed with wooden rails. The magistrates then counted the shells. If the number did not amount to six thousand, the ostracism had no

effect; if it reached six thousand, the obnoxious person was declared an exile for five or ten years, but with permission to enjoy his estate.

When Aristides was about to be banished, an illiterate burgher, who did not know him personally, happened to meet him, and showing his shell, requested him to write the name of Aristides upon it. "Has that man done you any injury?" asked Aristides. "No," replied the other, "nor do I know him; but I am vexed, I am wearied to hear him everywhere called the Just." Aristides made no answer, but took the shell, and having written his own name upon it, returned it to the man, and set out for his exile.

It was thus, as many other instances will show, that this capricious and inconstant people usually rewarded their most illustrious citizens. However, so undeserved a treatment did not damp the patriotism of Aristides; in leaving the city, he besought Heaven to avert from the Athenians any misfortune and accident that might make them regret his absence. Three years later, at the time of the second Persian invasion, the decree of his banishment was reversed by the Athenians, and a public ordinance recalled him to the service of his country.

In the interim, the news of the battle of Marathon had reached the Persian court. It exceedingly surprised and annoyed King Darius, but did not by any means dissuade him from carrying on the war against Greece, and rather animated him the more to pursue it with unrelenting vigor, in order to be revenged at once for the burning of Sardis and the defeat at Marathon. Nor was he diverted from his project by the insurrection of the Egyptians, which occurred about that time; this fresh obstacle merely induced him to undertake two expeditions instead of one. Always full of confidence, as well as courage, and not less determined to subdue his former enemies than to chastise his refractory subjects, he resolved, though at an advanced age, to put himself again at the head of his forces, and to employ a considerable portion of his army in the subjugation of Greece, whilst the other was to march against Egypt.

But Darius had not sufficiently noticed the approach of another and more formidable enemy. Preparations on the most extensive scale were already made for his two intended expeditions, when death prevented him from carrying them into execution. He died after a memorable reign of thirty-six years (B. C. 485).

The life of Darius proves that he was not entirely exempt from ambition, vanity and despotism. These blemishes, however, seemed to proceed from the absolute power which he so

long-enjoyed, rather than from his natural disposition; both as a man and as a sovereign, he was possessed of many excellent qualities. In him were blended gentleness, equity, clemency, and kindness for his people; he loved justice, and respected the laws; he esteemed merit, and took good care to reward it; he was extremely grateful for the favors which he received, and never failed to make a suitable return. He easily forgave injuries, even those which he felt most keenly. He was not jealous of his rank or authority, so as to exact a forced homage; on the contrary, he was easy of access, and notwithstanding his own great experience and ability in public affairs, he would hearken to the advice of others, and often profit by their counsels.

With regard to military valor, Darius possessed it in an eminent degree. He was not afraid to brave the dangers of the battle-field; nor did he lose his presence of mind in the hottest part of the engagement, and he used to say of himself that his courage increased in proportion to the danger with which he was threatened. In a word, few princes have been more skilled in the science of war and government. Nor was the glory of being a conqueror wanting to his character. He failed, it is true, in his expedition against Scythia and in his attempt upon Greece; but, on the other hand, he succeeded in bringing back the revolted Ionians and Babylonians to obedience, and not only strengthened the empire of Cyrus, which had been much weakened by Cambyses and the Magian impostors, but likewise added to it many great and rich provinces, such as India, Macedon, Thrace, and the isles near the coasts of Ionia.

The greatest glory of Darius was, that Almighty God chose him, like another Cyrus, to be the instrument of his mercy towards his people, the declared protector of the Israelites, and the restorer of the temple of Jerusalem. The reader may see this part of his history in the first book of Esdras, and in the writings of the prophets Aggeus and Zacharias.*

§ II. WAR BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND PERSIANS, CONTINUED UNDER XERXES.—B. C. 485—473.

THE reign of Xerxes, according to the opinion of many learned chronologers and historians, lasted only twelve years; but it abounded in events of the highest importance.†

* 1 Esdr. v and vi; Agg. ii; Zach. i.

† See, for a full account of those events, the three last books of Herodotus; Plutarch, in his lives of *Themistocles* and *Aristides*; Justin,

A dispute arose between Xerxes and his brother Artabazanes, respecting the right of succession to the throne. The latter pleaded seniority of age; the former based his claim on his descent from Cyrus the Great by his mother Atossa, the second wife of Darius, and on the circumstance of his birth having taken place whilst Darius was on the throne, whereas Artabazanes had been born whilst his father was a private citizen. The two brothers agreed to make their uncle Artabanes arbitrator in the matter, and, without further appeal, to abide by his decision. In the meanwhile, they gave each other every proof of a truly fraternal affection, and maintained a cheerful intercourse founded on mutual esteem, confidence and friendship. When Artabanes gave his decision in favor of Xerxes, Artabazanes was the first to acknowledge his brother for his sovereign, and to place him on the throne, showing by this conduct a real merit and greatness of soul far preferable to all human dignities. Nor was this a transient feeling of magnanimity; he always remained sincerely attached to Xerxes, and died whilst fighting in his service in the battle of Salamis.

Unfortunately, Xerxes himself was far from preserving in all things, after his accession, the moderation he had evinced before his elevation. Having, without much difficulty, again subjected the Egyptians to the Persian sway, he thought that the Greeks would be as easily crushed by the overwhelming superiority of his forces. He spent four years in preparing vessels, troops and ammunition for this enterprise. Not to omit any thing which might contribute to secure the success of his expedition, he entered into a confederacy with the Carthaginians, then the most powerful nation of the west, and made an agreement with them, that, whilst the Persian armies would invade Greece properly so called, the Carthaginians should attack the Grecian colonies in Sicily and Italy, in order to prevent them from lending any assistance to the mother-country.

When Xerxes had completed his preparations, he set out from Susa to join his army in Asia Minor, while the fleet advanced along the Ionian coast towards the Hellespont. He had caused, at a vast expense, a passage to be cut for his vessels through Mount Athos, a prominent mountain of Macedonia, and for his land troops, a bridge of boats to be built over the narrow seas which separate Asia from Europe. Shortly before his arrival, a sudden and violent storm destroyed the bridge. The news of

b. ii, ch. x—xv; Corn. Nepos, in *Themist. Arist. et Pausaniam*; among the moderns, Barthélemy, *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce*, vol. i; Rollin, vol. iii; Gérard, vol. vi; etc.

this accident threw the king into such a passion, that, in his foolish pride, he ordered three hundred lashes of a whip to be inflicted on the sea, and chains to be thrown into it, to chastise the indocility of this boisterous element.

By his commands, two other bridges were built, more solid than the first, the one for the troops, the other for the baggage and beasts of burden. Notwithstanding this wise precaution of a double bridge, it required seven days and seven nights for the army to pass from the Asiatic to the European shores. So great indeed was the multitude of the soldiers who composed it, that, upon an exact review of them made by Xerxes, they were found to be about two millions, independently of three hundred thousand men destined to fight at sea. The fleet consisted of twelve hundred ships manned for war, besides two or three thousand smaller vessels intended for the transport of provisions and other uses. More than fifty nations, subject or tributary to the Persians, had contributed to this formidable fleet and army.*

At the approach of this multitude, all the tribes inhabiting the countries through which they passed, were terrified, and made their submission; in Greece itself, no cities except Sparta and Athens, with a few others of secondary rank, made even a show of resistance. What rendered the determination of the latter still more heroic, was that all their land troops ready for battle, amounted scarcely to eleven or twelve, and perhaps only to seven thousand men, in the beginning of the war. They were directed, under the conduct of Leonidas, one of the two Spartan kings, to make their first stand at the narrow passes called Thermopylæ, which give an entrance from Thessaly into Greece.

When Xerxes arrived near the Thermopylæ, he was exceedingly surprised to find a handful of men prepared to dispute his passage. Still greater was his astonishment, when having sent against them two bodies of his best troops, he saw both detachments shamefully repulsed by the Greeks. His efforts to bribe Leonidas by splendid promises, or to terrify him by an imperious summons, were all in vain: the Lacedæmonian rejected every

* The prophet Daniel had foretold this extraordinary combination of circumstances, long before the event. Writing on that subject towards the beginning of Cyrus's reign, he said, or rather the angel through whom he received the divine revelation, said to him: "Behold, there shall stand yet three kings in Persia," viz.: (*Cambyzes*, *Smerdis Magus* and *Darius*): "and the fourth," (viz.: *Xerxes*) "shall be enriched exceedingly above them all; and when he shall be grown mighty by his riches, he shall stir up all against the kingdom of Greece." (Dan. xi, 2). How striking and wonderful must this prophecy appear, when we see it so accurately verified by the event!

offer with scorn; and to the summons to deliver up his arms, he replied, with truly laconic spirit, "Come and take them."

This undaunted courage greatly perplexed Xerxes. Unable to advance, he was at a loss what step to take, when an inhabitant of the country discovered to him a secret path leading to the top of a mountain which commanded the Grecian camp; the king immediately despatched a detachment to take possession of this advantageous post. Leonidas then perceived that it was impossible to make a longer stand against the enemy. Dismissing his allies, he kept with him three hundred Spartans, with about the same number of Thespians, all of them as determined as himself, and they resolved to die together for the honor and benefit of their country.

Between this heroic band and their countless opponents, the conflict was awful and bloody. The Lacedæmonians made an immense havoc among the Persians, before they were themselves destroyed. At last, overpowered by numbers, they all fell, except one man who escaped to Sparta, where he was looked upon as a traitor to his country, till he made amends for his flight by fighting with the greatest courage and losing his life in the battle of Plataea. Shortly after, a magnificent monument was erected in honor of the three hundred Spartans, near the spot where they fought and died, with an inscription expressive of their patriotism and indomitable valor. It was comprised in the following sentence: "Go, traveller, and tell Sparta that we died here in obedience to her sacred laws."

After this dearly bought victory, Xerxes, always at the head of his land forces, proceeded towards Attica, plundering and burning the towns in his way. On his arrival at Athens, he found it deserted by its inhabitants, with the exception of a few who had remained in the citadel, where they fought till death. This high-spirited people, seeing it impossible to avert the storm that threatened their city, and preferring liberty to their dwellings, had left them and embarked on board their fleet, which, through the care of Themistocles, was at that time in excellent condition. When it was joined by the vessels of their allies, it amounted to about three hundred ships; a number, it is true, far inferior to that of the enemy, but still sufficient to harass them by desultory attacks, and to inflict severe losses on them before a decisive engagement could take place.

They continued this desultory warfare for a time with great success, especially in the straits of Eubœa, near Cape Artemisium. But no sooner was it known that Xerxes, having at last forced the defiles, was advancing into the heart of the country,

than all the naval forces of Greece determined upon a retrograde movement. They reached Salamis, a small island opposite to the shore of Attica on the Athenian side, and were soon followed by the whole Persian fleet.

Here they deliberated what course it would be expedient to pursue. Most of the leaders, supported by the commander-in-chief Eurybiades, a Lacedæmonian, were of opinion that they should retire still farther south towards Peloponnesus. Others on the contrary, among whom were Themistocles and Aristides, now well reconciled together, strongly maintained that the narrow strait of Salamis was the most advantageous position that the Greeks could desire for a general battle, since it would of itself suffice to embarrass and render useless the great multitude of the Persian vessels. As on one occasion Themistocles urged his opinion with great vehemence in presence of the other generals, Eurybiades lifted his cane over him in a threatening manner. "Strike, if you will," said Themistocles, "but hear me." This moderation, and the solidity of his reasons, caused his advice to prevail in the council; and this new determination, aided by a stratagem of the Athenian hero, actually saved Greece.*

The two fleets then made immediate preparations for battle. The Greeks were animated by the remembrance of all that is most dear in life; Xerxes, to encourage his troops by his presence, caused a throne to be erected for him on an eminence near the sea-shore. The Persians advanced with great impetuosity and courage; but their ardor was soon checked by the superior discipline, ability and resolution of the Greeks, and even by the very number and bulk of their own vessels, which could scarcely move in that narrow passage. Thus embarrassed, and finding every circumstance, the place, the wind, etc., contrary to them, whilst every thing favored the enemy, they fought in disorder, then wavered, and finally fled. The Greeks destroyed two hundred of their ships, and took many others; moreover, storms and contrary winds, both before and after the battle of Salamis, combined to disperse this once formidable armament. Its shattered remains retired towards the Asiatic coast, and never after-

* The conduct of Themistocles shows that he possessed, in an eminent degree, the two most essential requisites of a great general, presence of mind in time of danger, and sagacity to contrive the best measures for future contingencies. This is what Cornelius Nepos, in *Themist.* c. 1, elegantly expresses by the following words: "*Neque minus in rebus gerendis promptus, quàm excogitandis, erat, quòd et de instantibus, ut ait Thucydides, verissimè judicabat, et de futuris callidissimè conjiciebat.*"

wards did a Persian fleet dare attempt the invasion of Greece (B. C. 480).

Xerxes himself, astounded and terrified by his defeat, set an example of despondency. Leaving Mardonius with a considerable portion of his troops to carry on the war against the Greeks, he took the rest with him and marched, notwithstanding many obstacles, towards the Hellespont. To his great disappointment, he found the bridges broken and carried off by the violence of the waves. There was no possibility of repairing them; so that *he* whose forces lately covered land and sea, was obliged to recross the strait in a small boat, nor did he think himself perfectly secure till he had reached his own territory.

Notwithstanding this signal defeat of the Persians at Salamis, some of their vessels made a brave resistance. Among their leaders, Artemisia queen of Halicarnassus, who commanded five ships, distinguished herself by her undaunted courage and activity; this made Xerxes exclaim that men had fought that day like women, and women like men. Towards the end of the battle, seeing herself in great danger of being taken, she lowered her flag and attacked a Persian vessel with great fury. This curious stratagem had the desired effect: the conquerors believing that her ship was one of their own vessels, desisted from the pursuit.

The battle of Salamis conferred immortal honor on all the Greeks, and especially on Themistocles, the Athenian leader; for, though he was only second in command, still it was he who directed the movements of the fleet, who prepared the way for a decisive action, and who ensured the victory by his consummate prudence. His admirable conduct and the important services which he had rendered to Greece, were now acknowledged by every one. The Lacedæmonians themselves paid homage to his uncommon merit, by giving him, in their own city, marks of esteem and respect never shown to any person before. What was still more, all Greece, as it were, did the same on a most solemn occasion. At the first Olympic games that were celebrated after the battle of Salamis before an immense concourse of people, when Themistocles appeared, there was a burst of applause from the whole assembly, and during all the day, the spectators kept their eyes fixed upon him as the worthiest object of their admiration. In the judgment of Themistocles himself, this mark of public esteem was an ample reward for all his labors in the service of Greece.

The bravery of Themistocles and Eurybiades at Salamis was imitated, the year after, by Aristides and the Lacedæmonian

king Pausanias, in the equally famous battle of Plataea. Their troops, joined with those of the allies and considerably increased by previous success, amounted to about one hundred and ten thousand men, whilst the Persians, notwithstanding their preceding losses, brought into the field three hundred and fifty thousand combatants. The shock of these numerous and gallant armies was the most terrible that had been witnessed since the beginning of the war. The Lacedæmonians, Athenians and Plataeans performed prodigies of valor. The Persians likewise, with Mardonius at their head, displayed great courage: but when they saw their general fall, they fled to their intrenchments, whither the victorious Greeks pursued them with irresistible fury. The slaughter was so great, both during the battle and the pursuit, and in the forcing of the Persian camp, that of their whole army, no more than one-eighth part, that is, about forty thousand, escaped by a timely retreat.*

To complete the disaster of the Persians in this unhappy expedition, the same day in which the battle of Plataea was fought, their fleet was entirely destroyed on the Ionian shore. After spending the winter in the harbor of Cuma, an Æolian city, it had reached the promontory of Mycale near Ephesus, where the remainder of the land-troops who followed Xerxes on his return from Greece, were encamped. Here, according to the usual practice of the ancients, they drew their ships on shore, and surrounded them with a strong rampart. The Greeks having landed in the neighborhood, under the command of Leotychides the Lacedæmonian and Xanthippus the Athenian, fearlessly commenced an assault, forced the intrenchments, and putting many of the Persians to the sword, routed the remainder, and burned all their vessels.

At the news of these repeated and signal overthrows, Xerxes left Sardis as precipitately as he had left Athens after the battle of Salamis; and in order to put himself as far as possible out of the reach of his victorious enemies, he fled to a more distant part of his empire. From that epoch, so remarkable and glorious for the Greeks, no Persian army was ever seen on the European side of the Hellespont.

Of all the states of Greece engaged in the late struggle, none had displayed greater energy or acquired greater honor than the Athenians. But their city, since the passage of Xerxes and Mardonius, was a heap of ruins, and the Lacedæmonians, yielding to a base feeling of jealousy, were throwing difficulties in the

* Plutarch, in *Aristid.*—Herodotus, b. ix, ch. 70.

way of its re-establishment. The genius of Themistocles again surmounted every obstacle. By his activity and care, not only the city was rebuilt, but its position was rendered stronger, its harbor much enlarged, and its navy, already very flourishing, considerably increased.

Themistocles thus constantly exerted himself for the glory and aggrandizement of his country, as well as for his own, but sometimes was not scrupulous in the choice of his measures. On one occasion in particular, he declared before the assembly of the people, that he had contrived an expedient to secure for Athens a decided preponderance in Greece, yet that he could not make it publicly known, because its success required the utmost secrecy. Aristides was appointed to deliberate apart with him on the subject. The design of Themistocles was to burn the whole fleet of their allies, in order to place under Athens alone the full and undisputed empire of the Grecian seas. When Aristides had been told of it, he returned to the assembly, and said that nothing, indeed, could appear more advantageous to the Athenians, but that, at the same time, nothing in the world could be more unjust than the contrivance of his colleague. Upon this decision, all the people, with an admirable sense of equity, ordered Themistocles to think no more of his project.

The Grecian liberties were, at that time, still more seriously threatened by one of the Lacedæmonian kings, namely Pausanias, the conqueror of Plataea, who, elated with success, began to treat the allies with haughtiness and contempt. His pride carried him still farther. Weary of the simplicity of Spartan life, he sought to ingratiate himself with Xerxes, and under the hope of a splendid reward from that monarch, promised to betray the country into his hands. The plot was happily detected before it could be put into execution. Pausanias, to avoid the danger of being arrested and condemned, ran to a temple as to a safe asylum; but the entrance being immediately blocked up with large stones, it became impossible for him to make his escape, and he died of starvation.

The direction of the public affairs in Greece was then committed to Aristides and Cimon, whose modest, kind and prudent behavior had gained universal confidence. The allies, of their own accord, agreed to acknowledge Athens, preferably to Lacedæmon, as the head of the Grecian confederacy; Sparta herself, notwithstanding her former jealousy and distrust of a rival city, had magnanimity enough to acknowledge the wisdom of this measure. Even at present, every sensible reader feels a secret satisfaction in perceiving that moderation and mildness procured

for the Athenians what they had generously refused to obtain by injustice and violence.

Aristides did not long survive a change of administration so glorious to his nation, and so honorable to himself. This great man, after having filled the highest offices in the government of his country and directed for some time the public revenues of all Greece, died so poor that he did not leave money enough to pay the expenses of his funeral. The state had to take charge of it, and to provide for the support of his family.

The same praise cannot be given to Themistocles; his domineering spirit and inordinate desire of glory provoked against him the envy or the fears of his citizens. He was even accused by the Lacedæmonians of having been an accomplice in the late conspiracy of Pausanias. The charge, it is true, had not sufficient foundation, and was refuted by Themistocles; yet, the party of his enemies and the suspicions of the people remained sufficiently strong to procure his banishment, not only from Athens, but also from all Greece and the neighboring states. In this extremity, Themistocles, estimating the magnanimity of an enemy by his own, resolved to apply for an asylum, to the very nation on whom he had before inflicted so many injuries, and set out for the court of the Persian monarch.

§ III. WAR BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND PERSIANS CONCLUDED UNDER ARTAXERXES-LONGIMANUS.—B. C. 473—449.

It was no longer Xerxes who reigned in Persia.* This prince, after an inglorious reign of twelve (many say twenty) years, was murdered in his own palace by Artabanes, the captain of his guards, and was succeeded on the throne by his son Artaxerxes. The latter is also known under the surname of *Longimanus*, which was given him on account of the extraordinary length of his

* This is the obvious meaning of Thucydides, in the first book of his History, ch. 137, and of Cornelius Nepos, in *Themist.* ch. 9. The testimony of these two historians, especially of Thucydides, who wrote very near the time in which these events occurred, has certainly considerable weight; yet, it must be acknowledged that a different statement is found in Diodorus Siculus and others. For this reason, there exists a serious difficulty and a great variety of opinions among the moderns, first as to the epoch when Xerxes ceased, and Artaxerxes began to reign; and, secondly, to which one of these two monarchs Themistocles applied for protection. It would be useless to undertake here any discussion on this matter. Leaving therefore the question to professed chronologists, we content ourselves with following the opinion, as above stated, of Usher, Bossuet, Calmet, Rollin, etc. If it be not the most probable, it is at least, every thing taken into consideration, the plainest and least intricate. (see in the appendix § II.)

hands. He is much praised by historians for his justice, goodness, generosity, and the great care he took, by repressing abuses and disorders; to promote the happiness of his people. His kindness was extended to the Jews: whilst they experienced every sort of difficulty from their jealous neighbors, he issued, in their behalf, edicts and orders the most favorable that they could desire, and the best calculated to secure their religious and civil prosperity.* The second of these rescripts, issued in the twentieth year of his reign, is commonly assigned as the beginning of the seventy weeks (of years) spoken of by the prophet Daniel, which were to elapse till the death of Christ for the redemption of mankind.†

Artaxerxes evinced likewise great wisdom, resolution and activity in different wars against the Bactrians and Egyptians; he at first experienced great losses, but persevered in his efforts, and at length brought both of these wars to a successful issue. It will soon be perceived that he was not equally fortunate in the continuation of the grand Persian struggle against Greece.

This was the monarch to whom Themistocles applied for refuge from the animosity or envy of his citizens. The event showed that the Athenian general had not set too high an estimate on Persian generosity; indeed the king received him with kindness, treated him with respect, gave him considerable influence at court, and allowed him the revenues of three cities for his support and that of his household. He even determined to place him at the head of an army for a third attempt against Greece, but the proposal was for Themistocles a subject of extreme difficulty. Equally unwilling to displease his benefactor and to fight against his country, he is said by some to have put an end to his life by poison; many think, however, that he died a natural death at the age of sixty-five years, and that his bones were afterwards carried back to Athens.

It seemed to be a right or privilege of the Athenian people to possess, during this period, an uninterrupted series of great men. After the banishment of Themistocles and the death of Aristides, the chief authority among them was exercised by two illustrious citizens, Pericles and Cimon. Both were equally distinguished by their abilities and their birth, the one being a son of Xanthippus, the conqueror of the Persians at Mycale; the other the son of Miltiades, the still more celebrated conqueror of the same Persians at Marathon. Pericles, a man of great eloquence and insinuating manners, obtained a surprising ascendancy over the minds of the Athenians. What was still more surprising, he

* 1 Esdr. vii; and 2 Esdr. ii.

† Daniel ix, 24—27.

maintained that ascendancy during the space of forty years, by the exertions of his genius, his success in war, his largesses to the people, and the splendid monuments with which he embellished their city. Cimon, still more generous in his views, united in himself the courage of Miltiades his father, the exquisite prudence of Themistocles, and the disinterestedness as well as equity of Aristides, to which he added an uncommon beneficence and liberality. Having acquired a very great fortune, he made no other use of it than to benefit his fellow-citizens in every possible way, especially those who appeared at the same time honest and poor. On the other hand, as he was a not less excellent general than profound politician, he raised Athens to the zenith of greatness and power.

Much will be said of Pericles in another section. To speak now exclusively of Cimon, and first of his moral and social qualities, we will here mention several instances of his liberality, disinterestedness and wisdom, recorded by Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos in their biography and life of this illustrious man.

"Cimon," says Plutarch, "had by this time acquired a great fortune; and what he had gained gloriously in the war from the enemy, he laid out with as much credit upon his fellow-citizens. He ordered the fences of his fields and gardens to be thrown down, that strangers as well as his own countrymen might partake of his fruit. He had a supper provided at his house every day, in which the dishes were plain but sufficient for a multitude of guests. The poor citizens at large, especially those of his own tribe, repaired to it at pleasure and had their diet without care or trouble. When he walked out, he used to have a retinue of young men well clothed; and if he happened to meet an aged citizen in a mean dress, he ordered some one of them to change clothes with him. This was great and noble. But besides this, the same attendants carried with them a quantity of money, and when they met in the market-place with any necessitous person of honest appearance, they took care to slip some pieces into his hands as privately as possible."

Cimon, it is true, was guided in this only by human and natural motives; but what more could be expected from Pagan virtue? And do not the facts just related show of themselves that he possessed a truly noble and generous soul; especially if we add to these what Cornelius Nepos says of him, that he was always ready to assist any one with his credit, his good services and his purse?*

So liberal a character was far from having selfish views of preferment or increase of wealth. "Whilst he saw the other

* Nulli fides, nulli opera, nulli res familiaris defuit (*in Cimon. c. 4*).

persons concerned in the administration, pillaging the public, he kept his own hands clean, and in all his speeches and actions continued to the last perfectly disinterested."

To these excellent qualities Cimon joined an uncommon prudence, and a thorough knowledge of the characters and dispositions of men. "About this time the allies, though they paid their contributions, became wearied of furnishing troops and ships manned for war. Being no longer exposed to foreign invasion, they desired to be freed from the military service, and to cultivate their lands in quiet and tranquillity. The other Athenian generals took every method to make them comply literally with this part of the confederacy, and by prosecutions and fines rendered the Athenian government oppressive and invidious. But Cimon took a different course when he had the command. He used no compulsion, and receiving from the allies money and ships unmann'd instead of troops, let them indulge in domestic employments, whilst he made the Athenians serve by turn in his vessels, and kept them in continual exercise. By these means the allies, from a warlike people, became quite unfit for war; whereas the Athenians being always engaged in some expedition were trained to every fatigue and every part of the military service. Hence the power of the latter went on the increase, and those who were formerly their fellow-soldiers, insensibly became their tributaries and subjects."*

No Grecian general humbled the pride and power of Persia like Cimon. Even after the Persian armies were entirely driven from Greece, he allowed them no respite, but closely pursuing them with two hundred sail, took their strongest maritime towns and deprived them of every ally or subject along the whole Asiatic coast from Ionia to Pamphylia. Not satisfied with this, he fearlessly attacked their fleet, though much larger than his own. It lay anchored at the mouth of the river Eurymedon, whilst a land-army was encamped at a short distance on the shore. Notwithstanding the advantage of their position and the number of their ships, which amounted to at least three hundred and fifty, the naval force of the Persians was entirely defeated; no less than two hundred vessels fell into the power of the Athenians, and many others were destroyed.

The sea fight was scarcely over, when Cimon, seeing his troops full of ardor and courage permitted them at their own request to land, and led them without delay against the enemy. The Persians resolutely waited their attack, and met the first onset with great firmness; but their efforts, as usual, proved

* Plutarch, in *Cimon's Life*.

unavailing. Being obliged to give way, they broke their ranks, fled, and were pursued with terrible slaughter; many were made prisoners, and a considerable booty fell into the hands of the victorious Athenians. Cimon was not yet satisfied with this new success. Aware that eighty Phœnician vessels were approaching to join the Persian fleet, he again set sail, and went to meet them, before they had received any certain intelligence of what had happened. His success was complete: all the Phœnician ships were either sunk or taken, and nearly all of their soldiers perished (B. C. 470).

Thus did Cimon, within hardly more than a day, gain a series of victories almost equal to those of Salamis and Plataea. After these glorious achievements, he returned to Athens, where he employed himself in fortifying the harbor, and embellishing the town with the spoils taken from the enemy. The following year, he sailed towards the Hellespont and Thrace, and continued to signalize his courage by various exploits. Afterwards his victorious career was interrupted for a time by fresh dissensions in the Grecian states, and among the Athenians themselves. As there existed in Athens a strong political party opposed to Cimon, it acquired such power during his absence, and finally became so strong against him, that he was condemned to exile for ten years. But, before the expiration of that term, the Athenians perceived how prejudicial it was to their interests to be deprived of the services of such a man; they recalled him from his banishment, and Pericles, who had been the chief cause of it, was the first to propose a decree for his return. "With so much candor," exclaims Plutarch, "were differences then managed! So moderate were the resentments of men, and so easily laid down, when the public good required! Ambition itself, the strongest, the most active of all passions, yielded to the interests and necessities of their country."*

No sooner was Cimon allowed to resume the course of his conquests, than he went again with two hundred vessels in search of the enemy. Having first signally defeated a fleet of three hundred ships under the command of Artabazus, he landed his troops for a short time on the Cilician coast, and gained another memorable victory over an army of three hundred thousand men, commanded by Megabyzus, one of the ablest among the Persian generals. The island of Cyprus was also one of the theatres of Cimon's exploits. He intended to go still further, and even to shake the Persian empire to its very centre, when King Artaxerxes, dispirited by so many losses, and apprehensive of new

* Plutarch, in *Cimon*.

dangers, resolved to put an end to so disastrous a war by a treaty of peace. It was concluded under the following conditions: 1. That the Grecian cities in Asia should be acknowledged as free and independent states; 2. that no Persian vessel fitted out for war should navigate between the Black sea and the coasts of Pamphylia; 3. that no Persian commander with his troops should approach the Grecian seas within a three days' journey; and 4. that the Athenians should no longer attack any part of the dominions of Persia. These conditions were accepted and ratified under oath by the two parties, in the year B. C. 449.

Such was the result, so glorious for the Athenians and their generals, of the struggle which they had to maintain against the mightiest empire in the world, under three successive monarchs. That struggle, since the burning of Sardis, had lasted fifty-one years.

During the negotiation of this treaty Cimon died, either of sickness or of a wound which he had received at the siege of Citium in Cyprus. When he drew near his end, he commanded his officers to set out with the fleet immediately for Athens, and to conceal his death with the utmost care. The order was punctually executed, and the secret so well kept, that neither the enemy nor the allies had any suspicion of the event; and the whole fleet returned safe to Athens, still under the guidance and auspices of Cimon, although he had died thirty days before. Thus this great man, the greatest perhaps that Greece ever produced, after having conferred on his country so many signal benefits during life, promoted its interests even after death, and left it in the height of glory and prosperity.

DEFEAT OF THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SICILY.—B. C. 480.

GREAT QUALITIES OF GELON, PRINCE AND SOVEREIGN OF SYRACUSE.

It has been already mentioned that Xerxes, in his earnest desire to subdue the Greeks, had entered into an alliance with the Carthaginians, and agreed with them that they should attack with all their forces the Grecian colonies in Sicily and Italy; whilst he, on his part, would march in person against Greece. The Carthaginians, who had already made great conquests not only in Africa, but also in other countries and in Sicily itself, and who were very desirous to obtain entire possession of this rich island, readily assented to the proposal of the Persian king. As they were determined to carry on the war upon a very extensive scale, so as to make it correspond to the efforts of their pow-

erful ally, they spent three years in making adequate preparations. Their land army amounted to not less than three hundred thousand men, and their fleet consisted of two thousand vessels.

This immense force set out from Carthage and landed at Palermo in Italy, under the conduct of Amilcar, a commander of great experience. This general after giving some rest to his troops, marched against Himera, a neighboring city, and laid siege to it. The governor of the place seeing it very closely pressed, despatched messengers to his son-in-law Gelon, who without the title of king exercised the principal authority in Syracuse; Gelon readily obeyed the summons and hastened in person to the relief of Himera, at the head of fifty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. His approach revived the hopes and courage of the besieged, who afterwards defended themselves with increased energy.

Gelon was an able warrior and excelled in stratagems. Having intercepted a letter informing Amilcar of the speedy arrival of a certain auxiliary body of troops, he selected an equal number from his own, whom he equipped in the manner described in the letter, and made them advance towards the camp of the besiegers at the time designated. These pretended auxiliaries being received as allies by an unsuspecting enemy, slew the Carthaginian general and fired his vessels. At the same moment Gelon attacked the camp with all his forces. The Carthaginians at first resisted with great valor; but soon hearing of the death of their leader, and seeing their whole fleet in a blaze, they lost courage and fled. In the dreadful slaughter that ensued, one hundred and fifty thousand of their number were slain. The rest of their army having retired to a place where they were in want of every thing, could not make a long defence, and surrendered at discretion. This memorable action took place on the same day with the battle of Thermopylæ, according to some; whilst others place it on the same day with that of Salamis.*

The sad news of the entire defeat of the army threw Carthage into a state of alarm and confusion which cannot be expressed. The inhabitants imagined that the enemy was already at their gates. They immediately sent deputies to sue for peace, and Gelon, whose usual character was lenity, granted it on moderate terms. One of the conditions prescribed to the vanquished was, that they should cease to sacrifice their children to Saturn; a circumstance which shows at the same time the superstitious

* The first is the statement of Diodorus Siculus; b. xi; and the second is found in Herodotus, b. vii.

cruelty of the Carthaginians and the humanity of their conqueror.

Gelon after this glorious victory returned to Syracuse, assembled the people and modestly gave an account of his whole conduct, offering himself an easy victim to the justice of his citizens, if they judged that he had done any thing contrary to the public good or in any manner abused his authority. His discourse was answered only by praises and marks of gratitude. As every one looked upon him as the deliverer and benefactor of the country, he was with unanimous consent proclaimed king. He showed himself more and more worthy of the flattering titles bestowed upon him, by acting more as a father than a sovereign, and never ceasing to exert himself for the happiness of his people. Unfortunately for Syracuse, his reign lasted only seven years. The sceptre after his death passed into the hands of his brothers Hiero and Thrasybulus, who reigned in succession, till the Syracusans, disgusted at the acts of oppression and tyranny committed by Thrasybulus, drove him from among them, and restored the democratic form of government (B. C. 460).

THE ROMAN COMMONWEALTH:

FROM THE INSTITUTION OF THE DICTATORSHIP TO THE EXPULSION OF THE DECENVIRI.—B. C. 498—449.

ORIGIN OF THE OFFICE OF DICTATOR.—B. C. 498.

THE time had not yet come for the Romans to take any share, much less to act a prominent part, as they afterwards did, in the affairs of other nations. Their attention was sufficiently engaged at home in fighting the enemies of their liberty, repelling the frequent attacks of their jealous neighbors, and preventing their newly framed republic from falling into despotism or anarchy.

From the beginning of the Roman commonwealth, there existed various causes of dissension between the patricians and the plebeians, or the senate and the people. This state of things originated not only in the mutual apprehensions and jealousy of the two orders, but likewise in the vast disproportion between their respective fortunes; nearly all the wealth and land were in the hands of the patricians, whereas most of the plebeians suffered poverty and distress. Their misery was more and more aggravated by the accumulation of debts on the one side, and by usuries and oppressive measures on the other. Moreover, in a naturally rude and half-civilized nation, without the mild influ-

ence of the true religion, measures were extremely severe against insolvent debtors, even against those whose insolvency was the effect of misfortune over which they had no control. The law or custom subjected them not merely to imprisonment, but even to torture and the lash. Avaricious creditors were not ashamed to avail themselves of these inhuman laws, and frequently put them in execution with merciless rigor.

Treatment so revolting, especially in a republic, did not fail to exasperate the minds of the people. They indulged by degrees in complaints, expostulations, murmurs and threats; and finally came to the determination, unless the senate should pass a decree for the abolition of their debts, not to take up arms for the defence of an imaginary commonwealth in which they had so much to suffer.

The senators having assembled to deliberate on the matter, were much divided as to the manner of proceeding in so delicate a circumstance. To them, either of the two methods of rigor or leniency appeared pregnant with evil consequences: the one would still more exasperate the people, and the other would seem to patronize and encourage rebellion. In this perplexity they resolved, first, to suspend for the present the effect of the laws with regard to insolvent debtors; and secondly, to appoint a supreme magistrate under the name of *Dictator*, whose authority should supersede every other authority in the nation, and from whose orders there should be no appeal. To prevent so great a power from degenerating into tyranny, it was to be conferred only for the space of six months.

The first Roman ever raised to this exalted dignity was Titus Lartius, B. C. 498. He was eminently fitted for the critical circumstances in which he found the state, namely, a civil feud to suppress and a foreign aggression to repel: by happily blending energy and firmness with wisdom and moderation, he succeeded in both attempts before the expiration of his term of office. He might have retained his power during the whole time for which he was elected; but he voluntarily resigned it before the close of that period; thus giving an admirable example of modesty, which, to the great honor and credit of the Roman character, was faithfully imitated by subsequent dictators for nearly four centuries.

Rome, having once experienced the beneficial result of this kind of magistracy, had frequently recourse to it in times of great and pressing dangers. It became towards the end of the republic an occasion of abuse, owing to the natural weakness of the human mind, by which the end of the best institutions may

be perverted. Still it is perfectly correct to say that the high office of dictator, generally intrusted to men of superior talents, wisdom and experience, rendered the most signal services to the commonwealth by insuring its internal tranquillity, and securing its power and sometimes its very existence against foreign invasion.

RISE OF THE PLEBEIAN TRIBUNES.—B. c. 493.

THE second Roman dictator was Aulus Posthumius, under whom was fought the decisive battle of Regillus against the Latins. Shortly after him, fresh dissensions arose between the plebeians and patricians concerning the hitherto unsettled affair of insolvent debtors and their treatment. Both the army and the people, driven almost to desperation and finding themselves unaided by the senate, withdrew in great numbers from the city to a mountain three miles distant, and afterwards called the Sacred Mount. Here they established themselves in a fortified camp, and by their subsequent behaviour showed a fixed determination never to return, until they should obtain a general abolition of those debts which exposed them to so many miseries and hardships.

This conduct of the plebeian order gave considerable alarm to the consuls and all the senators; they sent ten deputies chosen from among themselves, to effect a reconciliation and the return of the people. The most illustrious of these deputies was Menenius Agrippa, a patrician so universally revered for his moderation and impartiality, that the insurgents themselves received him, as they also did his colleagues, with every demonstration of joy. He, on his part, endeavored to convince them of the necessity of concord in every government, and of the confidence which they ought to place in the good intentions of the senate. On this occasion, he proposed to them the ingenious well-known allegory of the members of the human body, when they refused to do any thing for the stomach, under the plea of its apparent inactivity, and by so doing undermined and ruined their own strength.*

The application of this allegory to the circumstance which had called it forth was a very natural one, and the people felt its force without any difficulty. They were still more pleased when the deputies, in the name of the senate, declared the full acquittal of poor insolvent debtors and the abolition of their debts. They now readily prepared to return to the city; still, in order

* See Livy, b. ii, ch. 32.

to prevent the recurrence of similar evils, they asked and obtained, before leaving their camp, the appointment of a new class of officers to be annually chosen from the plebeian order, with authority to defend the interests of the people, not only against private citizens, but even, if necessary, against the senate and the first magistrates of the republic. Such was the origin of the Plebeian Tribunes.

This institution might have been, if kept within due bounds, very beneficial to the commonwealth; but, as the tribunes were frequently persons of a restless, factious and daring spirit, it soon became a source of new dissensions. Their power, at first limited in its objects, continually sought to extend its sphere, produced a variety of important changes in the government, and by the violent strifes which they occasioned, greatly contributed to its entire overthrow.

The number of these officers, originally five, was afterwards increased to ten. Two other annual magistrates were appointed, called Ediles, to take charge, under the tribunes, of the markets, provisions, public buildings and public shows.

BANISHMENT OF MARCIUS CORIOLANUS.—B. C. 489.

THE first important trial which the plebeian tribunes made of their power, was against an illustrious citizen called Marcius, and surnamed *Coriolanus*. He belonged to a patrician family in Rome, and was universally esteemed for his moral conduct, his courage and his military abilities. The capture of Corioli, a Volscian city, was principally due to the exertions of his brilliant valor; afterwards, going forward to fight a hostile army sent to the relief of the town, he had forced victory to declare in favor of the Romans. It was from this great achievement that he derived the surname of *Coriolanus*; all admired his bravery, his disinterestedness, and, above all, his magnanimity, the source of so many noble actions.

Unfortunately, these qualities of Marcius, for want of proper direction, often degenerated into haughtiness and obstinacy. He did not possess that full command of his temper so peculiarly becoming among a free people, nor that patience and moderation so necessary in the management of public affairs. In the new subjects of discussion that arose in the senate concerning the plebeians, he warmly defended the authority of the former against the claims of the latter, and occasionally used harsh expressions, calculated to wound and irritate the public feeling.

His opposition to the plebeian interest so much exasperated the tribunes and their partisans, that, in a general assembly of the people, they had him sentenced to perpetual exile.

Coriolanus received his condemnation with great apparent firmness, and left the city without uttering the least murmur or complaint, yet full of rancor, and meditating signal vengeance against his country. In effect, he soon after reappeared at the head of a powerful army of Volsci, whom he had induced to avenge with him their common injuries. Having, as he advanced, taken a multitude of towns and laid waste the neighboring territory, he took a position only five miles from Rome. The city was filled with instant consternation, especially among the plebeians at the approach of their irritated enemy, and the consternation was more and more increased by the fact that, notwithstanding the repeated offers made by the deputies of the senate, he rejected every proposal of reconciliation. The minds of the people were quite dejected; it seemed as if the courage of the Romans had passed from them, together with Coriolanus, into the camp of their enemies.

At this critical juncture, Rome owed her deliverance to the mother of Coriolanus. This generous lady, accompanied by many other noble matrons, went to meet her son, who had always entertained for her the most respectful and tender regard. She spoke so feelingly to him, and so touched his heart, that he exclaimed, "Dear mother, you have conquered me. Your victory saves Rome, but it is ruinous to your son." He withdrew his troops from the Roman territory; but, although he gave good explanatory reasons of his conduct, and satisfied many of the Volsci, yet he did not escape the blame or envy of others, and was, according to Plutarch, shortly after put to death through the intrigues of his colleague Attius Tullius.* Livy, on the contrary, seems inclined to think, from the testimony of a very ancient author, that he lived to an advanced age in his exile.†

In either case, Coriolanus was a sad example of the faults and calamities into which even great men may fall. A victim of the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens, much of his misfortune was a consequence of his obstinacy; and he became the terror of his country, whilst he might, by using greater moderation, have continued its best support and most illustrious ornament.

* Plutarch, in *Marcium Coriol.*

† Livy, b. ii, c. 40.

THE AGRARIAN LAW.—AMBITION AND PUNISHMENT OF
SPURIUS CASSIUS.—B. C. 486—483.

THE concord produced among the various orders of the state by the approach of Coriolanus and his army, disappeared with the transient alarm in which it had originated. As soon as the external enemy withdrew, the political parties within resumed their disputes. The present subject of debate was one of the most important that ever had engrossed their attention, and at the same time the most popular of all propositions, that is, the equal partition of land among the citizens, a proposition known by the name of *the Agrarian law*.

Whilst the Romans were making their first conquests and acquisitions of territory, the profits arising from them were understood to be for the state and for the people. A portion of the newly acquired territory was leased or sold, to indemnify the public treasury for the expenses incurred during the war; other portions were distributed among the citizens, especially those who had not the means to support their families. But, during a certain length of time, the republic had either made few acquisitions of this sort, or had connived at their occupation or purchase by powerful and wealthy individuals.

The first complaints on this subject came not, as might be naturally supposed, from the plebeian tribunes, but from the consul Spurius Cassius. This man, already in high favor with the popular party, continued, by all possible means, to court the affection of the inferior class, and is said to have aimed at an improper and dangerous influence in the state. He affected great zeal for the rights of the people, as well as indignation against their opponents; and complained, in particular, of the improper use lately made of the conquered lands, which were suffered to fall into the hands of persons already too wealthy. He at length moved that a new division of them should be made in behalf of the indigent citizens.

This proposal was, at first, extremely agreeable to the people. On the other hand, the senate and the patricians in general were greatly alarmed, either because they saw their own interest at stake, or because they feared the evil consequences of the Agrarian law with regard to the state at large, which it might throw into great confusion. They, therefore, applied with great earnestness to devise expedients for the defeat or suspension of the measure proposed by Cassius; and the consul himself contributed, more than any one, to ruin his cause, by the very means that he adopted to insure its success.

He alarmed the rich with the prospect of danger to their property, and at the same time filled all the citizens with serious apprehensions for their civil rights, by proposing that the Latins and Hernici, allies of Rome, should enjoy the same privileges with the Romans and share with them in the new division of the lands. Virginius, the other consul, strongly opposed this motion of his colleague, and the city for the present was saved from the intrusion of strangers. The attempt moreover gave great offence to the people, as well as to the senate. The unhappy author of it, in order to regain the favor of his party, proposed a resolution to refund out of the public treasury whatever had been formerly paid by necessitous persons, when buying corn at the public granaries in time of famine. This proposal also was interpreted to his prejudice, and placed him under a very strong suspicion that he meant, with the aid of aliens and of indigent citizens, to usurp the government: on this ground, all parties in the state combined against him, and he was condemned to death as guilty of treason.

Thus perished the first projector of the famous Agrarian law. The measure failed as to its intended effect; still the project itself remained to be a lasting source of dissension in the republic, and, by being renewed at intervals, served as an instrument in the hands of ambitious and designing men to court popular favor. On the part of the lower classes it became a subject of reiterated demands; nor could the senate succeed in diverting them from their purpose, otherwise than by occupying them almost constantly in foreign wars.

GENEROSITY AND PATRIOTISM OF THE FABIAN FAMILY.

B. C. 488—477.

OCCASIONS for the wars above mentioned were frequent. Nearly the whole of this period was one continued series of hostilities against the Etrurians, the Æqui, the Volsci, and other neighboring tribes, the perpetual foes of Rome. The Romans, although occasionally defeated, were commonly victorious, and derived from those incessant wars the twofold advantage of securing their power and of improving themselves more and more in military science.

Of all the illustrious families of Rome, none at this period acquired greater honor and rendered more signal service than the Fabian family. During several years in succession, some one of its members was appointed to the consular dignity and to the command of the troops; and all of them, by their conduct and

zeal, showed themselves worthy of the confidence placed in their abilities. Yet success and popular affection did not always accompany their exertions for the public good. On one occasion in particular, the consul Quintus Fabius, instead of distributing among his soldiers the spoils taken from the enemy, caused the whole booty to be sold and the proceeds to be added to the public fund; this measure occasioned great dissatisfaction in the army. Hence, in a subsequent encounter with the Æqui, most of the troops commanded by one of the Fabii refused to do their duty, and, instead of fighting, withdrew from the field, not to procure by an easy victory a triumph for their general.

The Etrurians, aware of the dissensions which prevailed among the Romans, thought it a favorable opportunity to crush the power of Rome. All Etruria flew to arms; a numerous and gallant army was quickly formed, and occupied a position near the strong city of Veii. The Roman consuls, equally careful to select an advantageous post, stationed their troops on two hills at a short distance from the enemy.

These consuls were Cneius Manlius and Marcus Fabius. The latter had with him, in the capacity of lieutenants, his two brothers Quintus and Cæso, both of whom had also enjoyed consular honors. So many able leaders, although conscious of the superior force of the Etrurians, had less apprehension from that source than on account of the discontent of their own soldiers. The remembrance of what had taken place in the last campaign, viz. the refusal of the army to fight, was for them the cause of great uneasiness. They therefore determined to avoid any thing like a battle, and to remain within their intrenchments, in the hope that delay and shame might work a salutary change in the minds of the soldiery. The case happened exactly as they had expected.

The Etrurians, perceiving that the Romans remained inactive in their camp, were emboldened to approach and to insult them by the most bitter sarcasms; they called the generals cowards, and their followers mere women. These taunts, repeated every day with increased insolence, although they did not move the consuls, pierced the soldiers to the quick. They first sent their officers, and then went themselves in great numbers from all parts of the camp, loudly requesting permission to fight without delay.* Still the consuls pretended to hesitate, feigning reluctance. At last Marcus Fabius, turning to his colleague, said in

* *Totis castris undique ad consules curritur; omnes clamoribus agunt poscunt pugnam, postulant ut signum detur.*—Livy, b. ii, c. 45.

an audible voice: "I know very well that these soldiers are able to conquer the enemy; but they have given me great reason to doubt whether they are willing to do so. Hence, I am resolved not to give the signal, till they have all sworn that they will return victorious. They once deceived a consul; they shall not deceive the gods." At these words, a brave officer called Flavoleius, who was the first captain of a legion, and one too among the most eager in asking leave to fight, came forward, and raising his naked sword, cried out: "Marcus Fabius, I pledge myself to return victorious from the combat; may I miserably perish, if my promise is vain!" The other officers and the whole army took the same oath.

The consuls, now satisfied and filled with confidence, immediately drew up their legions in battle-array. Such was the ardor of the troops, that the Etrurians, surprised at this movement, had scarcely time to prepare for the conflict; yet, full of courage themselves, they offered a resistance equal to the fury of the onset. The two parties were alternately conquerors and conquered, and the slaughter, on each side, was dreadful. The death of Manlius and of Quintus Fabius, his colleague's brother, together with the momentary occupation of their camp by the enemy, was about to cause the defeat of the Romans. But the other consul, by his presence of mind, and his wonderful activity that carried him to every place in which the danger was most pressing, succeeded in rendering the combat everywhere favorable to his party. At last, the Romans, by renewed efforts, gained a signal and complete, though dearly bought, victory.

They had never fought so considerable a battle, whether we consider its duration and the events which occurred in it, or the number of the combatants. The Roman army amounted to forty or fifty thousand, the Etrurian army was still more numerous; the advantage passed five or six times from one side to the other, and the fight, which commenced before noon, did not terminate till after sunset, when the remnants of the vanquished withdrew from the field.

Triumphal honors were decreed to the consul Fabius; but he modestly declined them, in consequence of the death of Manlius, his colleague, and of his brother Quintus. This magnanimous refusal did him as much honor as the victory itself. Among the subordinate leaders, the prize of valor was awarded, in the first place, to Cæso Fabius, another brother of the consul; next, to Siccus, who had recovered the Roman camp from its daring invaders; and, in the third place, to the brave Flavoleius, both on

account of his previous noble example, and of his determined courage during the conflict.

As soon as the victorious army returned to Rome, the wounded soldiers were, by the consul's direction, quartered in the houses of the senators, where they received the attention which their situation demanded. Most of them had been placed in the dwellings of the Fabian family, and nowhere were they treated with so much kindness. This generous conduct of the Fabii, joined with their heroism on the field of battle, for ever reconciled to them the minds and affections of the people.

Their magnanimity still more strikingly appeared in the ensuing years, and increased in the highest degree the public esteem and admiration in their behalf. The late victory, however splendid, had not put an end to hostilities; on the contrary, the Romans had now to sustain the war against the Æqui, the Volsci, and the Veientes, whom the other parts of Etruria were ready to assist. The coincidence of these wars created very great difficulty in the state. The public treasury was exhausted, and it seemed almost impossible to provide armies sufficient to repel so many enemies at once. In this emergency, the Fabii offered to bear the whole charge, both pecuniary and personal, of the war against the Veientes. As may be easily conjectured, their offer was accepted by the senate and the people with equal readiness and gratitude; all extolled them to the sky, especially when on the following day they set out, to the number of three hundred and six, on their perilous expedition. It was indeed a spectacle worthy of unqualified admiration, to behold these generous warriors, all belonging to the same family, all patricians, all worthy of the rank of generals,* willingly sacrificing every domestic comfort, every private consideration, and their own persons, for the honor and safety of the republic. Rome itself never saw an army so small, and yet so illustrious and so justly celebrated.†

This heroic band, having arrived near the small river Cremera, not far from Veii, built a fortress on a steep mountain, surrounded it with a double ditch, and flanked it with towers. From that fort, they often issued forth like lions to invade the Veian territory, and by carrying off a great booty in their excursions, kept the country in constant alarm. The enemy no longer ventured to encounter them in the open field, and remained shut

* *E queis dux fieri quilibet aptus erat.*—Ovid. *Fast.* ii, l. 200.

† *Nunquam exercitus, neque minor numero, neque clarior famâ et admiratione hominum, per urbem incessit.*—Livy, b. ii, c. 49.

up within the walls of their cities. This lasted for the space of about two years.

The Fabii, elated with success, daily made new progress, and inflicted fresh losses on their foes; but their too great confidence was at last the cause of their ruin, as the enemy skilfully made use of it to draw them into a snare. Having concealed troops in hilly places, they drove a large number of cattle to the plain below. The Fabii advanced from their fortress, as usual, with full security, and, when they had reached the spot just mentioned, prepared to seize the valuable prey that offered itself to their view. At this moment, there were heard loud cries, followed in every direction by a shower of darts; then, the Etrurian troops lying in ambush suddenly rushed on the incautious invaders, and surrounded them on all sides.

There was no possibility to avoid the unequal contest, nor hope of escape. Nothing could be done but to oppose undaunted bravery to overwhelming multitudes. This was actually done; the Fabii fought like lions, and forming themselves into a close column in the shape of a wedge, forced their way towards the declivity of a neighboring hill, where they could defend themselves with greater advantage. Here indeed they not only resisted, but even repelled for a time and overthrew the assailants. Still, being soon attacked in the rear by a body of Veientes who had reached the summit of the hill, they all fell, fighting to their last breath, and not until they had made immense havoc among the ranks of the enemy.

It thus happened that the engagement near Cremera was, in almost every respect, a repetition of the famous combat at Thermopylæ. The three hundred and six Fabii, like the three hundred Spartans whose contemporaries they were, gave the most admirable example of devotedness to the public good, and died together on the field of battle in defence of their country (B. C. 480—477).

It is said that only one young man of this illustrious family survived; this was Q. Fabius Vibulanus, afterwards consul. The circumstance appears to many critics very improbable, nay, almost incredible. It is however certain that Fabius Vibulanus was the direct ancestor of all the great men bearing the name of Fabius, who afterwards distinguished themselves in the service of the republic.

The unexpected loss of so many heroes deeply afflicted the Roman people; the day of their death was placed in the number of those which the superstition of that age considered as inauspicious and fatal. As to the fortress of Cremera, deprived of its

defenders, it became an easy conquest for the enemy. Moreover, the Etrurians won another victory over the army commanded by the consul Menenius, and, pursuing their advantage, advanced nearly to the walls of Rome. But no later than the ensuing year, their progress was checked, and their invasion repelled by two other consuls, Virginus and Servilius.

Dictatorship of Quintius Cincinnatus.—B. C. 458.

On a subsequent occasion during a war against the Æqui, the consul Minucius entangled himself with his troops in a narrow defile, where he was immediately hemmed in on every side by the enemy. He endeavored in vain to break through their ranks, and to open for his legions an egress from this perilous pass: being driven back with considerable loss, he was obliged to re-enter his camp under every disadvantage for the present, with the most disheartening prospect for the future. Gracchus, the general of the Æqui, lost no time in surrounding the Romans with a ditch and palisade, and he seemed to entertain no doubt but that he would soon be able to compel them by famine to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion.

The news of this melancholy event spread terror and dismay in Rome. It was deemed necessary, as was usual in all great and urgent perils of the state, to appoint a dictator without delay; the choice fell upon Quintius Cincinnatus. This celebrated man, one of the most distinguished members of the senate, formerly consul and now the only hope of the republic, lived on a farm of about four acres, which he cultivated with his own hands, and the produce of which sufficed for his support.

The deputies of the senate found him actually occupied in ploughing his field, and covered with dust and sweat. Saluting him dictator, they invested him with the insignia of that high dignity. He set out immediately for Rome, without manifesting any alteration in his accustomed gravity and modesty, and rather expressing regret that his field would not be tilled that year.

His first care, on entering the city, was to harangue the people in order to revive their courage; the following day, he mustered a sufficient number of troops and began his march without losing a moment. Having reached the enemy's camp during the night, he attacked it at the dawn of day with such order and resolution, that the Æqui, finding themselves pressed by two Roman armies and unable to stand the attack, were soon compelled to ask for quarter. It was granted them on the humiliat-

ing condition of passing under the yoke,* and of giving up one of their cities to the Tuscians, the faithful allies of the Romans. They did so, and the campaign was ended.

Cincinnatus, having thus by a single blow defeated the Æquians and rescued a Roman army from their grasp, made a solemn entry into Rome, accompanied by his victorious troops equally decked with laurels and enriched with booty. He might by law have held the dictatorial power for six months; but he voluntarily resigned it at the end of sixteen days, and returned to his farm more satisfied with honorable poverty than the rich usually are with all their treasures.

Such modesty, frugality and attachment to a rural life were not rare among the ancient Romans. The sequel of their history will furnish us with several instances of these virtues, neither less remarkable nor less praiseworthy than that of Cincinnatus.

THE LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES.—TYRANNY AND EXPULSION OF THE DECEMVIRI.—B. C. 452—449.

ROME had already existed for three hundred years without any settled code of jurisprudence. Differences among the citizens were adjusted by the chief magistrates, either according to ancient custom and the rules laid down by a few early statutes scarcely known to the plebeians, or by an appeal to the principles of natural equity. Hence there was no regular and uniform mode of administering justice; the rectitude of the decisions depended almost entirely on the individual integrity and learning of the judges. To obviate the many inconveniences that resulted or might result from this arbitrary state of things, three deputies were sent to Greece for the purpose of collecting from the Grecian laws, especially those of Solon, whatever they might deem best and most beneficial for the Roman people.

Upon the return of these deputies (B. C. 452), ten commissaries were appointed, under the name of *Decemviri*, to draw up a regular code of laws, conformably to which judgments should be passed in future. All the power of the consular and even of the dictatorial dignity was given to these commissaries for one year.

* The yoke consisted of two javelins fixed perpendicularly in the ground, at a short distance from each other, and a third one placed transversally on the other two. The vanquished who, in order to save their lives and their liberty, submitted to the above condition, were made to pass, the one after the other, between these javelins, in presence of the victorious army.

Their decisions during that period were to be without appeal, and every other magistracy, even that of the tribunes and consuls, was to be suspended.

The decemviri, during the first term of their office, fully answered the expectations of the public. By their activity and zeal, a body of laws, called the *Laws of the Twelve Tables* (on account of their being engraven on so many tables or plates), was published in a clear and concise form, and received the sanction of both the senate and the people. The conduct of the legislators was also characterized by moderation and equity, and gave universal satisfaction. But the scene was completely changed, when, under the plausible pretence of concluding the work so happily begun, a second election took place, to continue the same kind of magistracy for another year. Nay, the new decemviri, not satisfied with the term of their commission, retained the sovereign power even after this term had elapsed: Rome again beheld all the excesses of despotism and tyranny that had disgraced the reign of Tarquin the *proud*, such as confiscation of property, violence, tortures and death. All the citizens trembled for their safety. There were no more legal assemblies of the senate and the people; no one ventured to raise his voice in favor of public liberty. In a word, the situation of the commonwealth seemed desperate, when two infamous attempts, similar to those which had led to the downfall of the Tarquins, occasioned the overthrow of the ten new tyrants.

There was at that time a plebeian officer named Siccus Dentatus, well known to every one both in the city and in the army, and equally celebrated for his valor and greatness of soul. He had served during forty years, had been in one hundred and twenty battles, had received forty-five wounds, and, besides being enriched with innumerable spoils of every description, had been honored with twenty-six military rewards. His influence with the troops gave great weight to all his words. As he spoke his mind freely against the decemviri, they singled him out, more than any other, for their hatred and vengeance; and pretending to invest him with an honorable commission abroad, they caused him to be attacked in a lonely place by a body of soldiers, or rather satellites attached to their interests.

The intrepid veteran, seeing their wicked design, leaned against a rock to avoid an attack from behind, and in this position defended himself with such vigor that he killed several of the assailants, wounded others, and so terrified the rest, that not one ventured within his reach. Then withdrawing to a short distance, they changed their mode of attack, and overwhelmed him

with a shower of darts, javelins and stones. In this manner the bravest man of his age, who had come out of so many combats unhurt and victorious, perished miserably by the hands of vile assassins.

The murder committed in the person of Siccius Dentatus considerably increased the exasperation already existing in the public mind against the decemviri. Another equally unmerited and lamentable death which occurred in Rome, carried the detestation of their tyranny to the highest pitch, and gave the signal for the destruction of their power and government.

Appius Claudius, the first among them, had conceived a criminal affection for a young maiden called Virginia, the daughter of Virginius, an honest and high-spirited plebeian. Not being able to seduce her from her duty, he attempted, even publicly, to have her seized by force as a slave. Virginius, seeing no means left to save the honor and liberty of his unfortunate daughter, plunged a knife into her bosom, and instantly, with the bloody weapon still in his hand, fled for shelter to the army.

This disastrous event filled both the citizens and the troops with renewed indignation and horror against the decemviri. Almost instantaneously they found their party universally abandoned. What they had so long and so tyrannically practised against their fellow-citizens, was now justly turned against themselves: Appius and one of his colleagues perished in prison, whilst the other eight suffered banishment and the loss of their property. Rome, delivered from their oppression, re-established the consular and the tribunitia authority, together with the other magistracies of the republic (B. c. 449).

This date brings us back to the precise point at which we left the history of the eastern nations; to this it is now proper to return.

PROSPERITY AND SPLENDOR OF ATHENS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF PERICLES.—B. c. 449—481.

THE expulsion of the decemviri from Rome exactly coincides with the epoch at which Greece attained its greatest power and prosperity. The reader has already seen how much glory the Greeks won for themselves in their struggle against Persia; what splendid victories they achieved, and how honorable for their nation was the peace which they compelled the Persian monarch to conclude. Nor were they less renowned for the wisdom of their laws than for the brilliancy of their military achievements; for, as we have just before related, it was to them that the wisest

and greatest people of Italy, the Romans, had recourse through a solemn deputation, to draw from Grecian jurisprudence the materials for the formation of their own laws and civil polity.

Among the Grecian cities, Athens enjoyed unrivalled glory, wealth and splendor under the administration of Pericles. His influence and authority had increased since the death of Cimon, and he made use of the entire confidence reposed in him by the people, to render and maintain their city as powerful abroad, as he intended to make it conspicuous at home. Equally prudent and brave, he obtained great success in almost every undertaking. His favorite maxim, suggested by wisdom and humanity itself, was that the blood and lives of the soldiers should be spared as much as possible, and that a battle should never be hazarded except when victory was nearly certain. Hence the troops everywhere followed him with full assurance. Under his conduct, the maritime cities of Peloponnesus, the Chersonesus of Thrace, all the seas, coasts and islands, from Cyprus to the kingdom of Pontus, over an extent of more than a thousand miles along the Asiatic shore, acknowledged the laws or were taught to respect the power of the Athenians.

This extensive power was vested, as it were, in one man only, that is, in Pericles. He was, in fact, sole master of Athens and its dependencies. The revenue, the army and the navy, the islands and the sea, a vast territory peopled by barbarians as well as Greeks, and the possession of a kind of sovereignty cemented and strengthened by the obedience of conquered nations, the friendship of kings and the alliance of princes, were all at his command.

The genius of Pericles was not unequal to so extensive an administration. His sagacity embraced every useful object. He sent out every year a fleet of sixty galleys, well provided at the public expense, and furnished for eight months; by which means, he at the same time supported a large number of poor citizens, and prepared excellent seamen for the future service of the state. He also founded a multitude of colonies in various places, such as Chersonesus, Thrace, Andros, Naxos, and others. His chief motives in establishing these settlements were to remove from the city a large number of idle persons, ever ready to disturb the government; to provide for the most necessitous; and to keep the allies of Athens in awe, by placing colonies like so many garrisons in their neighborhood. The Romans used the same method, and it may be said that so wise a policy was one of the most effectual means employed by them to secure the public tranquillity.

But of all the achievements of Pericles, none did him greater honor in the judgment of the people, and has excited more the admiration of posterity, than the wonderful display of talent and the magnificent works erected in Athens under his care or protection. That city presented an uncommon reunion of men highly distinguished for their skill, industry and genius. During or about the same period with Pericles, Athens possessed the famous dramatical poets Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes; the masterly historians Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon; the eloquent orators Isocrates and Lysias; the eminent sculptors, architects and painters, Phidias, Callicrates, Apollodorus, Zeuxis and Parrhasius; the great philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates, with his celebrated school, the nursery of so many other great men, Xenophon, Alcibiades, Plato, etc.; Hippocrates, the ablest physician of antiquity; and Pericles himself, in whom were blended the characteristics of the admiral, the general and the statesman (though not in an equal degree with the illustrious Cimon), and of the excellent orator.

History, it is true, presents us at different other periods with a happy reunion of remarkable men and memorable events; as, for instance, in the ages of Cæsar Augustus, Leo the Tenth, and Louis the Fourteenth. But at these periods, talented persons had the ancients for their masters, their models and their guides; whereas the Greeks did not possess any such advantage. To the Greeks therefore belongs the exclusive merit of having, without previous examples and teaching, brought not only to light, but even to perfection, all the fine arts and every branch of polite literature. Hence, nothing in the history of the human mind better deserves our admiration than the multitude of wonders in point of science and skill achieved during the age of Pericles.

What should appear still more surprising, is that so many productions of genius, so many master-pieces of architecture, sculpture, painting, etc. came together into existence in a city of no very considerable extent, and *under one man's administration*. This is the remark of Plutarch in his life of Pericles. "Many edifices," says he, "each of which seems to have required the labor of several successive ages, were finished during the administration of one man. Works were raised of an astonishing magnitude, and inimitable beauty and execution, every architect striving to surpass the magnificence of the design with the elegance of the execution; but still, the most wonderful circumstance was the speediness with which they were completed." "Celerity seldom produces any work of lasting importance, or exquisite beauty; while, on the contrary, the time which is ex-

pended in labor, is recovered and repaid in the duration of the performance. Hence we have the more reason to wonder that the structures raised by Pericles should be built within so short a period, and yet, built for ages. For as each of them, as soon as finished, had the venerable air of antiquity, so, now that they are old" (that is, in the age of Plutarch, nearly six hundred years after Pericles), "they have the freshness of a modern building. A bloom is diffused over them, which preserves their aspect untarnished by time, as if they were animated with a spirit of perpetual youth and unfading elegance."

So many admirable works cost, it is true, large sums of money, and the enemies of Pericles frequently took occasion to charge him with a waste of the public revenues. Pericles, on his part, was not slow in representing to the Athenians the reputation and glory which would accrue to them from these masterly productions of the fine arts. One day, however, the clamors of his opponents were so great, that he publicly offered to take upon himself the expense which had been incurred, provided the new edifices should be inscribed with his name only, and not with that of the people of Athens. This proposal again turned the minds of the Athenians entirely in his favor. Whether they admired his magnanimity, or were ambitious to share the glory of such magnificent works, they cried out that he might spend in them as much as he pleased of the public treasure.

It was thus that Pericles knew how to preserve his ascendancy over an inconstant people, while, on the other hand, he knew how to give a vigorous impulse to every talent. There was, indeed, among the several artists, incredible ardor and emulation, which made them use every effort to excel each other, and immortalize themselves by masterpieces of art. They were all under the immediate superintendence of the celebrated sculptor Phidias, whom the friendship of Pericles had invested with the direction of the public edifices, and of every thing intended for the embellishment of Athens.*

* It was Phidias himself who cast the gold and ivory statue of Pallas or Minerva, so highly valued by the best judges of antiquity. This beautiful piece of genius was forty feet in height. The shield alone would have been enough to immortalize its author. A battle was represented upon it, and, among other highly finished details, Pericles appeared conspicuous in the attitude of a combatant; this part of the work was contrived with so much art, that the hand, which, in lifting up the spear, partly covered the face, seemed to be intended for the purpose of concealing the likeness, and yet it was very striking on both sides.

The excellence of this production excited envy against Phidias. He

Whilst the Athenians thus prospered in every attempt, a terrible storm was preparing against them from all sides. So much glory acquired by them in peace and war, partly at the expense and through the contributions of their allies, had been long pro-

was accused of having diverted to his own profit a portion of the gold allotted for the execution of his design. Happily for him, he had, by the advice of Pericles, so managed his materials, that the gold with which the statue was overlaid, could easily be taken off and weighed. This being publicly done, sufficed to confound his accusers.

Phidias was perfectly acquainted with the different rules of his art, as the following event fully testified. Both he and Alcamenes had been ordered to make, each of them, another statue of Minerva, the chief goddess of the Athenians, in order that, upon due examination, the finer of the two statues might be chosen, to be placed on the summit of a lofty column. The performance of Alcamenes, being seen from a short distance, was quite beautiful, whereas that of Phidias appeared to be nothing else than a rough unfinished cast. The former was about to be preferred, when Phidias made the request that both of them should be fairly tried, by being placed at their proper intended height. At this time, the appearance was very different. All the delicacy of Alcamenes' work disappeared; on the contrary, the Minerva of Phidias showed itself with such an air of grandeur, nobleness and majesty, as struck all the beholders with admiration.

A still more celebrated work of this great artist, was the statue of the Olympic Jupiter. It was sixty feet high, and all made of ivory and gold; yet, the height, the size and the costly materials were but of secondary moment, when compared with the beauty and perfection of the workmanship. So admirable did it appear to all, that the Olympic Jupiter was reckoned among the seven wonders of the world, and, among all subsequent statuary, none ever dared so much as to attempt an imitation of this prodigy.

The art of painting, likewise, made immense progress during the age of Pericles. This is the more remarkable, as the Greek painters of old were unacquainted with the use of the green and blue colors, and contented themselves with four colors only, the white, black, yellow and red. Notwithstanding this deficiency, the genius of Apollodorus, Zeuxis and Parrhasius, not to mention Apelles and Protogenes who flourished a century later, produced paintings of surprising beauty. Apollodorus set the example by the finish of his coloring and the use of the clare-obscure. Zeuxis, his disciple, by using and improving the same method, not only equalled, but even surpassed his master; still, Zeuxis himself met a successful rival in Parrhasius, as became manifest in the following instance.

Both presented themselves on a solemn occasion, as candidates for the prize in painting. The former represented grapes in so natural a manner, that, when he exposed his work to public view, birds, deceived by the likeness, flew towards the painting, and picked at the grapes. Zeuxis, transported with joy, challenged his opponent to exhibit as masterly a performance as his own. Parrhasius produced a picture covered, to all appearance, with a thin veil: "Remove the veil," said Zeuxis, "that we may behold your masterpiece." But this apparent

voking the resentment or envy of many among the Grecian states. Lacedæmon, in particular, could not see without jealousy the preponderance of Athens in Greece; nor was Athens at all inclined to lower and dissemble her lofty pretensions in behalf of

veil was the painting itself. Zeuxis confessed that he was vanquished; "because," said he, "if I have been able to make birds take appearances for the reality, Parrhasius has produced the same effect on me who am a painter."

Parrhasius peculiarly excelled in expressing the feelings and passions of the soul. This appeared, above all, in his representation of the Athenian people, where he succeeded in truthfully exhibiting them, on the one hand as kind, humane and compassionate; on the other, as capricious, irascible and unjust; now, as proud and haughty, and then, as dejected and pusillanimous. Must not that man have been possessed of the richest imagination and a vast inventive genius, who could express together in the same painting, so many different and even opposite features?

Yet Parrhasius himself was overcome in his turn by another celebrated painter of that time, called Timanthes; this likewise happened in a public competition. The subject proposed was Ajax, that famous warrior of old, inflamed with fury because the arms of Achilles had been given by the Greeks to Ulysses, and not to himself. In this instance, the prize was awarded by a tribunal of competent judges to Timanthes. Parrhasius, less candid than Zeuxis and unwilling to acknowledge his defeat, endeavored to console himself with this pitiful remark: "Lo! I pity the fate of my hero more than my own. Behold, he is conquered a second time, by one who is far inferior to him in merit!"

As to the beauties of Grecian architecture, it would be impossible to give here an exact enumeration, much less an accurate description of them. Suffice it to say that they were of the highest order. It is universally admitted that the most perfect kinds of architecture are of Grecian origin, as appears from their very names, Doric, Ionian and Corinthian. Grandeur and solidity peculiarly belong to the Doric, elegance and refinement to the Ionian, magnificence and splendor of ornaments to the Corinthian order; whilst all three are remarkable for regularity in the design, harmony in the proportions, and wonderful taste in the details. The chief masterpieces of these three orders of architecture were the temple of Ceres in Eleusis, of Diana in Ephesus, and of the Olympic Jupiter, others say of the Parthenon or Minerva in Athens.

We shall not dwell on the high degree of perfection to which poetry, history and eloquence were carried by the Greeks. The productions of their poets, orators and historians, (especially if to the names already mentioned we add Homer and Pindar, Demosthenes and Æschines, Polybius and Plutarch), are admired everywhere, and form the delight of all true scholars. It is no exaggeration to say that their literary merit has, in the long course of ages, scarcely ever been equalled, never surpassed. (See § vi of the Appendix.)

The conclusion then forces itself upon us, that the age of Pericles stands unrivalled in the annals of mankind. Masterly performances

Sparta. Pericles himself, with perhaps too much obstinacy on some points of debate, was careful to maintain his fellow-citizens in that disposition. A variety of fresh incidents or enterprises on the one side, and expostulations on the other, daily contributed to increase the animosity of the two parties, till it finally broke into an open rupture. It thus happened that the leading states of Greece were prompted to turn against each other the weapons which they had so gloriously wielded together against the barbarians.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR.*—B. c. 431—404.

THE war between Athens and Sparta, commonly called the Peloponnesian war, divided the Grecian cities and states into two hostile parties of nearly equal strength. There were on the side of Lacedæmon, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Bœotians, Thebans, Corinthians and the whole of Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achaia, which remained neutral, at least for a time. Athens was supported by the Plateæans, Acarnanians, Corcyreans, Ionians, Thracians, the country near the Hellespont, and most of the Ægean islands. The forces of the latter consisted of thirty-two thousand troops, and a powerful fleet of three hundred

of various sorts may have been produced in other ages and countries, but it should always be borne in mind, that the Greeks led the way, and contributed, by their example, to form other eminent writers and artists; whilst they themselves had no predecessors to follow, but were indebted, for the excellency of their productions, not to imitation, but to their own refined taste and inventive genius.

Even our boasted nineteenth century, so proud of its light and civilization, must bow in acknowledgment of Grecian superiority with regard to the points in question. We moderns, it is true, greatly excel the ancients in money-making industry and commercial skill, as well as in mechanical arts and natural sciences, the immense progress of which cannot be denied. Nor is it very surprising that men of later ages, profiting by the experience and discoveries of the past, and having, besides, greater resources, more abundant means, and a wider sphere of action, should be more advanced, in many things, than those who preceded them by upwards of two thousand years. With regard to the fine arts and polite literature, let the ancients, especially the Greeks, be still allowed the laurels of victory. We may be their superiors in spirit of enterprise; but for refined taste and productions of natural genius, they certainly bear the palm.

* The particulars of this famous war are taken from the contemporary historians, Thucydides and Xenophon; also from Cornelius Nepos, in *Alcibiad.*, and Plutarch, in his lives of Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades and Lysander. Among modern authors, Rollin's *Histoire Ancienne*, vol. iii, iv, and Gérard, *Leçons de l'Histoire*, vol. vii, letter 52, have been found the most useful.

vessels. The Lacedæmonians had a much smaller number of ships; but their land army, besides being composed of choice warriors, was nearly double that of their opponents. The first hostilities in this unnatural war proceeded from the Thebans, who attacked Plataea, and took it by surprise, but were very soon expelled with considerable loss. Shortly after, the province of Attica was invaded and laid waste by Archidamus, king of Lacedæmon, at the head of sixty thousand men. The Athenians, by the advice of Pericles, carefully avoided every pitched battle against so superior a force, and kept themselves shut up within the walls of their city. In return, their fleet, having sailed towards Peloponnesus, infested a large tract of country along the coasts, took several fortresses or cities, sacked the small towns and villages, and thus amply retaliated the depredations committed in Attica.

The following year was marked by similar events, the invasion and devastation of Attica by the Lacedæmonians, and a second descent of the Athenians on the maritime districts of Peloponnesus. This last expedition was headed by Pericles in person. When the whole fleet was in readiness, and he himself in his own galley preparing to set sail, there happened an eclipse of the sun. The sudden darkness occasioned by it was looked upon as an unfavorable omen, and threw every one into the greatest consternation. Pericles, observing that the pilot was much astonished and perplexed, took his cloak, and covering the man's eyes with it, asked him whether he found any thing terrible in that action, or considered it as a presage of evil. The pilot answered in the negative. "Then," said Pericles, "where is the difference in the two circumstances, except that some object larger than my cloak causes the eclipse?" There is every reason to believe that the apprehensions of the Athenians were removed, and their hopes revived, since this expedition, although less brilliant than the former, was generally successful.

The great man, who held with such skill the reins of government, endeavored in another way to animate the courage and confidence of his people. There existed among the Athenians a very laudable custom in reference to those who fell in war; at the end of an expedition, they collected, as far as possible, the mortal remains of the dead, and carried them to Athens, where a solemn ceremony took place, and splendid obsequies were celebrated in their honor. This was done at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war with the usual solemnity, and Pericles was charged to deliver the funeral oration of the deceased heroes. He performed his task with an eloquence worthy of his high

reputation. In a discourse equally remarkable for beauty of thought, loftiness of sentiments and noble simplicity of style, he admirably described the glory of the Athenian republic; and, by happily blending with it the glory and praise of the brave soldiers who had fought and died for its defence, kindled in his audience an ardent desire to become their imitators.

The peroration of that admirable discourse makes us acquainted with another trait highly honorable to the Athenians, and worthy of a sensible, humane and generous nation. They did not confine their gratitude to empty display and useless tears in behalf of the heroic defenders of their country, but extended it to their destitute children, whom they supported at the expense of the government. The effects of this generosity were felt, not only by private citizens, but by the whole state; for, as Pericles himself justly observed, great and virtuous men most abound where merit is best rewarded.

But the Athenians had now to suffer a still more severe scourge than the devastation of war. A pestilence had just broken out both in their city and among their troops. This terrible plague, before reaching Athens, had already exercised its fury in several other countries, and particularly in the Persian dominions. Its violence baffled every effort to stop its progress; the strongest constitutions were unable to withstand the attacks of the disease, and the greatest care or skill of the physicians was but a feeble help to those who were infected. The streets, the dwellings, the temples, were filled with the dead and dying, and every part of the city exhibited a dreadful image of destruction, with scarcely any remedy for the present or hope for the future.

In this trying circumstance, the celebrated physician Hippocrates, a native of the island of Cos, displayed his talent and his disinterested zeal in behalf of the unfortunate Athenians. Disdaining the splendid offers and promises of the king of Persia, he devoted himself, with several of his disciples, to the service of the sick in Athens and its neighborhood; nor did he leave the city till the contagion had entirely subsided. Yet, in spite of his generous and skilful exertions, no fewer than five thousand men, able to bear arms, were carried off by the violence of the distemper.

Pericles himself was attacked by it, and, after lingering for a time, sunk under its attack. As he was lying on his death-bed, apparently senseless and on the point of breathing his last, his friends around him began to enumerate and extol his exploits; they did not imagine that their words were at all noticed by the

sick man. He heard every thing, however, and suddenly breaking silence, said in an audible voice: "I wonder that you should so well recollect and so highly extol a series of actions in which fortune had so great a share, and which are common to me and to many other generals; whilst you pass unnoticed the most honorable circumstance of my whole life, that I never caused any citizen to put on mourning." It is easy to conceive what must have been the grief occasioned in Athens, by the loss of a man who had constantly evinced superior abilities in every part of the government. The faults which the Athenians committed after his death, still more than the tears which they shed at his funeral, manifested the greatness of their loss on this occasion (B. C. 428).

The next campaigns were remarkable chiefly for the siege of Plataea, one of the most famous in antiquity for the vigor of the attack, and still more so for the heroic bravery of the resistance. During three years in succession, four hundred Plataean and eighty Athenian soldiers withstood all the efforts of a numerous army of Lacedæmonians and their allies. The former having, at length, consumed all their provisions, and expecting no more aid from Athens, formed the bold scheme of making their escape across the camp of the enemy; one-half of them, however, terrified by the extraordinary difficulty of such an attempt, lost courage at the moment for its execution. The others persisted in their design, and, availing themselves of a dark and stormy night, forced their passage over the double wall which the besiegers had built round the city, and escaped without loss, before the enemy could recover from their surprise. As to those who had chosen to remain in Plataea, they surrendered on condition that their lives should not be forfeited without the benefit of a legal trial.

Five Spartan commissaries were appointed judges in this affair. Without laying any crime to the charge of the prisoners, they simply asked them whether they had, during the present war, done any service to the Peloponnesian confederacy. This unexpected question surprised and perplexed the Plataeans. They reminded their judges of the signal services which they had formerly rendered to all Greece at the time of the Persian invasion, and showed, by appealing to recent facts, that their present situation was a misfortune, and not a crime. But the stern policy of the Lacedæmonians, and still more the implacable animosity of the Thebans, had already sealed the fate of these brave and unhappy men. They were again asked the same question, "whether, since the beginning of the war, they had rendered any

service to the Spartans and their allies;" and being made to advance one after the other, they answered in the negative, and were all butchered without mercy.

After this bloody execution, hostilities were carried on in various places and with alternate success: many battles took place, in which sometimes Athens, sometimes Sparta, had the advantage; but none of them were decisive. The most distinguished general, at this period of the war, seems to have been the Lacedæmonian Brasidas, and, next to him, Nicias the Athenian. At the end of ten years, the two parties, equally tired and dispirited by their respective losses, consented to a truce, and even to a treaty of alliance, which, if it did not entirely stop, at least suspended for a time the effects of their former resentment. This treaty was called, from the name of its most zealous promoter, the peace of Nicias (B. C. 421).

The flame of war was soon rekindled. There existed at this time in Athens a rich, talented and fiery youth, called Alcibiades, who greatly attracted public attention by the brilliancy of his natural endowments, and the flexibility of his temper, equally susceptible of the various impressions of virtue and vice. Being, above all, excessively ambitious and desirous of fame, he used every means to provoke a new rupture between the two rival states; unfortunately for his country and for himself, he succeeded in the attempt. By his advice, the Athenians resolved to carry the war into Sicily and lay siege to the important city of Syracuse, which, being a Peloponnesian colony, was naturally more inclined to take part with their enemies. Alcibiades himself was appointed commander of the expedition, together with Nicias, whom we have already mentioned, and Lamachus, another brave and experienced general.

Athens had scarcely ever fitted out a more gallant armament than that which sailed from the harbor of Piræus for the invasion of Sicily. It reached without obstacle the shores of that island, where Alcibiades took the city of Catana by surprise; this was his first and last exploit during the Sicilian expedition. An order came, recalling him to Athens, where he had been accused of having, some days before the departure of the fleet, mutilated all the statues of Mercury. He instantly obeyed the summons; but reflecting during the voyage on the well-known fickleness of his fellow-citizens, and perhaps apprehensive that he would not be acquitted, he determined secretly to leave those who accompanied him, and effect his escape. He executed his design with his usual ingenuity. Having afterwards learned that the Athenians had condemned him to death as an outlaw; "I

will let them know," replied he, "that I am still alive." In effect, he joined the party of the Lacedæmonians, and suggested to them a variety of measures best calculated to injure the interests of his country.

The departure of Alcibiades, and, soon after, the death of Lamachus, left Nicias sole commander of the Athenian army. This general had already approached Syracuse, and, whilst his fleet blockaded it by sea, he almost entirely surrounded it by land with a line of intrenchments and redoubts; he moreover frequently defeated and repelled the besieged, whenever they endeavored by their sallies to retard his progress or interrupt his work. The city was thus more and more closely pressed, and the Syracusans were on the point of surrendering, when the arrival of Gylippus, a Spartan general, suddenly changed the aspect of affairs.

Gylippus commenced his operations by sending a messenger to Nicias, to offer him five days for his departure from Sicily. The Athenian leader scorned to answer such a proposal. Several combats ensued, in which Gylippus carried at first some posts occupied by the besiegers, and although repulsed on one occasion, signally defeated them in a second battle.

The tide of success had now taken a different course; the Athenians were likewise conquered at sea, with a considerable loss of men and vessels. So many disasters had already placed them in a very precarious situation, when the arrival of powerful reinforcements from Athens revived their hopes and courage; but their joy was not of long duration. An ill-concerted attack made during the night by Demosthenes, the leader of the new reinforcement, entirely failed, and cost the Athenians two thousand soldiers. Their ranks were also daily thinned by autumnal diseases; despondency pervaded more and more the remaining troops, and it became absolutely necessary to make preparations for abandoning the siege.

This measure, which had been already deferred too long, was at length about to be executed by the Athenians, when an eclipse of the moon again postponed their departure. Both the soldiers and the generals took this phenomenon for a very unfavorable omen, and Nicias expressed his determination to stay till the next full moon. This delay proved their ruin. The enemy had time to block up their vessels in the harbor, of which they had taken possession from the beginning of the siege, and to inflict on them new and severe losses. Moreover, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent various bodies of soldiers to occupy all the passes and roads by which the Athenians would probably

attempt to retreat, and prepared every thing for their final overthrow.

These unfortunate men, forty thousand in number, at last set out from their camp, under the conduct of their chief leaders Nicias and Demosthenes, almost destitute of provisions, and compelled to leave behind them their sick and wounded, whilst they themselves were closely pursued and harassed by a victorious foe, who gave them no respite. To add to their misfortune, Demosthenes, with a part of the army, lost his way during the night, and afterwards found himself so entangled and surrounded in a narrow pass, that the utmost exertions of courage could not save him from the necessity of surrendering. Two days later, Nicias, after a brave defence, and a dreadful slaughter of his troops, was reduced to the same extremity. He surrendered himself a prisoner of war, together with the sad remnant of his once flourishing army. Thus the defeat of the Athenians, both by sea and land, was decisive, entire, irreparable, and in fact proved to be the deadly blow to the greatness and power of their nation (B. C. 413).

The Syracusans, not less exasperated by their former losses than elated by their present success, treated their prisoners with inhuman rigor. Both Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death, contrary to both the intentions and the promise of Gylippus. The other Athenians, to the number of at least seven thousand, were confined in quarries or dungeons, where they had to suffer, during several months, incredible pains, hunger, thirst, and every species of hardship. Many of them died in those frightful dungeons. Others were sold as slaves, and, owing to their prudent and modest behavior, began to experience much kinder treatment. Plutarch relates (in the life of Nicias) that some of them were indebted for their preservation to the pen of Euripides and to the verses of that poet, with the recital of which they charmed the ears of their masters. These liberated captives, upon their return to Athens, went to give thanks to Euripides, and, in the most respectful language, hailed him as their deliverer.

The Athenians, dismayed by their defeats, resolved to recall Alcibiades, as being the only man truly able to restore their forlorn affairs. He eagerly acceded to the proposal; but not being willing to return except as a conqueror, he at first went to join the Athenian fleet near the Asiatic coast, and so encouraged the soldiers by word and example, that the Lacedæmonians were conquered in two great battles, their admiral was slain, and their army almost entirely destroyed. He then steered towards

Athens, where his arrival at the head of the victorious fleet was hailed with every demonstration of joy. But this flattering applause of the multitude was transitory. As Alcibiades again set sail in order to pursue the course of his exploits, one of his lieutenants took occasion during his absence to attack Lysander, the Lacedæmonian admiral, who defeated him and captured fifteen galleys. Alcibiades, as chief leader of the expedition, had to bear the blame of this loss, although it did not happen through his fault; he was again deprived of the command of the fleet, and ten generals were appointed to exercise it in his place.

These new commanders were not deficient in zeal for the service of their country, but not having the ability of Alcibiades, they experienced at first nothing but disappointment and defeat. This obliged the Athenian government to furnish them with a greater naval force. By uncommon efforts, the number of their galleys was made to amount on the present occasion to one hundred and fifty, to which the Lacedæmonians and their allies opposed one hundred and twenty vessels. The latter were under the command of Callicratidas, a true Spartan hero, who, in justice, magnanimity and valor, was equal to the best of the Greeks, but who at the same time showed himself too sensible on the point of honor. Being advised not to hazard a battle against the superior numbers of the enemy, he replied that he could not avoid it without shame, and that his life was of little moment to the republic. "The fate of Sparta," said he, "is not attached to one man." The action took place near the Arginusæ islands, over against Lesbos, and was one of the most terrible and obstinate of the whole war. Callicratidas bore down upon the enemy with such vigor, that he sunk or disabled many of their ships at the first onset. At last, his own vessel coming to close fight with the galley of Pericles (the son of the great Pericles and one of the Athenian admirals), was caught by a grappling-iron, from which he could not extricate it. After incredible efforts of courage, the Spartan admiral fell among the slain, and his death was followed by a complete overthrow and almost total destruction of his fleet (B. C. 406).

It was held a sacred duty among the ancients, to bury their soldiers who had fallen in battle. The Athenian generals had not only intended, but even taken measures, to comply with this duty; but a violent storm prevented them from fulfilling their design. In all this, there manifestly was no fault of theirs; yet the people at Athens were so much incensed because their dead had not received the rites of sepulture, that they deposed the victorious generals, and, in spite of the facts which vindicated their

conduct, doomed six of them to capital punishment. Among the multitude of citizens, a few only, and in the senate Socrates alone, had the courage to protest against the absurd and cruel measure. The sentence was no sooner executed than the people themselves opened their eyes, and were struck with horror at the iniquity of their judgment; but their tardy repentance could not restore the dead.

In this odious manner did the Athenians, otherwise a polished and humane nation, often inflict on their worthiest citizens the penalty of banishment or death, and entail on themselves severe injuries and indelible disgrace; at one time, blindly indulging in groundless exasperation or jealousy, and the next moment acknowledging the innocence of their victims, and bewailing, with bitter and fruitless regret, their own injustice, ingratitude, and criminal precipitation. Such, among other instances, was the case with the illustrious philosopher whose name has just been mentioned, as will be seen in the following section. As to Alcibiades, the most extraordinary character of that period, he died about the same time in Asia Minor, a fugitive and an exile, the victim both of his own indiscretion, and of treason, jealousy, and resentment.

The defeat of the Spartans at the Arginusæ islands obliged them to reinstate Lysander, the ablest of their admirals, a man otherwise noted for the looseness of his principles, and to invest him again with the chief authority in the fleet. The Athenians, with a hundred and eighty galleys, met him at the strait of the Hellespont, and offered him battle near the mouth of a small river called *Ægos Potamos*; but although his vessels and troops seemed ready for action, he did not move from his position. The enemy came four days in succession to make the same offer: the Lacedæmonians still remained motionless.

Nothing could now equal the confidence and security of the Athenians. Lysander, fully aware of the circumstance, waited, on the fifth day, till they had returned to their station, and the soldiers had, as usual, left the vessels to scatter themselves and take repose on the shore. Just at that moment, the Spartan fleet bore down upon them with incredible fury, captured or disabled all their ships except nine, sent detachments to cut in pieces or disperse the troops on shore, and took three thousand prisoners, with their generals. This masterly stroke, one of the greatest ever performed, was achieved in the space of an hour. It cost the conqueror scarcely any loss, and yet was sufficient to prostrate the whole force of the Athenians, and put an end to the Peloponnesian war, after it had lasted twenty-seven years.

The triumphant fleet of Sparta soon appeared in sight of Athens, and blockaded it by sea, whilst a numerous army under Kings Agis and Pausanias besieged it by land. The inhabitants had no troops, no allies, no vessels, no provisions, no resources whatever to enable them to oppose a successful resistance; yet they were unwilling to surrender. Nothing but the extremity of famine could prevail upon them to take this humiliating step, and sue for a capitulation. Some among the confederates were of opinion that Athens should be entirely demolished; but the Lacedæmonians declared that they would never consent to destroy this noble city, which had produced so many great and illustrious men, and in the most perilous times had done so much for all Greece. Peace was therefore concluded on the following conditions: "That the Athenians should confine themselves within the bounds of Attica; should demolish their principal fortifications and the harbor of Piræus; should deliver up all their ships except twelve; should have the same friends and the same foes with the Lacedæmonians, and follow them at command either by land or by sea." Galling as they were, all these conditions were accepted, and some of them were immediately executed (B. C. 404).

Lysander, without giving the Athenians time to adopt other measures, entirely changed the form of their government: he appointed a Spartan governor over their city, together with thirty archons or magistrates, to whom power was given to enact laws. Finally, having put a strong garrison in the citadel, he returned to Lacedæmon, crowned with laurels and loaded with booty. But the government which he had established in Athens was of short duration. The thirty magistrates appointed by him committed so many acts of despotism, injustice and cruelty, that they provoked the indignation and horror of all sensible persons against their administration. Thrasybulus, who was not less a brave general than an excellent citizen, put himself at the head of some troops, overthrew this tyrannical government, and, if he could not restore the power, at least succeeded in restoring the liberties of his nation.

Several years elapsed before open hostilities between Athens and Sparta were renewed. This interval was filled up, on the one hand, by the trial and death of the illustrious philosopher Socrates; and, on the other, by the expedition of the younger Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes, king of Persia, and the famous retreat of the ten thousand, so elegantly described by Xenophon the historian, one of the chief actors in this interesting event.

TRIAL AND DEATH OF SOCRATES.

WHILST so many civil and political revolutions happened throughout Greece, Socrates was effecting a more useful and pacific change in the study of moral philosophy. It will not be amiss to dwell at some length on this celebrated man, who exercised so great an influence over his contemporaries by his doctrine, his moral instructions, and his example.

Socrates was born at Athens, one year after the historian Thucydides, and about the time of Cimon's victories over the Persians near the river Eurymedon. As his father Sophroniscus was a sculptor, he himself exercised the same art in his youth. He also applied with great ardor and success to the study of the other fine arts, as well as of rhetoric and the exact sciences, and gave, as soldier, several proofs of his intrepidity during the first campaigns of the Peloponnesian war. Yet, because his mind was most strongly bent towards moral philosophy and the knowledge of man's duties, he made this most important science the chief object of his inquiries and meditations. He studied it first under the philosopher Anaxagoras, who had been also the master of Pericles; and afterwards entirely devoted himself to it, both for his own sake and for the benefit of others, seeking in it, not the bare knowledge, but also the practice of virtue.

His principal care was to subdue first his too hasty disposition, and his efforts in this particular were eminently successful; this should be accounted the more praiseworthy in him, as he was naturally much inclined to anger. In order to check this passion, and to acquire moderation and evenness of temper, he made an agreement with his friends, that they should warn him whenever they would see him on the point of indulging his natural irascibility; at the first sign or word of advice, he lowered the tone of his voice, or even ceased to speak. By this and other efficient means, he obtained great command over his temper. As he one day felt himself very much excited, he said to a slave; "I would beat you, were I not angry." At another time, being insolently struck on the face, he smiled and said: "It is rather unpleasant not to know when one should put on a helmet."

He had a wife whose blunt, peevish manners constantly tried his patience. She sometimes gave way so far to her passionate temper, as publicly to strip him of his cloak, and on one occasion, after loading him with a torrent of abuse, she poured the contents of a filthy vase on his head. Socrates, as usual, contented himself with laughing at her fury: "After such claps of thunder," said he, "it was natural to expect a shower."

This great man did not confine his virtuous exertions to himself; he endeavored, with admirable zeal, to lead others to the love and practice of virtue. To spread the principles of honesty and morality among the people, he made use of every favorable circumstance, public or private, that offered itself, to give them useful instructions. He endeavored, above all, to improve the good natural dispositions of young men, to form their minds and hearts, and train them to justice, temperance, fortitude, respect for religion and the laws, etc., warning them, at the same time, with the greatest earnestness, against idleness, licentiousness and vanity.

His whole soul seemed bent on these grand and vitally important subjects. His manner of teaching was so attractive, and he possessed so persuasive an eloquence, that the young Athenians frequented his lectures with incredible ardor; they left their parents, their homes, their amusements, to see and hear Socrates. Foreigners were not excluded from his school, and he readily extended to them the same care that he bestowed on his fellow-citizens. Nor could he be accused in all this of any interested view, since he received no reward, no salary whatever, for the trouble which he took and the instructions which he delivered.

Having lost nearly all his fortune by the failure of a creditor, he neither complained nor appeared any way concerned. Although he might have easily retrieved this loss by the aid of his numerous and wealthy friends, he always refused to do so, and declined all their offers of assistance, readily preferring to make up for the deficiency of his fortune by strict frugality, to which he had inured himself from his early years. For the same reason, he nobly rejected the gifts and promises of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, who ardently desired to have him at his court; he felt reluctant, he said, to dwell with a man for whose favors he was unable to make a return.

It would be difficult indeed for one not actuated by supernatural motives, to surpass Socrates in his contempt of riches and his love of poverty. At the sight of great treasures, he would congratulate himself, and exclaim: "How many things there are, of which I have no need!" Once, however, when surrounded by his disciples, he observed that he would buy a cloak, if he had money. This remark was quite sufficient: it became a matter of dispute among them, who should have the privilege of making him this trifling present.

Besides disinterestedness and magnanimity, Socrates evinced also great fortitude, not only in the affair, already mentioned, of the six generals unjustly condemned to death by the Athenians.

but likewise under the tyrannical government of the thirty archons. He opposed their violent proceedings, consoled the afflicted citizens, labored to revive the hopes of the oppressed, and was for all a model of courage and firmness, so long as the tyranny lasted.

Such was the celebrated man, against whom a trial was instituted and sentence of death pronounced in his own city, by those who should have been foremost in rewarding his zealous and successful exertions for the public good. The first instigators of these iniquitous proceedings were certain sophists, much respected in Athens, proud of their fame, and eager in advancing their pecuniary interests. To prevent them from perverting the minds of the young Athenians by their vain and deceitful discourses, Socrates had often unmasked their ignorance and hypocrisy. Men of this description naturally became his inveterate enemies. To them were added numbers of vicious persons, for whom his example and instructions were a continual reproach, or who, through base jealousy, could not bear his conspicuous merit. Such were the various and more or less guilty contrivers of Socrates' ruin.

The first attack directed against him came from the poet Aristophanes. As Socrates had openly testified his dislike and contempt of the immoral productions of that author, the pride of Aristophanes or the advice of wicked persons, prompted him to gratify either his personal resentment or the malice of others, by making the wisest philosopher of Greece the subject of a satirical comedy, and holding him up on the stage to public ridicule as a false teacher.

This first attempt to ruin the character of Socrates was followed by a second, threatening his liberty and life, although not put into execution till many years after. Melitus, a contemptible writer, and Anytus, an envious, rich, and powerful man, lodged against him a formal accusation before the magistrates of Athens: they charged him with introducing novel deities under the name of demons, and seducing the Athenian youths from their duty. To these groundless charges Socrates was summoned to answer before a tribunal of five hundred judges.

No sooner was this second attack made known, than his friends hastened to offer him their services for the vindication of his innocence. Among others, the orator Lysias composed in his defence an eloquent and pathetic discourse; but Socrates, ever firm and magnanimous, would not consent to receive assistance, nor would he stoop to excite the compassion and to implore the mercy of those before whom he was arraigned. He defended

himself with the calm intrepidity of conscious innocence, with such force and dignity, that he seemed to be the judge of his judges. Yet this very circumstance principally served to indispose their minds against him, and he was pronounced guilty by a small majority. Being then asked what he himself thought should be his punishment, he answered: "Having spent my whole life in earnest endeavors to serve my country and benefit my fellow-citizens by teaching them the way of virtue, I know of no other punishment that I deserve, than to be maintained during the remainder of my days at the expense of the republic." The judges were so much offended by this answer, which was an implicit reproof of their injustice, that they condemned him to drink hemlock, the usual punishment of state criminals.

Socrates heard his sentence with the same composure and firmness with which he had defended his cause. He observed that he would readily, in obedience to the laws, suffer death, to which nature had condemned him long since; but that his accusers and enemies had condemned themselves to eternal disgrace. Apollodorus, one of his disciples, began to express how intensely grieved he was to see him die innocent. "Why," replied Socrates, "would you have me die guilty?" He spent his last days in conversation with his friends on philosophical subjects, especially the immortality of the soul; refused the means of escape that were offered to him; and calmly drinking the fatal hemlock, expired a few moments after, at the age of about seventy years, B. C. 400.

It cannot be denied that Socrates was an admirable philosopher, a great benefactor to his country, and one of the greatest men that Greece, perhaps even the whole world, ever produced. He was not, it is true, without his failings; he may have been, on certain occasions, actuated by a spirit of affectation and philosophical pride; he may have, once or twice, uttered loose words and acted in an objectionable manner; yet, whatever some may think to the contrary,* it is impossible to read the dialogues of Plato and the memoirs of Xenophon, without being convinced that Socrates was in the main a zealous and most sagacious inquirer after moral truth and virtue, and, except on another point, to be afterwards mentioned, generally animated with an earnest desire to make others relish, both in theory and practice, the same laudable objects which he himself pursued.

"When we consider," says the judicious Rollin, "how sub-

* E. g. Feller, the biographer, who finds fault with whatever Socrates did or said. See *Dictionnaire Historique*, article *Socrates*.

lime were the sentiments of Socrates with regard to moral virtues, sobriety, temperance, contempt of riches, patience in adversity, and forgiveness of injuries; also, with regard to the deity; the unity of the Supreme Being; his immensity, which sees and knows every thing; his omnipotence in the creation, and providence in the government of the world; the immortality of the soul; her last end and eternal destiny; the rewards of the good and the punishment of the wicked: when we consider this train of sublime knowledge, we ask our reason whether it was a pagan philosopher who thought and spoke thus, and can scarcely persuade ourselves that, from so dark and impure a source as heathenism was, should shine forth so brilliant and glorious rays of light.”*

It is however equally certain that this great and enlightened philosopher was far from being in possession of the whole truth. Whilst he knew and taught that there is but one supreme God and Lord of the universe, he at the same time admitted inferior and subordinate gods, namely, the false gods of his countrymen, and was of opinion, as his own conduct fully testified, that adoration and sacrifices were to be offered to them: This was his capital error and fault. For, either he believed in the divinity of these inferior deities, or he did not. In the first case, he divided, and, by dividing, destroyed the divine nature. In the second, he paid to mere creatures, known as such by himself, the homage of supreme worship and adoration due only to the Creator, and thus incurred, in either case, the guilt of polytheism or idolatry.

Still, as this was no crime in the judgment of a heathen people, the Athenians afterwards lamented, with bitter regret, their injustice towards Socrates. Some authors relate that, at the exhibition of one of the tragedies of Euripides, in which the hero of the piece, called Palamedes, had been destroyed by a foul calumny, the whole assembly, remembering Socrates, melted into tears, when the actor came to the verse,

“You doom the justest of the Greeks to perish.”

The whole city was for a time a scene of affliction and mourning; nay, among his accusers, Melitus was singled out to suffer capital punishment, and the others were banished. Finally, the Athenians, not satisfied with these marks of their grief, passed from one extreme to the other, from prejudice and envy to a feeling of religious veneration for Socrates. They not only erected a splendid statue of brass in his honor, but placed it in one of the most conspicuous parts of the city; and the man whom they

* *Ancient History*, vol. iv, p. 449.

had condemned as an impious criminal, they now began to honor as a hero and a demi-god.

Never had any philosopher more numerous or more illustrious disciples than Socrates had in Athens: Plato and Xenophon, not to mention others, would suffice to confer immortal honor on their master. This is not the place to dwell on the merit of these distinguished men; their names will recur again, and with more propriety, in the sequel.

EXPEDITION OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER.—RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND.—B. C. 401-399.

After the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, and of two other kings, his sons and successors, who reigned but a very short time, the throne of Persia was occupied by their brother, Darius Nothus, during the space of nineteen years (B. C. 424-405). The prominent feature of this new reign was an almost continual series of intrigues at court, and revolts in the provinces.

Nothus, having died towards the end of the Peloponnesian war (B. C. 405), was succeeded by his eldest son, Artaxerxes, surnamed Mnemon from his excellent memory. But he had another son possessed of great talents and of still greater ambition, the famous Cyrus, surnamed the Younger, whom he had invested with the government of all Lesser Asia. This young prince, not satisfied with his portion, began to indulge in the most culpable and audacious projects. Having raised an army of about a hundred thousand barbarians and thirteen thousand Greeks, he set out, at their head, from the city of Sardis, and advanced into the heart of his brother's dominions, with the desperate resolution of depriving him of his crown and his life.

Artaxerxes, on his part, had mustered a force of nine hundred thousand men, and was advancing in good order against his foes. The two armies met at Cunaxa, in the country of Babylon. The battle had scarcely commenced, when Cyrus, perceiving his brother in the centre of the Persian troops, uttered a loud cry, and urged his horse in that direction, accompanied by a few attendants. With desperate fury he killed or put to flight all who opposed his passage, and having approached the king, wounded him severely, but was himself wounded both by the king and by other Persian warriors, and fell dead on the spot; thus paying with his life the forfeit of his lawless ambition.

In the mean time, the Greeks of his army had attacked the multitude of barbarians to whom they were opposed, and put them in complete disorder. In vain did Artaxerxes, who came

to this part of the field after his victory over Cyrus, rally his troops, and lead them again to the charge; they were again put to flight by that small but intrepid band of warriors. Thus the Greeks were completely victorious. However, after the fall of the young prince for whom they fought, their exertions had no longer any object, and it became their evident interest to make a speedy return to their country. They immediately set out on their homeward march, though by a different road. After a few days, the peril of their situation was unexpectedly and dreadfully increased by the loss of their chief officers; these unhappy men, being drawn into a snare, through the perfidious agency of a Persian general who pretended to be their friend, were all made prisoners and put to death without mercy.

This sad event placed the Greeks in a most gloomy condition. They found themselves reduced to the number of ten thousand, without generals, without guides, without provisions, and at the distance of nearly fifteen hundred miles from Greece, hemmed in by deep rivers, and surrounded by enemies. At the sight of so many dangers, their distress was extreme. Still Xenophon, one of their number, succeeded by his eloquent exhortations in raising their drooping spirits, and persuaded them to proceed courageously in their march, after having first appointed new leaders. Himself and four others were chosen for this office. The troops committed themselves with implicit reliance to their guidance, and set out again, fully determined to open a passage through every enemy.

They were made to advance, first in the form of a square battalion, and then in two columns, with the baggage between them, and some bodies of reserve. For want of boats, they could not pass the Tigris and the Euphrates, till, by marching towards the north for many days, they reached the mountains of Armenia, where these two great rivers take their rise. During this time, they were often compelled to fight, either against the Persians who pursued them, or against the inhabitants of the countries through which they passed. A thousand other difficulties and obstacles continually impeded their progress, such, for instance, as deep and rapid streams, mountains and defiles, desert places, hunger and thirst, rain, cold, and snow sometimes to the depth of five or six feet, etc. The Greeks, by their patience, constancy, and valor, overcame all these obstacles, and, at the close of about four months, reached the Grecian colonies near the Euxine sea. They thence proceeded towards the Hellespont, and as far as the city of Pergamum, where they enlisted themselves among the troops of Thymbron, the general of the Lacedæmonians, who

was preparing to march against the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

The retreat of the ten thousand Greeks has always been considered a perfect model in the art of warfare, and one of the most glorious exploits recorded in military annals; indeed, no enterprise could have been commenced with more boldness and valor, or conducted with more prudence and success. Numberless, as we have just seen, were the dangers which attended their march through so many hostile nations; yet they returned victorious and triumphant to their own country. Long after, when Antony, the famous Roman general, was pursued in nearly the same provinces by a Parthian army, finding himself in the like perilous situation, he exclaimed, through admiration of their invincible courage: "O the retreat of the ten thousand!" The Greeks themselves were taught by the success of this admirable retreat, to have still greater confidence in their strength and contempt for their enemies than they had before. They could now look forward, with well-founded hope, to the time when they would be able to overthrow the Persian empire.

GREAT QUALITIES AND EXPLOITS OF AGESILAUS.—LEAGUE
AGAINST SPARTA.—PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.—B. C. 399—387.

THIS consciousness of superior ability was increased in the minds of the Greeks by new victories over the Persians, whose policy during the long struggle between Sparta and Athens had been to favor the two parties in succession, the more surely to weaken both. It was principally by their assistance that the Lacedæmonians were at length enabled to crush the power of the Athenian republic; but the Persians were now to reap the bitter fruit of this ungenerous conduct, and to tremble for their own territory. A very singular circumstance in this series of events was, that the fresh losses which they experienced were inflicted by that very nation whose preponderance over all Greece their partiality had promoted: Agesilaus, the Spartan king, was in their regard another Themistocles or Cimon, destined to humble again the mighty sovereign of Persia.

The mind of Agesilaus was as great and noble as his bodily appearance was mean. Although he was lame and of small stature, his courage, his wisdom, his ability, his constant compliance with the laws, and his zeal for the interests of his country, rendered him one of the most conspicuous kings of Lacedæmon. Unfortunately, his ambition equalled his valor, and subsequently

involved Sparta in great difficulties. Being charged, in the beginning, to pursue the war against the Persians, after it had been carried on for a time by Thymbron and Dercyllidas, he had no sooner taken the command of the army, than he showed what an able general may effect, when he has previously known how to gain the esteem, confidence and affection of his troops. Every thing yielded to the vigor or prudence of Agesilaus. He restored good order and tranquillity in the Grecian colonies of Lesser Asia, defeated the Persian generals, took many of their cities, and carried off an immense quantity of spoils.

So many glorious achievements were performed by Agesilaus within the short space of two years. His military fame was now so great, that it already spread terror throughout the provinces of Upper Asia; deputies came from all sides, to make alliance with him, and fresh bodies of troops continually arrived to join and increase his army. Encouraged by this great success, he seriously thought of going forward to attack the Persian monarch in the very centre of his dominions. But just at that time, he received a message requiring his immediate return for the defence of his own nation, whose power was more than ever threatened by a terrible and perilous war. He instantly obeyed, and contented himself with saying that he was driven from Asia by *ten thousand archers* of the king, meaning by this expression Persian coins, having an archer represented on one side.

This remark was correct. A large quantity of these coins had been distributed among the orators and other influential persons of the Grecian states, to rouse them against Sparta; moreover, feelings of resentment or national jealousy made them anxious and eager to humble her proud superiority. Hence a powerful league, consisting of the Thebans, the Athenians, the Corinthians and the Argives, was in a short time formed against the Lacedæmonians, and the armies immediately took the field. Agesilaus, on his return from Asia Minor, found the confederates encamped in the Bœotian plains, near Chæronea. Here, a fierce and well-contested battle took place, in which each party had the advantage in one part of the field, and was conquered in the other. On the whole, however, the result was decidedly favorable to the Lacedæmonians, and enabled them to preserve, for some years longer, their superiority by land over their opponents.

But they were not so fortunate by sea. Of the Athenian leaders who had distinguished themselves in the Peloponnesian war, Conon yet remained, a man of great energy and courage, skilful in finding out resources, and, notwithstanding his frequent

failures, justly esteemed an able admiral. In the battle of Ægos Potamos, he had escaped with nine vessels from the grasping hand of Lysander. Having retired to the court of Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, he watched from that place the vicissitude of events; and the various occasions that might present themselves to retrieve the misfortunes of Athens. He at last found what he desired in the hostile feeling of the Persians against the Lacedæmonians, which had been so much excited by the attacks of the latter.

When the moment had arrived for the continental league of the Greeks to be put into operation, Conon, supported by Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap, obtained from King Artaxerxes a powerful fleet to act in the same cause. This armament was placed under the command of both Pharnabazus and Conon. They immediately went in search of the enemy, and met him near Cnidus, a maritime city of Caria. The naval force of the Lacedæmonians, although inferior to that of the Persians, was however considerable; hence Pysander, their admiral, a brother-in-law of Agesilaus, did not decline the combat, nay he displayed in it a truly Spartan valor, even at the cost of his life. But nothing could resist the extraordinary efforts of Conon, who captured many galleys, sunk others, and compelled the rest to seek safety in flight (B. C. 394).

This brilliant victory deprived Sparta for ever of the superiority by sea, and also detached from her most of her Asiatic allies, some of whom declared for the Athenians, whilst others proclaimed their independence. Hence the battle of Cnidus proved a terrible blow to the Lacedæmonians. From that time, they made but feeble efforts in Asia; their subsequent success on one side was often counterbalanced by heavy losses on the other, and their power soon declined even by land, till its preponderance was completely lost in the disastrous battles of Leuctra and Mantinea.

Athens, on the contrary, was now enabled to recover a great portion of her former ascendancy. After the battle of Cnidus, the two victorious admirals, Pharnabazus and Conon, ravaged without opposition the coasts of Laconia; the satrap, then returning to his government of Phrygia, left the fleet under the direction of his colleague, and furnished him, besides, with large sums of money for the complete re-establishment of Athens. Conon, crowned with glory, and possessed of every facility to carry out his designs, revisited that city without delay. He was received with enthusiasm by the citizens: but he himself experienced feelings of mingled exultation and sorrow, exultation on behold-

ing again his beloved country after so long an absence, and sorrow at the sight of the sad condition of a place once so flourishing. He lost not a moment, but instantly began to rebuild the walls and fortifications of Athens, and employed in this important work not only masons and professed workmen, but likewise the other citizens, the sailors, the soldiers, even the allies, and generally all persons favorably disposed towards the undertaking. By these means, and by a striking change in human events, a city which the Persians had formerly destroyed, was restored to its ancient splendor by their willing co-operation both in men and money; and this restoration was effected in spite of the hostile feelings of the Lacedæmonians, formerly its friends and allies.* By these untiring exertions of Conon, Athens again resumed a high rank in the list of nations, and became nearly as formidable as ever to her enemies.

The Lacedæmonians again betrayed their alarm, with their usual jealousy, at this return of prosperity in a rival state. Rather than suffer their pre-eminence to slip from their hands, they had recourse to base or iniquitous measures in order to preserve it; but in this also their hopes were soon frustrated. One of their movements covered them with everlasting disgrace, and another, besides the dishonor attached to it, became the occasion of their severest losses.

The first was the famous treaty of peace concluded by their plenipotentiary Antalcidas with the king of Persia. The terms of this treaty were, that the Greek cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomena and Cyprus, should belong to the king; that the other Grecian states generally, whether great or small, should be left free and independent; and that such as refused to embrace the peace, should be compelled to do so by force of arms (B. C. 387).

It was plain that, by receiving these conditions, the Spartans agreed to take a foreign power for the arbiter of Greece. They again reduced to a state of bondage the cities for whose liberty Agesilaus had fought. In a word, they surrendered the glorious advantages which the victories of Themistocles and Cimon had extorted from the Persian court. The other Greeks, and espe-

* *Fatum illud Athenarum fuit, ut ante a Persis crematæ, manibus eorum, et nunc a Lacedæmonijs dirutæ, ex spoliis Lacedæmoniorum restituerentur: versa quoque vice, nunc haberent socios, quos tunc hostes habuerant; et hostes nunc paterentur, cum quibus juncti tunc arctissimis societatis vinculis fuerant.*—Justin, b. vi, c. 5. See also Plutarch, in his life of *Agesilaus*; Corn. Nepos in *Conon*, ch. 4; and Xenophon's *Affairs of Greece*, b. iv, ch. 8.

cially the Thebans, were fully sensible of the disadvantages of such a peace; yet, because they were unable to resist the combined forces of Persia and Sparta, they all sooner or later acceded to the treaty. Such was, for the present, the unhappy though natural fruit of their endless dissensions.

THEBAN WAR.*—B. C. 382—363.

ANOTHER disgraceful step which the Lacedæmonians took for the purpose of securing their power, was the fraudulent occupation of the citadel of Thebes. The loud complaints occasioned by this violation of the treaty of peace were of no avail; four hundred Thebans found themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from the town, and retiring to Athens for protection and refuge (B. C. 382). The situation of Thebes appeared desperate as to its liberties, whilst, on the contrary, the power of Sparta seemed established more firmly than ever. Still, the liberation of the one and the fall of the other were at hand; Thebes itself was destined by Providence to crush the haughty pre-eminence of the Lacedæmonians, and render their late act of injustice and oppression the chief cause of their disasters.

The latter city possessed at that time two men of uncommon merit, viz.: Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The first, who was still young and the only heir of an opulent family, spent his fortune, not in expensive dress and luxurious living, but in assisting the needy and distressed, showing by this noble conduct that he was not the slave, but the true master of his riches. The second, through choice, lived in honorable poverty. He was, at the same time, grave, magnanimous, valiant, prudent, modest, temperate, and so much attached to truth, that he would never utter a falsehood, even in jest.† Both of them were able statesmen, skilful generals, devoted citizens, in a word, the heroes of their age, and actuated by the noblest principles of patriotism. Far from being envious, they were so full of esteem for each other, that their intimacy lasted during their whole life, and rendered their united services and talents eminently useful to their native country. Such appeared, from the beginning of their public career, the two illustrious men who not only delivered Thebes from oppres-

* From Xenophon's *Affairs of Greece*, b. v-vii;—Plutarch's lives of *Agésilas* and *Pelopidas*;—Corn. Nepos, in *Agésil.*, *Pelop.*, and *Epam.*;—Justin, b. vi, c. 7, 8.

† *Erat modestus, continens, prudens, gravis, peritus belli, fortis manu, animo maximo; adeo veritatis diligens, ut ne joco quidem mentiretur.* Corn. Nepos, in *Epam.*, c. iii.

sion and the tyranny of powerful usurpers, but also, by their glorious achievements, raised it to the very first rank among the cities of Greece.

Pelopidas was one of those whom the Lacedæmonian party had driven from Thebes, and obliged to withdraw to Athens. Here, having assembled his fellow-exiles, he impressed upon them the necessity of making a bold and decisive effort towards the liberation of their oppressed country. As Thrasybulus had formerly set out from Thebes, to suppress and destroy the tyrants of Athens, so, said he, should they go from Athens, to suppress and destroy the tyrants of Thebes. All readily assented to this proposal of Pelopidas. They set out with him, and having entered the city at dusk and in disguise, marched towards the house where the magistrates appointed by Sparta were assembled to partake of a splendid supper.

A few moments before the conspirators reached that place, a messenger arrived, bringing to the magistrates letters containing a circumstantial account of the whole conspiracy. This messenger had been directed to tell them that the contents of the letters were of the most serious nature, and demanded immediate attention: "Serious affairs to-morrow," exclaimed the first of the magistrates; and both himself and the other guests continued to eat and drink, even to excess. It was no difficult task for the assailants, who surprised them in that state, to put them to the sword. During the following days, the Thebans, encouraged by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, and aided by several bodies of Athenian and Bœotian troops, besieged the citadel with great vigor, and obliged the Lacedæmonian garrison to capitulate, before any assistance could be received. Scarcely had the place been evacuated, when the expected succor arrived; but it was too late, and Thebes was now ready to make Sparta pay the forfeit of her injustice (B. C. 378).

War therefore was openly declared. The first hostilities consisted in private encounters, which naturally had no decisive result, and yet proved very advantageous to the Thebans, by rendering them still more hardy, intrepid, and experienced warriors than they were before. It was true, moreover, that commonly they came off victorious from these partial engagements. Hence the Spartan Antalcidas, one day seeing Agesilaus returning wounded from his campaign in Bœotia, said to him: "Truly you are well paid for teaching the Thebans to fight, when they had neither inclination nor sufficient skill for it." Though, to speak properly, the Thebans were not instructed by Agesilaus, but by those prudent generals whom they had placed at their

head; who led them to the field, inured them to the labors of a military life, and improved every favorable opportunity to animate them by new success.

Pelopidas was eminently qualified for this kind of warfare. He defeated several parties of Lacedæmonians at Plataea, Thespiæ, and Tanagra. But his character was principally raised by the combat of Tegyrae, which was a sort of prelude to the battle of Leuctra; for none of the other commanders could lay claim to any share in the honor of the day, nor had the enemy any pretext to cover the shame of their defeat. As he was returning from Orchomenus to Tegyrae with some cavalry, and the battalion of young Thebans called the *sacred band*, he suddenly met a party of Lacedæmonians, three times as numerous as his own.—“We have fallen into the enemy’s hands,” exclaimed a Theban.—“And why,” replied Pelopidas, “should we not rather say that they have fallen into ours?” His hopes were fully realized: the little troop under his command fought so valiantly, that their opponents, however brave themselves, were repeatedly put to flight, and dispersed with dreadful slaughter.

The Spartans had never before been conquered in a regular fight, whenever they brought to the field an equal, and much less, when they brought a superior number of troops. But on this occasion the reverse had happened; and the battle of Tegyrae plainly proved that pre-eminence of valor was no longer on their side.

The battle of Leuctra contributed most to ruin both their political and their military superiority. The two parties had at length determined to come to a decisive engagement, although, indeed, their forces were very unequal in number. The army of the Lacedæmonians, commanded by King Cleombrotus, consisted of twenty-four thousand foot and sixteen hundred horse; the Thebans had only four hundred horse and six thousand foot, just one-fourth of the Spartan army; but all of them were excellent troops, determined to conquer or to die, and full of confidence in their accomplished generals, Epaminondas, the commander-in-chief, and Pelopidas, the leader of the *sacred band*.

The arrangement of the Theban force for the battle was made in a masterly manner. It was the design of Epaminondas, as soon as the cavalry would commence the conflict, to advance with a dense battalion of his choicest men, and attack in person the Lacedæmonian phalanx, confident that, if he could once break through it, the rest of their army would give him but little trouble. The battle therefore was begun by the cavalry. As the Theban horse, though far less numerous, were better and harder than

the Lacedæmonian cavalry, the latter did not stand the attack, but were forced back upon their infantry, which they threw into disorder. Epaminondas, following close upon them, fell with all the strength of his heavy battalion upon the Spartans commanded by King Cleombrotus. The latter, to make a diversion, detached a body of troops with orders to attack Epaminondas in flank; but Pelopidas, seeing this movement, advanced with incredible speed and boldness at the head of the sacred band to prevent the enemy's design, and flanked Cleombrotus himself, who, by that sudden and unexpected attack, found his plan completely frustrated. Yet, the conflict was fierce and obstinate, and, as long as the king lived, the victory remained in suspense; when he fell, the Lacedæmonians, unable any longer to resist the weight of the enemy, were compelled to retire. Although they succeeded, by prodigious efforts, in carrying off the body of their leader, they could not succeed in restoring the combat. Their rout was ir retrievable, their defeat entire, with a greater loss than they had ever experienced; for they left four thousand of their bravest troops on the field of battle, whereas the Thebans did not lose above three hundred men. Thus was the fatal blow given to the power of Sparta and to her superiority in Greece, a superiority which she had held during nearly five hundred years (B. C. 371).

The victory of the Thebans drew over to their party a multitude of allies, who before this period sided with the Lacedæmonians. Their victorious army, within the space of one year, increased to the number of seventy thousand men, of whom the Thebans themselves were but one twelfth part; Epaminondas advanced at their head into the enemy's territory, and, invading Laconia, subdued and plundered it as far as the river Eurotas. He even reached the suburbs of Sparta, and challenged the Lacedæmonians to a new battle, though for reasons of deep policy, that is, not to dissatisfy the rest of Greece, he did not attempt to force them to it, nor to reduce their city by assault. He contented himself with taking every other kind of efficient measures, to humble their pride and cripple their power.*

* This, Epaminondas himself pointedly expressed, by saying that he had reduced the Spartans to the necessity of *lengthening their monosyllables*; a significant allusion to the peremptory character of their manners and language, particularly in the hour of prosperity.—It is true, even during their decline, they did not altogether lay aside the use of that concise and *laconic* style; the contrary is certain from facts, and they soon after employed it again in a very forcible manner against Philip, king of Macedon. This prince had threatened them in a letter, that, "if he once entered their territory, he would destroy every thing in it with fire and sword." The answer of the Lacedæmonians

In all these glorious achievements, Epaminondas was ably seconded by Pelopidas; both of them, indeed, but especially the former, gained imperishable laurels and attracted universal admiration. King Agesilaus, on the contrary, being shut up within the precincts of Lacedæmon, had the bitter mortification to see all the surrounding country overrun by the Thebans, and to witness, with his own eyes, the full practical refutation of what he himself had frequently said, "that no Spartan woman ever saw the smoke of an enemy's camp."

When the generals of the Theban army returned from their brilliant campaign, they were arraigned before a high-court of justice and tried, for having kept the command of the troops a little longer than they were permitted by law. Pelopidas did not defend his cause with that courage and firmness which he usually displayed on the field of battle; hence, he was not without difficulty acquitted by his judges. Epaminondas acted in a very different manner. He appeared before the tribunal with a firm countenance, and spoke with dignity. Instead of stooping to an apology for the great things he had done, he began to relate and extol them in a strain of animated eloquence; saying that he would die with pleasure, if it should be stated in the verdict against him, "that he was condemned to death by the Thebans for having obliged them to conquer the Lacedæmonians at Leuctra; for having, by this single victory, not only saved his nation from utter ruin, but even secured the liberties of all Greece; for having carried the victorious arms of Thebes to the very gates of Sparta, and made the Spartans tremble for their safety; in fine, for having restored, in their neighborhood, the strength of the Messenians, their former and irreconcilable enemies."

These words of the Theban hero excited the laughter, and at the same time, the admiration of the whole assembly. All the votes were in his favor; and he returned from his trial as he was accustomed to return from battle, with additional glory and universal applause.

Epaminondas had already evinced his unshaken magnanimity on another grand occasion, previous to the battle of Leuctra. All

was the single monosyllable *ix*!—an ingenious reply, and a masterpiece of conciseness, far more comprehensive than the longest letter. Still, the remark of Epaminondas about this haughty people was, in another sense, perfectly correct; he in fact obliged them by his victories to alter their pretensions, tone, and language, and to have recourse to humble as well as lengthy discourses and negotiations, for the purpose of obtaining the assistance of their former adversaries and rivals against the Thebans, at that time their formidable enemies.

the states of Greece, and the Thebans themselves, had sent deputies to Lacedæmon, for the purpose of adjusting their differences and treating of peace. The chief question to be settled between them was, whether Sparta should submit to set free the cities of Laconia, and Thebes the cities of Bœotia, in accordance with the treaty of Antalcidas, mentioned above (p. 190). Epaminondas, being one of the ambassadors, easily saw that the other deputies were awed by the presence of Agesilaus; he alone preserved a becoming dignity and freedom both in his manner and his proposals. Full of a noble assurance, he made a speech in favor not only of the Thebans, but of Greece in general, and showed that the peace should be founded upon justice and equality, because then only would it be durable, when all were put upon an equal footing.

Agesilaus, perceiving that the Greeks listened to him with wonder and great attention, asked him "whether he thought it just and equitable that the cities of Bœotia should be declared free and independent." Epaminondas, with great readiness and spirit, answered him by asking in his turn, "whether he thought it reasonable that the cities of Laconia should be declared independent and free." Agesilaus, incensed at this retort, started up, and insisted upon his answering "whether he agreed to perfect independence for Bœotia;"—and Epaminondas replied as before, by asking "whether he also agreed to perfect independence for Laconia." The Spartan king, exasperated in the highest degree, and glad of a pretext against the Thebans, struck their name from the treaty, and declared against them that war which, quite contrary to his hopes, led to so important results in their behalf.

The magnanimity of Epaminondas shone forth in every circumstance of his life. Being once appointed by his fellow-citizens to an humble office, he rendered it honorable by the dignified manner with which he discharged its various obligations. Again, when they deprived him for a time of the office of commander-in-chief, he readily served as a private among the troops, and even then signalized himself by so many splendid actions, that the Thebans, repenting of their injustice, soon replaced him at the head of their armies. With these noble feelings and dispositions he united modesty, filial piety, and the other amiable virtues of domestic life. A contemporary, extolling his merit, said, "that he had never seen a man who knew more and spoke less than Epaminondas did." After the battle of Leuctra, whilst he was an object of admiration for others, and received congratulations from all sides, he was heard to say: "My own joy arises from the anticipation of that which the news of my success will give

to my father and mother." It is peculiarly interesting to find sentiments like these amidst the turmoils of political strife and all the bloody scenes of war.

Pelopidas also, on his part, continued his successful exertions for the glory of Thebes. Being appointed thirteen times governor of Bœotia, he caused his nation to be respected abroad throughout the north of Greece, in Thessaly, and even in the kingdom of Macedon; and this he effected not less by the reputation of his integrity and wisdom than by his valor. But his admirable talent for negotiation appeared to the greatest advantage at the court of Persia, in the affairs of central and southern Greece.

The Lacedæmonians, humbled by their defeat and apprehensive of new dangers, applied for succor to those whom they before held as their greatest enemies, the Athenians and the Persians. To form a confederacy against Thebes with greater certainty of success, ambassadors were sent from Athens and Sparta to King Artaxerxes Mnemon; whilst the Thebans, to counteract this design, deputed Pelopidas, nor could they have made a better choice. His renown had preceded his arrival in Persia. He no sooner entered the territory of that empire, than he was universally known and revered, and the king himself received him with extraordinary honors. What was still more important, Pelopidas convinced Artaxerxes that the interest of the Persians required them to protect, not the Athenians and Spartans, their almost constant foes, but rather the Thebans, who had never been their enemies, and who might, in behalf of Persia, form an equilibrium between the other two republics. Hence he obtained what he desired: "that Messenia should remain, contrary to the Spartan interest, a perfectly free and independent state; that the Athenians should no longer infest the Bœotian coast with their galleys; and finally, that the Thebans should be reckoned the king's hereditary friends."

To the honor of so much success in his negotiation, Pelopidas added the merit of disinterestedness. Whilst the other ambassadors willingly received every kind of present from Artaxerxes, he, on the contrary, declined the still more splendid presents that were offered to him, and accepted only a few tokens of the royal favor and regard, such as he could not refuse without offending the Persian monarch. This embassy was consequently honorable to Pelopidas in every respect.

The embers of war, which, owing to the incidents just related, had been smothered for a time, again burst forth after a few years with increased violence. The question now to be decided by the sword was, which of the two parties should have the sovereignty

of Peloponnesus. The Thebans, having assembled their forces, again entered the hostile territory under their favorite leader Epaminondas; and this general occupied a strong position at Tegea, in order to attack the Mantineans, who had been unfaithful to the alliance of Thebes. Being informed that Agesilaus was coming to their relief at the head of the Spartans, the idea suggested itself to him that Sparta itself might be taken by surprise. He immediately advanced towards it by a road different from that taken by Agesilaus. Nothing indeed was more likely than that the place, in this defenceless state, would at the first onset fall into his hands. Happily for Sparta, some Cretan or Thespian ran to give notice of his intention to Agesilaus, who had just time to retrace his steps and reach the city before Epaminondas.

The Theban leader, finding himself baffled in this attempt, returned to the neighborhood of Mantinea; here also his enemies had taken their position, so that both parties began to prepare for battle. Epaminondas, who intended to make it a decisive one, took every precaution to ensure success. The Spartans and their allies were not less determined to do their duty. Hence every thing foreboded a terrible conflict, the more so as the Greeks had never fought among themselves with more numerous armies; for the Lacedæmonians amounted to more than twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry; whilst the Theban cavalry amounted to three thousand, and their infantry to thirty thousand. From these, Epaminondas selected a body of choice troops, and formed them into a dense column, in order to make with them an irresistible attack on the Lacedæmonian infantry.

By his orders, the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, then the best in Greece, commenced the battle. The enemy's cavalry made a brave, but short and ineffectual resistance; unable to withstand the onset of the Thebans, they retired, with great loss, behind their battalions. In the mean time, Epaminondas with his infantry had charged the Lacedæmonian phalanx. The troops fought on each side with undaunted bravery, both the Thebans and the Lacedæmonians being resolved to perish rather than yield the victory to their rivals. They began by fighting with their spears, and when these weapons were broken in the fury of the combat, they rushed to close conflict with their swords.

The attack and the resistance were equally obstinate; the carnage was frightful on both sides; yet victory still remained in suspense, till Epaminondas, to make it declare in his favor, thought it his duty to make an extraordinary effort without regard to the danger of his life. Gathering round him the bravest and most

determined warriors, he made with them so vigorous a charge, that the Lacedæmonians, unable to withstand the shock, began to waver and retire. The phalanx was at length broken. The other Theban troops, animated by their general's example and success, renewed likewise their efforts, and assailed the enemy on the right and left with great slaughter. At that decisive moment, whilst Epaminondas continued to fight with the most heroic valor, he received a mortal wound in the breast from a javelin which pierced his cuirass. He immediately fell in the sight of all. The battle raged with redoubled fury about the dying hero, one side making every effort to take him prisoner, the other to rescue him from their grasp; the Thebans gained their point, and bore away their leader, after having put the enemy to flight.

They did not pursue the vanquished far, but contented themselves with preserving their late position. Their cavalry also, dismayed by the terrible accident which had just happened, desisted from the pursuit; and even one of their detachments was put to the sword by the enemy's left wing, composed of Athenians. Still, victory undoubtedly belonged to the Thebans, since they had defeated both the cavalry and the main body of the other troops of their opponents, and moreover remained masters of the field.

Epaminondas had been carried into the camp. The surgeons, after examining the wound, declared that he would expire as soon as the dart would be extracted. These words filled all present with sorrow and affliction; they were overwhelmed with grief to behold so great a man about to die, and to die without issue. As for him, his only concern was about his arms and the success of the battle. When they showed him his shield, he kissed it as the faithful companion of his dangers and exploits; and, being informed that the Thebans were victorious, he said with a placid countenance: "I have lived long enough, since I die unconquered. I leave Thebes triumphant, proud Sparta humbled, and Greece delivered from the yoke of servitude. As to the rest, I do not look on myself as dying without issue; Leuctra and Mantinea are two illustrious daughters, that will not fail to keep my name alive, and to transmit it to posterity." Having said this, he drew the javelin from the wound, and immediately expired (B. C. 363).

Only one year before, Pelopidas, during a new expedition against a Thessalian prince, had likewise fallen at the moment and expired, as it were, in the arms of victory.

GENERAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE THEBAN WAR.

THE glory of Thebes, for which she was indebted to Pelopidas and Epaminondas, departed from her with these illustrious men. The latter, especially, a man of universal talent and the most conspicuous, in Cicero's opinion,* that ever appeared in Greece, had raised his nation to the summit of fame and prosperity; with him that prosperity suddenly disappeared. As a dart, whose point is broken, can no longer inflict a wound, so the Thebans, deprived of this eminent leader, were no longer formidable to their enemies, and their power seemed annihilated by the death of Epaminondas.†—Shortly after the battle of Mantinea, the Thebans concluded a treaty of peace with most of the Grecian states, relapsed into their former obscurity, and were afterwards famous only for their disasters.

But the Lacedæmonians on their part had irrevocably lost their power over Greece. The defeats of Leuctra and Mantinea had so humbled them, that they never could regain their ascendancy; nor could all the talent and undaunted spirit of Agesilaus repair the evil consequences of his ambition and obstinacy. Besides these reverses, the internal constitution of the Spartan people had begun to undergo some alterations, especially since the introduction of the use of gold and silver among them by Lysander. Other changes followed; the national character gradually disappeared; and the Lacedæmonians, more and more shorn of their strength, except during one reign to be afterwards mentioned, no longer accomplished any thing very remarkable or worthy of their previous reputation.

The Athenians also had, since the time of Cimon and Pericles, greatly degenerated from their pristine vigor. They retained, it is true, sufficient courage to gain many laurels during the Theban war, and sufficient generosity or political foresight and prudence to act as auxiliaries in behalf of the weaker side, that is, of the Thebans in the beginning, and of the Spartans in the end of this protracted conflict. All that time, the Athenians had the advantage of possessing excellent officers of their own nation, such as Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus, the son of the illustrious Conon. But when these able leaders disappeared from the busy

* *Acad. Quæst.* l. i, n. 4.

† *Sicuti telo si primam aciem præregeris, reliquo ferro vim nocendi sustuleris; sic illo, velut mucrone teli, ablato duce Thebanorum, rei quoque publicæ vires hebetatæ sunt; ut non tam illum amisisse, quam cum illo interiisse omnes viderentur.*—Justin, b. vii, c. 8.

scene of life, Athens again experienced various losses, and whilst its inhabitants indulged more than ever in a spirit of levity and idleness, several cities and islands subject to them asserted their independence.

So many dissensions and wars produced their disastrous though natural effect. All Greece found itself, in consequence of them, much weakened, distracted, and exposed to pass, if an occasion presented itself, which soon happened, under the control of some ambitious and powerful neighbor.

RELIGION, MANNERS, AND INSTITUTIONS OF GREECE.

WE have thus gone through the most interesting period of Greek history; a period comprising nearly a century and a half, from the year B. C. 500 to the year B. C. 360. We will now describe, in a few words, the characteristic features of a country and people so justly celebrated in the annals of antiquity. Of their political and social character, their love of glory and liberty, their valor and other natural endowments and qualifications, the reader may have already formed a competent idea in the preceding pages. Their literary character and wonderful proficiency in the fine arts have likewise been mentioned. We have yet to speak of their religion, national manners, institutions, and philosophical schools.

§ I. RELIGION OF THE GREEKS.—ORACLES.

THE religion of the Greeks was polytheism or a belief in many gods, with its usual attendant, idolatry or supreme worship paid to idols; for, as we learn from both sacred and profane authors,* the Gentiles believed their idols to be animated by some virtue, spirit, or divinity. The principal deities, whose worship the Greeks received from the Egyptians and Phenicians, and in their turn communicated to others, were Saturn, the father of Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto; Jupiter, supposed to be the greatest god, the god of Olympus or heaven, and the principal ruler of the earth; Neptune, the god of the sea; Pluto, the god of Tartarus or hell; then Mars, the god of war; Apollo, the god of poetry;

* Jerem. ii, 27;—Daniel xiv, 5, 23. Diogen. Laert. in *Stilpon*.;—Pausanias, b. iii, ch. 16; and others quoted by St. August. *De Civitate Dei*, lib. viii, c. 23, 24.

Mercurius, the god of eloquence, etc., with a multitude of demigods, or heroes of their early times. To all these, and, under their name, to personified vices, and to the demon himself, the chief author of so deplorable a superstition, did the heathens offer sacrifice and adoration. This evil, it is true, was common to most of the ancient nations; but the Greeks were the first to embellish that absurd system with all the brilliancy of imagination and all the charms of poetry.

Another peculiarity of their religion was an implicit confidence in oracles, especially that of Apollo at Delphi. Here a priestess was regularly appointed to return answers in behalf of those who came to consult the Oracle, though she could not do so, unless when under the exciting influence of a certain vapor which came forth from the sanctuary of Apollo. When this happened, her hair stood erect; her look was ghastly; she foamed at the mouth; her whole body was agitated by violent convulsions; in a word, she evinced all the symptoms of mania and frenzy, contrary to the mild, grave, and dignified bearing of the true prophets. In that state, she uttered, at intervals, some half-articulated words, which the attendants carefully collected and arranged, so as to elicit a meaning.

The characteristic feature of these oracles, at least in reference to future events, was equivocation and obscurity; so that the same answer might be equally applied to different objects. To use the words of an illustrious doctor of the church, S. Jerom, in his comment on the prophets: "If it appears to any one that many things were predicted by the idols, let him bear in mind that they always blended lies with the truth, and so worded their answers, that, whatever should happen, whether good or bad, it might be said with equal reason to have been foretold."* By this means, the evil spirits, who cannot have a certain knowledge of future contingencies, covered their own ignorance, and imposed on the credulity of their deluded worshippers.

Thus, when Cræsus, king of Lydia (see p. 99), consulted the oracle of Delphi about the result of his intended war against Cyrus, he received for answer that, if he were to cross the river Halys, he would ruin a great empire:

Cræsus, Halym penetrans, magnam subvertet opum vim.

Which empire? His own or that of Cyrus? This was left to be guessed by Cræsus himself. He naturally gave to the oracle the construction most favorable to his wishes; but he failed, was conquered, and the kingdom of Lydia was overthrown. Still,

* S. Jerom, on the 42d ch. of *Isaias*.

even in this case, the assertion was right, since a great empire was really destroyed.

The same must be said of the answer given by the oracle to Pyrrhus, king of Epirus :

Aio te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse.

Which signifies either that Pyrrhus might conquer the Romans, or that the Romans might conquer Pyrrhus; an answer that required no aid from an oracle.

How great the difference between these ambiguous oracles, and the clear, unequivocal, and positive predictions of the inspired prophets, Moses, Isaias, Jeremias, Daniel, etc. ! God himself has deigned to mark this difference in Holy Writ, when he says : "Bring your cause near, saith the Lord show the things that are to come hereafter ; and we shall know that ye are gods."* And in another place : "I am God, and there is no God beside, neither is there the like to me : who show from the beginning the things that shall be at last, and from ancient times the things that as yet are not done, saying : My counsel shall stand ; and all my will shall be done."†

§.II. NATIONAL MANNERS OF THE GREEKS.—SOLEMN GAMES.

THE Greeks, notwithstanding the peculiarities of their different states, were bound together by many social ties, which produced and maintained among them a deep feeling of nationality. Such were the natural boundaries of Greece, the similarity of their government and laws, their equal love of liberty, the council of the Amphictyons, etc.

Nothing, perhaps, contributed more effectually to strengthen these ties than the regular celebration of public and solemn games in various parts of Greece. Games of this kind were, among the ancients, a part of the public worship ; but, among the Greeks, they were, moreover, a school of dexterity, a nursery of courage, a means of emulation in every bodily exercise, a theatre for the display of mental acquirements, and finally, one of the prime movers of their social life. Bearing thus the character of both religious and national festivities, and being celebrated with the utmost magnificence, they attracted from all sides an immense concourse of spectators ; and, in order that they might be carried on with perfect tranquillity, there was, during the time of their celebration, a general suspension of arms and cessation of every hostility throughout Greece.

* Isa. xli, 21, 23.

† Isa. xlii, 9, 10.

These solemn games were four in number, viz.: the *Pythian*, kept at Delphi every four years, in honor of Apollo; the *Nemean*, so called from the town of Nemea in Peloponnesus, and kept every other year, in honor of Hercules; the *Isthmian*, from the Corinthian isthmus, kept every four years, in honor of Neptune; and the *Olympic* games, the most celebrated of all, also kept every four years, at Pisa or Olympia, a Peloponnesian city, in honor of Jupiter.

The persons destined to contend in these games, and especially in the Olympic games, were called *athlets*. Before appearing as such, they had to undergo severe trials and preparations: their diet, in particular, was very austere; they lived upon dry figs, walnuts, soft cheese and coarse bread, and were totally forbidden the use of wine. The other requisite qualifications to become an *athlet*, were to be of Grecian extraction, of free condition, and irreproachable manners.

The various kinds of contests used in the Grecian games, were wrestling, boxing with a leather gauntlet armed with iron or lead, throwing a heavy disk of lead or copper, and racing, either on horseback or on foot, or in chariots. The last was the most conspicuous of these exhibitions, and kings themselves contended in it for the prize. The most dangerous was boxing with the gauntlet, especially when combined with wrestling, in which case it took the name of *Pancratium*; in effect, these violent exercises frequently ended in the maiming, and sometimes even in the death of the combatants.

The conqueror in any of these games was crowned, as it were, in the sight of all Greece. He was reconducted to his country with great pomp, and entered his city, not by one of the gates, but through a breach purposely made for him in the city wall. During the remainder of his life, he was free from taxes and supported at the expense of the public; finally, his name was celebrated by poets, and statues were erected in his honor.

Could there be more flattering rewards than these for men who knew no other praise than the praise of men? Hence, they imagined nothing more desirable than a victory won at the Olympic games, and thought it impossible for man to obtain greater honor. Unhappy people, not to have understood that all is frivolous which passes with time, and that only those crowns which will last for eternity, are worthy of man's esteem, desire and constant exertions.

§ III. GRECIAN INSTITUTIONS AND SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

No country was ever more remarkable than Greece for its philosophical institutions and schools. It abounded with men of great mental powers, who, with more or less sincerity, more or less success, made open profession to love and seek the truth; whence came their name of *philosophers*, — friends of wisdom. Whatever might be their motives and their earnestness in the study of philosophy, one thing at least is certain, namely, that there was scarcely any attainable truth, physical or moral, which they did not make the object of their researches, of their meditations, of their disputes, and frequently of their sophisms and contradictions.

The most ancient of those real or imaginary sages who became the founders of distinct sects, was Thales, a native of Miletus, without doubt a great philosopher and astronomer for his time, yet imbued with most strange notions, so far as to believe and assert that water is the principle of all things. Next came Pythagoras, another great man in many respects, but who spread throughout Greece and southern Italy the absurd dogma of metempsychosis, that is transmigration of souls into different bodies of men or animals during the space of three thousand years. At a later period lived Epicurus, and his ill-famed school, placing man's sovereign happiness in sensual gratifications, as if men were no better than swine: "*Epicuri de grege porcus.*"

Another pretended philosopher, Diogenes, was justly surnamed the *Cynic* (dog-like), on account of the boldness with which he trampled under foot every rule of decorum; finally, Pyrrho, who affected to doubt every thing, and pretended not to know even whether he was awake or asleep.

Socrates, and Plato his disciple, taught a philosophy much more worthy of reasonable beings. We have already spoken at some length of Socrates and of his doctrines: as to Plato, he not only equalled, but even surpassed the reputation of his master. His writings, it is true, contain several errors; but, independently of the surprising beauties of style, they also show forth a variety of truths so grand, so sublime, in a word, so conformable in some respects to divine revelation, that there is much reason to believe that he was indebted for them to the inspired writings of the Hebrews, with which he had probably become acquainted during his travels in the east. As he delivered his lectures in a beautiful spot situated near Athens, and called the Academy, his disciples took on that account the name of *Academics*.

The most illustrious of Plato's disciples was Aristotle, whom Plato himself called the soul and the gem of his audience. Aristotle became afterwards the founder of another celebrated school, viz: the *Peripatetics*, thus named from a walk in the Lycæum, a beautiful place in Athens adorned with porticos and gardens, where that philosopher gave his instructions. Quintilian says that he does not know what to admire most in Aristotle, his extensive knowledge and profound erudition, his penetration, the agreeableness of his style, or the multitude and variety of his writings.

Shortly after Aristotle, Zeno, another renowned philosopher, established the sect of the *Stoics*, whose appellation was also derived from the place (a portico) in which they assembled. Of all the schools of Grecian philosophy, the Stoic school seemed to be the most favorable to morality, fortitude, and noble feelings. For, whilst the Academics and Peripatetics set a real though secondary value on health, honor and fortune; Zeno maintained that men should give their undivided esteem and affection to virtue, in whatever rank or circumstance they may be found. This principle, if faithfully carried out, could not fail to have a salutary influence; hence, the Stoic school, notwithstanding its errors on several points, produced many great men, such as Panætius, the master and friend of Scipio the Younger; Cato Uticensis; Epictetus; the emperor Marcus-Aurelius, etc.

Most of these philosophers knew the dogma of the unity of God, the supreme Lord and Ruler of the universe; but they had not the courage openly to profess it, and to labor in turning men from idolatry. They were, moreover, totally unacquainted with spiritual and supernatural goods; and in the natural and moral order, they proposed, it is true, many beautiful maxims, but frequently blended with false principles, or a false application of the general truths. So faint was the light of reason left to itself, even in the greatest geniuses of antiquity! So little fitted were they to dispel the spiritual darkness which covered the face of the earth, and which kept all nations, with the exception of the Jews, in the region of the shadow of death! * The fall of idolatry was, indeed, to take place; but this great work could be effected only by the preaching of the Gospel, and by the ministry of Apostles very different from those sages who "detained the truth of God in injustice," and gave not glory to their Creator. †

* Matt. iv, 16.

† Rom. i, 18, 21.

THE ROMAN COMMONWEALTH:

FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE DECEMVIRI TO THE ENTIRE SUBJECTION
OF THE LATINS.—B. C. 449—338.

CENSORS, QUÆSTORS, AND MILITARY TRIBUNES.

AT RÔME, the expulsion of the Decemviri, besides restoring the consular and tribunitial power, was soon followed by the establishment of new magistracies, made necessary by the increasing exigencies of the state. The office of censor was one of these new institutions (B. C. 442). The Censors were invested with power to take, every five years, the census of the Roman people, and to strike from the list of any tribe or rank, every citizen, knight and even senator, who had given considerable subject of complaint by the irregularity of his conduct. For this reason, the Roman Censorship became one of the most important offices in the state. It was often filled by men of great merit, such as Cato the Elder, Scipio Nasica, etc., and proved, for a long time, the strongest support of the laws, and the best guardian of justice, morals and public decency.

Shortly after the institution of the censorian dignity, the number of Quæstors or treasurers was increased from two to four. The functions of these officers had hitherto been confined within the city of Rome; by the increase of their number, the sphere of their jurisdiction was enlarged. Out of the four Quæstors, two continued, as before, to reside within the city and watch over the public treasury, revenue, and taxes; the other two followed the Roman generals and consuls at the head of the troops, to have the care of their military chest, and provide for the subsistence of their armies.

During these improvements of the Roman Constitution, disputes continued almost without intermission between the two orders of the state. The Plebeians insisted that the consuls might be chosen from their own order; the Patricians strongly opposed this motion, yet they perceived that they must soon yield the point. To cover their perplexity or their defeat, they themselves proposed that, instead of two consuls, three *military tribunes*, taken from either order, the Patrician or the Plebeian, should be annually appointed, and invested with consular authority.

The people, satisfied with their advantage and the acknowledgment of their claim, acted with extreme moderation. Acknowledging in their turn, that superiority of talents and merit was on the side of their opponents, they made up their minds

accordingly in the choice of the military tribunes, and, as long as this new form of magistracy lasted (B. C. 444—366), almost invariably gave their votes to the Patricians. "Where," exclaims Livy, "could we find now in a single individual, the same equity, modesty, and magnanimity, which were then found in a whole nation?"*

CONQUEST OF THE CITIES OF VEII AND FALERII.

B. C. 396—394.—CAMILLUS.

It was under the military tribunes that the Roman troops began to receive a salary from the state. As this regulation had been spontaneously decreed by the senate, it filled the people with gratitude and joy. Until then, the soldiers had been obliged to provide for themselves, and to subsist at their own cost during every campaign; and, as they could not in the mean while take proper care of their farms, this onerous service was the principal cause of their subsequent debts and misery, whence arose so many disturbances threatening the safety of the republic itself. Moreover, as long as this custom lasted, the Roman armies, might, it is true, gain repeated victories over their surrounding foes, but they could not, for want of sufficient provisions, pursue their conquests to any distance; so that they were compelled to return home after a few days, or at most a few weeks of warfare.

But no sooner was the regular pay of the troops established, than military expeditions were planned upon a much more extensive scale, and such as could not be thought of before. The first undertaking of this kind was the siege of Veii, an Etrurian city and the capital of the Veientes, scarcely inferior to Rome itself in extent, population, wealth and power. On this occasion, the Romans used a mode of attack hitherto unheard of in their history. They turned the siege into a blockade, having drawn two lines of intrenchments round the city, the one of contravallation, against the sallies of the garrison, and the other of circumvallation, against any attempt that might be made by the neighboring tribes in behalf of the besieged. Notwithstanding these precautions, and in spite of all their exertions and hardships under the walls of Veii, the Romans found themselves as little advanced after the lapse of nine years, as they were at the commencement of this protracted siege.

Ultimate success might have proved hopeless, had not Furius

* *Hanc modestiam, æquitatem, et altitudinem animi, ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quæ tunc populi universi fuit?*—Livy, b. iv c. 7.

Camillus been appointed to the supreme office of dictator. This illustrious Roman was distinguished alike for his valor, his skill, and the experience which he had acquired in inferior employments. As soon as he assumed the command of the troops, he revived courage and discipline among them, increased the fortifications of their camp, defeated the allies of the Veientes, and pressed the siege of Veii more than ever. Still, as he perceived the great difficulty of taking so strong a city by storm, he caused a mine to be dug by his troops, extending from the Roman camp to the enemy's citadel. When it was completed, he ordered a general assault on the place. Whilst the Veientes, not aware of their real danger, ran to the different parts of the wall in order to repel the assailants, a body of choice soldiers entered, by order of Camillus, the subterranean passage, penetrated into the citadel, and thence spread through the city. Some attacked the garrison from behind, some began to fire the houses, whilst others hastened to open the gates of the town to their fellow-soldiers. In a few moments, this mighty capital was entirely in the power of the Romans. The quantity of spoils which they found in it was beyond description, and the dictator, loaded with glory, enjoyed triumphal honors suitable to the importance of his conquest (B. C. 396).

Two years later, the same Camillus laid siege to Falerii, the capital city of the Falisci. Here he effected by his justice and generosity, what he had effected at Veii by his prudence and valor. One day, a schoolmaster, who had under his charge the children of all the chief families in Falerii, led them, under pretence of exercise, to a certain distance from the city, and betrayed them into the hands of the Roman general. Camillus, fired with indignation at this base conduct, exclaimed: "Have we, then, taken up arms against children, whom we spare even in the storming of cities, and not rather against men who have provoked our resentment, and who, moreover, can defend themselves? God forbid that I should avail myself of this base offer of a traitor, to conquer the Falisci!" Having said this, he dismissed the perfidious master, and obliged him to return to the town, with his hands tied behind him, and under the incessant lashes of his young pupils. This act of humanity and justice so moved the Falisci, that they no longer hesitated to surrender to so generous an enemy.

Although Camillus had already achieved so much for the service of his country, he was accused by a plebeian tribune of having converted to his own use a part of the spoils taken at Veii. The charge was groundless; still the people were highly incensed against him. Aware of the danger, Camillus, rather

than undergo the ignominy of an unjust condemnation, went into voluntary exile, and retired to Ardea, a city not far distant from Rome. His mind, on this occasion, was so painfully affected by the ingratitude of the citizens, that he expressed a wish that some great misfortune might befall them, calculated to make them regret his absence; a wish far less noble and generous than that of Aristides, who, on a similar occasion, prayed to heaven that nothing might happen to the Athenians which might cause them to need his return and services.

ROME TAKEN BY THE GAULS.—B. c. 390.

CAMILLUS had scarcely gone into exile, when the inhabitants of Clusium, an Etrurian city, being besieged by a formidable army of Gauls, applied to the Romans for succor. Instead of troops, ambassadors were despatched from Rome, for the purpose of interceding with the Gauls in behalf of the besieged. But these deputies, all of them young men of a warlike disposition, not satisfied with their pacific commission, began to fight on the side of the Clusians, and in a sally killed a Gaulish chieftain. The Gauls were highly exasperated by this violation of professed neutrality; not receiving satisfaction, they abandoned the siege of Clusium, and marched towards Rome with threats of vengeance. They met the Roman army, which consisted of forty thousand men, near the small river Allia. This army, commanded by unskilful generals, and terrified by the yells, the stature and the multitude of these new foes, whose number amounted to more than seventy thousand, did not sustain even their first attack. Both officers and soldiers fled in every direction. It was rather a rout than a combat; a rout not less disastrous than shameful, on account of the great slaughter which was made of the fugitives.

The victorious Gauls, instead of closely pursuing their advantage, spent three days in gathering the spoils and taking unnecessary precautions against imaginary dangers. This delay saved the Roman power from utter destruction. Those who were able to fight had time to withdraw into the citadel, with a supply of arms and provisions; others made their escape to the neighboring towns; and there remained in Rome only eighty senators or patricians, far advanced in years, who devoted themselves as so many victims to be immolated for their country, and whom, in fact, the Gauls put to the sword, when they entered the city. Afterwards, these barbarians fired the houses, and reduced them to ashes; finally, they endeavored to storm the citadel.

Being repulsed in the first assault, they made a second attack during the night, and were so far successful that some of their number reached the top of the battlements, without being heard by the sentinels, or even by the watch-dogs. Had the Gauls remained undiscovered one moment longer, the ruin of the Romans might then have been complete. In this extreme danger, the sudden gabbling of some geese and the flapping of their wings awoke Manlius, a patrician of consular dignity and extraordinary courage; in an instant he sounded the alarm, ran to the rampart, and drove off the first barbarians whom he found ready to enter the citadel. The other Romans arrived, and easily overthrew the rest of the assailants, by precipitating them from the rock on which the citadel was built into the precipice below.

Still this transient advantage could not have delivered the country from its invaders, without the patriotic exertions of Camillus. This great man, now an exile, but generously prevailing upon himself to overcome his resentment and overlook the wrongs which he had suffered, hastened to assemble troops, whether Romans or allies, to fight the invaders. He came to the relief of the capitol at a very critical moment. The besieged, much weakened by famine, the natural consequence of a blockade of six months, had finally agreed to treat with the Gauls, and were actually about to pay a considerable sum for the preservation of their liberty. Before this transaction was completed, Camillus arrived, and perceiving the present disgraceful state of things, cried out that by steel alone, and not by gold, was Rome to be recovered from the hands of its enemies. He then charged with great vigor the astonished Gauls, obliged them to abandon their prey, and shortly after, in a decisive battle fought at a short distance from Rome, amply revenged the disaster that his countrymen had suffered on the banks of the Allia.*

By this sudden change of fortune, the Roman power, which appeared on the point of being extinguished for ever, was re-

* The above narrative is taken from Livy (b. v, c. 49), and Plutarch (in *Camill.*) These are grave authorities. Still, the latter part of their account is differently related by the learned and judicious historian Polybius (b. i, c. 1), whose testimony in this particular is corroborated by that of Justin (b. xliii, c. 5). According to Polybius, the agreement between the besiegers and the besieged was fulfilled; the Romans actually gave a considerable sum for their ransom, and the Gauls, with the money in their possession, returned safely to their own territory. Livy himself acknowledges (b. vi, c. 1) that the early history of Rome, till the Gaulish invasion, is involved in great obscurity.

vived, as it were, in a moment, and resumed its former course of success and prosperity. Camillus now received from the gratitude of his citizens the praise which he deserved, of being the father of his country and the second founder of Rome. By his eloquent exhortations, added to the power of religious motives, he succeeded in diverting the people from removing their residence to Veii, and the Roman city was rebuilt on the spot it had formerly occupied.

PLEBEIAN CONSULS.—PATRICIAN ÆDILES.—PRÆTORS.

ROME had scarcely emerged from its ruins, when its military strength was revived. The neighboring states vainly endeavored to take advantage of its recent humiliation; they all experienced again the superiority of its arms, particularly when the Roman legions were led to the field by the great Camillus. They were truly invincible under him. He never fought a battle without coming off victorious, and never besieged a city without making himself master of it. After having been appointed dictator no fewer than five times, this illustrious Roman died at a very advanced age, and was universally regretted (B. C. 365).

In the mean while, the commonwealth had continued to be much distracted at home by disputes between the senate and the people. For a long time, the plebeians asked, through their tribunes, to be admitted with the patricians to the highest offices in the state; they at length carried their point, and were consequently allowed to be candidates for the dictatorial, consular, and censorian dignity. It is true that, in order to indemnify the patricians for this partial loss of their privileges, two new offices were established in their favor, that of Prætor, for the administration of justice, and that of Patrician Ædile, for a better superintendence of the public shows and buildings; but even these offices became, in the course of time, common to both orders of the state.

From the time of this important victory of the people with regard to the first magistracies in the government, the consulate was revived, and the military tribuneship abolished for ever. The condescension of the patricians on these points produced at least one good effect—it restored, in some measure, civil harmony between the two parties, and permitted them to combine their efforts more vigorously than ever for new and foreign conquests.

FINAL AND COMPLETE SUBJECTION OF THE LATIN TRIBES
TO THE ROMAN POWER.—B. C. 340—338.

ONE of the greatest enterprises that now claimed the attention of the Romans, was the reduction of the whole country in their neighborhood, called *Latium*.* Its inhabitants had been, for more than a hundred years, the allies or rather the vassals of Rome. At length, wearied with a state of inferiority which they looked upon as degrading to their nation, they laid claim to an equal share of honor and authority with Rome herself, and boldly demanded, as the price of peace, that one of the two consuls and one half of the senators should be chosen from among the Latin people.

To these haughty proposals no other answer was returned than a declaration of war. The two consuls, Manlius Torquatus and Decius Mus, immediately took the field at the head of their legions, and reached the neighborhood of Capua, where the Latins and their allies had already assembled. As the two armies were nearly equal in valor, discipline and the use of their weapons, the utmost precautions were deemed indispensable by the consuls to meet so critical an emergency; they forbade, under penalty of death, any one in the army, under any pretence whatever, to fight out of his rank and without their permission.

It happened, however, that the son of Manlius, being challenged by a Latin warrior, could not refrain from rushing to the conflict. He fought and conquered. Returning in triumph to his father, he expected to receive praise; but Manlius viewed this conduct of his son in a very different light, that of a flagrant breach of obedience and military discipline. As a father, he grieved at his fate; as a magistrate, he judged and condemned him without mercy, and caused him to be beheaded on the spot in presence of the whole army. Such was the specimen of unflinching rigor given by one of the consuls in the person of his son. The other, soon after, displayed an equally unbending patriotism in his own person.

Decius said he had a dream, in which he was told that victory would belong to the party whose general would devote himself to death during the combat. He therefore agreed with his colleague, that either of the two whose troops would show less courage or obtain less success, should become the devoted victim. The battle was fought near Mount Vesuvius. So great were the

* The Samnite war also began about this time. As it lasted long, and for the most part belongs to the following epoch, the whole account of it will be more properly given in another place.

courage and animosity on both sides, that victory remained a long time doubtful; till, after vigorous exertions, the left wing of the Romans, commanded by Decius, was unable to resist any longer the violent attack of the Latins, and began to give way. In this pressing danger, Decius recollected his dream and his promise, nor did he hesitate a single instant to act accordingly. After asking, with a loud voice, that the wrath of the gods might be diverted from the Romans and fall only on himself and the enemies of the republic, he rushed into the thickest of the Latin battalions, and fell covered with wounds.

The change produced in the state of the battle by this act of devotedness was almost instantaneous. The same superstitious motive which led to the consul's voluntary death, had also an extraordinary effect on the troops, spreading renewed vigor among the Romans, and terror among the enemy. The former returned to the charge with such determined courage, and by the skilful dispositions of the other consul in so admirable order, that the Latins were at last entirely defeated, and lost three-fourths of their army (B. C. 340). This terrible overthrow was followed by other defeats, and soon after, by the surrender of all the Latin cities and territory to the Romans (B. C. 338).

AFFAIRS OF SICILY AND CARTHAGE.

B. C. 410—337.

SICILY had also continued to be a theatre of important events. The previous losses of the Carthaginians had not extinguished their desire to become masters of that rich and fertile island; they again made powerful and vigorous efforts to accomplish this object towards the year B. C. 410. The cities of Selinuntes, Himera, and Gela successively fell into their hands. Even Agrigentum, a still more important place, and a city famous for its wealth, its fortifications, and its population of two hundred thousand inhabitants, was taken by the invaders after a brave and protracted resistance.

The Carthaginians, emboldened by their success, at last undertook the conquest of Syracuse. Not daunted by the terrible disaster which had lately befallen the Athenians in a similar attempt upon that city, in the year B. C. 396 they attacked it with a fleet of three or four hundred vessels, and a land army of about three hundred thousand men. They seemed the more entitled to hope for a happy result, as this powerful armament was under the command of Himilco, the same general who had taken Agrigentum a few years before.

Syracuse was then under the sway of Dionysius surnamed the Elder, a usurper and a tyrant, still a man of remarkable skill in war and government, joined to boundless ambition. For some years previous to the conflict, he had made extraordinary supplies of ammunition, arms, troops and vessels. Yet, at the approach of the amazing force of Himileo, he thought it more prudent to retire from the open field, and concentrate his strength within his capital city.

On the other hand, the Carthaginian leader, elated by the advantage which he had already gained and looking upon Syracuse as an assured prey, encamped in its neighborhood, and began to lay waste all the country round, sparing neither the temples nor the tombs within his reach, nor even the splendid mausoleum of King Gelo. His pride and fierceness did not long remain unpunished: a pestilence broke out in his camp, and soon made incredible ravages among his troops. Dionysius, on his part, did not lose so favorable an opportunity of attacking them both by sea and land. The success of the attack exceeded his most sanguine expectations; the enemy's fleet was nearly all burnt or captured, and their land army almost totally destroyed; only forty vessels and the remnant of the native Carthaginian troops returned to Carthage, where the news of so unexpected a disaster spread the utmost consternation. As to Himileo, their general, who had returned with them, he no sooner entered the city than he repaired to his house, and, without seeing any one of his family, killed himself in despair.

The Carthaginians, although intensely grieved, still were not discouraged by their late disaster. After a short interval, they continued their attacks upon Sicily, though, at first, without much success; Mago, their general and one of the chief magistrates of Carthage, lost a great battle together with his life. This new disaster compelled the surviving leaders to sue for peace, which was granted on condition that, besides defraying the expenses of the war, they should evacuate all Sicily. They pretended to accept the proffered conditions, but representing that it was not in their power to deliver up the cities without first obtaining an order from their republic, they obtained a truce long enough to make the state of affairs fully known and understood at Carthage. The Carthaginians instantly raised fresh troops, and placed them under the command of another Mago, the son of the one lately killed. The new general was young, but possessed of great abilities and renown; he landed in Sicily, and at the expiration of the truce, gave battle to Dionysius, in which the Syracusans were signally defeated, with the loss of

fourteen thousand men. This victory enabled the Carthaginians to conclude an honorable peace. They not only retained their Sicilian possessions, but even obtained some increase of territory, and instead of paying, were themselves paid for the expenses of the war.

The death of Dionysius the elder (B. C. 368) was followed by great disturbances in Sicily. His son and successor, the younger Dionysius, after being compelled to leave Syracuse, succeeded by open force in re-entering the city and regaining his power, which he used again in tyrannizing over his subjects. The Carthaginians, ever ready to seize any occasion favorable to their views, deemed the present a most advantageous circumstance, and equipped a numerous fleet for a new invasion of Sicily. Their army, as usual, made at first rapid and considerable progress, so far as to take possession of the harbor of Syracuse. In this extreme danger, the Syracusans applied for assistance to the Corinthians, whose descendants they were, and obtained from them a body of about one thousand soldiers, under the conduct of an able leader called Timoleon: this force seemed very inconsiderable for so great an enterprise; but the bravery of the men and the abilities of their commander made them equivalent to a numerous army (B. C. 345).

When this little band reached the Sicilian shores, the Syracusans were in the most critical situation. Whilst the Carthaginians were masters of their harbor, Icetas, king of Leontium, a false and treacherous friend, was master of their city, and Dionysius still occupied the citadel. Very happily, this prince consented to deliver up to Timoleon both that fortress, together with the arms which it contained, and the remainder of his troops, amounting to two thousand men.* This transaction and the fear of new disappointments induced the Carthaginian leader to set sail for Carthage. Here, he was tried and condemned to death for his dastardly conduct, and two other generals were appointed in his place, to lead another expedition into Sicily; it consisted of two hundred ships of war, besides an incredible multitude of smaller vessels or transports, and an army of seventy thousand soldiers.

To this multitude of the enemy, Timoleon, although now in full possession of Syracuse, could oppose no more than six thousand warriors. Yet, trusting in the courage of his little army, he did not hesitate to go forward, and attack the Carthaginians

* Dionysius, having executed his design, embarked for Corinth, where, according to some authors, he spent the remainder of his life in the capacity of a schoolmaster.

on the banks of a small river called Crimessus. The event justified his views and expectations: the Carthaginians were routed, and lost ten thousand men, whilst as many were taken prisoners; their camp also fell into the power of the enemy, who found in it immense riches.

This brilliant victory of Timoleon was followed by other signal advantages, which secured the liberties not only of Syracuse, but likewise of other parts of Sicily. The Carthaginians were confined within their ancient possessions; usurpation and tyranny disappeared; peace and prosperity took the place of disorder and anarchy. Having done so much for the Sicilians, Timoleon resigned his authority, and retired to a private life in Syracuse. But honor accompanied him in his retreat; for the Syracusans never ceased to revere him as their father and their deliverer, and paid him every kind of respect both in public and private. At his death, which happened in the year B. C. 337, his mortal remains were accompanied to the grave by all the citizens, who manifested by abundant tears their feelings of gratitude, affection, and sorrow. Finally, such was the esteem universally entertained for Timoleon, that solemn games of various sorts, to be annually celebrated, were instituted in his honor.

MACEDONIAN KINGDOM.

REIGN OF PHILIP.—B. C. 360—336.

DURING these transactions in the west and south of Europe, there was arising in the east a power destined by Divine Providence to have the greatest influence on the civilized world. This was the Macedonian empire, the third, in order of time, among the four great empires of antiquity.

The kingdom of Macedon, situated at the north of Greece, had been founded by the Corinthians or the Argives, nearly eight hundred years before the coming of Christ. Its history offers nothing remarkable until the reign of Philip, who was the father of Alexander the Great, and who had been, in his youth, a disciple of the illustrious Theban leader Epaminondas. Philip rescued Macedon from its previous obscurity, and succeeded, within a few years, in raising it to a marked pre-eminence over all the neighboring nations. The means which he employed for this purpose were not, it is true, always of the most honorable kind: cunning, intrigue and bribery were as readily used by him for the promotion of his designs as fair negotiation or open war; and he himself would say that he considered no fortress

impregnable which could be reached by a mule loaded with gold. Yet it cannot be denied, and the whole of his reign amply testifies, that he was both an excellent general and an able monarch, and was indebted for nearly all his success to his own skilful exertions.

Although Philip, at the time of his accession to the throne, was no more than twenty-four years of age, he knew how to put a speedy end to the disturbances and civil feuds by which the country had long been distracted. He repelled domestic rivals, defeated foreign enemies, and not only preserved his hereditary kingdom in its full extent, but even greatly enlarged it by his valor. Besides his conquests over the Thracians and Illyrians, he skilfully took advantage of the protracted disputes which, under the name of *sacred wars*, broke out among the Greeks about the territory of the Delphian temple of Apollo, to obtain a solid footing and ascendancy in Greece. Under the plea of vindicating the honor of this famous temple, he poured his army into the country of the Phocians where Delphi was situated, secured the possession of the passes of Thermopylæ, and took the important city of Elatea, which commanded the whole province.

Philip, however, did not gain so many advantages without experiencing much opposition, especially on the part of the Athenian people. His career of victory and conquest was repeatedly checked by their excellent leader Phocion, a man worthy of better times, and who, on account of a rare assemblage of great talents and great virtues never after witnessed in Athens, might be as justly surnamed the last of the Athenians, as the famous patrician Ætius was, at a later period, styled the last of the Romans. The merit of Phocion had gained him public esteem to such a degree, that he was appointed to command the troops no fewer than forty-five times, and each time during his absence from the public assemblies. The great fault of the Athenians was that they did not place him once more at their head, at the time of their last effort against Philip.

But the Macedonian king found a still more powerful obstacle against his views of aggrandizement, in the patriotism, zeal and eloquence of Demosthenes. This illustrious man, who was at the same time a profound politician and a perfect orator, ceased not to exert his talents, and to give the most energetic as well as wholesome counsels, in order to avert the storm which threatened the liberties of his nation. No sooner was the loss of Elatea made known, than he prevailed, by the mere power of his eloquence, upon the Athenians on the one side, and the Thebans

on the other, to forget their private animosities, and unite for their common defence.

Philip, not having been able by negotiation to prevent the conclusion of this league against his interests, determined to crush it on the field of battle. He entered the Boeotian territory at the head of thirty-two thousand men, and met near Chæronea the army of the confederates, amounting to nearly the same number. Having taken the command of the right wing in person, he placed the left under his son, Alexander, then a youth seventeen years of age. The Athenians were opposed to Philip, the Thebans to Alexander.

The shock, as might be expected, was terrible between two warlike, brave and rival parties, one of which fought to maintain its former success, the other, to preserve its freedom. After the battle had continued for a long time, Alexander, already displaying the skill of a general and the intrepidity of a warrior, broke the ranks of the sacred band and of the rest of the Thebans, and put them to flight. Philip, for some moments, was not so successful; a part of his troops began to give way, and Lysicles, the Athenian general, was heard to exclaim: "Come, let us pursue them into Macedon." The king, in the meanwhile, was attentively watching the movements of both armies. Seeing the enemy too eager in the pursuit of some fugitive troops, and not improving their advantage by attacking his main body in flank, he calmly said to those around him: "The Athenians know not how to conquer." Immediately he commanded his phalanx* to wheel about, and attacking his imprudent foes both in the flank and rear, threw them into such disorder as very soon ended in their total defeat (B. C. 338).

Philip made a generous use of his victory. He dismissed all the Athenian captives without ransom, and granted peace to the two republics. The year following, he caused a general assembly of the Greeks to be held at Corinth, and was, according to his earnest desire, appointed commander-in-chief of their forces against Persia; for he now seriously thought of undertaking the conquest of that empire. The troops promised to him for this great attempt, were to consist of two hundred thousand infantry, and fifteen thousand cavalry. But death surprised him in the midst of these vast preparations, and the prospect of affairs in Greece was once more changed, at least for a time.

The refusal to give satisfaction to a young Macedonian lord,

* The Macedonian phalanx was a close and compact body of heavy-armed infantry, whose number amounted to about sixteen thousand men.

who had been grossly insulted by one of the favorites of the court, cost Philip his life; the young man, in a paroxysm of fury, stabbed him during the celebration of a festivity. Philip had lived forty-seven years, during twenty-four of which he had occupied the throne of Macedon with great fame and prosperity. He fell the victim of his own imprudent partiality to a subject, and at the very time when he was about to reap, in the conquest of Persia, the long-desired fruit of his ambitious and hitherto successful career.

During one of his wars, he had lost an eye in a very strange manner. Whilst he was engaged in the siege of Methone, a small Thracian city, a certain man called Aster, of Amphipolis, offered himself to serve in his army in quality of marksman, saying he was so skilful in this respect, that he could bring down birds in their most rapid flight. Philip replied that, since such was the case with Aster, he would take him into his service, when he would wage war against starlings. This answer deeply wounded the feelings of the archer. Having thrown himself into the besieged town, he shot an arrow on which was written, "To Philip's right eye," and which actually pierced the right eye of that prince. The king sent him back the same arrow with this inscription: "If Philip takes Methone, he will hang Aster;" and so he really did, as soon as the city fell into his power. A satirical and malicious repartee often costs its author very dear, as both Philip and Aster sadly experienced on this occasion.

Philip is likewise reproached with other faults of a serious nature, and also with vulgarity. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that there were in him many excellent qualities worthy of a great monarch. He kept a man in his service, to say to him every day, before he gave audience: "Philip, remember that thou art mortal." As he was rising one day from a repast at which he had remained several hours, a woman applied to him to obtain justice, but failed to persuade him of the strength and validity of her reasons. He therefore gave judgment against her. "I appeal," she exclaimed. "Why?" said Philip, "you appeal from your sovereign! and to whom?" "To Philip in his sober senses," was the answer. The remark struck the monarch; he reconsidered the affair, acknowledged his mistake, and reversed the sentence which he had too precipitately pronounced.

Another distressed woman frequently appeared before him, begging an audience to terminate her lawsuit; but Philip always answered that he had not time to comply with her re-

quest. Being very much annoyed by these refusals, she one day replied with emotion: "If you have no time to do me justice, cease to be king." Philip felt keenly the rebuke, which a just indignation had extorted from the poor woman, and far from being offended, immediately satisfied her claims, and was afterwards more punctual in giving audience.

Although Philip availed himself of the treasonable practices of others for his own purposes, he heartily despised and abhorred the traitors. Having bribed two citizens of Olynthus to betray their city into his hands, he took an early opportunity to manifest his supreme contempt for them. Every one, even the common soldiers of the Macedonian army, reproached these men with their perfidy. They complained to the king, who contented himself with giving them the following ironical answer, which was, indeed, far severer than the reproach itself: "Do not mind what may be said by vulgar people, who call every thing by its real name."

With all his warlike habits and the agitation of his life, Philip was possessed of great literary merit; to him might be justly applied what was afterwards said of Julius Cæsar, that he was not less skilful in using the pen than in wielding the sword. He wrote and addressed to the Athenians, his most constant enemies, a long letter, vindicating his political conduct and passing strictures on their policy: that letter is considered a masterpiece for vigor of thought, strength of reasoning, and nobleness, conciseness and elegance of style. Being thus truly eloquent himself, Philip entertained the highest idea of the eloquence of Demosthenes; he feared it more than he feared all the Athenian troops and vessels. Even after his victory at Chæronea, he shuddered at the bare recollection of the danger to which the prodigious power of that orator had exposed his empire and his life. He even candidly acknowledged that, if he had been present at the public assemblies of the Athenian people, his mind would have been convinced, like theirs, by the powerful reasons of Demosthenes, and he would have come, first of all, to the conclusion that war was to be declared against the Macedonians.

DEMOSTHENES AND ÆSCHINES.

SINCE Demosthenes exercised such influence and enjoyed so great a reputation, it will not be amiss to add a few more particulars on this extraordinary man. He was the son of one of the principal citizens of Athens, also called Demosthenes, who left him a considerable fortune. But, being only seven years of age

when his father died, he had the great misfortune to fall into the hands of covetous and faithless guardians, who converted a part of his property to their own use, suffered the rest to lie neglected, and were vile enough to defraud his tutors of their salaries; so that he did not obtain those advantages of education to which he was entitled.

Although there were so many obstacles thrown in his way, the natural talent of Demosthenes appeared to great advantage as soon as an occasion called for its display. At the age of sixteen, he heard the orator Callistratus plead with great applause and success; this fired him with a spirit of emulation. From that time, he gave up his other studies and exercises, and assiduously applied himself to the art of declaiming, in hopes of being one day numbered among the orators. He took lessons of eloquence from Isæus, and is believed to have likewise studied under Plato, and to have been greatly assisted by him in preparing to speak in public.

He began to appear at the bar as an orator, shortly after his minority had expired. The first cause which he pleaded, and with success, was his own cause against his unfaithful guardians, from whom he recovered a portion of his patrimony. His first addresses to the people were not so successful; certain defects in his appearance, voice and delivery, caused him to be laughed at and interrupted. This treatment greatly distressed him, and he might have given up his profession in despair, had not the advice of some experienced persons, who perceived his talents for oratory, encouraged him to persevere in the study of eloquence, and by correcting his natural defects of pronunciation and delivery, confidently pursue the course which he had adopted.

Demosthenes followed this advice. He caused a small chamber to be built under ground; here he frequently occupied himself in study for two or three months in succession, shaving one side of his head, that the shame of appearing in this condition might prevent him from leaving his retreat.* Here, by the light of a lamp, he composed the admirable orations, which were said by those who envied him, *to smell of oil*; "Yours," he would reply on such occasions, "most assuredly did not cost you so much trouble." He rose very early, and used to say, that he was very sorry when any workman was at work before him.† We may judge of his extraordinary efforts to excel in his art, from the fact of his copying the History of Thucydides eight times with

* Plutarch in *Demosth.*

† Dolere se aiebat, si quando opificum antelucanâ victus esset industriâ. Cicer. *Tusc. Quæst.* b. iv, n. 44.

his own hand, in order to become familiar with the style of this great historian.

Demosthenes attended as carefully to his action and voice, as to the composition of his harangues. To correct a natural impediment in his speech, he would pronounce several verses without interruption, with pebbles in his mouth, whilst walking in steep and difficult places. By his constant exertions, he at length overcame every difficulty, and was able to pronounce with ease the longest periods. He used also to declaim on the sea-shore, in the midst of the roaring and violent agitation of the waves, in order to accustom himself to the tumultuous movements and clamors of the people in their assemblies.

So many cares and precautions were amply rewarded; for it was by these various means that Demosthenes carried the art of speech to the highest degree of perfection of which it is naturally capable. He had a glorious subject for the display of his eloquence, the defence of Grecian liberty against the ambition and continual encroachments of Philip. He defended that cause in a manner worthy of its object and of his lofty genius, so as to be esteemed and feared by Philip himself, highly honored by the king of Persia, and admired by all the Greeks, who flocked to Athens in order to hear him. And this extraordinary renown of Demosthenes was no more than he deserved. He united in himself the various qualities of an accomplished orator, and in point of animation, energy and vehemence, transcended all the orators of any age or country.

In some respects, however, and in his own time, Demosthenes met with successful rivals. Such were Demades, who even surpassed him in extemporaneous speaking; Phocion, whom Demosthenes called a *hatchet* that destroyed the effect of his words; and particularly Æschines, his most constant antagonist in the arena of politics.

The opposite views and interests of these two great orators gave rise to one of the most interesting trials that ever took place. Immediately after the battle of Chæronea, Demosthenes had been charged by the Athenians to repair the walls and fortifications of their city. He nobly acquitted himself of this commission, so far as to give considerable sums of money out of his own estate, to defray the expenses of the work, and make up for the deficiency of the public treasury. At the request of an influential citizen, called Ctesiphon, a crown of gold was decreed to him as a reward for his zeal and generous patriotism; Æschines attacked this decree as contrary to law, and though he pretended

to accuse Ctesiphon, manifestly directed his charge against Demosthenes.

This cause excited the greatest curiosity, and was conducted in the most solemn manner, and before a vast concourse of people. It was, indeed, a grand spectacle to behold the two greatest orators of Greece arraying against each other all the powers of eloquence. The harangues which they delivered on this occasion have always been considered as the most brilliant efforts of ancient oratory, especially that of Demosthenes: Æschines lost his cause, and was, for his rash accusation, sentenced to banishment, or perhaps condemned himself to it in consequence of his failure; he retired to Rhodes, where he established a school of eloquence, the fame and glory of which continued for several ages. He began his lectures with the two speeches that had occasioned his banishment. The assembly greatly admired his own production; but when they heard the harangue of Demosthenes, the plaudits and acclamations were redoubled. Then it was that he spoke these words, so praiseworthy in the mouth of an enemy and a rival: "What applause would you not have bestowed, had you heard Demosthenes deliver his harangue himself!"

Demosthenes, on his part, made a very noble use of his victory. When Æschines left Athens to embark for Rhodes, he ran after him, and obliged him to accept a large sum of money. Æschines was greatly moved by this unexpected offer, and is said to have exclaimed: "How will it be possible for me not to regret a country, in which I leave an enemy far more generous than any friends that I can hope to find elsewhere?"

POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

WHILST Demosthenes continually warned the Athenians to guard against the ambition of Philip, and oppose it with all their strength, he exhorted them, on the other hand, to seek for the alliance of the king of Persia—an act of prudent policy, since Athens, at that time had every thing to fear from Philip, but nothing from the Persian monarch; for, although the Persian empire still displayed great splendor and riches, and in this respect might afford much assistance to an ally, yet there was no nation in the world more feeble in reality, and more rapidly tottering to its fall. This unhappy state of Persia was owing chiefly to the degeneracy of Persian manners, the frequent revolts occasioned by the malversation of governors in provinces

distant from the court, and the almost incessant intrigues, animosities and conspiracies which distracted the court itself.

These different evils had imbibtered the days of King Artaxerxes Mnemon, especially towards the end of his reign. They continued under his successor Ochus, or Artaxerxes III. The latter sovereign, it is true, suppressed most of the rebellions that occurred under him; but his indolence and effeminacy rather increased the disorders which prevailed at court, and, at the same time, his many cruelties rendered his government extremely odious. After a reign of twenty-one years, he died by poison given to him by his chief minister, the Egyptian Bagoas. The same wicked officer also put to death all the sons of the king, except the youngest, called Arses, whom he pretended to place on the throne, whilst he retained the whole power of sovereignty in his own hands.

Arses did not long enjoy the honors of royalty, and the empty title of king. This young monarch, filled with horror at the crimes of Bagoas, had not taken sufficient care to conceal his real sentiments, and his intention to punish that monster of cruelty. Bagoas did not allow him to execute his project, but prevented it by putting Arses himself and his children to death. As there remained, in consequence of these murders, no direct successors to the crown, it devolved on Codomanus, a prince of royal descent by a collateral line; he took the name of Darius, and was the thirteenth and last king of Persia.

This prince had proved himself worthy of the high station to which he was called. In a late war against the Cadusians, a warrior of that nation challenged the whole Persian army to produce a champion capable of fighting against him; after all the other Persians had refused, Codomanus accepted the challenge, and slew the barbarian. This exploit was rewarded with the government of Armenia, which he retained until he received the news of his elevation to the Persian throne.

Bagoas soon perceived that he had placed a master over himself. He resolved to make him share the fate of the two preceding monarchs; but Darius, informed of his design, forced this abominable man to drink the fatal cup which he had prepared for his sovereign, and so remained in undisturbed possession of the crown.

History represents Darius Codomanus, in the general tenor of his life, as a brave, kind, and generous prince. He might, in ordinary times and circumstances, have done great honor to Persia. It was his misfortune to have to contend against an enemy of far superior abilities, Alexander the Great, who began to reign exactly in the same year with himself, B. C. 336.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

B. C. 336—324.*

I. HIS ACCESSION TO THE THRONE, AND FIRST EXPLOITS.

B. C. 336—334.

ALEXANDER, afterwards surnamed the Great, was born at Pella, the capital of Macedon, in the year B. C. 356. His father Philip, who shortly before had achieved important conquests, received three joyful tidings on the same day: the first informed him that Parmenio, one of his generals, had gained a signal victory over the Illyrians; the second, that his race-horse had won the prize at the Olympic games; and the third, that his wife Olympias was delivered of a son. He feared that this extraordinary prosperity might be the forerunner of impending calamities, and, in order to avert them, he cried out: "Great Jupiter, in return for so many blessings, send me some slight misfortune as soon as possible."

Philip showed his wisdom and paternal affection in the great care which he took of the education of his son. He chose the celebrated philosopher Aristotle to be Alexander's preceptor, and, on that occasion, wrote to him in the following terms: "I inform you that Heaven has favored me with the birth of a son. I return thanks to the gods, not so much for having given him to me, as for having given him during the life of Aristotle; I can justly promise myself that you will render him a successor worthy of me, and a king worthy of Macedon." Never, indeed, were lofty hopes more fully realized.

Even from his early years, Alexander evinced uncommon qualifications of body and mind. Possessed of admirable sagacity, elevated genius, great strength of judgment and generosity of soul, he improved these natural endowments under excellent tutors, and particularly Aristotle, to whom he thought himself no less indebted than to his father Philip. By the care of so great a master and his own application, he made rapid progress in every branch of knowledge, acquired a manly eloquence, and imbibed such a relish for all the fine arts, that they found in him a constant admirer and a munificent patron. Among the celebrated sculptors and painters of that age, he set the highest value

* See Plutarch, in the life of *Alexander*;—Arrian, in his seven books of Alexander's expeditions;—Quintus Curtius, *De rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*;—Justin, *Hist. b. xi et xii*;—Rollin's *Ancient History*, vol. vi;—Gérard, vol. x, lettre 66; etc.

on the talents of Lysippus and Apelles; the former alone had his permission to represent him in marble, and the latter on canvas.

But, unfortunately for the tranquillity of the world, the predominant disposition of Alexander's mind was an insatiable thirst for glory and conquest. This he manifested on every occasion. Whenever news was brought that Philip had taken some strong city, or been victorious in a great battle, the young man, instead of appearing delighted with it, exclaimed with sadness in the midst of his companions: "Alas! my father will make every conquest, and leave us nothing to do."

He was no sooner admitted to a share in the command of armies, than he began to display the intrepidity of a warrior and the skill of a general: it was in this twofold capacity that he signalized himself at the famous battle of Chæronea, by being the first who broke the sacred band of the Thebans. Even before that period, he had given a signal specimen of what the world might expect from him. When only sixteen years of age, his father Philip, going upon an expedition against Byzantium in Thrace, appointed him regent of Macedon, with very extensive powers. The Medari or Mædi, a neighboring tribe, rebelling during his regency, he attacked and overthrew them, took their city, expelled the barbarians, planted there a colony of people collected from various parts, and gave it the name of Alexandropolis.

A still more extended field opened before Alexander for the display of his abilities and his ambition, when, at the age of twenty, he succeeded his father on the throne. His first care was to punish the murderers of Philip, and celebrate his obsequies with all possible magnificence. He then set out at the head of an army against the barbarians, who were endeavoring, on all sides, to shake off the yoke imposed on them by the late king. He defeated the Triballians in a great battle near the Danube, made the Getæ fly at his approach, subdued several other tribes, some by force of arms, others by the terror of his name; and, notwithstanding the bold assertion of some among their ambassadors that the only fear they had, was lest the heavens and stars should fall upon them, caused them all to dread or at least to respect his power. A few months were sufficient for this young conqueror to vanquish so many enemies and win so many laurels.

Whilst Alexander was thus engaged at a distance against the barbarians, news was brought to him that several Grecian cities had adopted measures the most contrary to his interests. The Thebans, especially, had proceeded to take up arms against him

with a boldness that far surpassed their strength, and Demosthenes was incessantly urging the Athenians to follow the same course. The king, in the mean while, had begun to advance rapidly towards Greece. When he had passed the Thermopylæ, he said to his followers: "Demosthenes in his speeches called me a child, whilst I was among the Triballians and Illyrians; he called me a youth, when I was in Thessaly; and I must now show him, near the walls of Athens, that I am a grown man." Having surprised the Thebans by the rapidity of his march, he defeated them with great slaughter, levelled their city to the ground, and sold the surviving inhabitants as slaves, to the number of thirty thousand. This example of severity, which Alexander himself afterwards deemed excessive, spread terror among all the neighboring cities, and particularly among the Athenians; they hastened to make their submission, sued for peace, and were happy enough to obtain it under moderate conditions.

Having thus fully restored the Macedonian influence throughout Greece, Alexander convened a general assembly to be held at the isthmus of Corinth, and here he was, as his father Philip had been, unanimously elected commander-in-chief of the Greeks against the Persians. As many distinguished persons came to congratulate him on the occasion, he hoped that Diogenes of Sinope, who then lived at Corinth, would be of the number. Finding himself disappointed, he went to see that philosopher in a part of the suburbs called Cranium. Diogenes happened, at that moment, to be lying in the sun; and seeing a large concourse of people approach him, he raised himself a little, and fixed his eyes on Alexander. The king addressed him in a courteous manner, and asked him whether he stood in need of any service; "Only stand a little out of the sunshine," said Diogenes. Alexander, we are told, was struck and surprised to such a degree at finding himself so little regarded, and saw in that indifference (if not rather philosophical pride and pedantry), something so extraordinary, that while his courtiers were ridiculing the philosopher, he said: "I could wish to be Diogenes, if I were not Alexander."

But, whatever may have been his conditional wish, this prince certainly *preferred* to be Alexander rather than Diogenes. He then thought of nothing except the conquest of Asia, and having obtained from the Greeks what he most desired, he hastened his return to Macedon, in order to make his immediate preparations for the momentous enterprise.

§ II. ALEXANDER UNDERTAKES THE CONQUEST OF ASIA.—
FALL OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.—B. C. 334—330.

ALEXANDER appointed Antipater, one of his best generals, to govern Macedon in his absence, and gave him a sufficient number of troops to watch effectually over the interests of that kingdom and the tranquillity of Greece. He himself embarked for his expedition with an army of about thirty-five thousand men. This number, when compared to the greatness of the attempt, might be deemed a very inconsiderable force; but Alexander's troops were all chosen, intrepid and experienced warriors, having at their head, besides himself, excellent generals, such as Parmenio for the infantry, and Philotas, the son of Parmenio, for the cavalry. This army was furnished with neither a great quantity of provisions, nor a large amount of money for the necessary expenses; Alexander relied, for the future, on the strength of his sword, and the weakness of the enemy whom he was preparing to attack.

His calculations were correct. The Persians could bring to the field vast multitudes of men, but only a few warriors; and among these, not one good general, except Memnon the Rhodian, whose valor and prudence were equalled only by his fidelity to Darius. This able leader suggested the best measures to defend the empire against its invaders; but either his advice was disregarded by the Persian satraps, or a premature death prevented him from carrying his excellent views into execution. This accident delivered Alexander from a formidable rival, and the only commander who could have opposed him with success.

It is true, however, that the Macedonian hero had already entered upon his course of rapid conquests, whilst Memnon was yet alive. Having crossed the Hellespont without any difficulty, he encountered the first Persian army on the banks of the Granicus, a river of Phrygia. It was a perilous attempt to ford it in presence of an hostile force of one hundred and ten thousand men, who, from the other shore, were ready to oppose his passage; yet, so many obstacles did not make Alexander hesitate for a single moment. Throwing himself with the cavalry into the stream, he rushed at their head against the Persians, even at the risk of his life. A battle-axe, brandished by a vigorous hand, broke his helmet, and a second and deadly stroke was about to follow, when Clitus, one of his officers, saved his life by cutting off the hand of the Persian warrior.

The Macedonians, greatly excited by the perilous situation of their leader, rushed forward with the most desperate courage

until the two wings of the enemy's horse were at length put to flight. The Persian infantry offered still less resistance. Being attacked at the same time by the phalanx, which had now crossed the river, and by the victorious cavalry of the Macedonians, they dispersed, and after a chosen body of Grecian auxiliaries had also been defeated, left Alexander absolute master of the field (B. C. 334). The loss of the Persians, according to the more common report, amounted to twenty thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse; whereas the whole number of slain on the side of the Macedonians did not exceed one hundred and thirty.

The victory at the Granicus had all the happy consequences that Alexander could reasonably expect. Among the chief cities of Lesser Asia, it induced many, for instance, Sardis, Ephesus, Magnesia, etc., to make an immediate surrender into his hands; and it helped him to subdue others, such as Miletus and Halicarnassus, notwithstanding their vigorous and protracted resistance.

After these conquests, Alexander reached the city of Tarsus in Cilicia. When he arrived there, being all covered with dust and sweat in consequence of the excessive heat of the day, and invited by the cool and limpid waters of the Cydnus, he had the imprudence to throw himself into that river. He was immediately benumbed with cold, and carried back half dead to his tent. As soon as he had recovered the use of his senses, he desired his physicians to give him quick, strong, and even, if necessary, violent remedies, because, aware of the approach of a Persian army under the command of Darius, he preferred a speedy death to a slow cure. This impatience of the king alarmed every one, and the physicians were unwilling to undertake so perilous a case. One of them, however, called Philip, much attached to Alexander whom he had attended from his tender years, thought it the highest ingratitude, when he now beheld him in so much danger, not to risk something with him in exhausting all the art of medicine for his relief. He therefore attempted the cure, and on condition that he should have sufficient time to make all necessary preparation, promised a powerful and sure remedy.

In the interval, the king received from Parmenio, his most trusty general, a note stating that Philip had been bribed by the Persians to poison his sovereign. When, at the appointed time, the physician entered the chamber, holding a cup with the medicine which he had prepared, Alexander gave him the letter to read, and, at the same instant, taking the cup from his hands, swallowed the whole draught without hesitation. Philip showed more indignation than fear at the charge contained in the letter; "My lord," said he, "your recovery will soon place my innocence

in the clearest light." Within the short space of three days, Alexander was restored to health, and showed himself again to his troops, whose joy was proportioned to the danger to which they had been exposed of losing their leader.

In the mean time, King Darius was advancing with an almost countless force against Alexander.* He had been advised to station himself in the vast plains of Mesopotamia, where he might indeed have used all his forces to the best advantage, and so direct the movements of the numerous squadrons of his cavalry, as to hem in on all sides the small army of the Macedonians. But the Persian monarch would not listen to this salutary advice, and advanced as far as the small town of Issus, amidst the narrow passes of Cilicia (B. C. 333).

The spot could not possibly be more unfavorable to him, nor more advantageous to Alexander, who, being protected on the one side by the mountains, on the other by the sea, was not in danger of being surrounded. Hence the issue of the battle was not long uncertain, except perhaps in the centre of both armies, where the Grecian auxiliaries for Persia opposed the Macedonian phalanx. To speak in general, although several bodies of the Persian troops fought at first with great courage, their two wings, as likewise their centre, were broken, routed, driven from the field, and, owing to both the narrowness of the place and the closeness of the pursuit, experienced a dreadful slaughter. They lost from one hundred thousand to one hundred and thirty thousand men, together with their camp, their treasures, and a large number of prisoners. Among the captives were the mother and other persons of Darius' family, all of whom Alexander treated with the utmost courtesy and respect. As to Darius himself, as soon as he saw himself in danger, he was seized with terror, threw off the insignia of royalty, and gave to those around him the example of a precipitate flight.

The best fruit of this great victory for the conqueror, was to render him master of Syria and Phenicia. One city, however, in the latter country, the famous and powerful city of Tyre, closed its gates against him. He, indeed, succeeded in taking it by storm, but not till after a siege of seven months' duration,

* The number of men who composed the Persian army is differently stated by various historians. Quintus Curtius (b. iii, c. 2, n. 4) makes it amount to about three hundred thousand soldiers of different nations. According to Justin (b. xi, c. 9), it consisted of one hundred thousand cavalry and four hundred thousand infantry; and Plutarch (*in Alex.*) makes the total number not less than six hundred thousand.

which cost him and his whole army incredible dangers and hardships.

Tyre was situated on a small island, the whole extent of which it occupied, at the distance of about half a mile from the continent. Thus surrounded by the sea, it could not be besieged in the ordinary manner like other towns, and, independently of its numerous fortifications and means of defence, it appeared perfectly sheltered against the peril of a regular assault. To overcome this difficulty, Alexander undertook to join the city with the main land, by raising a mole across the strait which separated them. This astonishing work, the greatest proof perhaps of the indomitable energy of his mind, was effected by dint of patience and efforts, in spite of winds, waves, tempests, and the incessant attacks of the besieged. No sooner was it completed, than the Macedonians began to assault the city both by land and sea. Yet the Tyrians did not lose courage; their ardor seemed rather to increase; with their navy, their machines, and the various resources of personal valor, they continued to offer a most vigorous and undaunted opposition to all the exertions of the enemy. Even after the outward fortifications of the place were ruined or carried by storm, they still defended the avenues and streets with incredible obstinacy.

Alexander, on his part, rendered furious by their resistance, visited it with a dreadful retaliation. By his orders, almost all the inhabitants of Tyre were either put to the sword or sold at auction; and, as if this were not sufficient to satisfy his fury, he caused two thousand men, his prisoners, to be crucified along the shore. He exercised similar cruelties against the governor, the garrison and the citizens of Gaza, in Palestine, to punish them for having, by the vigor of their defence, detained his army before their walls during the space of two months. Thus early had prosperity begun to inflate his pride, and turn his former generosity into the worst form of anger, revenge and fierceness.

This terrible conqueror intended likewise to treat the Jews with great severity, on account of their attachment and fidelity to the Persian king. For this purpose, he had no sooner subdued Tyre than he marched against Jerusalem, with the determination to inflict on it the most rigorous punishments; but, through a special providence of God over his chosen people, the heart of Alexander was suddenly changed, and his anger appeased at the sight of the High-priest Jaddus, who had come in great pomp to meet him out of the city. The king recognised in that pontiff a venerable personage who had appeared to him in his sleep, whilst he was in Macedon, and had promised him the conquest and

empire of Asia. His admiration increased when he was shown, in the book of Daniel's prophecies, the predictions which concerned himself and expressly foretold that a Grecian king would overthrow the Persian empire.* Alexander, exceedingly struck with the occurrence and pleased with the prediction, showed the greatest respect to Jaddus, adored the true God whose minister he was, and, instead of punishing the Jews, conferred on them a variety of benefits and favors. This interesting fact is related by the historian Josephus.†

Alexander then advanced towards Egypt, a considerable, though disaffected part of his enemy's empire. Here, aided by the aversion of the natives against the Persian government, he subjected the whole country to his power without any opposition. The favorable situation of a part of the northern coast induced him to lay on that spot the foundation of a city, which was called after his own name, *Alexandria*; it became and remained for several ages the greatest emporium in the world. At this period, also, giving full scope to the pride of his heart, he undertook to make himself pass for a god. Full of this extravagant idea, he proceeded across the Lybian sands and deserts, to the temple of Jupiter-Ammon, and the priests of that temple, bribed by his presents, declared him the son of Jupiter.

After having gratified his foolish vanity, Alexander returned to Egypt. He revisited his rising city of Alexandria, granted many privileges to the inhabitants, and settled the government both military and civil of the whole country. He then set out for Palestine and Phenicia, in order to give his undivided attention to the affairs of the east. About this time, he received a letter from Darius, in which that prince proposed, on condition of a pacification and future friendship, to pay him ten thousand talents (about ten millions of dollars) for the ransom of the prisoners, to cede to him all the countries on the western side of the Euphrates, and to give him his daughter in marriage. Parmenio, to whom these proposals were communicated, was of opinion that they should be received. "I would accept them," said he, "if I were Alexander." "So would I," replied Alexander, "if I were Parmenio;" thus fully implying that he despised whatever might satisfy ordinary ambition, and would be contented with nothing less than the possession of the whole world.

In consequence of this answer, Darius lost all hopes of an accommodation, and again prepared for war. Alexander, on his part, advanced towards the Euphrates, which he crossed by

* Daniel viii, 5, 8, and 20, 21.

† Jewish Antiquities, b. xi, ch. 8.

means of a bridge, and continuing his journey, soon reached the banks of the Tigris. Here, for want of the same convenience, and in consequence of the impetuosity of the stream, the crossing of this river was far more difficult, and would most probably have been fatal to the Macedonians, if the orders of the Persian king had been executed. Mazæus, one of his chief officers, with a numerous body of cavalry, was directed to oppose and prevent the passage; but this general arrived too late, and only at the time when Alexander had already, though with much peril and trouble, conveyed all his troops to the Persian bank of the river. They might have been destroyed, says Q. Curtius, if an enemy had been in readiness to conquer them, while they struggled against the natural difficulty of the attempt.* A few days later, the armies came in sight near the village of Gaugamela, in an open plain, at the distance of at least forty miles from Arbela, which latter place, being a much more considerable town than Gaugamela, gave its name to the battle.

There was a vast difference between the two armies, both in number and courage. The troops of Darius consisted, if not of a million of men, as Plutarch admits, at least of six hundred thousand infantry and forty thousand cavalry. The forces of Alexander amounted only to forty thousand foot, and seven or eight thousand horse. But the latter army was full of vigor and strength; whereas that of the Persians, with the exception of some bodies of cavalry and the Grecian auxiliaries, was, as usual, rather a prodigious and confused multitude of men, than a band of real warriors.

The night before the battle, Alexander slept so soundly that his chief officers were obliged to wake him, in order to receive his instructions; he never appeared so resolute, so cheerful, and so confident of victory. His presence of mind, as well as his bravery, mostly contributed to turn the scale in his favor. Having first broken and routed the left wing of the Persians, he was eager to improve his advantage by falling, with redoubled energy, upon their centre, where Darius had taken his position. The presence of the two kings inspired their respective troops with new vigor. Darius was mounted on a chariot, and Alexander on horseback, both surrounded by their bravest officers and warriors, whose only aim was to protect the lives of their sovereigns, even at the risk of their own.

After a furious and bloody conflict, Alexander came so near the chariot of the Persian king, that he killed his driver, who

* *Deleri potuit exercitus, si quis ausus esset vincere.*—B. iv, c. ix, n. 38.

stood before him, with a javelin. Both the Macedonians and Persians imagined that it was Darius himself who had been slain, and the Persians, in the utmost consternation, began to quit their ranks and to give way in almost every direction. Even the monarch, believing that all was lost, fled with the greater part of his army. Up to this moment, he had displayed, during the battle, a judgment and valor truly worthy of praise; and, whilst withdrawing from that scene of carnage, evinced a feeling of humanity still more honorable to his character. Being advised by some persons to break down the bridge of a river, in order to retard the enemy's pursuit, he refused, and said that he would never seek to save his life at the risk of so many thousands of his subjects, who had the same right with himself to provide for their safety.

Until the defeat of both the left wing and centre of the Persian army, nothing of importance had been done in other parts of the field. From the beginning of the combat, a detachment of Cadusian and Scythian cavalry in the service of Darius had attacked and begun to plunder the camp of the Macedonians. The news of this attack was brought to Alexander; still, not to weaken the main bodies of his troops, he with difficulty consented to send any assistance, hoping that victory, if it could be secured, would amply compensate every previous loss. But that was not the only nor the greatest difficulty to be encountered.

Parmenio, who commanded, as usual, the left wing of the Macedonians, found himself in imminent danger of being totally defeated; Mazæus, the general of the Persian cavalry, pressed very hard on that side, and, extending his gallant squadrons, began to surround his opponents by superiority of number. No sooner was Alexander informed of this new peril, than he desisted from the pursuit of Darius, and returned in haste to protect his left wing. When he arrived, the danger was past. The Persians had been suddenly dispirited by the sad tidings from other parts of the field; Parmenio had revived the courage of his men, recovered his ground, and put the enemy to flight.

By this additional success, the victory of the Macedonians and the defeat of the Persians were complete. According to Arrian, the battle of Arbela cost the vanquished three hundred thousand men, independently of prisoners; it certainly gave to Alexander the empire of Asia (B. C. 331), for it was soon followed by the surrender of Arbela, Babylon, Susa, Pasagarda, Persepolis, and Ecbatana, that is, of all the chief cities of the Persian empire; and, together with them, the conqueror received an amount

of treasures and riches equal in value to one hundred and eighty thousand talents of silver (nearly two hundred millions of dollars), with which he purposed partly to bestow magnificent rewards on his officers and soldiers, partly to defray the expenses of the war.

On the other hand, no misfortune, no distress, can be imagined more deplorable than that of Darius on this occasion. He had hitherto used every possible means, nay sometimes base expedients, to arrest the course of his mighty rival, but had constantly failed; in particular, he had often tried the chances of war, and was invariably overcome. After his late disaster, he fled as far as Ecbatana, the capital of Media. Nor could he be safe there; the approach of Alexander obliged him to leave that city, and retire to a greater distance. In this continued flight, he was still followed by a respectable body of troops; but during their further march, Bessus, one of his generals, having bribed most of them, made himself master of the person of the king, whom he loaded with chains. When this traitor learned that the Macedonians were fast approaching, both he and his accomplices pierced Darius with their arrows, and left him covered with wounds, though still alive, at a short distance from the road. The unfortunate monarch was found in this sad condition by a Macedonian called Polystrates, of whom he asked a drink of water. Having received and taken it, he expressed his lively gratitude for the boon, and pressing the soldier's hand in his own, requested him to thank Alexander in his name for the great kindness he had shown to his family, and to recommend to the justice of that prince the punishment of a monster of ingratitude and cruelty, who, by putting his king and benefactor to death, had outraged all sovereigns in his person. Having said this, he breathed his last. Alexander arrived a few moments after he had expired, and, weeping over him, caused his funeral obsequies to be performed with royal magnificence, and his body to be interred in the sepulchre of the kings his predecessors (B. c. 330).*

* The great facility with which the Macedonians overthrew Darius and his empire, is thus described by the eloquent Bishop of Meaux:

"Alexander, at the time of his accession to the throne, found the Macedonians not only inured to warfare, but also victorious over all their enemies, and nearly as superior to the other Greeks in valor and discipline, as the Greeks were superior to the Persians and the other nations of the east.

"Darius Codomanus, who began at the same time to reign in Persia, was just, brave, generous, beloved by his subjects, and by no means deficient either in ability or courage. But, if we compare him with

With Darius Codomanus ended the great Persian empire, after it had lasted two hundred and six years, from the time when Cyrus, its founder, began to reign over the united kingdoms of Persia proper, Media and Babylonia. Shortly after, Bessus paid the just forfeit of his parricide. Being himself betrayed by his officers, he fell into the hands of Alexander, and was condemned to be quartered, both as a chastisement of his crime, and a warning to all imitators of his cruel perfidy.

§ III. DISTURBANCES IN GREECE—FURTHER CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA—HIS RETURN TO BABYLON, DEATH AND CHARACTER.—B. C. 330—324.

ALEXANDER was careful to show his satisfaction for past success, not only to those who actually followed his standard and were the instrument of his victories, but likewise to the Greeks at large, who had chosen him to be their common leader against the Persians. He ordered by letters, that every usurpation and tyranny should be abolished throughout Greece, and freedom restored to all the towns. In behalf of the Plataeans, in particular, he directed that their city should be rebuilt, as a reward of the zeal and courage which their ancestors had evinced during the period of the Persian invasion.

Whilst Alexander showed so much concern for the liberty of Greece, there were not wanting, among its inhabitants, those who dreaded the increase of his power, and who strove, by every means, to arrest or prevent its influence among them. Most

Alexander; his ability with that bold and mighty genius; his courage with that unconquerable valor which obstacles and dangers only served to animate; his zeal for the defence of his empire, with that unquenchable thirst of glory which counted the greatest hardships as nothing, and faced death a thousand times; or with that boundless ambition which wept at the idea of not being able to conquer more than one world; or, in fine, with that unbounded confidence which, filling Alexander's mind, convinced him that all must yield to his arms, a confidence which he communicated to his officers, nay to all his soldiers, in such a degree as to raise them, by this means, not only above difficulties, but even above themselves: if we thus carry on the comparison between Alexander and Darius, it will be easy to judge with which of the two victory must have sided.

"Furthermore, if to this discrepancy of personal character between the two sovereigns, be added the difference of their military resources, and the vast superiority, in courage and discipline, of the Macedonians and Greeks over their enemies, it must be acknowledged that the Persian empire, attacked by soldiers like these and by such a hero as Alexander was, could not fail to be overthrown."—Bossuet, *Discourse on Universal History*, part iii. ch. 5.

of the Peloponnesian cities formed a league for this purpose, and calling into the field their bravest warriors, mustered an army of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. The Athenians, on whom Alexander had lavished many marks of esteem, had no share in this insurrection against his authority; the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, took the lead in it, and pretended to assume to themselves the defence of Grecian freedom.

They might hope to derive advantage from the absence of Alexander, but they had not sufficiently considered the abilities and activity of his lieutenant. As soon as Antipater, the governor of Macedon, was informed of the hostile confederacy formed in southern Greece, he led the troops left at his disposal in that direction, and, increasing their number from the contributions of those states which had remained faithful to the Macedonian party, he entered Peloponnesus at the head of forty thousand men. A furious and most obstinate battle was fought near Megalopolis, in Arcadia. The Lacedæmonians behaved with a courage worthy of their former renown; but, having to contend against a general superior in skill as well as in the number of his forces, they were at last completely routed and driven from the field, with the loss of their intrepid king, Agis, and upwards of five thousand other combatants. The Macedonians did not lose more than a thousand soldiers; however nearly all the rest were wounded. This decisive action baffled all the hopes, and weakened more than ever the strength of Sparta.

Antipater immediately sent an account of his victory to Alexander; still, as a prudent courtier, he did not pretend to decide by himself the fate of the vanquished, but merely directed them to send deputies to the king for the purpose of imploring forgiveness and peace, which were granted on moderate terms. That general used this caution and reserve, not to wound the well known susceptibility of his sovereign, and yet he could scarcely avoid displeasing him. Alexander considered all glory acquired by others as a diminution of his own. He rejoiced that the Lacedæmonians were conquered, but regretted that they had been conquered by any one but himself. Hence, no precaution of modesty and prudence could prevent him from uttering expressions which betrayed his jealousy, as when he said that the battle of Megalopolis, compared with his own achievements, was nothing more than a battle of rats.* Such was the

* *Accepto victoriæ nuntio, suis operibus id discrimen comparans mirum eam pugnam fuisse cavillatus est.*—Q. Curtius, b. vi, c. i, n. 1.

pride of this conqueror; he would be the sole possessor of military fame, sole master of the world.

Still, in his personal career of success, there was assuredly enough to satisfy the utmost craving of human ambition. The three or four years which followed the battle of Arbela, were for him one continued series of new victories and conquests: the Drangians, Margians, Hircanians, Bactrians, Sogdians, and other tribes, yielded successively to his victorious arms; even the Scythians, that warlike and undaunted people of the north of Asia, were conquered by him in a great battle near the river Jaxartes. His troops, incessantly animated by his example, and hurried on, as it were, by his martial spirit and indefatigable ardor, subdued fortresses, cities, and countries, within a shorter time than it would take an ordinary traveller to visit them. He would frequently pursue an enemy for whole days and nights, giving himself and his soldiers scarcely any rest. By this astonishing rapidity, he came suddenly upon nations, who thought him at a great distance, and conquered them before they had time to provide against his attacks. This was the very idea which the Sacred Scripture had given of Alexander long before his birth, by representing him as a leopard and a he-goat, rushing forward with so much swiftness that his feet seemed not to touch the ground.*

What must appear most astonishing, is that Alexander could find troops hardy enough to follow him through that series of toilsome expeditions. Such, however, was his good fortune: he knew how to conciliate in the highest degree the affection, devotedness and obedience of his soldiers, and had such power over their minds and hearts as to obtain from them whatever he desired. Besides their just confidence in his abilities, the means by which he secured this influence over them, were his gracious manners and kindness in their regard, his assiduous care to confer on them merited praises or rewards, and his readiness to share in all their dangers and fatigues. Seeing, one day, a poor Macedonian driving a mule laden with the king's money, and striving to relieve the wearied beast by taking the load on himself, he cried out to him: "Hold on, my friend, the rest of the way, and carry the burden to your own tent; for the sum is yours, I give it to you." At the time of a difficult and harassing march through dreary places, some Macedonians, seeing the king greatly distressed with heat and thirst, presented him some water in a helmet. Alexander took the helmet, but observing that those

* Daniel vii., 6, and viii., 5.

around him were suffering like himself, and that there was not water enough for all, he refused to drink; in order to encourage them to bear their sufferings more cheerfully. At the sight of this generous self-denial and magnanimity, the cavalry who accompanied him, cried out that he might lead them whithersoever he pleased; that they were neither weary nor thirsty; and that they should hardly think themselves mortal, whilst under the guidance of such a king. By means like these, did he endear himself to his soldiers, and secure their ready services on every occasion.

Alexander might be said to have, at that period, reached the height of human glory; but about this time he plunged into an abyss of degrading excesses, and his uninterrupted success, which had commenced to blind his heart after the battle of Issus, wrought a fatal change in his moral character. Not satisfied with imitating the Persian splendor and manners, he required adoration to be paid to him, at least by his new subjects. He began to indulge in intemperance and debauchery, and, in the paroxysms of his anger, often proved as formidable to his friends as he was in battle to his enemies. He put to death, on a slight suspicion of conspiracy, his most distinguished generals, Philotas, the son of Parmenio, and Parmenio himself, whom he had lately appointed commander in Media. He caused the virtuous philosopher Calisthenes, who had rebuked his pride, to expire in the midst of torments; and once, when heated with wine, he killed with his own hand Clitus, the same officer that had saved his life in the battle of Granicus. Thus did a prince who aimed at the empire of the universe, often become the voluntary slave of his unruly passions, and thus did he, who wished to be considered and honored even as a god, place himself beneath the condition of a reasonable creature.

Still, as ambition continued his predominant vice until death, and as he saw that his Macedonian veterans were much displeased at his new manner of life, he marched towards India; both to occupy their attention, and to add this celebrated country to his empire. In proportion as he advanced towards the river Indus, he besieged and took, though frequently at the risk of his life, cities and fortresses which seemed impregnable. When he had crossed that river, the terror of his name spreading far and wide, induced the various kings of the neighborhood to make their submission; only one of them, called Porus, ventured to resist him and impede his progress. Having assembled a gallant army, this prince stationed himself on the banks of the Hydaspes, a deep, broad and rapid stream, and held himself in readiness to attack the Macedonians, as soon as they should attempt a passage.

Alexander very soon perceived that he would never succeed, by open force, in so difficult an attempt. He had therefore recourse to stratagem; and having, in sight of the enemy, made preparations to cross the river in a certain place, passed over it by night in another, during a frightful storm, the very violence of which favored the prosecution of his designs. A regular and pitched battle was the inevitable consequence. It was well contested; but, like every other fought by Alexander in person, terminated in the total defeat of the enemy. The Indians lost, besides their numerous elephants and chariots, twenty-three thousand men, with all their chief officers, among whom were two sons of Porus; and that monarch himself, after having given to the end, proofs of the most extraordinary courage, fell into the hands of his conqueror. He appeared before him with a dignified countenance, and when asked how he wished to be treated, nobly answered: "Like a king." Alexander, moved by this magnanimity of the Indian prince, did not permit himself to be surpassed in generous feelings; he not only reinstated him in his kingdom, but even added to it several other provinces (B. C. 327).

It was the intention of Alexander to proceed still farther through the east, and even to cross the Ganges, the greatest river of India, for the purpose of enlarging still more the boundaries of his empire. But the complaints, tears and entreaties of his army, naturally wearied with so many painful expeditions, induced him to retrace his steps towards the west. His return was marked by new adventures, hardships, dangers, battles and conquests. When he arrived in Babylon, he had the pleasure to find there ambassadors from nearly all parts of the world, who had come to pay him homage; he gave them audience with a dignity worthy of a great monarch, and, at the same time, with the affability of a prince desirous of winning universal affection. In the mean while, his mind was occupied with new enterprises, the conquest of Arabia, the circumnavigation of Africa, the war against Carthage, and the subjugation of Europe. Death, however, did not allow him to execute any of these gigantic projects: at the close of a banquet in which he drank to excess, he was seized with a violent fever, and in a few days was reduced to the last extremity. As a last mark of affection, he presented his hand to kiss to his soldiers, and shortly after expired, at the age of nearly thirty-three, after a reign of twelve years (B. C. 324).*

The death of this great conqueror, obliterating, as it were, the

* Justin asserts (b. xiii, c. 13, 14,) that Alexander died by poison, and Q. Curtius (b. x. c. 4, n. 11) seems much inclined to admit the assertion of Justin. But Arrian and Plutarch are of a different opinion. The

recollection of his faults, was equally lamented by his ancient and by his new subjects. The Macedonians called to mind his glory and magnificence; the Persians, his equity and mildness in their regard. At the news of this last misfortune, Sysigambis, the mother of Darius, shed a torrent of tears; and that princess, who had borne with patience the sad fate of her son and the ruin of her family, could not endure the loss of Alexander. She refused to take food, and, in order not to survive what she considered the greatest of her calamities, voluntarily died of starvation.

It is certain that Alexander possessed, with talents of the highest order, many noble and brilliant qualities, invincible courage, inexhaustible liberality, generosity, kindness, etc. Still it is equally true, that his virtue was not steadfast enough to stand the test of extraordinary prosperity, and that his moral qualities were, towards the end of his life, more than counterbalanced by a variety of disgraceful excesses.

As to his exploits, they certainly were, both in magnitude and rapidity, of the most brilliant description, and, if these suffice to deserve the appellation of *Great*, no prince deserved it more than Alexander. For, what conqueror ever accomplished as much in so short a time? Who, like Alexander, subdued in person so many nations, tribes, and countries, and in less than twelve years, founded one of the most extensive empires that ever existed? But, on the other hand, when we consider the motive of so many achievements: when we reflect that they originated in ambition and a thirst after military fame, and that no reasonable principle could prompt him to attack numberless nations who had never done him any injury, and to carry all the terrors of war, misery, desolation and bloodshed, into almost every part of the known world; then our admiration at the exploits of Alexander is considerably diminished, and, if we cannot deny that he was a great conqueror, we are forced to admit that he was a great scourge to mankind.

latter, in particular, gives several good reasons for believing the story of the poison to be a mere fable.

PART V.

FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT (B. C. 324), TO THE END OF
THE PUNIC WARS AND OF GRECIAN INDEPENDENCE, OR THE DESTRUCTION
OF CARTHAGE AND CORINTH (B. C. 146).

DISMEMBERMENT AND PARTITION OF ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE. B. C. 324—301.

THE worst effect of the conquests of Alexander was to inspire his generals with the same spirit of ambition by which he had been himself constantly actuated. We may justly ascribe to his knowledge of their dispositions in this respect, his refusal, whilst yet alive, to designate any one in particular to succeed him in the empire: he contented himself with confirming or at least with leaving his chief officers in the government of the various provinces for which they had been already appointed, and foretold that his friends would celebrate his obsequies with many bloody battles.* This measure of the dying conqueror was fully equivalent to a division of his kingdom among them, as the first book of Machabees expresses it;† while his prediction was too soon and too fatally verified.

The first years subsequent to the death of Alexander presented little else than a series of dissensions, usurpations, and wars among his first successors. In order to render themselves perfectly independent in their respective governments, they began very soon to set aside—some of them went so far as to destroy—the family of their ancient master. In the mean time, they had bloody conflicts among themselves, each endeavoring to obtain and secure a pre-eminence over the others. The only one among them who showed genuine loyalty, disinterestedness, and affection for the royal family, was Eumenes, the governor of Cappadocia. Unfortunately, this brave general, after a multitude of splendid exploits, was betrayed into the hands of Antigonus,

* Q. Curtius, b. x, cap. 5, n. 12.

† 1 Mach. i. 7.
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who yielding to the impulse of ambition, put him to death in the year B. C. 315, although they had formerly been on terms of friendship.

This Antigonus, having acquired great influence in all western Asia, provoked the fears or distrust of the other governors throughout the empire. These were Ptolemy in Egypt, Seleucus in Babylonia, Cassander, the son of Antipater, in Macedonia, and Lysimachus in Thrace. At the suggestion of Seleucus, they all entered into a confederacy against Antigonus as a common enemy, and promised to co-operate with each other in checking his ambitious career.

Antigonus, on his part, prepared to withstand the attack of so many opponents. Although he could not prevent the formation of their league against him, still he vigorously opposed their united efforts, being ably seconded by his son Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes. This young prince was remarkable for his noble appearance, and still more for his genius, activity and courage: when occupied with some military enterprise, he spoke and acted like a hero; in the other circumstances of life, he seemed the personification of effeminacy and luxury. This diversity in his character and conduct appeared likewise in his fortunes, and rendered his whole life an alternation of extraordinary prosperity and signal disasters.

When Demetrius began to command armies, he was only twenty-two years of age. He lost a first battle at Gaza, near the Egyptian frontier, but shortly after was victorious in a second, and secured to his father, at least for a time, the possession of the neighboring provinces, Phenicia, Palestine, and Cœlo-Syria. Afterwards, passing over to the continent of Greece, he made himself master of Athens, then governed by Cassander (B. C. 306), and the same year, gained a complete victory at sea over Ptolemy. The engagement took place near the shores of the island of Cyprus. Poliorcetes, having given proper directions to his officers, bore down upon the Egyptian fleet with so much vigor and impetuosity, that one-half of it was destroyed and sunk, and nearly all the other vessels were captured, together with the transports, ammunition, provisions, military chest, and a large number of prisoners. Of one hundred and fifty vessels, not more than eight made their escape with Ptolemy.

This achievement, so splendid in itself, became still more honorable to the conqueror, from the noble use he made of his advantage, and the feelings of kindness and humanity evinced by him on the occasion. He caused magnificent obsequies to be performed for the slain. He received most of the prisoners

among his own troops; and as to the brother and the son of Ptolemy, who were among the captives, he generously set them at liberty, and dismissed them without ransom, together with their friends, their attendants, and all their baggage, as a token of his gratitude, and in return for the like generous kindness experienced by himself from Ptolemy at the battle of Gaza.

At this period, Antigonus and Demetrius, emboldened by success, assumed the title of kings; the leaders of the opposite party did the same, and notwithstanding their losses, determined to carry on the contest with renewed vigor. This resolution was a source of new calamities for the many countries destined to be the theatres of the war.

Demetrius, being now master of Cyprus, directed his efforts against the island and city of Rhodes, whose inhabitants had provoked his resentment by refusing to join him in the late war against the Egyptians. He attacked them with a fleet of two hundred sail, besides a very great number of transports, and an army of about forty thousand men, not including the cavalry. But the Rhodians were dismayed neither by the force nor by the reputation of their enemy: being themselves a brave and warlike people, and well skilled in naval tactics, they made every preparation to repel the attack of the besiegers.

If the attack was vigorous, the resistance was not less spirited. If on the one side Demetrius, who possessed an inventive genius, contrived a variety of machines to throw darts and stones, and to batter the walls and ramparts of the city; the besieged, on their part, contrived every means to injure or even destroy these formidable engines, and succeeded in rendering many of them harmless. The indefatigable Demetrius invented and built new ones of various sizes, among others, a wooden tower called Helepolis, which was at least one hundred feet, or nine stories high, and, although admirably constructed and made to roll on large wheels, required three thousand four hundred robust men to put it in motion.

This amazing tower, filled with smaller engines, missiles and combatants, seemed to forebode the approaching fall of the city. The Rhodians, unable to destroy it by fire, had recourse, it is said, to another expedient, which proved more successful: they undermined the ground over which the Helepolis had to pass in its approach to the walls; when it reached that place, the earth gave way beneath it, and the whole machine sank so deep, that no exertion of the besiegers could raise it again. This accident, very probably, as well as other disappointments of a similar nature, without damping the courage of Demetrius, rendered him

more tractable. The Rhodians, too, were equally weary of a siege which threatened a fatal result to their capital, and were equally desirous of peace. The two parties, therefore, were easily induced to come to an agreement. Through the mediation of the Athenians, it was concluded on terms honorable and advantageous to both, viz. that the Rhodian republic, and all its citizens, should retain the enjoyment of their rights, privileges and liberty, without being subjected to any power whatever; that their former alliance with Antigonius should be confirmed and renewed, with an obligation on their part to take up arms for him in all future wars, except against Ptolemy; finally, that the city should deliver a hundred hostages to Demetrius for the security of the stipulated articles. As soon as the hostages were given, the besiegers evacuated the island.

Demetrius, wishing to give before his departure a mark of his esteem to the Rhodians, made them a present of the military engines hitherto employed in the siege of their city. They sold these machines, and the produce of the sale was spent in erecting the famous Colossus, or brazen statue of the sun, between whose feet vessels had to pass when entering or leaving the harbor. This colossus, being soon after overthrown by an earthquake, lay on the ground till the seventh century of the Christian era, when the Saracens, having subdued the island of Cyprus, sold it to a Jewish merchant, who loaded with it nine hundred camels. (See Modern History, p. 173.)

During the siege of Rhodes, Demetrius gave a signal proof of his relish for the fine arts. There lived in the suburbs of that city the celebrated painter Protogenes, a native of Caria; neither the presence of the enemies who surrounded him, nor the tumult of arms, could induce him to quit his habitation or discontinue his work. Being asked the reasons, he replied:—"Because I know that Demetrius has declared war against the Rhodians, and not against the arts." Nor was he deceived in his opinion; for Demetrius actually showed himself his greatest protector. He placed a guard round the house of Protogenes in order that the artist might enjoy tranquillity, or at least be secure from danger amidst the ravages of war; nay, he frequently went to see him at work, and never could sufficiently admire the talent and the application of this great painter.

At the same time, the Athenians called Demetrius to their assistance against Cassander, who was besieging their city. In compliance with this request, he sailed with a fleet of three hundred and thirty ships, and a numerous body of land forces. With these he not only drove Cassander out of Attica, but en-

tirely defeated him near Thermopylæ, and returning to the south, gained other advantages and took a large number of cities. Having in this manner crushed the party of his opponents in Greece, he set out for Asia, to join his father Antigonus and advance with him, at the head of their joint forces, against the chief army of the confederates, commanded by Seleucus and Lysimachus. The former had more than seventy thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and seventy-five elephants. The infantry of the latter consisted of sixty-four thousand men, their cavalry of ten thousand five hundred; they had four hundred elephants, and one hundred and twenty armed chariots. Thus the two armies were nearly equal in number and strength. They came in sight near the city of Ipsus in Phrygia, where they soon engaged in the bloody conflict which was to decide the partition of Alexander's empire.

At the very commencement of the battle, Demetrius, with his best cavalry, fell upon Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, and fought with so much valor that he put the enemy to flight. But having, through a vain desire of glory, rashly continued the pursuit of the vanquished, he lost a victory that was decidedly his, if he had known how to improve his first advantage; when he returned from the pursuit, he found the field completely occupied and the passage obstructed by the elephants of Seleucus, absolutely preventing him from rejoining his own army. This accident occasioned another still more disastrous, the surrender of his infantry to the confederates, whilst a strong detachment of their troops rushed against Antigonus, who was vainly expecting the return of his son. The old king maintained for a time the unequal contest, and fought with desperate courage; but he fell at last under a shower of darts. Demetrius, seeing every thing lost, collected nine thousand soldiers, and fled with them to Ephesus, whence he shortly after returned to Greece (B. C. 301.)

The battle of Ipsus produced the final partition of the empire of Alexander. The four allied princes distributed among themselves the dominions of their vanquished enemy, and added them to their own. Egypt, Libya, Phenicia, Coelo-Syria and Palestine were allotted to Ptolemy; Macedon and Greece, to Cassander; Thrace and Bithynia, with a few more districts, to Lysimachus; and all the other provinces to Seleucus, who thus greatly surpassed his allies in extent of territory. His kingdom generally went by the name of the kingdom of Syria, because it was in Syria that he established his chief residence, and built on the banks of the Orontes his capital city, Antioch, so called after

his son or his father Antiochus. But his Syrian provinces were far from being the whole or even the main part of his monarchy; it comprised, moreover, all those rich and extensive countries lying between the river Indus and the Euphrates, which properly constituted the Persian empire.

Thus was literally and fully accomplished the prophecy of Daniel, written upwards of two hundred years before, that the empire of Alexander would be divided into four kingdoms, among persons, not of his posterity, but of his nation, and that none of them would be equal to him in strength and power.* As the history of these kingdoms generally does not offer much interest, we will present to the reader merely a rapid sketch of them, down to the time in which both their national transactions and the affairs of Greece began to be closely connected with those of the Romans.

KINGDOM OF EGYPT.—B. C. 301—221.

EGYPT, as has been already mentioned, fell to the lot of Ptolemy son of *Lagus*, and surnamed *Soter* or *deliverer*, a surname given him by the Rhodians, in acknowledgment of the signal services which he had conferred on them in their greatest dangers. He reigned about forty years, if we reckon from the death of Alexander, and sixteen from the battle of Ipsus. This prince was the ablest as well as the best sovereign of his dynasty, and left many examples of virtue which very few of his successors took the trouble to imitate. He displayed, whilst on the throne, the same plainness and modesty which characterized him before his accession; and, when told that his dignity required greater pomp and splendor, he answered that a king ought to make his true greatness consist, not in being rich himself, but in enriching others.

Ptolemy was a patron of learning. He did much to promote its progress in his kingdom, and laid the foundation of the Alexandrian library, so justly famed for the number of its volumes, which amounted in the course of time to no fewer than seven hundred thousand.

Ptolemy Lagus had for his successor Ptolemy II, or *Philadelphus*, (that is, *friend of his brothers*), thus ironically surnamed, because he had, under the plea of self-defence, put two of his brothers to death. This prince inherited from his father a great esteem and relish for the fine arts, sciences, and learned men.

* Daniel viii, 21, 22; and xi, 3, 4.

He completed, in the first year of his reign, the building of the lighthouse of Pharos, one of the seven wonders of the world; it was a square and lofty tower of white marble, bearing on its summit a perpetual light, to guide during the night vessels approaching the shores of Egypt. The king made also valuable additions to the library founded by his predecessor, and enriched it with a translation of the sacred books of the Old Testament from the Hebrew into Greek — this is the version known under the name of the *Septuagint*, or version of the seventy interpreters. This work is supposed to have been executed at the suggestion of Demetrius Phalereus, who, after having governed Athens with great wisdom for ten years, had withdrawn into Egypt, and become the superintendent of the Alexandrian library.

Ptolemy Philadelphus devoted his chief care to the improvement of commerce in his kingdom. To effect his purpose, he secured excellent harbors on the north and east of Egypt, equipped an immense number of vessels of every size, and established, by means of a canal and the river Nile, an easy communication between the Red and Mediterranean seas. By these means, he placed nearly all the trade of the Oriental nations in the hands of his subjects, and rendered Alexandria the general emporium of the then known world, of which it occupied, as it were, the centre. That city, shortly after its origin, increased most rapidly, and rose in a few years to an astonishing degree of splendor and prosperity. It not only remained the capital of Egypt under all the Ptolemaean kings, but even continued, for a long time after, the chief city of the whole eastern continent.

The reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus lasted thirty-eight years, from B. C. 285 to 247. The next sovereign of Egypt was Ptolemy III, or *Evergetes*, that is, *the beneficent*, a title bestowed on him by the gratitude of his subjects. He had scarcely ascended the throne, when he undertook to avenge the death of his sister Berenice, queen of Syria, whom her rival, Laodice, had caused to be cruelly murdered. A powerful army, supported by numerous auxiliaries, enabled him to make the Syrian court feel all the weight of his indignation. Not satisfied with putting Laodice to death, he overran all the provinces of that monarchy on the western side of the Tigris, and, besides taking a prodigious number of gold and silver vessels, carried away the enormous sum of forty thousand talents (between forty and fifty millions of dollars).

On his return, Evergetes passed through Jerusalem, where he offered many sacrifices to the true God in thanksgiving for his victories over the Syrians. He died in the year B. C. 221, after

a reign of twenty-six years, and was the last prince of his dynasty who showed some moderation and virtue; most of those who came after him, whilst they assumed magnificent appellations or surnames, were monsters of wickedness and profligacy.

KINGDOM OF SYRIA.—B. c. 301—223.

THE same remark may be applied to the contemporary kings of Syria, with the exception of a few, among whom must be chiefly reckoned Seleucus *Nicanor* or *conqueror*, and the founder of this monarchy. Although his good qualities were occasionally tainted by ambition, still it cannot be denied that he was a brave, active, magnanimous, and truly able sovereign. Besides Antioch, his capital, he built throughout his dominions many other considerable cities, such as Apamea, Laodicea, Seleucia near Antioch, and another Seleucia on the banks of the Tigris. The situation and magnificence of the latter, by attracting the inhabitants of Babylon, greatly contributed to the utter decay of this once superb capital of the Chaldeans.

Seleucus had hitherto been on terms of friendly alliance with Lysimachus, king of Thrace; but towards the close of their life, and when both were more than eighty years old, they became enemies. Seleucus invaded the districts belonging to his opponent in Asia Minor, and when the latter advanced to impede his progress, defeated and slew him in a battle fought in Phrygia (B. c. 281). With Lysimachus fell the kingdom of Thrace, after a short duration of about twenty years: being now dismembered, it was made the prey of several occupants, and its Asiatic provinces, in particular, formed the small kingdoms of Pergamus and Bithynia.

As to Seleucus, he had the pleasure of seeing himself the only surviving general of Alexander the Great, and conqueror of the conquerors of the world. But his joy and triumph did not last long; only seven months after his victory over Lysimachus, he was basely assassinated by Ptolemy Ceraunus, an Egyptian prince, whom he had kindly received at his court and loaded with benefits.

Antiochus *Soter*, the son of Seleucus Nicanor, reigned after him during nineteen years (B. c. 280—261). He did nothing very remarkable, and was succeeded by his son, Antiochus II, impiously surnamed *Theos*, or *god*. The reign of this pretended god was most unhappy. Whilst he was engaged in a war against Egypt, the Parthians, provoked by the wickedness and profligacy of their governor, began to shake off the Syrian yoke, and took for their

leader Arsaces, a man of obscure birth, but of great valor and ability (B. C. 250); this was the origin of the Parthian empire, afterwards so formidable even to the Roman power. The example of insurrection set by the Parthians was followed by other nations in their neighborhood, and the proud monarch of Syria lost all his provinces beyond the Tigris.

This same Antiochus Theos, by his successive marriage with two rival queens, brought upon Syria the many disasters which have been already mentioned in the history of the Egyptian kings. It is true, however, that most of these evils, of which Antiochus himself was the first victim, cannot be imputed to him, but to his first wife Laodice and their son Seleucus Callinicus, both of them the real contrivers of the cruel death inflicted on King Ptolemy's sister. This Seleucus had an inglorious reign of about twenty years (B. C. 246—226), and died a prisoner among the Parthians. The next sovereign, Seleucus Ceraunus, was equally insignificant. He held the Syrian sceptre for a short time only, and was succeeded (B. C. 223) by his brother Antiochus the Great, whose reign, of which we shall speak fully hereafter, was much more conspicuous in every respect, and lasted thirty-six years.

KINGDOM OF MACEDON, B. C. 301—220.—SPARTA UNDER THE CONTEMPORARY KINGS AGIS AND CLEOMENES.

CASSANDER, one of the four allied princes who had destroyed the power of Antigonus in Asia, remained undisturbed possessor of the Macedonian kingdom. After his decease, in the year B. C. 298, his two sons commenced against each other, about their succession to the throne, an unnatural struggle, which terminated in the death of the one and the expulsion of the other. During that interval, Demetrius Poliorcetes had continued, notwithstanding his defeat at Ipsus, to wage war against various opponents and with varied success; at the news of these dissensions between the two brothers, he hastened to interfere, and turning every thing to his own profit, was himself declared king of Macedon.

When he saw his power sufficiently established in that country, he began to devise new schemes of conquest. He aimed at nothing less than the recovery of all his father's dominions, and was already making, throughout Greece, stupendous preparations for this purpose, when information was given him that his affairs were considerably on the decline in Macedon; moreover, most of the numerous troops that he had mustered, deserted his party for that of a new competitor, the famous Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. In

this sudden reverse of fortune, Demetrius resolved to set sail for Asia, in quest of new adventures. Here also, disappointment followed disappointment. Finding himself gradually stripped of all his resources, and deprived of nearly all his soldiers by desertion or the hardships of warfare, he at last delivered himself into the hands of Seleucus, the king of Syria. This prince treated the illustrious captive with much kindness; and in a manner suitable to his rank; Demetrius, however, never recovered his liberty, but died after a captivity of three years, at the age of fifty-four, of a distemper occasioned by long inactivity and excessive indulgence of his appetite (B. C. 283).

During his captivity, Antigonus Gonatas, his son, had evinced the most sincere and touching sentiments of filial affection. He wrote to the other kings, and to Seleucus himself, to obtain the release of his father, offering whatever he possessed, even his own person and liberty, for the ransom of Demetrius. In recompense, as it were, for this heroic filial piety, Antigonus Gonatas obtained the Macedonian throne; he occupied it thirty-four years (B. C. 276—242), and transmitted it to his posterity, in whose possession it remained whilst Macedon continued an independent kingdom.

The first successor of Gonatas was Demetrius II, who reigned ten years, and made the conquest of Cyrenaica and all Lybia. The reign of the next king, Antigonus Doto, was still more remarkable, on account of the great share he took in the affairs of Sparta and other Peloponnesian cities.

Sparta, or Lacedæmon, was no longer that mighty and influential republic which it had been during many previous ages. A succession of enemies, provoked by its haughtiness, restlessness and ambition, had vied, as it were, with one another in the attempt to lower it in the scale of nations; but it had gradually undergone a still greater and more fatal change in its manners, its institutions, and its morals. Contempt of riches and austerity of life were now replaced by avarice and luxury. Men of fortune sought by every means, lawful or unlawful, to increase their possessions, whilst the rest of the city was filled with an insignificant rabble, without property or honor, who had neither heart nor spirit to defend their country against wars abroad, and who were always watching an opportunity for changes and revolutions at home.

For these reasons, King Agis V thought it a noble undertaking to reform the manners of the people, and revive the laws of Lycurgus. In so delicate a matter, he sounded, first, the inclinations of his subjects. The young men listened to him with a readiness beyond his expectation, and with him adopted the cause of virtue; but most of those far advanced in age, being also too far gone in

vice, were as much afraid; says Plutarch, of the name of Lycurgus, as a fugitive slave, when brought back, is of that of his master. They inveighed, therefore, against Agis for his being displeased at the present state of things, and desirous to restore the former dignity of Sparta. He was opposed, betrayed, and persecuted by the very magistrates who should have been the most zealous in promoting his noble attempt, and a sentence of the ephori condemned to a cruel and ignominious death the most virtuous prince that Lacedæmon had possessed for a long period (about the year B. C. 240).

As Agis was going to execution, he perceived one of the officers lamenting his fate with tears: "My friend," said he to him, "cease to weep over me; since I suffer innocently, I am in a better condition than those who condemn me contrary to law and justice." Having said this, he cheerfully offered his neck to the executioner. His mother Agesistrata and his grandmother Archidamia, for having countenanced the schemes of the young king, suffered the same punishment with him, and in the same dungeon. Archidamia was executed first, without any regard to her rank, her virtues, and her very advanced age. Agesistrata was then introduced into the prison. Beholding her son extended on the ground, and her mother hanging by the neck, she exclaimed: "My son, your excessive moderation and lenity have ruined both you and us." She then showed herself ready to meet her fate, and said, with a sigh for her country: "May all this be for the good of Sparta!" When these events were reported in the city, and the three bodies were carried out, the melancholy spectacle filled the people with grief, terror and indignation; they were persuaded that there had not been such an exhibition of villany and impiety in Sparta, since the Dorians first inhabited Peloponnesus.*

Cleomenes, who reigned shortly after him, was not dismayed by the unhappy fate of his predecessor. With great energy of mind, language, and action, which he even carried at first to violence and despotism, he set about the work of social reformation, and having, in one way or another, removed all the influential persons who opposed his views, he saw his exertions attended with much greater success than the mildness of Agis had been able to obtain. Unfortunately both for him and his country, he engaged in a war against the Achæans, who were then the most powerful people of Peloponnesus. The final result of this war, the begin-

**Plutarch in Agid.* The life of Agis is one of the most interesting among the lives written by Plutarch, and is not encumbered with that multitude of superstitious tales, omens, dreams, etc. which often disfigure the narrative of that otherwise judicious historian.

ning of which was very auspicious, blasted for ever the hopes and promising aspect of the affairs of Sparta, and ruined Cleomenes himself.

Cleomenes, although still young, showed that he was possessed of great military skill as well as courage. With only a small force at his disposal, he inflicted frequent and severe losses on his enemies; so much so, that the Achæans, finding themselves after many defeats unable to resist him, called Antigonus Doto, the Macedonian king, to their assistance. At this time, Cleomenes had already made himself master of several of their most important cities, such as Argos and Corinth. Even the advance of the Macedonian troops did not prevent him, at first, from executing many bold and glorious undertakings. Still, their superior numbers compelled him to evacuate his recent conquests and to make a retrograde march, till, being determined to give way no longer, he occupied a strong position in the passes of Sellasia, stationed most of his troops on the neighboring hills, and waited for the enemy.

The two armies were far from being equal in numerical strength, there being thirty thousand men on the side of Antigonus, and only twenty thousand on that of Cleomenes; but the advantages of the situation were manifestly in favor of the latter, so that each party had good reason to flatter itself with the hope of success. As both wished to render the engagement decisive, the battle was obstinately disputed, at least where the two kings commanded in person. Sometimes, the Lacedæmonians were nearly overwhelmed by the attack of the Macedonian phalanx; at other times, the Macedonians were obliged to give ground before Spartan valor. At last, the troops of Antigonus, advancing with levelled lances, charged the enemy with that force which rendered the shock of the phalanx irresistible, and drove them from their intrenchments. The whole army then fled in disorder, and a general slaughter ensued. According to what we read in Plutarch, great numbers of the mercenaries of Sparta were killed, and, of six thousand Lacedæmonians, no more than two hundred made their escape* (B. c. 222).

This bloody defeat destroyed for ever the hopes of Sparta, as to the revival of her former laws and glory. Cleomenes, who had acted like a hero in the engagement, and who now saw every thing lost, advised the citizens to receive Antigonus; as for himself, he came to a different determination respecting his own future des-

* Plutarch, in *Cleomen*.—The other particulars of the battle are related at full length by Polybius, *Gen. Hist. b. ii, ch. 5*.

tiny, and, without taking any food, drink or rest, which he however so much needed, embarked for Egypt. Here, his virtues and talents gained him the esteem and confidence of King Ptolemy Evergetes; but, after the death of that monarch, which occurred about this time, and under his unworthy successor, Philopator, Cleomenes abandoned all hope. Finding himself most unjustly treated by a profligate court, he made an effort to recover his liberty by open force, and perished in the attempt.

We left the victorious Doto near the walls of Sparta. The inhabitants, in compliance with the advice of their late king, submitted to their conqueror; Antigonus, on his part, acted towards them rather as a friend than a master, and expressed a wish that posterity should say of him, that the only prince who had the honor of taking their city, had also the honor of preserving it. He remained but two or three days with them, and returned in haste to his own kingdom, having received information that it was attacked by the Illyrians. Although he actually lingered under that terrible disease, the consumption, still he had sufficient time and courage to gain a signal victory over the barbarians; he died shortly after (B. C. 221 or 220), with the rare reputation of a prosperous management of the internal affairs of his country, and of great success in his foreign wars. He was succeeded by his ward and nephew, Philip, whose long reign of forty-two years will afterwards deserve a separate chapter.

The close connexion of events requires that we should relate here the history of the Achæan league, which was the last bulwark of Grecian liberty, first under Aratus, and then under Philopœmen.

HISTORY OF THE ACHÆAN LEAGUE UNDER ARATUS.

B. C. 251—214.

The republic of the Achæans, thus called from Achaia, a district of Peloponnesus, owed its influence in the beginning not to the number of its troops, or the influence of its riches, or the extent of its territory, but to its great reputation for integrity and justice. It originally consisted of twelve inconsiderable towns, whose form of government strikingly resembled, though on a small scale, that of the United States of America. For, the towns which composed it, although independent of each other and placed on a footing of perfect equality, were subject to one common and supreme authority, a council of representatives, who met twice a year to discuss and decide the affairs of the whole nation; and to one executive power, composed of a prætor or president (there were two in more ancient times), annually elected by a plurality

of votes, and ten officers of state, his assistants and counsellors. It belonged to the general assembly to declare war, to make peace, to conclude treaties, to dispose of vacant offices, to watch over the fidelity of each particular state to the terms of the confederacy, and to provide for all the important wants of the commonwealth. The office of the prætor was to command the army, to preside in the diet, and to propose matters for deliberation; but he could propose nothing without the previous approbation of the body of his counsellors.

The good order which reigned in this little republic, at last drew over to it places of considerable importance. Sicyon, one of the chief cities of Peloponnesus, set the example. Its inhabitants, having been delivered from the yoke of a usurper by their fellow citizen Aratus, a virtuous and distinguished young man, readily followed his advice in this matter, and joined the Achæan confederacy (B. c. 251).

A few years later, Aratus, being chosen general of the Achæans for the second time, rendered a signal service not only to their nation, but to all Greece, by wresting the Corinthian citadel, which was the key of Peloponnesus, from the hands of the Macedonians. He embarked on this perilous enterprise with uncommon disinterestedness and generosity. He hesitated not to pledge his most valuable property to defray the expenses of the expedition, and then at the risk of his own life executed his design with a prudence, boldness and courage which did him immense honor, and gained him the highest reputation among the Greeks.

When every thing was ready for the attempt, Aratus chose four hundred brave soldiers, and having provided them with ladders, led them at night to the foot of the Corinthian ramparts. Some of them began by surprising and killing the sentinels at one of the gates. At the same time, the ladders were applied to the walls as silently as possible, and Aratus, with one hundred men, entered the city with the utmost expedition. The rest he commanded to follow in the best manner they could, whilst he himself, animated by this first success, hastened at the head of his party to advance through the town towards the citadel.

This resolute band met a small guard of four men who had lights in their hands, and whom they clearly saw, without being seen by them on account of the surrounding darkness: they killed three of the four; but the other, only wounded, fled with all speed, and cried aloud that the enemies were in the city. In a moment, the trumpets sounded the alarm, the people flocked into the streets, and the whole town was filled with uproar and confusion. Still, Aratus marched on, and began with his brave

followers to climb the craggy rock upon which the citadel was built. They reached the height at a spot where the rampart was less difficult of access, but having failed to surprise, were obliged to fight, hand to hand, the soldiers of the garrison, who made a very vigorous defence.

In the mean time, the three hundred men left behind, not being able to discover the path which Aratus had followed, drew themselves up in a compact body under an impending rock, and there waited in the utmost anxiety and distress. They heard the cries of the combatants; but as the noise was echoed by the neighboring mountains, they could not distinguish whence it first came, and knew not which way to direct their course. Just at that moment, a body of Macedonian soldiers, hastening to the relief of the garrison in the citadel, passed before them, without the least idea of their own danger. As soon as they had passed, the three hundred Achæans fell with great fury on their rear, and put some of them to the sword, whilst the rest saved themselves by a precipitate flight. A guide then came from Aratus, to conduct the conquerors to the citadel, where their assistance was greatly needed; having at last joined their friends, they made together so vigorous an effort that the garrison could not resist, and the victorious Achæans saw themselves, at the break of day, absolute masters of the fortress.

Aratus had no sooner secured his conquest, than overlooking his excessive fatigue, he descended into the city, and was met in the theatre by an immense concourse of people. When he appeared, all were eager to testify their profound respect and gratitude for him by repeated acclamations. Aratus delivered to the Corinthians the keys of their city, which had not been in their hands from the time of King Philip; this act of generosity won them entirely over to his cause, and in compliance with his exhortations, they joined the confederacy of the Achæans (B. C. 243.).

During the ensuing years, Aratus restored freedom to several other cities of Peloponnesus, and continually increased the forces of the Achæan league. This conduct rendered him very dear to the Greeks, whose predominant characteristic was an ardent love of liberty; still, his wars against the Lacedæmonians detracted much from his reputation, especially as a general. Cleomenes, one of the bravest kings that Sparta ever had, was willing to join the Achæans, on condition that he should be appointed their chief leader; but Aratus would not consent to resign an honor he had enjoyed for more than thirty years, and thus lose the reward of his services. His unwillingness to comply with the wishes of

Cleomenes, exposed him still more to the attacks of the Spartans. Being repeatedly defeated by them, and anxious to stop the course of their victories, he committed another great fault, namely that of calling to his assistance those very Macedonians whom he himself had formerly expelled from Corinth.*

King Antigonus Doto readily acceded to the proposal, though he made the Achæans pay dearly for his services. Besides enjoying the chief command of their troops as long as he remained among them, he required and obtained that the citadel of Corinth should again receive a Macedonian garrison; by this impolitic measure, the Achæans fell into a sort of subjection to the kings of Macedon, who took advantage of it to interfere more and more in the affairs of Greece. This new state of things lasted till the Macedonians were defeated by the Romans, and Philopœmen restored by his victories the glory and power of the Achæan republic.

ACHÆAN LEAGUE UNDER PHILOPŒMEN.—B. C. 206—183.

Philopœmen was born at Megalopolis, a city of Peloponnesus, towards the year B. C. 253. From his youth, he inured himself to a hard, laborious and active life, and readily entered upon the course of such exercises as might render him an excellent warrior. His exertions to that effect were perfectly successful; being equally well qualified to fight and to command, he yielded to no soldier in vigor and courage, nor to any officer in prudence and ability. At the age of thirty, he signalized himself in the famous battle of Sellasia, and to him, more than to any other, was Antigonus indebted for his victory. The king acknowledged this after the battle, in a manner very flattering and honorable to Philopœmen. Feigning to be angry, because the cavalry had charged before the signal was given, and being answered by the commander of that body that the fault was to be laid entirely to the account of a young Megalopolitan officer, the king replied: "This young man, by seizing the proper moment for action, has performed the part of a prudent and experienced general; and you, the general, have acted the part of an unskilful young man."

Philopœmen deserved by his services to be appointed commander-in-chief of the Achæans. His nation was at that time involved in a war against the tyrant of Sparta, Machanidas, who

* Aratus, in his memoirs, and after him, the historian Polybius (b. ii, ch. 3), endeavored to justify this transaction on the plea of necessity; but it is severely, and, we think, justly reprehended by Plutarch, in his *life of Aratus*.

endeavored to make conquests in Peloponnesus, and had already advanced as far as Mantinea. Philopœmen went to attack him near that place. The beginning of the battle was far from being favorable to him; on the contrary, his left wing, composed of mercenaries, was, after a sharp conflict, entirely broken and put to flight. Still, the Achæan general did not, on this account, lose either his courage or his presence of mind; he rather watched the more attentively the errors that the enemy might commit, in order to turn them, if possible, to his own advantage. One such error was committed, which is common on the like occasions.

Machanidas, instead of attacking both on the front and flank the centre of the Achæans, lost his time in pursuing the fugitives. Philopœmen instantly occupied the ground thus incautiously abandoned by the tyrant, and not only separated him from the main body of his troops, but even cut the latter in pieces, while they were hurrying to cross a ditch, in order to come to close fight with the Achæan phalanx. Machanidas at length returned from the pursuit; but it was too late. At the very instant when he was spurring his horse through the ditch to rejoin the remnants of his army, Philopœmen pierced him with a spear, and by this bold exploit completed and secured a victory, the fruit in every respect of his superior talents (B. C. 206).

The battle of Mantinea was of immense advantage to the Achæans; besides enriching them with a large quantity of spoils and enlarging their territory, it saved their nation from the yoke of the Spartan despot. Hence, the same honor which had been paid to Themistocles after the battle of Salamis, was now paid to Philopœmen after his victory at Mantinea. It is related that, when he appeared at the Nemœan games, just as Pylades, the musician, was singing this verse of an ancient poet:

The palm of liberty for Greece I won,

The people, struck at the coincidence, from every part of the theatre turned their eyes upon Philopœmen, and welcomed him with the loudest plaudits. They recollected the ancient dignity of Greece, and in their present joy seemed filled with the noble spirit of former times.

Such also was the confidence which the Achæan troops placed in Philopœmen, that, in great emergencies, they were discontented under any other commander: they longed for the return of their favorite general; and if he but made his appearance, they were soon satisfied and again ready for action.

He had, indeed, several other occasions to try their courage in the field. The death of Machanidas, instead of restoring to the

Spartans the enjoyment of their ancient liberty, had served only to make room for another and still more odious tyrant in the person of Nabis. This man, having inherited the hostile feelings of his predecessors towards the Achæans, waged an obstinate war against them. He at first obtained a partial success, but was subsequently so often and so signally defeated by Philopœmen, that he lost nearly all his troops and resources; till, at length, he himself fell by the sword of deceitful allies, after a detestable reign of fifteen years (B. C. 191). Philopœmen was no sooner informed of this event, than he marched with his army to Sparta, where he found all things in great confusion. Having assembled the chief citizens, he so dexterously influenced them by motives of persuasion and of fear, that he persuaded them, and, through them, the whole city, to join in the Achæan league.

This important operation added new lustre to the reputation of Philopœmen. The Lacedæmonians themselves, out of gratitude for him, resolved to make him a present of the whole sum accruing from the sale of Nabis's property; a sum amounting to one hundred and twenty talents, or upwards of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars. But so well known was the integrity of Philopœmen, that not one of the Spartans could be induced to be the bearer of the present; it became necessary to intrust it to one Timolaus, a stranger, to whom Philopœmen was bound by the rights of hospitality.

Timolaus therefore went to Megalopolis, and took lodging with Philopœmen, who gave him a kind reception. Here, having observed the virtue of this great man, the simplicity of his diet, the gravity of his discourse, and the nobleness of his sentiments, he did not dare even mention the object of his journey, and, having assigned another motive for it, returned to Lacedæmon. Nor was he more successful in a second visit. Being sent a third time, he at last ventured to speak, and delivered his commission. Philopœmen listened to him with marks of great satisfaction, but immediately set out for Sparta, where, having expressed his gratitude to the citizens for their benevolence, he exhorted them not to endeavor to bribe with money those who, for the sake of virtue, were already their friends; but rather to employ their gold in purchasing the wicked, and those persons who, in council, perplexed and divided the city by seditious discourses; so that, being paid for their silence, they might no longer occasion disturbances in the government.

Such was the disinterestedness and magnanimity of Philopœmen. These, with other great qualities and noble deeds, rendered him equal to the illustrious heroes of earlier times, Cimon, Aristides

Epaminondas, etc.; hence he was deservedly called *the last of the Greeks*, since after him Greece produced no great men worthy of her ancient glory. At the age of seventy years, and after fighting in a private encounter with his usual courage, he was, in consequence of a fall from his horse, made prisoner by a Messenian party, who had the base cruelty to deprive him of life by poison (B. C. 188). The Achæans, in order to avenge the loss of their general, waged a terrible war against the Messenians, and, punishing with inexorable severity all those who had a part in the death of Philopœmen, performed in his honor magnificent obsequies, which resembled a triumph rather than a funeral.

AFFAIRS OF CARTHAGE AND SICILY.—AGATHOCLES,
TYRANT OF SYRACUSE.—B. C. 317—289.

WE have thus far conducted the history of Greece and of the neighboring states, through an unbroken chain of events. The history of the western world, during the same period of time, must now engage our attention, till, by the progress of the Romans in all directions, the same narrative will be made to comprehend all the countries of the earth known to the ancients.

On a former occasion it was remarked that, after the Carthaginians first obtained a footing in Sicily, they never ceased to make vigorous efforts both to preserve and to extend their conquests. Their late defeat by the Syracusans under Timoleon did not prevent them from soon renewing their attempts, and the struggle was now carried on between them and the famous tyrant Agathocles.

This man was a Sicilian by birth, of low extraction, but remarkable for natural talents, and still more so for his ambitious and fierce disposition. With the assistance of the Carthaginians, he usurped the sovereign authority in Syracuse twenty years after the death of Timoleon, and exercised it in the most tyrannical manner, as well in Syracuse itself as in other cities, which he took either by force or surprise. The Carthaginians then thought of putting a check on his ambition, and their commander Amilcar made him agree to a treaty calculated to maintain peace; but Agathocles did not long comply with it, on the contrary he rose against his former benefactors. They, on their part, marched against him, and having chastised his ingratitude by a signal defeat, obliged him to shut himself up in Syracuse. They laid siege to that city with the more readiness, as the reduction of this important place might have easily rendered them masters of the whole island.

Agathocles had comparatively few forces with which to oppose

them; and his cruelty, besides, caused him to be deserted by his allies. To rescue himself from so terrible an extremity, he made a plan so very bold and so seemingly impracticable, that even at present it might appear incredible, were it not for the fact of its execution: unable as he was to resist the Carthaginians on his own territory, he had the audacity to sail for Africa, in order to attack them upon their own ground.*

The perfect secrecy with which Agathocles conducted this enterprise, was not less astonishing than the enterprise itself; nobody knew or suspected his design, till he reached the African shores. He announced it only after the army had landed, and represented to his followers that, in order to rescue their country from danger, his intent was to divert the enemy's attention from Syracuse by marching against Carthage, an opulent though ill-protected city, whose riches would be the reward of their courage. Finding the troops disposed to follow him, he executed a second project still bolder than the first, by burning his fleet, and thus leaving to his soldiers no alternative but victory or death (B. C. 310).

Agathocles allowed no time for reflection and repentance; he resolutely marched into the heart of the enemy's country, subduing cities, and enriching his soldiers with their spoils. The Carthaginians began to be the more alarmed; as this invasion led them to suppose that their forces had been conquered and destroyed in Sicily. New armies, it is true, were mustered in great haste, to hinder the approach of the enemy; but they were repeatedly defeated, and, as a natural consequence, their defeat increased more and more the general consternation, even so far as to occasion great disturbances in their city.

Very happily for them, when Agathocles saw his affairs in this prosperous condition, he determined to revisit Sicily. His absence, though it lasted but a short time, caused a complete change in the prospect of the war, and when he returned to Africa, he could not succeed in regaining his former superiority: in this critical situation, the tyrant sought a means of preservation for himself; he abandoned his army, and recrossing the sea with a few persons, again returned to Syracuse. The soldiers, enraged at this base conduct, vented their vengeance on his two sons; they killed both of them, and surrendered themselves to the enemy. Some years after, Agathocles himself closed his criminal life by a violent and frightful death (B. C. 289).

* "Mirâ prorsus audaciâ," says Justin, "ut quibus in solo urbis suæ par non erat, eorum urbi bellum inferret, et qui sua tueri non poterat, impugnaret aliena, victusque victoribus insultaret."—Justin, b. xxii, ch. 4.

This tyrant, however, must be allowed to have possessed one good quality, that of modesty in his private conduct. Being the son of a potter, he not only betrayed no shame of his lowly origin, but purposely made use of earthen vessels at table, in order to perpetuate the recollection of his former humble condition.

WAR OF THE ROMANS AGAINST THE SAMNITES. B. C. 343—282.

DURING the disputes between Carthage and Sicily, the Romans continued to lay the solid and durable foundation of their future greatness. The history of that singular nation, particularly at the period which we have now reached, presents an almost uninterrupted series of exploits, battles, and conquests achieved in spite of a thousand difficulties, not less by their unflinching perseverance than by their heroic valor. This appeared in the most striking manner in their war against the Samnites, a powerful tribe of Southern Italy. The Samnites yielded not to the Romans themselves in martial spirit, intrepidity, and discipline: often vanquished, sometimes victorious, they maintained the bloody contest with incredible courage and obstinacy for the space of about sixty years.

This protracted struggle may be considered under three distinct heads, according to the various stages of its duration and the characteristic events by which every one of them was marked.

§ 1. SAMNITE WAR.—ITS BEGINNING AND FIRST RESULT.

B. C. 343—324.

Under the consulate of Valerius Corvus and Cornelius Cossus, the Romans and Samnites, hitherto allies and friends, became enemies on account of an intermediate nation, the Campanians, attacked at that time by the Samnites, and defended by the Romans. The senate of the republic sent heralds to demand satisfaction of the invaders, for their attempt upon a people then placed under the Roman protection. On their refusal, war was declared, and both consuls received orders to set out instantly at the head of their troops against this new enemy; Valerius led his army into Campania, and Cornelius marched to the Samnite territory.

Valerius was soon obliged to come to a battle. He readily prepared for it, and by words full of energy and strongly expressive of his well-known affection for the troops and his confidence in their valor, filled them all with the determination to maintain, in the approaching conflict, the glory of the Roman name. The Samnites, likewise, were proud of their recent exploits and

ancient renown. Never did foe meet foe on more equal terms, with more similar hopes, and with greater confidence in their own courage, and respect for their opponents.* The action lasted long, without any sign of victory on either side. The day was drawing to its close, and several ranks of the Samnites were already destroyed; yet, so fully resolved were they to conquer or die, that none of the survivors were seen to abandon their post, and withdraw from that scene of carnage. The Romans themselves began to be exhausted; still, excited by the example of their general who performed prodigies of valor, and maddened, as it were, by the undaunted resistance of their opponents, they made so furious an attack, that the Samnites at last began to give way, and were at length driven from the field. The conquerors took many of them prisoners, slew many others, and very few would have escaped, if night had not put an end to the pursuit.

The joy occasioned by this important success of Valerius, was soon damped by the peril of his colleague and of the other Roman army. The Consul Cornelius had incautiously marched his troops into a deep valley, without noticing that the surrounding hills were occupied by the Samnites, and he became sensible of his danger only when it was too late to avoid it. Fortunately, however, the enemy had neglected to take possession of one eminence more elevated than all the rest; the consul's attention was directed to it by P. Decius, one of his chief officers. As this height, though almost inaccessible to heavy armed soldiers, could easily be reached by light armed infantry, Decius asked no more than a body of two thousand and four hundred men, to take possession of so favorable a spot, and thus save the whole Roman army. When he would be once stationed on the eminence, the consul, with all his troops, could leave the defile without danger of an attack, because the Samnites would naturally be afraid of being themselves attacked, with immense disadvantage, by the detachment from the height.

This salutary advice was highly applauded and eagerly followed. Decius, with the body of troops which he had desired, went through a forest towards the intended spot, and was not perceived by the enemy till he had reached the summit. While the Samnites, in surprise and dismay, and not knowing what step to take, made different movements to no purpose, the consul had time to extricate his legions from danger and to occupy a safer position. When night came on and the Samnites were at

* *Prælium, ut quod maximè unquam, pari spe, utrinque æquis viribus, cum fiduciâ sui sine contemptu hostium, commissum est.*—Livy, *l. vii. c. 33.*

rest, Decius and his brave companions left the height, and crossing the enemy's camp with equal celerity and courage, early in the morning rejoined their own army, which welcomed them with every expression of gratitude for their devotedness, and joy for their return.

The consul, having assembled his legions, began to lavish merited praises on Decius; yet, at the suggestion of this brave officer himself, he dismissed the assembly for the sake of a more urgent affair. Decius advised him to go instantly at the head of the troops and attack the Samnites, before they could have recovered from their amazement, and whilst they would still be scattered about the neighborhood. Whatever he proposed was executed. The Samnites, thus suddenly attacked, offered but a feeble resistance: some escaped by flight; others, who had hoped to find a shelter within their camp, were pursued there by the victorious Romans, and all, to the number of thirty thousand, were put to the sword.

After this great achievement, the consul again assembled his troops, and not only began to harangue them as before in commendation of Decius, but bestowed on him additional praises for the late signal service which he had rendered to the republic. Besides other military rewards, he presented him with a crown of gold. The legions likewise, to testify their gratitude to Decius, honored him with a crown made of grass, such as was given to those who had delivered the Romans or their allies from a siege.*

* This crown was for that reason called *Corona Obsidionalis*, a very appropriate name, as it was composed of grass that grew in the place just besieged, and related to the siege of that place or city.

The other coronets bestowed as military rewards among the Romans, were the following:

Corona Civica, given to any soldier who had saved the life of a Roman citizen in an engagement. This crown, though composed of only oaken materials, was considered the most honorable that could be bestowed.

Corona Muralis, awarded to him who first scaled the walls of a city in a general assault; and therefore in its form there was some allusion made to the figure of a wall.

Corona Vallaris or *Castrensis*, the reward of him, who, first of all, had forced the enemy's intrenchments.

Corona Navalis, set round with figures of the beaks of ships, and bestowed on such as had signalized their valor in a naval engagement.

In fine, *Corona Triumphalis*, made with wreaths of laurel, and awarded to the general who had gained a signal victory. To him also, was reserved the *triumph*, or solemn entry into Rome in a chariot magnificently ornamented, and at the head of his victorious army.

There were other rewards for occasions different from those already mentioned. Among others, were the *torques*, a golden or silver collar, exquisitely wrought; and the *armilla*, a sort of bracelets given, on account of some eminent service, to such only as were born Romans.

Another battle was fought near Suessula between Valerius, the other consul, and the Samnites. The latter had summoned all the flower of their youth under their standards, to try again the chance of war; but the excessive confidence of that people in their number and bravery, their want of sufficient precautions, and the skilful movements of Valerius, secured to this general a second victory as complete as the first. No fewer than forty thousand bucklers and one hundred and seventy military standards were taken from the Samnites. Their camp likewise was captured at the first onset, and all the booty and spoils found in it were divided among the Roman soldiers.

The fame of this expedition was not confined to Italy. It spread abroad even to Africa, and the Carthaginians sent ambassadors to congratulate the Roman people on their success, with a golden crown of twenty-five pounds weight to be dedicated in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. A triumph was decreed to both consuls. In the triumphal march, Decius walked after them in great pomp, adorned with the crowns which he had received, and sharing in the honors and praises conferred on the two victorious generals. The Samnites, on the contrary, dispirited by their losses and the additional devastation of their territory, sent deputies to sue for peace: it was granted to them without much difficulty and on moderate terms, under the consulship of Æmilius Mamercinus.

§ II. SAMNITE WAR—ITS RENEWAL AND PROGRESS.

B. C. 324—290.

The late treaty between the two nations lasted for about fifteen years. During that interval, the Romans made so steady a progress in consequence of their prosperous wars against other foes, that the Samnites were alarmed at this continual increase of power, and began to make preparations for the renewal of hostilities. This was the most bloody and protracted part of their obstinate struggle. At Rome, it was thought from the beginning that the emergency required the appointment of a dictator, and L. Papirius Cursor was chosen for this high office; the charge of master of the horse was given to Fabius Maximus Rullianus. Both of them, by their eminent talents and important services, deserved to be numbered among the greatest generals of ancient Rome; but their discord at first threatened the state with serious evils.

Papirius, having occasion to leave the army for a few days, strictly forbade the general of the cavalry to undertake any thing and engage in any combat during his absence. His orders were

not obeyed. Fabius, seeing a favorable opportunity to attack the Samnites, led the army against them, and gave them such an overthrow, that they left twenty thousand of their men on the field of battle. When the news of this action reached the dictator's ears, instead of being rejoiced at the victory, he was highly incensed at the disobedience of Fabius: with all possible haste, he set out for the camp, asserting everywhere that the victory gained by Fabius was not more destructive to the Samnites, than it would prove fatal to discipline and to the majesty of the dictatorship, if this contempt of authority would remain unpunished.

Fabius, aware of the danger that threatened him, invoked the protection of the soldiers against the severity of his general. Having found a refuge in their ranks as long as the day lasted, he fled during the night to Rome, where on the next day Papirius followed him, in order to bring him to trial. The cause was warmly, though vainly debated, first in the senate, and then in the assembly of the people, Papirius dwelling strongly on the necessity of exemplary chastisement for the vindication of public authority, and Rullianus pleading his services. At last, the people with unanimous consent, the tribunes, Rullianus himself and his aged father, M. Fabius, putting an end to the debate, humbly besought the dictator to forgive a transient act of disobedience. Papirius, moved by this spectacle, resisted no longer. He granted the pardon so much desired, saying that he was now fully satisfied, since military discipline and the majesty of the empire had prevailed, after they were both in danger of being overthrown for ever.

This noble and merciful act of Papirius, although universally applauded at Rome, did not restore to him the affection of the troops. They had been exasperated at his first rigor in the case of Fabius, and were by no means pleased at his return among them. This became evident on the very next day, when the Samnites, by their approach to the Roman camp, gave a new occasion to fight them with immense advantage; such was the ability of the dictator and the skill with which he drew up his legions for battle, that, if he had been seconded by the usual display of their valor, no person doubts but that the enemy might that day have been totally subdued. But the Roman soldiers, not to increase the glory of their general, chose to fight with remissness, and without suffering themselves to be vanquished, would not become victorious.

Papirius easily understood the cause of his failure in obtaining full success. Being made sensible that he ought to moderate his temper and blend mildness with severity, he took with him his

lieutenants, and, going about through the camp, visited all the wounded, asked how they were, and earnestly recommended them to the care of their officers. These obliging manners, always popular in themselves, made then so favorable an impression, that the dictator fully regained the affection of his troops; as soon as they were sufficiently recovered and fit for action, he again led them against the enemy with full confidence of victory. His hope was realized, and the Samnites were so completely routed, that they no longer dared to meet the dictator in the field.

The condition of the war was very different under two of his successors in command. The imprudence of Veturius and Posthumius, both consuls in the year B. C. 321, brought upon the Roman arms the most signal disgrace that they had yet encountered. Pontius, the general of the Samnites, succeeded by stratagem in enclosing, near the small village of Caudium, the consular legions in a defile out of which there was no escape. When the Romans found themselves hemmed in on all sides, they fell into the utmost dejection; motionless with terror and grief, they looked sadly at each other, and gave vent to complaints and murmurs against the temerity of their generals. They thus spent the night without either food or rest.

The Samnites themselves were at a loss how to make use of their advantage. They consulted on the subject their general's father, Herennius, a man of consummate prudence and judgment; Herennius answered that they ought either to set the Romans free and dismiss them honorably, in order to gain their friendship, or put them all to the sword, in order to cripple, by a decisive blow, the power of Rome. The victorious Samnites followed neither advice. They preferred a middle course, less calculated, as Herennius justly observed, to weaken than to exasperate a vanquished enemy, and like a half-remedy in a violent crisis, very apt to turn in the end to their own ruin. Life was granted to the Romans on these conditions: that they should lay aside their arms and a portion of their garments, and in this state, with the consuls at their head, should all pass under the yoke; secondly, that the two nations, putting an end to the war, should live henceforth on a footing of equality.

Since there was no resource left, these disgraceful terms were accepted. The dreaded ceremony of the yoke took place in presence of the armed battalions of the Samnites, who were both ungenerous and imprudent enough to accompany it with bitter sarcasms and many acts of brutal violence. The Romans went out of the defile, covered with shame and overwhelmed with grief; the light of day seemed to them more intolerable than

death. They silently marched towards Rome, and, entering it late at night, hastened to conceal themselves in their houses.

The Roman people and senate did not believe themselves bound by the treaty of Caudium, as being an unauthorized agreement, concluded by their consuls and troops without their own consent. They appointed new and more skilful generals; they reorganized the vanquished legions, and sent them against the Samnites. As soon as the Roman soldiers perceived the enemy, they did not wait for either exhortation or signal, but running, sword in hand, with inexpressible fury, they slew or drove every foe before them, and taking the Samnite camp, filled it in a moment with dread and carnage. Shortly after, they defeated another army, nearly in the same manner and in the same circumstances. Besides their advantages in the field, the conquerors recovered all their colors, their stands of arms, and their hostages; and obliged seven thousand prisoners, together, as some believe, with the famous general Pontius, to pass under the yoke, and thus undergo the same ignominious treatment which the Romans themselves had been doomed to suffer at Caudium.

These disastrous events did not put an end to hostilities. Each nation seemed to have sworn the extermination of the other; for a long period of time (B. C. 320—290), almost every year was marked by bloody battles, and almost every battle was a new wound inflicted on the power of the Samnites. This undaunted people were, it is true, occasionally successful in their efforts; but even success was fatal to them, because, by reanimating their hopes, it roused them to new exertions which invariably ended in new losses and defeats. In vain did they recruit their armies with unabated energy; in vain too did they seek and find assistance in the powerful tribes of central and northern Italy, the Marsi, the Umbrians, the Etrurians, the Gauls situated near the river Po, etc. Whether they fought alone, or jointly with their allies, they experienced the most signal overthrows from those great generals of Rome, Papirius, Fabius, and others, and on several occasions lost from twenty to forty thousand men; the Etrurians, indeed, lost in one engagement sixty thousand slain or prisoners. In a word, it is no exaggeration to say that there never was seen a greater and more continued success on one side, nor a more protracted and obstinate resistance on the other.

§ III. THE SAMNITE WAR.—ITS CLOSE.—B. C. 290—282.

THE Samnites at length became sensible of their own weakness and the complete failure of their resources. The loss of their

armies, population, cities and territory, if it did not extinguish their martial spirit and abate their courage, at least undermined and exhausted their strength. In the year B. c. 290, the two consuls, Cornelius Rufinus and Curius Dentatus, having led their légions into the Samnite country, gained so many advantages over the inhabitants, as to compel them to sue for peace. The Roman senate were willing to grant it, but left the articles of treaty to be settled by Curius. The deputies of the Samnites found him sitting near the fire in his modest farm-house, whither he had retired for a time, and taking a frugal meal served up in a wooden dish. Having first explained the object of their embassy, they offered him a large sum of money, to render him more favorable to their interests; he graciously listened to them, but constantly rejected the proffered gift, saying that he had found it far more honorable to command those who had gold, than to have any himself. After the ratification of the treaty, this great man returned to Rome, where he enjoyed triumphal honors.

By an unprecedented example in the history of the republic, another triumph was decreed in the same year to Curius, for having subdued the whole country of the Sabines, and carried his victorious arms to the Adriatic sea. In giving an account of this expedition to the senate, he made use of these remarkable words: "I have conquered so much land, that it must have remained uncultivated, had I not also taken so great a number of prisoners; and I have taken so many prisoners, that they would die of starvation, had I not conquered so much land." As to Curius himself, so illustrious a personage and one of the brightest ornaments of his age and nation, seven acres of land composed the whole of his property.

To return to the Samnites; their treaty with Curius was or seemed to be the close of their bloody strife against Rome. That strife had given to the Romans more trouble, perhaps, than all the other Italian wars together, though in the end they obtained a complete and lasting success. When, a few years later, the Samnites endeavored to reassert their independence, a new and signal defeat, which cost their nation twenty-five thousand men, taught them to respect in future the superiority of Rome. They at last submitted to their conquerors; and their example was imitated by most of those Italian states formerly involved in their quarrel, and at that time subdued like themselves by the exertions of Roman valor.

These events lead us to the year B. c. about 282. The Romans had scarcely brought so many contests to a successful close, when another struggle called for their attention, and served to increase their progress in military science and discipline.

WAR OF THE ROMANS AGAINST PYRRHUS.—ADVENTURES
AND DEATH OF THAT PRINCE.—B. C. 281—272.

THIS war originated in a series of gross insults offered to Roman ambassadors by the inhabitants of Tarentum. Rome openly declared vengeance against this arrogant city. The Tarentines seeing the storm ready to burst upon them, and conscious of their utter inability to face it by themselves, called to their assistance Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a prince not less remarkable for his courage and skill in war, than for his reckless ambition which continually prompted him to go from country to country in search of military adventures. He readily acceded to the request of the Tarentines, and crossing the Adriatic sea with an army of about thirty thousand men, passed over to Italy (B. C. 281). Before commencing hostilities, he offered his mediation to adjust the existing differences between Rome and Tarentum; the consul Lævinus, who had already approached with his legions, answered him that the Romans neither took Pyrrhus for an arbiter of their claims, nor feared him as an enemy.

Upon this reply, the king advanced against the Romans. It is said that when he beheld from a distance their excellent order and disposition, he was surprised, and began to entertain some uneasiness about the result of the war. But now he had no time for deliberation; the Romans crossed the river Siris, which separated them from his army, and a battle immediately ensued. It was a sharp and bloody conflict. Pyrrhus himself, whilst performing the duties of both a general and soldier, ran great risk of his life, and, if he at length gained the victory, he was indebted for it principally to his elephants, whose enormous bulk and size affrighted the Romans, unaccustomed to see such huge animals. This success, moreover, was purchased at a very dear rate; it cost him a great number of his choicest men; hence, on his return to Tarentum, when congratulated on his victory, he said: "If we gain such another victory, we are undone." A second battle, equally obstinate and terrible, increased his fears as to the ultimate consequences of the war, and a variety of other incidents contributed to render him more and more apprehensive of the result.

An embassy had been sent to Pyrrhus from Rome, for the purpose of coming to an agreement with him about the ransom or the exchange of prisoners: the conduct of the ambassadors, and especially of C. Fabricius, the most illustrious of them, gave the king

a most exalted idea of Roman disinterestedness and magnanimity. —This Caius Fabricius was highly esteemed by the Romans for his probity, his wisdom, and his martial abilities; but he was extremely poor. Pyrrhus received him with particular distinction, and privately offered him gold, which he begged him to accept, not for any base purpose, but as a pledge of friendship and hospitality. As Fabricius positively refused to receive any present, however valuable and useful it might be, Pyrrhus urged him no farther; but the next day, wishing to surprise him, and knowing that he had never seen an elephant, he ordered the largest one in his possession to be caparisoned and placed behind a curtain in the room in which they were to meet. This being done, the curtain was suddenly drawn at the king's command, and the elephant raising his trunk over the head of Fabricius, made a horrid and frightful noise. But Fabricius turned about very calmly, and said with a smile: "Your gold did not tempt me yesterday, nor has your beast affrighted me to-day."

After this, Fabricius being consul, an unknown person came to his camp with a letter from the king's physician, who offered to take off Pyrrhus by poison, and so end the war without any farther hazard to the Romans, provided they would give him a proper compensation for his services. Fabricius detested this perfidy, and having brought his colleague into the same sentiments, sent despatches to the king, without losing a moment's time, to caution him against the treason. It is said that, when Pyrrhus read the letter, he exclaimed: "It would be easier to turn the sun out of his stated course, than to divert Fabricius from the paths of justice and probity;" and that he might not seem to be surpassed in generosity, he immediately dismissed all the Roman prisoners without ransom. Still he desired more than ever to conclude an honorable peace. Seeing that the Romans made no advance towards a treaty of this kind, he was the first to propose and urge it himself. But the senate, faithful to their maxim never to yield any thing in time of adversity or danger, repeatedly answered Pyrrhus that he never would obtain peace from the Romans, till he should have evacuated Italy.

These were not ostentations or idle words. The king knew very well that, among the Romans, vigorous action ever went hand in hand with firmness of language. He had noticed that they recruited their legions with the greatest facility, and notwithstanding their losses, opposed to him armies more numerous than the preceding; so that it seemed as if he had to do with the Lernæan hydra. He had likewise observed, when viewing the dead bodies lying on the field after his first battle, that all the

Romans had died of honorable wounds, and with their faces towards the enemy. This circumstance, whilst it elicited from him a desire to have soldiers like these, plainly told him how hardy a kind of warriors they were, against whom he had undertaken to contend.

These considerations threw Pyrrhus into great perplexity as to his future course. He was relieved from his uneasiness by a deputation of Sicilians, entreating him to espouse their cause against the Carthaginians their enemies, and offering to put Syracuse, Agrigentum, and the city of the Leontines in his hands. He acceded to their proposal, and setting sail for Sicily, occupied the towns just mentioned, drove the Carthaginians before him, and in a short time, stripped them of whatever they possessed in that island, except the strong city of Lilybæum. But, as was usual with him, he lost his conquests as quickly as he had achieved them; nor could he succeed, without much difficulty and danger, in recrossing the strait to rejoin his Italian allies.

During his absence, the Romans had made considerable progress. Pyrrhus, in order to restore his forlorn affairs, determined to try again the chance of a battle. He lost it, and together with it twenty-six thousand men, besides prisoners; the king himself escaped with a small body of cavalry to Tarentum, whence he shortly after re-embarked for his own country (B. C. 275).

Thus were the lofty hopes of Pyrrhus respecting Italy and Sicily frustrated, after he had wasted six years in these expeditions. But, although he was not successful, still he preserved his unconquerable courage, and was reputed to excel, in military experience and personal prowess, all the princes of his time. Unfortunately for him, what he gained by his achievements, he lost by vain hopes, his desire of something absent never suffering him effectually to persevere in a present pursuit.

The close of his public life was in keeping with the rest of his career. Having failed in an attempt upon Sparta, he turned his efforts against the city of Argos, and succeeded in entering it and filling some streets with his troops, though with great danger to them and at the cost of his own life. He first received a wound, and as he was rushing with all his force to charge his aggressor, the mother of this man, who witnessed the fight from the roof of a house and trembled for her son, threw a large tile with such violence on the head of the king, that he fell senseless, and a soldier cut off his head (B. C. 272). Such was the end of Pyrrhus, an end little worthy of his high rank as a prince and a general, but not unworthy of his adventurous life.

The Romans, by their final triumph over Pyrrhus, and the

subsequent surrender of Tarentum into their hands, became masters of all central and southern Italy. The foundation of their empire had been laid slowly, but surely, by a continual warfare of nearly five hundred years; having now no longer any thing to fear either for their safety or their pre-eminence in the peninsula, they began to think of carrying their arms into foreign countries.

FIRST PUNIC WAR.—B. C. 264—241.

PYRRHUS is reported to have said, in leaving Sicily, that this island would not fail to become a battle-field for the Romans and Carthaginians. His prediction was soon verified by the event. These two nations were now too near each other, and at the same time too powerful and ambitious, to remain idle spectators of their respective aggrandizement; notwithstanding their previous and reiterated treaties of alliance, it was plain that a clashing of interests would lead to an open rupture between them as soon as a specious occasion would offer. Such an occasion presented itself in the affairs of the Mamertines or new inhabitants of Messina, formerly a band of adventurers, who were, on the one hand, attacked by the Carthaginians and by Hiero, king of Syracuse, and on the other, defended by the Romans whose assistance they had earnestly implored. The consul Appius, having crossed the strait of Sicily during the night, fell on the Syracusans and Carthaginians, defeated them successively in two great battles, and rescued Messina from danger (B. C. 264).

The success of Appius was eagerly pursued in the ensuing year by the consuls Otacilius and Valerius. These victories of the Romans at the very beginning of the war, and their steady progress in the island, made a deep impression on the mind of Hiero. That prince, already conspicuous for his wisdom in the government of his people, conjectured from the beginning what would be the final result of this contest; and being, for several reasons, dissatisfied with his Carthaginian allies, offered his friendship to the Romans. It was readily accepted, and became for them a subject of constant satisfaction; for they never had a more faithful and useful ally. The first fruit of their treaty with him was the capture of Agrigentum, the most important place of Sicily except Syracuse, and the most considerable among the cities occupied by the Carthaginians.

So prosperous a beginning exceedingly raised the hopes of the Romans. They determined to create a naval force, in order to pursue their advantage with greater effect, and in every respect, by sea as well as by land, successfully to cope with their opponents. A Carthaginian galley, stranded by some accident on the

Italian coast, served them as a pattern. They set themselves to the work with so much ardor, that one hundred and twenty vessels were built within the short space of two months. But these vessels, on account of their hasty construction and for want of skilful workmen, being slow and heavy in their motions, it was resolved to make up for this deficiency by the use of certain machines purposely invented for the occasion, and afterwards called *Corvi* or *Crows*, with which they might seize the enemy's ships, board them, and immediately come to close engagement.

The Roman fleet thus equipped went, under the command of the consul Duilius, in search of the Carthaginians. It met them and their armament consisting of one hundred and thirty sail, near the coast of Mylæ or Melazzo, in Sicily. At the approach of the Roman force, the Carthaginians, full of contempt for an enemy so inexperienced, as they thought, in the art of sea-warfare, advanced in the expectation of an easy triumph, but they were soon undeceived; their ships, suddenly seized by the machines before mentioned, obliged them to come to closer fight, in which they were unable to stand the attack of the Romans. Their defeat was entire, and besides the loss of about fifty vessels, it cost them ten thousand men, either slain in the action or taken prisoners (B. C. 260).

No victory was ever more gratifying to the Roman people. As Duilius was the first who had obtained for them such an advantage at sea, peculiar honors were conferred upon him: first of all, he celebrated a naval triumph, and, as a memorial of his victory, a triumphal column of white marble, adorned with prows of ships, was erected in the forum by order of the senate.

During the following years, great efforts were made and a design was formed to carry the war into Africa; the Carthaginians, who feared nothing so much, made likewise stupendous preparations to prevent the execution of such an attempt. This disposition of the two parties led to a new engagement at sea, both terrible in itself and important in its consequences (B. C. 256).

The Romans had appointed Manlius and Regulus consuls for this year. Their fleet amounted to three hundred and thirty ships, having on board one hundred and forty thousand men, averaging three hundred seamen and one hundred and twenty soldiers for each vessel. The Carthaginian fleet was still more numerous, consisting of three hundred and sixty vessels; and their forces, computed in the same proportion, must have amounted to upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand men. They were under the command of Amilcar and Hanno, the former with the title of general, and the latter with that of admiral.

The two fleets came in sight near mount Ecnomus, at the mouth of the river Salsi in Sicily. In seeing these vast armaments, the most considerable that ever appeared at sea, preparing for battle and approaching each other, the spectator must have been amazed both at the importance of the contest, and at the power and strength of the two republics thus engaged. As there was no great inequality of forces, and nearly the same courage on both sides, the fight was obstinate and victory long remained doubtful. The Carthaginians at last were entirely overcome: sixty-four of their vessels were taken by the enemy, and upwards of thirty were sunk; the Romans lost no more than twenty-four of their ships, nor did any of them fall into the hands of the Carthaginians.*

The conquerors were enabled by this victory to make an immediate descent upon the coast of Africa. They had no sooner landed, than they laid siege to the city of Clypea, took it, and overrunning the whole neighboring district, carried off a considerable booty, with more than twenty thousand prisoners. Manlius, one of the two consuls, was then recalled by the senate, and Regulus was left, with a portion of the fleet and army, to prosecute the war in Africa.

When this general advanced further into the hostile country, he was at first obliged to contend with an enemy of a very extraordinary kind. There was, near the river Bagrada, a serpent of prodigious size, whose skin, all covered with scales, no dart could penetrate. As several soldiers who went to the river were killed by this monster, it became necessary to attack it with the whole strength of the army and with every sort of machines, as though it had been a fortress. After many ineffectual discharges, a huge stone thrown by one of the engines at length broke the back-bone of the serpent, and left it stretched on the ground, where it was entirely, though not without great difficulty despatched by the soldiers. The skin, one hundred and twenty feet long, was sent to Rome, and hung up in one of the temples of the city.

Regulus, having removed this obstacle, resumed the course of his military operations. He conquered a numerous army of Carthaginians which had attempted to stop his progress, and took, besides many other places, the important city of Tunis near Carthage. So rapid an advance spread the utmost terror among the inhabitants of this capital; they sent deputies to the Roman

* All the particulars of this battle may be seen in Polybius, b. i, c. 2, or Freinshemius, in his excellent supplement to Livy's History, b. xviii, n. 2—9.

general, to conclude a treaty of peace; but Regulus, dazzled by his success, would not grant it except under the most rigorous terms, and said that a nation ought to know either how to conquer or to submit to the conquerors.

This haughty conduct so exasperated the Carthaginians, that they resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. Having lately received among them Xantippus, a Lacedæmonian officer of great skill and experience, they placed him at the head of their troops. Under this new leader, affairs assumed a quite different aspect: after he had, for some time, carefully trained up the soldiers in all the military exercises, he led them against the enemy, and offered battle to Regulus, who, although actually stationed in a very unfavorable position, did not decline the contest. The defeat of the Romans was complete; nearly all their army was destroyed, and five hundred men were taken prisoners, together with their general (B. C. 255): so true is it, as a judicious author remarks, that one prudent advice is better than a thousand weapons, and that nothing is more dangerous in life than presumptuous confidence inspired by prosperity.

The Carthaginians, after detaining Regulus a captive for some years, sent him to Rome for the purpose of obtaining an exchange of prisoners. Before he set out, they made him promise under oath that he would return to Carthage, should their proposal happen to be rejected; this really happened, on the motion of Regulus himself, who proved in the senate that the exchange under consideration would be greatly disadvantageous to the republic. He therefore returned to his prison, aware indeed of the cruel treatment which awaited him there, but preferring, without hesitation, the fulfilment of his oath to the preservation of his life. He had no sooner arrived, than the Carthaginians, incensed against him, made him suffer every pain that their resentment could suggest, till he expired in the midst of torments, having rendered himself greater by his constancy in sufferings, than he was formerly by his splendid success.

The late defeat of Regulus was not the only disaster suffered by the Romans at this period of the war. The land and the sea, the winds and the waves, now seemed to combine their efforts for the destruction of their vessels and troops. On one occasion, they lost, in consequence of a furious tempest, nearly three hundred ships of war which were wrecked along the Sicilian coast; and on another, near the shores of Italy, upwards of a hundred and sixty ships, besides other vessels and transports. The Romans were extremely afflicted at so many and so severe losses; and because all the elements seemed to oppose their superiority

at sea, the senate resolved to reduce their naval force to the number of sixty sail, intended merely to protect their coasts and preserve their communication with Sicily. Yet they did not long persevere in this determination. For they soon perceived that its execution would diminish their influence in that island, give great advantage to the enemy, and protract the war to no purpose. The former plan therefore was resumed; and they began, with great energy, to equip a new fleet.

During these preparations, Metellus, the commander of the Roman troops in Sicily, attacked the Carthaginians near Palermo with such skill and prudence as to gain a complete victory; in this battle, twenty thousand Carthaginians were slain, and all their elephants, one hundred and twenty or forty in number, were taken (B. C. 250). So unexpected a result inspired the Romans with their former courage, and struck terror into the enemy.

It was just the reverse in the ensuing year, when the presumption and rashness of the consul Claudius Pulcher brought destruction on one of the most gallant armaments that the Romans ever put to sea. He had intended to surprise the enemy at Drepanum, a maritime town of Sicily, but was himself surprised, with his whole fleet, in a most unfavorable position: Adherbal, the Carthaginian commander, by his skilful movements and the masterly disposition of his ships, compelled the Romans to fight in a narrow place, so near the shore and so crowded together, that they could scarcely move. Besides all these disadvantages, they were likewise dispirited from a superstitious cause, because the consul not only was resolved to fight notwithstanding unfavorable auspices,* but even made a jest of them. For when the *sacred* chickens would not eat, he had ordered them to be thrown into the sea, "that they might drink." The soldiers were disconcerted by this action, and imagining themselves to be under the displeasure of their gods, did not act in the conflict with their usual intrepidity.

Under such circumstances as these, it must not appear surprising that the Romans, so often victorious before, suffered a dreadful defeat. The consul escaped with no more than thirty of his vessels, which he saved by sailing along the coast; about ninety others, with all the seamen and soldiers on board, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, whilst the remaining ships were wrecked upon the sands or dashed against the shore.

* The *auspices* were a superstitious practice much in use among the ancient Romans, and consisted in searching after signs of the divine will and presages of futurity, in the flight of birds, or in their manner of eating.

At the news of this overthrow, the Romans expressed their complaints against the consul Claudius, whose rash imprudence had brought such heavy losses upon his country. Adherbal, on the contrary, received among the Carthaginians all the applause and honor due to his brave and skilful conduct. The battle of Drepanum was indeed so much the more glorious to him, as he had, with only ninety vessels, engaged more than two hundred, and gained a signal victory without losing a single ship, or even one man, and having only a small number wounded; whereas the Romans had, it is said, eight thousand of their men killed, and twenty thousand taken prisoners.

Thus two mighty nations were wasting their treasures, their strength and their blood in fighting each other. Yet, the greatness of the losses suffered by each of them did not abate their ardor and courage; it merely induced them to confine their sphere of action within narrower limits, and, as it were, to concentrate their efforts on a single point. The remainder of the war, during about ten years, seemed to have no other object than the city of Lilybæum, the most important and nearly the only one that the Carthaginians had hitherto preserved in Sicily. The attempt of the Romans upon this place might be well compared with the famous siege of Troy, not only for its duration, but also for the innumerable exploits performed on each side, either for the purpose of attack or defence. Nor was the siege of Lilybæum terminated by the capture of the city or the surrender of its inhabitants, but it continued till the war was brought by other means to a conclusion. On the one hand, every exertion that experience and skill, as well as boldness and intrepidity, could suggest, was used by the Carthaginian generals, Himilco, Carthalo, and above all Amilcar, surnamed Barcas. On the other hand, the Romans displayed, in the midst of their continual difficulties and dangers, a patience and firmness worthy of all praise; their constancy was at length crowned with entire success.

They had, since the disastrous fight of Drepanum, abandoned again all attempts at sea, under the hope that their land armies would alone be able to decide the contest in their favor. Yet, when they found that all their expectations were likely to be frustrated by the vigorous and intrepid conduct of Amilcar, they resolved for the third time to make trial of a naval armament. The patriotism of private citizens made up for the deficiency of the public treasury, and their voluntary contributions enabled the state to equip a new fleet of two hundred galleys. With this force, the consul Lutatius sailed for Sicily. Having met near the Ægates islands the Carthaginian fleet, still more numerous

than his own, but heavily laden and having none but new levies on board, he attacked it, and gave it an entire overthrow. This defeat cost the enemy at least ten thousand men and one hundred and twenty vessels. As it fell on them at a time when they were already exhausted by so many efforts, it put an end to their resources, and though they wanted not courage, they had no longer money and troops to continue the war.

In this extremity, the Carthaginians invested Amilcar with full powers to do whatever he thought advisable for the public good. This great man, after having achieved for the service of his country all that could be expected from consummate prudence and the most undaunted valor, at length yielded to the necessity of the times. He sent ambassadors to the Roman consul to treat of peace, and it was concluded under the following conditions: "That the Carthaginians should pay three thousand two hundred talents in the space of ten years; evacuate all Sicily; dismiss the Roman prisoners without ransom; and wage no war against the allies of Rome." Such was the end of the first Punic war, after it had lasted twenty-three years without intermission (B. c. 241).

If we take a general view of this long and bloody contest, it will justly appear to us that the mighty nations engaged in it were like two athletes full of vigor and strength, and equally animated by the desire of victory, grasping and rudely handling each other, throwing each other to the ground, then rising again with redoubled energy, and using all the means of attack that force and art, courage and dexterity, can suggest; until, thrown down a second time, and struggling long for the mastery, after this new and protracted effort one at last completely gets the better of his adversary, and compels him to ask for quarter and acknowledge his defeat. Such was the case with Rome and Carthage in the beginning, prosecution, and close of the first Punic war.

There was on each side an equal desire of securing victory and final pre-eminence of power; both parties showed great energy, great courage, and real magnanimity in both the formation and execution of their plans. The Carthaginians surpassed the Romans in the science of navigation, in the shape and swiftness of their vessels, the experience of their sailors and pilots, and their knowledge of the winds, bays, and coasts. The Romans had none of these advantages; but courage, emulation, unabated firmness and a lively sense of national glory, made ample compensation for their want of skill and experience. Unaccustomed as they had hitherto been to a sea-warfare, they not only coped with the Carthaginians, the greatest maritime power then in existence, but

obtained over them a great number of naval victories. No difficulty, no reverse was able to damp their spirit, not even the destruction of seven hundred of their galleys, which happened during that war whether in sea-fights, or in consequence of storms and shipwrecks, whilst those destroyed among the Carthaginians amounted only to five hundred; and this, above all, shows the constancy of the Roman people. They certainly would not have thought of making peace in the same circumstances in which Carthage asked for it; the unexpected loss caused by the battle at the Ægates islands at once blasted all the hopes and resources of the latter, whereas much severer losses had not dispirited the Romans.

With regard to the soldiers employed in the first Punic war, the superiority of courage was undoubtedly on the side of Rome. Among the commanders, Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, was beyond comparison the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence; of all the Roman generals, none appeared very remarkable, nor endowed with talents calculated to ensure complete success: to the nature and strength of the national character and constitution was Rome indebted for her triumph over Carthage.

ROME AFTER THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.—B. C. 241—219.

By the late treaty of peace, all that part of Sicily not belonging to Hiero, king of Syracuse, passed under the power of the Romans. They made it a province, the first they acquired out of Italy, to be governed by a *prætor* annually sent from Rome. Shortly after, upon a transient occasion or pretence of new broils with Carthage, they likewise subdued Sardinia to their laws; whilst in Italy itself, they completely defeated and reduced the rash and restless nation of the Falisci.

Rome was then freed for a time from all foreign hostilities; a circumstance which had not occurred during the space of four hundred and forty years. As a sign of general peace, the temple of Janus was shut for the second time since the building of the city, the first time since the reign of Numa Pompilius (B. C. 235).

Even this peace was of short duration. Besides other causes of dispute, the murder of a Roman ambassador, committed by the Illyrian court, drew the armies of Rome for the first time to those parts of Europe. The Illyrians were easily conquered, and some of them became subjects, others tributary, to the Roman government.

A more difficult and considerable war which the republic had then to sustain, was that against the various inhabitants of the

north of Italy, Gauls, Ligurians and others. It gave the Romans a favorable and effectual opportunity to extend their conquests as far as the Alps, but obliged them to make several campaigns and fight many battles against these warlike nations. The greatest and most important of all the engagements that then took place, was the celebrated battle of Telamon, in which the Gauls, simultaneously attacked by two Roman armies, lost fifty thousand men, slain or prisoners (B. C. 225); this saved Rome and Italy from an invasion which might have proved as fatal as that of Brennus, one hundred and sixty-five years before.

CARTHAGE AFTER THE FIRST PUNIC WAR—REVOLT OF THE MERCENARIES.

After the Punic war had come to a close, both Rome and Carthage were involved in disagreeable contests, and forced to employ their arms in the suppression of domestic troubles. But there existed a great difference between the two nations. The Romans easily checked the insurrection of the Falisci; but the Carthaginians were engaged in a much more serious war against their mercenaries and the revolted Africans; a war the progress of which filled them with the greatest alarm, and threatened even the entire subversion of their state.

At Carthage, the public treasury had been exhausted both by the expenses of the late struggle against Rome, and the heavy sums required to be paid to the Romans. Still the mercenary troops employed by the Carthaginians, and then stationed near the city, were loudly demanding payment for their military services. When they found it postponed, and were even requested, on account of the actual depressed condition of the republic, to be satisfied with a part of their stipend, they at first loudly complained, then gave way to seditious cries, and finally took up arms to maintain their claim by force.

The flame of insurrection, fanned by a few desperate individuals, rapidly spread over every part of the country. All the cities of Africa, sooner or later, joined the party of the insurgents; and the number of their troops rose in a short time from twenty to seventy thousand. Never had Carthage been exposed to greater danger, even when attacked by Agathocles or Regulus; the republic, just emerging from an unfortunate contest, was destitute of arms and troops, of the assistance of friends or allies, and of the necessary preparations to sustain a siege. Still, notwithstanding their distress and alarm, the Carthaginians did not yield to despair. They made extraordinary efforts for their

defence, refitted their remaining vessels, levied new troops, and their energy being well seconded by one great man, at last succeeded in removing the danger.

This man was Amilcar Barcas, whose prowess has been already mentioned, and whose bravery, prudence and skill never were surpassed among the Carthaginians, except by his own son, the great Annibal. Being appointed commander of the army destined to fight the rebels, he acted with so much wisdom, that, although he at first declined a general engagement, yet he defeated a considerable portion of their army not far from Carthage, and drove them from nearly all the advantageous posts which they occupied.

The arrival from Numidia of a young nobleman called Naravasus, who, through personal esteem for Amilcar, joined him with two thousand Numidians, was of great service to that general. Encouraged by this reinforcement, he made a sudden attack upon the enemy, killed ten thousand of their number, and took four thousand prisoners. Notwithstanding these losses, the army of the rebels still amounted to upwards of fifty thousand men. Their leaders kept them on the hills which intersected the country, watching thence all the motions of the Carthaginian general, and avoiding the plains through fear of his elephants and his superior cavalry. Amilcar, with still greater prudence, never exposed himself to any of their attacks, but cut off their stragglers and harassed them in a thousand ways. At last, he came upon them when they least expected him, and caught them, as it were, in a snare from which there was no escape. Not daring to venture a battle, and unable to effect their retreat, they endeavored to fortify their camp with ditches and intrenchments; but another and still more dangerous enemy, famine, soon reduced them to the utmost distress. It became so terrible among them, that they began to feed upon one another; a just punishment, says Polybius, of the atrocities which they had committed during the war. While they were in this dreadful situation, Amilcar attacked them on all sides, and destroyed them to the number of more than forty thousand.

The consequence of this great victory was the recovery of almost all the cities which had shaken off the yoke of Carthage; such as dared to resist, like Hippo and Utica, were compelled to surrender at discretion. Another battle completely overthrew the rest of the insurgents, and so annihilated their party, that all Africa returned to its former allegiance.

Before we proceed in our narrative, we will avail ourselves of the opportunity offered by the events that have just been described,

to give some idea of the character, manners, government, and religion of the Carthaginians.

MANNERS, GOVERNMENT, CHARACTER, AND RELIGION OF THE CARTHAGINIANS.

THE Carthaginians were indebted to the Tyrians, not only for their origin, but also for their manners, customs, laws, religion, and particularly for their constant success in commerce. Trade was, indeed, their chief occupation, the particular object of their thoughts, and the predominant feature of their character. Yet, they were not merely a trading nation; they were likewise a powerful and warlike republic. If, on the one hand, commercial industry seemed the peculiar characteristic of the citizens of Carthage; on the other, the necessity of defending their possessions, and a desire of extending their traffic, rendered them famous even as a conquering nation.

The military power of the Carthaginians was upheld partly by troops raised among themselves, partly by their alliance with various princes, but chiefly by tributary tribes obliged to furnish a certain quota of money and troops, and by mercenary soldiers whose services they purchased from the neighboring states. They drew from Numidia a bold, impetuous and indefatigable cavalry, which constituted the principal strength of their armies; from the Balearic isles, the most expert slingers in the world; from Spain, a well disciplined infantry; from the coasts of Genoa and Gaul, troops of renowned valor; and from Greece, soldiers trained to every species of warfare.

The Carthaginians were thus enabled to send powerful armies into the field, and to subdue provinces and kingdoms without much trouble. But this advantage was counterbalanced by the inconveniences attached to such a system: hiring soldiers, like those just mentioned, had neither great attachment for their employers, nor a constant zeal for the prosperity of the state whose battles they were engaged to fight. Should they happen to withdraw in time of danger, or to revolt in time of peace, the Carthaginian republic, thus deprived of its chief supports, was shaken to its very foundation. This is what happened particularly in the defection of the mercenaries after the first Punic war.

The government of Carthage, like that of Rome and Sparta, was composed of three different powers, which at the same time counterbalanced and assisted one another, namely, the senate, the people, and two supreme magistrates, called kings by some authors, and by others *suffetes* or judges. The tribunal of the *one*

hundred, which afterwards acquired a great influence in the republic, was of a more recent origin.

The *suffetes* were annually elected, and their authority corresponded to that of the consuls at Rome. They were empowered to assemble the senate, to preside over it, and to propose the subjects of deliberation; they likewise had the principal share in the judgment of important cases as well as in the care of public revenues, and sometimes, as was the case with Annibal, were invested even with the command of armies.

The senate was composed of persons venerable for their age, their experience, their standing in society, and, especially, their personal merit. They formed the council of state, and might be called the soul of public deliberations. In the senate, all affairs of consequence were debated, the letters from generals read, the complaints of provinces heard, ambassadors admitted to audience, and peace or war declared.

When the votes were unanimous, the senators decided without appeal; otherwise, the affair was brought before the people, on whom the power of deciding then devolved. For a long time, it is true, the citizens of Carthage spontaneously left almost all the care of their government to the senate; nor had they reason to complain, for they were principally indebted to it for the preservation and increase of their power during the space of several hundred years. But a check was put to that prosperous course of events, when the people, by taking nearly the whole power into their own hands, weakened the authority or paralyzed the action of the senate. Then the public prosperity rapidly declined, and this innovation in the government was, according to Polybius, one among the chief causes of the ruin of Carthage.

Although there existed a few good scholars and highly educated persons among the Carthaginians, their nation, generally speaking, was never conspicuous for any proficiency in literature and the arts, nor for polish and gentleness of manners. They were, on the contrary, noted for craftiness and duplicity. Nay, their habitual disposition savored of austerity, and a sort of savage ferocity, which they too often displayed not only against foreigners and enemies, but even against their own citizens. The commanders of the fleets and armies of the republic had not merely to give an account of their conduct, they were also made responsible for the events of the war.* Ill success was held as a

* The conduct of the Romans towards their vanquished generals was very different and much more humane. They knew that misfortune is not a crime, nor mere imprudence an act of treason. They thought it a far sounder and better policy to spare the life of an unsuccessful com-

crime against the state, and whenever a general lost a battle and failed in an expedition, he was almost certain, at his return, to end his life upon a gibbet.

The Carthaginians evinced the same spirit of cruelty in their religious worship; in public calamities, they immolated human victims to their gods, in order to appease the anger of these imaginary deities. Infants were generally chosen, without compassion for their tender age, as the victims of that horrid superstition. Diodorus Siculus relates that, on one occasion, no fewer than two hundred children, of the first families in Carthage, were burnt alive in honor of Saturn. It was in vain that sovereigns of a humane disposition, such as Darius I, king of Persia, and Gelo, king of Syracuse, endeavored, even by threats of war, to make the Carthaginians abstain in future from such atrocities; the custom was soon revived, and continued till the destruction of Carthage. Such also, as we learn from the sacred writings,* had been the case with the Chanaanites of old, from whom the Carthaginians derived this impious and barbarous practice.

SECOND PUNIC WAR.—B. c. 218—201.

THE second Punic war is justly thought to have been one of the most memorable in all history, and most worthy of the attentive consideration of the reader. Whether we consider the duration or extent of its operations, the bravery of the troops or the ability of the generals on each side, the variety and vicissitude as well as the importance of the events, and finally the result which, notwithstanding a series of defeats unparalleled in the history of the Roman commonwealth, secured for ever the superiority of Rome over Carthage: every thing in it is well calculated to excite a lively interest.† Our narrative of that grand struggle will be comprised in the two following sections.

mander, and give him an occasion to retrieve his defeat by new exertions, than inflict on him a punishment, perhaps undeserved, and commonly useless, which would deprive them for ever of his services.

* Deuter. xii, 29-31; and xviii, 9-12.

† Livy thus begins his narrative of the second Punic war: "I may be allowed, in this part of my work, to premise that I am about to relate the most memorable of all wars, that which the Carthaginians, under the conduct of Annibal, carried on against the Romans—In parte operis mei, licet mihi præfari, *bellum maxime omnium memorabile me scripturum; quod, Annibale duce, Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere.*"—*Hist. b. xxi, c. 1.*

"La seconde guerre Punique," says Montesquieu, "est si fameuse que tout le monde la sait. Quand on examine bien cette foule d'obstacles

§1. ORIGIN OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.—PROGRESS AND
SIGNAL VICTORIES OF ANNIBAL.—B. C. 218—215.

THE chief, though more or less remote, causes of the second Punic war, were the severity of the conditions imposed on the vanquished by the late treaty of peace, the ungenerous and haughty manner in which the Romans afterwards took possession of Sardinia, and the rapid conquests of the Carthaginians in Spain, the natural effect of which was to fill them with confidence, whilst they gave apprehension to the rival power of Rome. Indeed, great advantages had been lately obtained by the celebrated Amilcar Barcas over the Spanish tribes. Other successes were obtained after him by Asdrubal, his son-in-law, and others still greater by Annibal, his son, on whom the command of the army devolved after the death of Amilcar and Asdrubal.

Annibal was, beyond comparison, the most formidable enemy that the Romans, in their long career of progress, ever encountered. When he was but nine years of age, his father made him take a solemn oath that he would be their constant foe; and never was an oath more faithfully observed. No sooner did he appear among the troops, than he attracted the notice and gained the esteem of all, both officers and soldiers, not only on account of his striking resemblance to his father Amilcar, but chiefly on account of his personal merit. All admired in him an uncommon degree of activity, constancy, fortitude, intrepidity in the greatest dangers, and presence of mind in the most trying circumstances.* This rare combination of qualities, to which he soon added a perfect acquaintance with all the parts of military science, raised him, at the age of twenty-six years, to the chief command of all the Carthaginian forces (B. C. 220).

Immediately after his appointment, Annibal thought of avenging Carthage for every loss and humiliation lately sus-

qui se présentèrent devant Annibal, et que cet homme extraordinaire surmonta tous, on a le plus beau spectacle que nous ait fourni l'antiquité. Rome de son côté fut un prodige de constance."—*Grandeur et décadence des Romains*, ch. 4.

For a full account of this momentous war, see Polybius, *Gener. Hist.* b. iii, and fragments of several other books;—Livy, ten entire books of his *Roman Hist.*, from the twenty-first to the thirtieth, both inclusively;—Florus, *Epitome Rerum Romanarum*, b. ii c. 6.—Cornelius Nepos, in *Annib.*—Plutarch, in his *lives of Marcellus and Fabius Max.*—Ferguson and Rollin, in their *Histories of the Roman Republic*; etc.

* Plurimum audaciæ ad pericula capessenda, plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat. Livy, b. xxi, c. 4.

tained from Rome. He resolved from the beginning to carry the war into Italy, as he was convinced that the surest way to fight the Romans with success, was to attack them in the very centre of their power, and make them tremble for their own existence. The attempt was one of immense difficulty and danger; but it was for this reason the better adapted to the bold, enterprising and extensive genius of Annibal: this very attempt, and his conduct in its execution, have placed him among the ablest generals that the world has produced.

Having first provided, as well as he was able, for the safety of Africa and Spain, Annibal commenced hostilities against Rome, by the siege, capture, and destruction of Saguntum, a Spanish city extremely attached to the Romans. He then completed his preparations for the prosecution of the war, with a wisdom which appeared to be the fruit of the longest experience, though he had been but two years at the head of armies. Finally, in the year B. c. 218, he left Spain, and advanced by land towards Italy with about sixty thousand men, all full of ardor and courage under such a general. But so long a route across rivers, mountains, hostile districts, and a thousand other obstacles, cost him upwards of one half of this gallant army; and, on a review of his soldiers after the passage of the Alps and his arrival in Piedmont, he found only twenty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry. With so small a force did Annibal venture to attack a republic, which, according to a detailed account left by Polybius, could levy from seven to eight hundred thousand troops among its citizens and allies.*

The first encounter of Annibal with the Romans in Italy took place near the river Ticinus, and consisted of a combat between the whole cavalry of both sides. The Roman force was defeated, and the consul P. Cornelius Scipio, who commanded it, grievously wounded. He might even have lost his liberty or his life, had not his son, then a youth seventeen years of age, run to his assistance and rescued him from danger. This young hero was Publius Scipio, who afterwards had the honor to vanquish Annibal and put an end to the second Punic war.

After the battle of the Ticinus, the Gauls inhabiting the country hastened, on all sides, to enter into an alliance with the Carthaginians, supplied them with ammunition, and enlisted in their army. This was the very effect which Annibal had anticipated and relied on for the recruiting of his forces. Shortly after, he won a still greater victory near the small river Trebia, over

*Polyb. *General History*, b. ii, c. 2.

forty thousand Romans commanded by the other consul Semprenius, who had just come in great haste from Sicily, to join his colleague. So masterly were the dispositions of the Carthaginian general, that, with little loss on his side, he cut off no fewer than twenty-six thousand Romans.

The ensuing year (B. C. 217), Annibal, who had now advanced into the heart of Italy, was opposed by Flaminius, another brave, but rash and presumptuous leader. With admirable skill, he drew him into a valley near the lake of Thrasymenes, after having taken the precaution to surround the valley with Carthaginian troops artfully concealed behind the hills. He no sooner saw the enemy's legions sufficiently entangled in this narrow place, than he sounded the charge, and simultaneously attacked them in front, in flank, and in the rear. Every one may judge of the terror and dismay of the Romans thus assailed on all sides. According to Polybius, they suffered themselves to be slaughtered without resistance; but according to Livy, despair revived their courage, and both parties began to fight with incredible animosity, their fury being so great, that none of the combatants noticed an earthquake which took place at the same time, and destroyed considerable portions of several Italian cities. During this confusion, Flaminius was slain by an Insubrian Gaul, and the Romans, dispirited by this accident, gave way and fled. Some of them, closely pressed by a victorious enemy, threw themselves into the lake, whilst others climbing over the mountains fell into the hands of the foes whom they sought to avoid. Fifteen thousand at least were cut in pieces; perhaps an equal number were taken prisoners, and only ten thousand escaped by different roads to Rome, where the news of this disastrous battle caused universal grief and alarm.

Never had the Romans experienced such a succession of defeats. They felt the necessity of appointing a general whose superior authority and prudence might retrieve, in some measure, the faults or the misfortune of his predecessors. Fabius *Maximus* was chosen dictator; and indeed no better choice could have been made in the present juncture, as this illustrious and *truly great* man was the first who put a check to the victories of Annibal. Always attentive to the motions of this terrible enemy, he contented himself with harassing him in his march without coming to any decisive engagement; if he ever allowed the soldiers to fight, it was only in slight skirmishes, and so very cautiously that his troops generally had the advantage.

By this wise conduct, Fabius gradually revived the courage or confidence of the Romans, which the loss of three successive

battles had greatly diminished. On one occasion, he saved his presumptuous colleague Minucius from certain defeat ; on another, he even succeeded in enclosing the Carthaginians within a valley between Capua and Falernum. Annibal perceived that his own stratagems were employed against himself.* He immediately ordered two thousand oxen to be collected together, caused bundles of dry wood to be tied to their horns and set on fire during the night, and then ordered these animals to be driven towards the hills, near the narrow passes which were guarded by the enemy. Every thing happened as he desired : the oxen, feeling the fire, became furious, and ran wildly in every direction ; the Romans, and Fabius himself, apprehensive of an attack, dared not quit their intrenchments during the night, whilst they who guarded the defile, still more frightened than the rest, abandoned their post and fled to the mountains. Annibal seized the opportunity, and rescued all his troops from the danger of their situation.

After the dictatorship of Fabius, the Roman people appointed for their consuls Paulus Æmilius and Terentius Varro, the first of whom had prudence enough to save, and the second temerity enough to ruin, the republic. Unfortunately, the opinion of Varro prevailed as to the manner of conducting the war. Rendered still bolder on account of a slight advantage which he gained at first over the Carthaginians, he prepared for a battle in an open plain near the village of Cannæ and the little river Aufidus. The spot had been purposely selected by Annibal, as extremely favorable to his cavalry. Besides the advantage of the place, he arranged his troops in so skilful a manner and with such sagacity, that the Romans, during the conflict, at the same time had to face the wind, the dust, and the rays of a scorching sun.

Shortly after, the battle began. At the two wings, the superior cavalry of Annibal soon broke and put to flight the cavalry of the Romans and their allies. In the centre, the Romans advanced with great courage against the auxiliary troops of Gauls and Spaniards led by Annibal in person ; the latter, conformably to the views of their general, gradually gave way, so as to leave a considerable opening into which the legions hurried precipitately and in confusion. At that moment, Annibal ordered his heavy-armed Africans on each side to attack the Romans on the flank, whilst his victorious cavalry attacked them in their rear. Courage and discipline were of no avail against this masterly disposition ; a dreadful carnage ensued on all sides. Whilst the consul Varro

* *Nec Annibalem fefellit suis se artibus peti.*—Livy, b. xxii, c. 16.

escaped with seventy horsemen, Æmilius, the other consul, lost his life on the field of battle, together with twenty-five or thirty chief officers, eighty senators, who were serving as volunteers, and about fifty thousand soldiers, according to Livy, nay seventy thousand, according to Polybius, whose testimony, as more ancient, more consistent, and naturally more impartial, is by far the more worthy of credit.*

This was the most bloody and signal overthrow that the Romans, in their long course of warfare, had hitherto experienced. The result of the battle did, in every respect, immense honor to Annibal, and the more so, as he had opposed only fifty thousand men to more than eighty-seven thousand Roman troops, then considered the best in the world. Whilst he was receiving after the battle the warm congratulations of his officers, Maharbal, one of them, and general of the cavalry, exhorted him to march without delay against Rome, promising that within five days they would take their supper within the capitol. Upon the answer of Annibal that an attempt of this kind required mature deliberation, Maharbal replied: "You know, Annibal, how to conquer, but you know not how to improve your victory."† And it is generally believed, says Livy, that this delay saved both the city and the empire of Rome (B. C. 216).‡

* The number of the Roman troops before the battle is generally admitted to have been from eighty-seven to eighty-eight thousand, whilst the number of survivors after the battle does not appear, in any account, to have exceeded eighteen thousand, fugitives or prisoners. Now, if eighteen thousand survivors are deducted from eighty-seven or eighty-eight thousand men that composed the army before the battle, the number of slain must have amounted to about seventy thousand, and this is the number assigned by Polybius.

† "Vincere scis, Annibal; victoriâ uti nescis." *Mora ejus diei satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio.*—Livy, b. xxii, c. 51.

‡ There are certain assertions which, because they have been once advanced by some conspicuous man, are continually repeated ever after, without taking much trouble to ascertain their real merit and accuracy. Since the time when Livy wrote that Rome was saved by the delays of Annibal, and by his unwillingness to attack it immediately after the battle of Cannæ, it has been customary to view the conduct of this general as an unpardonable fault. Yet, it may be pleaded in defence of Annibal, that the great advantages he had hitherto gained were chiefly owing to his cavalry, which could not act in a siege; whilst it was scarcely possible for his infantry alone, five or six thousand of whom had fallen in the last battle, either to surround or to storm a large, populous and well fortified city, as he had neither ammunition, nor machines, nor other things requisite for the attempt.

Experience, besides, taught Annibal to be cautious. After his victory at Thrasymenes, he had failed and even suffered a great loss in the

Some months later, Annibal fell, according to the same historian, into a still greater fault than that of his remissness. After the battle of Cannæ, many allies of the Romans abandoned their party which they thought irretrievably lost, and sided with the conqueror: among them were the Campanians, with Capua their capital, a rich, powerful, and licentious town. Annibal imprudently selected it for his winter quarters; and this choice proved highly fatal to the courage of his troops. Here these hardy warriors, who had undergone the severest hardships and successfully confronted the greatest perils of war, permitted themselves to be conquered by the attractions of an indolent and a sensual life. After their sojourn in Capua, they seemed no longer the same men and soldiers as before. They had lost in it their military ardor as well as their love of discipline, their recollection of past glory as well as all hope or desire of future success; and from that epoch the fortunes of Annibal were visibly on the decline.*

siege of Spoletum, a place not deserving to be compared with Rome, as Livy himself acknowledges (b. xxii, c. 9). How much greater, then, were the chances of failure in the siege of Rome itself? For it can scarcely be doubted but that the Romans, inured to warfare from their infancy, would use their best efforts in defence of their liberty and families; and, when sheltered by walls and ramparts, would stand their ground against a comparatively small number of assailants. In fine, no Italian nation had yet declared for Annibal. It was highly important for him to gain as many as he could, before attempting a direct attack upon Rome; because, if he should fail in this attempt, as in every probability he would, this alone might prevent him from gaining any ally to his side, and ruin at once the prospect of his affairs.

For these and similar reasons, such as have very attentively weighed this matter, are inclined to think that the science of war did not allow Annibal to attack Rome immediately after the battle of Cannæ, and that the same delay which many look upon as a signal oversight, was in him the effect of profound wisdom and prudence.—See Montesquieu, *Grandeur et décadence des Romains*, ch. iv; *Engl. Univ. Hist.* vol. ix, p. 269; Ferguson, *Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic*, b. i, ch. 5; Rollin's *Roman History*, vol. v, pp. 94–96, etc.

* Here also, doubts may be entertained as to the perfect accuracy of these remarks of Livy, however admirable he is in most respects as an historian. The sojourn of the Carthaginians at Capua, although it had bad effects, was neither the only nor even the principal cause of the subsequent decline of their fortunes. Those soldiers who, according to Livy, were so much enervated by their stay in Capua, still fought with great bravery on numberless occasions, took cities in the very sight of the Romans, maintained themselves in Italy fourteen years longer, till they were recalled by orders from Carthage, and, if occasionally defeated, frequently also defeated their enemies, even when commanded by the ablest officers of the republic. Hence, there is every

Such is in substance the language of Livy, which we produce without answering for its exactness, but reserving this discussion for a note. In the mean while, this remains certain, that Annibal himself, during his sojourn in Campania, far from wasting his time in useless employment, or losing sight of the grand object of his expedition, did, on the contrary, at this very period of the war, earnestly solicit new succors and reinforcements from Carthage for a vigorous prosecution of hostilities, and concluded a treaty offensive and defensive with the king of Macedon on the one side, and with the Syracusans on the other; two transactions that would have placed Rome in the greatest danger she ever encountered, had the chief rulers at Carthage and the new allies of Annibal acted with more prudence and vigor.

reason to believe that, in this point also, the Roman historian has overrated the fault of Annibal and its consequences.

The real cause of the decline of this great general's affairs was this: Whilst the Romans easily recruited their armies, he himself was left destitute of necessary succors and reinforcements from Carthage, where there existed a powerful faction opposed to him and to the continuance of the war. This is the express opinion of not only Montesquieu, Ferguson, Rollin, etc., but likewise of Cornelius Nepos, one of the most judicious authors of antiquity, and, though an Italian, one of the greatest admirers of Annibal. "Si verum est," says he, "quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superârit, non est inficiandum Annibalem tantò præstitisse cæteros imperatores prudentiâ quanto populus Romanus antecedeat fortitudine cunctas nationes. Nam quotiescumque cum eo congressus est in Italiâ, semper discessit superior: quod nisi domi civium suorum invidiâ debilitatus esset, Romanos videtur superare potuisse. Sed multorum obtrectatio vicit unius virtutem." —Corn. Nep. in *Annib.* c. 1.

It is also very remarkable, that the latter historian (c. 1. 5. 6) considers Annibal as having been constantly victorious in his Italian campaigns. The same is found in Justin's History (b. xxxi, c. 5) to have been asserted by Annibal himself, and Polybius likewise (b. xv, extract 1) says that he was conquered for the first time at the battle of Zama in Africa. On the contrary, Livy (b. xxiii and xxvii), and Plutarch (in *Marcell.*), mention several defeats sustained by this general in Italy. The only way perhaps to reconcile these conflicting accounts, is to admit that Annibal's defeats must have been very inconsiderable when compared with his victories, and were owing to such circumstances as could not impair his military reputation. A similar remark may be applied to the portrait of this great man drawn by the same Livy (b. xxi, c. 4). Without either impeaching the sincerity of the Roman historian, or admitting the Carthaginian leader to have been blameless, it may be said that Livy was betrayed by national prejudice into a tendency to lessen the superior merit of Annibal, both in his public achievements and in his personal character.

§ II. PREPONDERANCE REGAINED BY THE ROMANS.—SCIPIO AFRICANUS.—BATTLE OF ZAMA, AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.—B. C. 214.—201.

The revolt of Capua and its inhabitants had greatly exasperated the Romans. They resolved, so soon as the state of their affairs permitted, to lay siege to that proud city, and not to desist from their enterprise, till they had taken ample revenge on its inhabitants. The proconsuls Appius and Fulvius were appointed for this expedition, and carried on the attack with such vigor, that the place was soon reduced to the utmost distress. The Capuans, aided by some Carthaginian troops, offered indeed a brave resistance, but famine began to rage among them, and no courage was able to prevail against this powerful enemy: in vain, too, did Annibal strive to force the lines of the besiegers; after a sharp and almost successful conflict, he was repelled. As a last resource, he suddenly marched his troops towards Rome, in the hope that the Romans would withdraw from Capua, in order to defend their own capital. But they did not suffer themselves to be caught in the snare, and diverted from their design; the siege of Capua was not discontinued, and Annibal found Rome prepared to repel every attempt.

Two incidents contributed to increase his vexation and disappointment: the first was that, while he lay encamped near one of the gates of Rome, recruits had been sent by another gate to the Roman army in Spain; the second, that the field in which his camp was pitched, had been just sold at its full value. Giving up, therefore, all hope of reducing his foes and saving his allies, he withdrew to another part of Italy. Capua, thus left to itself, did not resist much longer. After many of its senators had undergone a tragical and voluntary death, the city surrendered at discretion, and immediately experienced the severity of the victors, as well by the execution of many citizens, as by the loss of all its privileges. The success of that famous siege gave Rome a manifest superiority over the Carthaginians. It proved at the same time how formidable was the power of the Romans, when they undertook to punish perfidious allies, and how feeble was the protection which even the victorious Annibal could afford his friends in time of their greatest need.

The result of a similar attempt in Sicily was equally conspicuous in itself, and equally decisive in favor of Rome. After the death of King Hiero, Syracuse had embraced the party of

the Carthaginians; an example of this nature, if permitted to go unpunished, might easily cause the ruin of the Roman interest in Sicily. To prevent this, the consul Marcellus, who had just gained an advantage over Annibal near the city of Nola, crossed the Sicilian strait, and laid siege to Syracuse both by land and sea. In all probability, he would have soon brought the siege to a close but for the famous Archimedes, the greatest geometrician of antiquity. This wonderful man invented a multitude of engines of every size and shape to annoy the besiegers, and by their means threw all sorts of missive weapons and stones of an enormous size, with such rapidity and violence, that they crushed whatever came in their way, and forced the land troops of the Romans to stay at a great distance from the wall, without being able to make either a mine or an assault. At sea the peril was still greater. Archimedes had placed behind the walls lofty and strong machines, which, laying hold of the Roman vessels by means of enormous hooks and grappling irons, lifted them up, and after making them whirl about with rapidity, sunk them with all on board, or dashed them to pieces against the rocks. Marcellus, repelled on all sides, was obliged to expect from blockade and starvation, a success which he could not obtain by open force.

The siege lasted in this manner for three years with scarcely any progress, when the contrivance of a private soldier enabled Marcellus to take Syracuse. This man conceived the idea of counting, from a favorable spot, the stones of the wall, and of measuring by the eye the height of each of them; having made his calculation, he found that the whole height was less than the Romans believed, and that with ladders of moderate size, it might be easily scaled. Marcellus being told of this circumstance, resolved to put the information to profit. He availed himself of a great festivity observed by the Syracusans, to make his bravest soldiers advance towards the rampart during the night, and they so well seconded his views, that, in a short time, they made themselves masters of a part of the town.

A few weeks later, Marcellus took possession of the whole city; but the joy of his success was damped by an unfortunate accident. Whilst confusion reigned in Syracuse, Archimedes was wholly intent in his closet on the examination of a geometrical figure. A Roman soldier suddenly appeared and commanded the mathematician to accompany him to Marcellus; Archimedes, on his part, desired his visiter to wait a moment, till he would have solved his problem and completed his demonstration. But the soldier, who cared very little for the demonstration and the problem, taking this answer for an insult, drew his sword and

killed him on the spot. Marcellus was sensibly afflicted at the melancholy event, and not only gave a solemn funeral to Archimedes, but even erected a monument to his memory (B. C. 212).

The remainder of Sicily followed the example and fortunes of Syracuse, and the whole island passed under the power of the Romans. As to Marcellus, after his return to Rome, he was elected consul a fourth and a fifth time, continued to signalize himself by various exploits, and finally perished in an ambuscade prepared by Annibal.

The war was carried on with no less vigor in Spain, than in Italy and Sicily. Cornelius Scipio, the same who had been wounded near the Ticinus, and Cneius Scipio, his brother, had won great victories and made great conquests in Spain over the Carthaginians. Emboldened by their success, they divided their troops, in order to complete within a shorter time the reduction of the country. This imprudent step was the cause of their ruin. The Carthaginian generals adopted the contrary method, and, combining their efforts, overthrew the two brothers separately; the defeat of the Romans was so terrible and disastrous, that even both Scipios lost their lives in the struggle.

This change of fortune seemed calculated to ruin altogether the power of the Romans in Spain. It was still upheld, it is true, by the valor and prudence of an officer called Marcius, who even succeeded with such troops as he could rally, in gaining two victories over the Carthaginians; yet so little hope of success in that country was entertained at Rome, that, when the time arrived to appoint a proconsul for Spain, no candidate at first presented himself. In the general dismay of the people, one young man, twenty-four years old, arose and declared that he would readily accept the dangerous office, if intrusted to him, and that he hoped to discharge its duties with success. This man was Publius Scipio, Cornelius Scipio's son, whom we have already had occasion to mention, and who was now anxious to avenge both the death of his father and uncle, and the defeat of the Roman armies. His proposal elicited from every one cries of joy, admiration and confidence; the people, with unanimous consent, named him proconsul and general of all the Roman forces in Spain.

Scipio did not frustrate the high expectations reposed in him. Shortly after his landing on the Spanish shores, he took the wealthy and strong city of Carthago Nova. By his engaging manners, his generosity and his benefits, he drew over to the Roman cause nearly all the nations of Spain. In fine, he conquered four Carthaginian generals, destroyed or scattered their armies, and obliged them to evacuate the whole Spanish peninsula.

Asdrubal, one of them, led the remnants of his troops across the Pyrenees, and adding to their number a multitude of auxiliary Gauls, crossed the Alps also, and entered Italy with a view to join and reinforce his brother Annibal. Much was to be feared from this new enemy, especially if he could effect the desired junction. Livius, one of the consuls, and the prætor Porcius, each at the head of an army, went to oppose him in the north of Italy, whilst Nero, the other consul, was sent against Annibal in the south. Asdrubal had already reached the neighborhood of Placentia, when his letters to Annibal were intercepted by the Romans. Upon the information which they afforded, Nero contrived a scheme not less wise than daring: with seven thousand chosen men, he secretly left his camp, and traversing a great part of Italy in the space of six or seven days, joined Livius his colleague during the night. On the following day, the three Roman generals attacked Asdrubal near the river Metaurus; he on his part did all that could be expected from an experienced leader, and displayed a valor and skill worthy of better success. After seizing an advantageous post, he himself led on his soldiers to the charge against an enemy superior to them in number and resolution. He animated them by his words, supported them by his example, and by entreaties or menaces endeavored to bring back those that fled; yet seeing that victory declared for the Romans, and unwilling to survive so many thousand men who had left every thing to follow his fortunes, he rushed into the midst of a Roman cohort, and continued to fight till he met that death which became the son of Amilcar and the brother of Annibal.

Nero immediately returned to his former camp, which he reached in six days. Having brought with him the head of Asdrubal, he caused it to be thrown into the camp of the Carthaginians; this informed Annibal of the whole extent of his brother's disaster, and plunged him into the deepest affliction. Being thenceforth unable to undertake any thing of importance, he collected his forces, and retired into the extremities of the province of Brutium. But never perhaps was he greater than in the midst of so many and so melancholy reverses. It is considered something like a *prodigy*,* that he maintained himself for so long a time in a hostile country, without reinforcements and assistance from Carthage; and still more so, that he kept

* This is the identical expression used by Bossuet, *Discourse on Univ. Hist.* part iii, c. 6; and Rollin, *Roman Hist.* vol. vi, p. 168; conformably to the meaning of Polybius, b. xi, extract 4th, and of Livy himself, b. xxviii, ch. 12.

his troops, a medley of different nations, quietly under his banner, without any sedition or mutiny on their part even in their greatest need and most trying circumstances. It is impossible, says Polybius, to contemplate the length and extent of Annibal's war against the Romans, and not be struck with admiration at the courage, the prudence, and the ability of this great commander. Above all, the latter part of his expedition, when difficulties of every sort pressed upon him, is enough to prove the greatness of his mind, the fertility of his genius, and the wonderful skill which he possessed in the command of armies.

In the mean while, Scipio, having driven the Carthaginians from Spain, returned to Rome, where the people gave him extraordinary marks of favor and esteem. He was by unanimous consent appointed consul, with Sicily for his department, and permission to pass over to Africa, if he thought it expedient. This was the object which he most earnestly desired; for he entertained a full conviction, that the surest means to remove Annibal from Italy and put an end to so long a conflict, was to make Africa the seat of the war. When he had completed his preparations, he sailed for the African shores with a fleet and an army equipped in the very best order, landed his troops, and laid siege to the important city of Utica.

The Carthaginians sent against the Romans two numerous armies, the one under the command of Syphax, a Numidian prince, the other under Asdrubal, the son of Gisco. Scipio, having learned from his spies that in these two armies the tents of the soldiers were composed only of reeds and withered branches, took a resolution to destroy both camps by fire during the night: he gave charge to Lælius his lieutenant and Masinissa his ally, to attack and burn the camp of Syphax, and he himself advanced with great caution against that of Asdrubal.

Every thing succeeded according to his wishes. Not only the conflagration spread with the utmost rapidity through the camp of Syphax, but most of the Numidians were either put to the sword by the soldiers of Masinissa, or perished in the flames, or crushed one another at the gates which were too narrow to give a free passage to the multitude of fugitives. The like disaster soon happened in the camp of the Carthaginians. They had perceived the spreading fire, and attributing it to accident, several of them ran confusedly and without any precaution, to afford assistance to their allies; all were destroyed by the Romans under Scipio. This general then attacked the camp itself, and finding it open and unguarded, consigned it likewise to the flames. Of the numerous troops of the Carthaginians and Numidians, forty

thousand perished in that dreadful night; five or six thousand were taken prisoners, and only two or three thousand made their escape with Asdrubal and Syphax. Shortly after, these two generals, having assembled a new army of thirty thousand men, were again completely defeated by Scipio.

Carthage, overwhelmed by so many losses, hastily sent messengers to recall Annibal from Italy. He obeyed the order; but it was only with feelings of intense grief and indignation, that he quitted the Italian soil which he had so long considered as his prey. Having landed on the coast of Africa, without entering Carthage, he went directly at the head of his troops to encounter Scipio. Yet, as he was conscious of the great strength of the Romans, and of an impending increase of danger for his country in case of another defeat, he asked of the Roman general an interview in order to treat of peace. The request was granted, and the interview took place on an eminence between the camps of both armies. Here these two famous heroes, not only the greatest men of their own age, but even equal in merit to any commander and conqueror that ever lived, gazed for some time at each other in silent admiration.* Annibal spoke first and with great dignity, but proposed conditions little suitable to the present fortunes of Carthage; Scipio, who answered in the same dignified manner, would not accept them, and both came to the determination to decide the quarrel at once by an appeal to arms.

The battle was fought on the following day in the plains of Zama. It is needless to say that, on both sides, the utmost skill was used to promote or secure the success of an action on which the future destiny of Carthage and Rome depended. Annibal in particular, as Scipio acknowledged, seemed to surpass himself on that day; but the superior strength and discipline of the Romans, aided by the talent of their leader, baffled all the hopes of the former, and a variety of incidents turning his very best measures against himself, united to thwart his combined courage, ability, and experience. After having done, both before and during the battle, whatever could be done by a great and undaunted general, after having resisted to the last, and seen his brave veteran soldiers perish on all sides, he was entirely defeated and driven from the field (B. C. 202). Above fifteen hundred of the Romans fell in the action; but on the side of the Carthaginians, more than twenty thousand were slain, and almost as many taken prisoners. Such was the memorable battle of Zama, which established for

* *Submotis pari spatio armatis, cum singulis interpretibus congressi sunt non suæ modò ætatis maximi duces, sed omnes antè se memoriæ, omnium gentium, cuilibet regum imperatorumve pares.* Livy, b. xxx, c. 30.

ever the superiority of Rome over Carthage, and contributed, more than any other battle, to render the Romans masters of the world.* (See § III of the Appendix.)

Annibal, on his return to Carthage, not only acknowledged his defeat, but urged an immediate acceptance of all the terms of peace offered by the conqueror. They were substantially the same with those proposed before the battle of Zama, viz. that the Carthaginians should henceforth content themselves with their possessions in Africa; that they should deliver up to the Romans all the prisoners and deserters who had at any time fallen into their hands, together with their elephants and all their long vessels except ten galleys; that they should wage no war in future without the consent of the Roman people; and that they should pay ten thousand talents of silver in the course of fifty years. These terms were accepted, and ratified shortly after by a solemn treaty of peace; and thus ended the second Punic war, in the year B. C. 201.

SCIPIO AND ANNIBAL CONTINUED.—B. C. 201—183.

SCIPIO, besides the treaty concluded with the Carthaginians, made some other arrangements in Africa; for instance, he gave to Masinissa, his ally, the kingdom of Syphax who was now a prisoner. When this was done, the Roman general embarked with all his troops, and, after passing the sea, traversed Italy through an immense concourse of people, who ran from all sides to behold the deliverer of his country, the terror of Carthage, and the conqueror of Annibal. After enjoying a magnificent entry into Rome, he received the surname of *Africanus*, which becoming blended with his proper name, revived at every moment the recollection of his triumph.

Annibal, on his part, was called to display his talents on a new theatre. Being appointed prætor at Carthage and invested with the proper authority to conduct the civil affairs of the state, he executed, with no less success than ability and zeal, important reforms both in the administration of justice and in the management of the finances. But these reforms raised against him vio-

* All this is expressed with admirable conciseness by Florus in these words: "Constat utriusque *ducis* confessione, nec melius instrui aciem, nec acrius potuisse pugnari. Hoc Scipio de Annibalis, Annibal de Scipionis exercitu, prædicaverunt. Sed tamen Annibal cessit; præmii-que victoriæ Africa fuit, et secutus Africam statim terrarum orbis." *Epitome*, b. ii, c. 6.

lent opponents at home, who had even the baseness to excite the alarms of his enemies abroad, by representing him as a dangerous and constant foe to the Roman republic. Annibal saw the storm gathering around him, and by a timely flight escaped from Carthage to Tyre, where he met with a most flattering reception. Thence he proceeded to the court of Antiochus the Great, king of Syria, and his presence alone emboldened that prince to undertake a war against the Romans. Annibal offered his services, and gave the best advice for the conduct of this war; yet Antiochus knew not how to profit by either, and the illustrious exile, finding himself rather exposed to new perils, set out for the island of Crete, where he for some time resided.

His last asylum was the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia. He enabled this prince to obtain several victories over his enemy Eumenes, king of Pergamus; one of them, at sea, was the result of a very curious stratagem. Having filled a large number of earthen pots with venomous serpents, he caused them to be thrown, during the conflict, into the Pergamenian vessels; great confusion ensued among their crews and soldiers, and the whole fleet withdrawing in haste left the victory to Annibal. So many services ought naturally to have secured to him the lasting gratitude of Prusias; still the contrary happened. That monarch, at the request of the Romans, who, it seemed, could enjoy no degree of security as long as Annibal was alive, promised to betray him into their hands. The unfortunate general, perceiving the danger and seeing no possibility of escape, took poison, and died at the age of about sixty-four years (B. C. 183).

Such was the end of this great man, according to all, one of the ablest, and according to some, the ablest commander that ever existed; of one whose defeats arose from circumstances over which he had no control, and whose victories were all the fruit of superior genius; of one who united the merit of a most sagacious politician with that of a consummate general; of one, in fine, whom the mightiest nation in the world could not remember during his life, without a sort of feverish apprehension. Although he is justly reproached with some acts of cruelty, committed in times of great vexation or disappointment, his habits and moral qualifications, liberality, moderation, temperance, and continency, were worthy of his public character. He was not even a stranger to learning, and notwithstanding his incessant labors in war or civil administration, he found time to become proficient in polite literature. Many of his repartees, which have been preserved by historians, show that he was possessed of a quick and sagacious mind as well as an excellent judgment.

Annibal, then, was not only a great, but even an extraordinary man, and one whose equal is very seldom seen in the course of ages. It is commonly believed that he died in the same year (B. C. 183) with Philopœmen and Scipio, two other admirable personages, and, together with Annibal, the ablest commanders of their time. "*Insignis hic annus,*" says Justin (b. xxxii, c. 4), "*trium toto orbe maximorum imperatorum mortibus fuit, Annibalis, et Philopœmenis, et Scipionis Africani.*"

ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT, KING OF SYRIA.—B. C. 223—187.

The history of Annibal is naturally connected with that of the sovereigns whom he endeavored to rouse against the Romans. The most conspicuous of them was Antiochus, king of Syria, who gave an asylum to this illustrious exile. Antiochus was the son of Seleucus-Callinicus, and the sixth monarch of that kingdom after its foundation by Seleucus-Nicanor. He ascended the throne at the age of about fifteen years, and by his achievements during a considerable part of his reign, deserved the surname of *Great*, by which he is distinguished in history from many other kings of Syria, who also bore the name of Antiochus.

The first military campaigns of that prince were not, it is true, very successful; on the contrary, having undertaken to fight a great battle against the Egyptians near Raphia, he was entirely defeated by them in the year B. C. 217. But his losses on that occasion were amply compensated by his conquests in other parts of Asia. Having checked the revolt of some ambitious leaders, who took advantage of his youth to withdraw their allegiance, he afterwards led his armies towards the east. Here, if he failed to overthrow the newly established empire of the Parthians, he at least stripped it of its late acquisitions, and obliged its king Arsaces to content himself with the provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania.

After this campaign and a similar one in Bactriana, the king, in pursuit of new advantages, crossed mount Caucasus or the ridge so designated by the ancients. As the various countries which extend, east of the Tigris, from that mountain to the southern ocean, had some time before shaken off the yoke of Syria, he went through them all at the head of his victorious troops, and every where succeeded in re-establishing his authority. This expedition lasted seven years, during which he displayed so much vigor and activity, that he became formidable to all the neighboring nations. He returned to Antioch covered with glory,

and with the reputation of a monarch equally prudent and courageous.

About this time, Ptolemy Philopator, king of Egypt, died, leaving for his successor a child only five years of age. Antiochus lost no time to improve the circumstance, and to turn it to his own profit; he invaded Cœle-Syria and Palestine, the constant object of dispute between the kings of Egypt and Syria, and easily subdued those two provinces. Animated by this success, he now formed a design to reconquer all the cities of Asia Minor, which he pretended had formerly belonged to the Syrian monarchy. But here he met with an unforeseen opposition, and this obstacle not only could not be overcome by his efforts, but even caused the rapid decline, and nearly the utter ruin, of his affairs.

The cities whose liberty was at stake, had solicited and obtained the assistance of the Romans. It was the interest of these high-spirited republicans, now so much exalted by the happy conclusion of the second Punic war, not to suffer a new rival in their way. Their legions, after having first checked the king's progress, came at last to a decisive engagement with him in the plains of Magnesia (B. C. 190). Although Antiochus fought with great valor, and opposed eighty-two thousand troops to thirty thousand Romans, he experienced a most signal defeat which cost him more than two-thirds of his army.* He was compelled to sue for peace, and could obtain it under no other condition than by yielding all the provinces of Asia on the north-western side of Mount Taurus, and defraying all the expenses of the war.

Upon the news of this extraordinary success, Rome decreed a triumph to her admiral *Æmilius* who had crippled the maritime power of Syria, and still more justly to the consul *Lucius Scipio* who had conquered the king in person. The latter received the surname of *Asiaticus*, and became equal in this respect to his brother *Publius Scipio*, on whom the title of *Africanus* had been conferred after his victory over *Annibal*.

This war against Antiochus was of short duration, cost the Romans but little, and yet contributed very much to the aggrandizement of their empire. But, at the same time, its result also began to prepare the decay and final dissolution of that very empire, by introducing wealth, avarice, ambition, and licentiousness into its capital. In effect, it is to the period of the Syrian war and the conquest of Asia, that *Pliny* traces the origin of that moral depravity which pervaded Rome, and was attended with so long a train of evils. Asia, vanquished by the Romans, after-

* See *Livy*, b. xxxvii, c. 44; and *Justin*, b. xxxi, c. 8.

wards vanquished them by its vices. Luxury, more fatal than armies, spread its poison among them, and in this manner avenged the world subdued by their arms:

Sæviôr armis
Luxuria incubuit, victumque ulciscitur orbem.
Juven. Sat. vi, 1, 215, 216.

But, if the conflict between the Romans and Antiochus proved fatal to the conquerors themselves, it gave a most disastrous blow to the vanquished. Antiochus, first of all, became the victim of his defeat at Magnesia. Being bound by the late treaty to pay large sums of money to the Romans, when the time approached to fulfil his obligation, he found himself in great perplexity. His coffers were empty, and his resources considerably diminished; in this embarrassment, he attempted to plunder by night a rich temple in the country of Elymais, but was discovered by the inhabitants and killed with all his followers (B. C. 187).

This prince was otherwise deserving of praise for his humanity, clemency, and liberality. A decree ascribed to him, by which his subjects were not only permitted, but even commanded to disobey his orders, if these should be found contrary to law, showed that he had a high regard for justice. Till the age of nearly fifty years, he had behaved with such bravery, steadiness and application, as to succeed in most of his enterprises. But subsequently his prudence began to wane, and his prosperity decreased in the same proportion. His conduct in the late war against the Romans, the practical disregard which he showed for the wise counsels of Annibal, his overthrow in the battle of Magnesia, the ignominious treaty of peace which was forced upon him, and his disgraceful death which soon followed it, all greatly impaired and tarnished the lustre of his former actions.

PHILIP, KING OF MACEDON.—B. C. 220—178.

A VICISSITUDE similar to that experienced by Antiochus, also happened to his contemporary, Philip, king of Macedon. This prince was the grandson of Antigonus Gonatas, and the immediate successor of Antigonus Doto. He displayed in his youth much activity, courage, prudence and moderation, owing to the care he took to secure and follow the advice of virtuous men, such as the celebrated Aratus. This conduct rendered him successful in various wars against his neighbors; but prosperity, as too often happens, made him proud, ambitious, and not less terri-

ble to his friends than rash towards his enemies. For his own misfortune, certain flatterers induced him to form an alliance with Annibal against the Romans, about the time of the defeat of the latter in the battles of Thrasymentes and Cannæ.

As soon as the Romans were apprised of this treaty, they began to watch carefully all the motions of Philip. Still, as they were obliged to send the greater portion of their forces against the Carthaginians, they contented themselves, at first, with hindering this new foe from coming to Italy, and giving him enough of encumbrance at home to keep him at a distance. They acted with greater vigor on that side, when by the victory of Zama, they were freed from the alarms and perils of the Punic war. Their consul Quintius Flaminius, having crossed the Adriatic with a choice body of troops, advanced through a rugged country, and at length met the Macedonians near Scotussa in Thessaly.

The two armies, consisting of about twenty-six thousand men each, were separated by hills called *Cynoscephalæ*, from which the battle took its name. It happened that both Philip and Flaminius sent detachments, on the same day, to occupy the hills or to make discoveries; these hostile parties having met on the heights, came to a close engagement, and as each of them successively received reinforcements, the action from a private encounter, was soon changed into a general battle. The king evinced great resolution and courage, and, where he commanded in person, obtained a considerable advantage. But it was not the same every where. The entire overthrow of his left wing, and a vigorous charge made by the Romans on the rear of his phalanx, turned the day against him, and cost him one half of his army (B. C. 197). Terrified by this loss as well as by the presence of a victorious enemy, he asked for peace, and obtained it on condition that he would pay the sum of two thousand talents, deliver up his galleys, give his son Demetrius as a hostage, and evacuate all the Grecian cities that were garrisoned by his troops.

The time had now come for the celebration of the Isthmian games. Flaminius assisted at them, together with an immense concourse of people, all anxious to learn the future destinies of Greece; for the terms of the treaty between the Romans and Philip were as yet but imperfectly known. When the multitude had assembled in the stadium or amphitheatre to see the games, a herald put an end to the public uncertainty, by proclaiming with a loud voice that the Roman senate and people, and Q. Flaminius, their general, after having vanquished the king of Macedon, restored to the Greeks their liberties and the free use

of their respective laws and customs. At these words, the whole assembly abandoned themselves to the liveliest transports of joy, and burst into so loud and prodigious acclamations, that some ravens, which then happened to be flying over the shouting multitude, fell into the stadium. The crowd ran towards the Roman general to salute him as their deliverer, gave him their warmest thanks, kissed his hand, or threw garlands and crowns of flowers around him; nay, they carried the expression of their gratitude so far, as to put him in some danger of being suffocated.*

Such was the result of the victory gained by Flaminius over Philip. Still, it is true that this conduct of the Romans towards the Greeks was not less the dictate of policy than of generous feeling. On the one hand, it obtained for Rome, amidst other nations, a reputation for extraordinary disinterestedness and moderation, highly favorable to her interests; on the other, the power and influence of the Macedonian kings was annihilated throughout Greece, and the Grecian republics themselves, left to their own resources, might afterwards be easily controlled and even subdued, if they chanced to be engaged in a war against their actual deliverers. This indeed was understood at that very time by a few sagacious statesmen, and after a short interval really happened. But the people at large, instead of fearing any evil consequence, thought of nothing but how to enjoy the advantages of their present condition, and for these, they repeatedly expressed to the Romans their unbounded admiration and gratitude.

Far different reflections occupied the mind of Philip. He cherished a secret animosity against the Romans, and though he concealed it for a time, could hardly repress it when his affairs gave him some respite and greater hope of success. In the interim, his son Demetrius, who was a hostage at Rome, so completely won by his good qualities the esteem and affection of the senators, that they most honorably dismissed him to the court of his father. Still, these tokens of regard served only to render him odious in the sight of Philip, who considered the Romans as his greatest enemies. Another circumstance most unfavorable to this young prince, was the implacable jealousy of his half-brother Perseus: the latter had an intense desire to succeed his father on the Macedonian throne; well aware that the better claim of Demetrius, equally supported by the affection of the people and the favor of the Romans,

*Livy, b. xxxiii, c. 33. Plutarch in *Q. Flamin.*

would be an insuperable barrier to his ambition, he determined to remove him by artifice and intrigue.

He availed himself of the first plausible opportunity to execute his dark designs. On a day of great festivity for the Macedonians, the army, divided into two bodies under the command of the two brothers, represented a battle, in which the body led by Demetrius obtained a decided advantage. This was keenly resented by Perseus. At night, both princes gave a repast to their respective partisans and friends: whilst joy and mirth reigned among the guests, Perseus sent a spy to hear what might be said at his brother's banquet. That spy happened to be discovered, and was ill-treated, outside of the hall, by four persons belonging to the party of Demetrius. The young prince, totally unaware of this incident, invited his guests to accompany him to the residence of his brother, in order to show their good feeling towards him, and to allay his displeasure, if he still entertained any. The proposal was readily accepted by all, except the four young men who had ill-treated the spy: fearing for themselves the same kind of reception which they had given to another, they concealed swords under their garments, to repel any attack that might be made. Unfortunately, this very circumstance was reported to Perseus, before the company arrived. He took occasion from it to deny them admittance, caused the doors of his house to be shut against them, and on the following day charged Demetrius, in presence of the king, with a deliberate design and attempt to deprive him of life.

Philip, deeply afflicted at such a charge of a brother against a brother, summoned both princes before him in presence of a few trusty friends. After having bewailed his unhappy condition which obliged him, a sovereign and a father, to judge between his two sons, and pronounce one guilty of a projected murder, or the other of a dreadful calumny, he listened to them both with great attention. Perseus, who spoke first, endeavored very artfully to prove the charge which he had advanced; but Demetrius, although overwhelmed with grief, easily repelled it and vindicated his innocence. Seeing, however, that his affection for the Romans continued to render him an object of dislike and suspicion at court, he resolved to set out secretly for Italy; he was betrayed in this also, and saw his design turn against himself.

In fine, a new contrivance of Perseus against his brother completed the latter's ruin. This unfortunate prince was placed in a sort of confinement, and shortly after deprived of life, by the command, as it appears, of his own father. Philip after-

wards discovered the innocence of Demetrius, and expired with the bitter regret of having so cruelly treated a guiltless son who ought to have been his successor, whilst he had spared and favored another, who alone was deserving of the severest punishment (B. c. 178).

PERSEUS.—FALL OF MACEDON.—B. c. 178—148.

Perseus, without having the natural abilities of his father, had inherited his animosity and hostile designs against the Romans: he spent the first years of his reign in making preparations for a new contest, and used every species of intrigue either to gain allies for himself, or to destroy those of Rome. After various recriminations and useless embassies, war at length was openly declared. During three years it scarcely produced any event of importance, except that, on one occasion, Perseus gained a considerable advantage over the Romans; still this action was far from being decisive. Hostilities continued for some time longer in a rather languishing manner, and it required the activity, courage and experience of the celebrated consul Paulus Æmilius, to procure a speedy and happy termination of the war.

The very beginning of his campaign, and the vigor of his operations, taught Perseus that he was now opposed by a more terrible enemy than he had hitherto encountered. The unhappy monarch himself, first of all, contributed by his avarice to the destruction of his fortunes. He had secured, by the promise of a large sum, the assistance of twenty thousand Gauls stationed beyond the Danube; when they arrived near the frontier of Macedon, the unwary king, more inclined to keep his money than to fulfil his word, declined under various pretences to pay the stipulated amount. The Gauls became furious at this breach of faith: they laid waste a great part of the country whilst returning home, and Perseus lost, through his own fault, a large number of auxiliaries who might have been of very great service to him in time of danger.

He himself must have been sensible of his imprudence, when the Romans, having crossed the passes of Mount Olympus, overtook him near Pydna. Here was fought the famous battle destined to crush the Macedonian power, though it seemed at first calculated to produce the contrary effect. At its very commencement, the Macedonian phalanx signalized itself among all the troops of the king, and for a time bade defiance to all the efforts of the Romans and their allies. Æmilius, advancing

to the first ranks, found that the foremost men of that body had stuck the heads of their pikes into the shields of his soldiers, so that it was impossible for the latter to reach the enemy; and when he saw the rest of the Macedonians join their bucklers close together, and present their long spears against his legions, the strength of such a rampart and the formidable appearance of such a front struck him with terror and amazement. He never indeed beheld a more terrific spectacle, and he often mentioned afterwards the impression which it made upon him; however, he took care to show a pleasant and cheerful countenance to his troops, and even rode about, without either breast-plate or helmet.

The Romans, animated by the presence and example of their general, made incredible exertions. They attempted to cut the pikes of the Macedonians asunder with their swords, to beat them back with their shields, or to turn them aside with their hands; but the Macedonians, holding them steady with both hands, pierced the assailants through their armor. Thus the first line of the Romans was cut in pieces, and those behind began to give way. The consul, seeing this, rent his clothes through excess of grief; nay, he was almost reduced to despair, to find that his troops would no longer face that terrible phalanx, which, on account of the pikes that defended it on all sides like a rampart, appeared impenetrable and invincible; still as the unevenness of the ground and the large extent of the enemy's front would not permit their bucklers to be joined, so as to leave no interruption nor openings, he observed several interstices in the Macedonian line. This circumstance suggested to him the happy idea of dividing his forces into platoons, and directing them to throw themselves into the openings of the phalanx. His orders were instantly and punctually executed. The Romans forced their way between the pikes, wherever there was an opening; which was no sooner done, than some took the enemy in flank, while others attacked them in the rear.

By this manœuvre the ranks of the phalanx were soon broken, and deprived of their principal strength, which depended on one combined effort. Yet, as the troops that composed it fought with great valor, a sharp conflict and dreadful carnage ensued. The contest, however, was now too unequal: most of the Macedonians fell under the swords of the Romans; about twenty-five thousand of them were killed; eleven or twelve thousand were taken prisoners; and, before night, the rest were driven from the field (B. C. 168).

King Perseus, unworthy of so brave soldiers, had already

fled with a considerable body of cavalry to Pella his capital. He soon left it, and went first to Amphipolis, and afterwards to Samothrace, whence he intended to withdraw to a still greater distance; but he fell, with his whole family, into the hands of the consul, who conducted him to Rome to make him grace his conqueror's triumph. After this ceremony, so painful to his pride, he was placed in confinement, and though otherwise treated with humanity by the Roman government, could not bear his misfortune, but sunk under excess of grief.

With Perseus fell the Macedonian kingdom, after it had lasted one hundred and fifty-six years from the death of Alexander the Great.

Rome acted with moderation and generosity towards the vanquished nation; the Macedonians were declared free by their conquerors themselves, on condition that they should pay an annual tribute amounting to one-half of the revenue which they paid to their sovereigns. But new disturbances which arose in that country, gave occasion to the Romans to place it entirely under their control, and make it a Roman province (B. c. 148). About this time, also, the armies of the republic subdued Epirus and the whole of Illyria.

EASTERN NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE JEWS UNDER THE ASMONEANS OR MACHABEES.—B. c. 168—158.*

The Romans were thus rapidly advancing towards the subjugation of the universe. What their armies did not achieve, was effected by their negotiations and political wisdom: in every part of the civilized world, they eagerly embraced every opportunity to establish or extend their influence, and to increase their reputation for justice and generosity, by taking the defence of the weaker against the stronger states. They had previously accepted the guardianship of the young Ptolemy Epiphanes, king of Egypt, against his two powerful enemies, Philip of Macedon and Antiochus the Great, king of Syria. They now employed their assistance in behalf of the Egyptian court with still greater effect against Antiochus Epiphanes, the second successor of Antiochus the Great (B. c. 169).

This prince had already made three successful campaigns in Egypt, and was now preparing to achieve the reduction of that kingdom, when he met near Alexandria a Roman embassy, with orders from the senate and people of Rome to desist from further

* See Rollin's *Ancient History*, vol. viii and ix—Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, b. xii and xiii—especially the two books of Machabees.

hostilities. On the receipt of this mandate, the king said that he would consult with his friends and return an early answer. But this did not satisfy the lofty spirit of the Romans: Popilius Lænas, one of the ambassadors, indignant at such delay, drew with the rod which he held in his hand, a circle round Antiochus, and raising his voice summoned him to give his answer, before leaving the limits of that enclosure. Terrified by this summons, the king, after a moment's silence, promised to comply with the wishes of the senate.

He withdrew therefore from Egypt, filled with secret rage at seeing himself forcibly dispossessed of a crown, which he had already looked upon as his own. Unable to avenge himself on the Romans, the sole authors of his disappointment, he resolved to make the Jews who had in no manner offended him, feel the whole weight of his anger. In his march through Palestine, he detached twenty-two thousand men under the command of Apollonius, with orders to destroy Jerusalem. Two years before, a cruel slaughter had been committed in this unfortunate city, under the king's personal direction; he now ordered that those cruel scenes should be reiterated with increased fury. Apollonius took advantage of the circumstance of the Sabbath, during which all the people were peacefully engaged in religious worship, to let loose his soldiers upon them. In a few moments, every part of the town streamed with the blood of its butchered inhabitants. The city was afterwards plundered, and fired in several places.

The temple and sanctuary were profaned, the other buildings demolished, and the ruins served to build a strong citadel, from which a well armed and provisioned garrison commanded the whole neighborhood, overawed the remaining Jews, and occasionally issued forth to kill those who dared approach the temple of God to offer him their adoration.

Not satisfied with these cruelties, Antiochus published a decree, by which the several nations of his empire were commanded, in the first place, to lay aside their ancient religion, and then to profess the same religion, and adore the same gods with the king. Although expressed in general terms, this decree was directed chiefly against the Jews, whose faith as well as nation Antiochus, in his impious rage, was determined to extirpate. The Gentiles and Samaritans obeyed with little reluctance; even among the Jews, many were found to apostatize from their holy faith; but many also generously resisted the king's edict, and disregarded the torments by which it was enforced. Among the latter, the virtuous old man Eleazar, and the mother with her

seven sons commonly called Machabees, suffered death for this sacred cause with such alacrity and courage, as to deserve the same glory with the Christian martyrs. Others fled into the mountains and deserts in order to avoid the persecution. At the head of these noble fugitives was a family of heroes, Mathathias and his five sons, the most remarkable of whom were Simon, Jonathan, and especially Judas, surnamed Machabæus. Having assembled their friends and other zealous Jews, they formed a resolute though small band of warriors, and began to fight valiantly for the defence of their people, their country, and their holy law, against unjust persecutors. Their first exertions had already proved successful, when Mathathias felt that the end of his life was fast approaching. Calling for his five sons, he exhorted them to continue the great work which they had undertaken, appointed Judas the commander of their forces, and then died at a venerable old age, to the great affliction of all good and faithful Israelites.

Judas Machabæus had thus become the leader of the little army. He began immediately to fortify the cities, to rebuild the fortresses, to supply them with garrisons, and to deliver the country, wherever he went, from the yoke of its oppressors. Apollonius, the king's general in those parts, attempted to retrieve these losses; Judas not only conquered him, but put him to death, together with many of his troops. Seron made a similar attempt, and was likewise defeated.

When the news of these defeats reached Antiochus, he was so much exasperated, that he determined on the ruin of the whole Jewish nation; but, as the state of his affairs obliged him to visit the provinces of Upper Asia, he intrusted the execution of this design to Lysias, a prince of the royal family, whom he appointed governor of Syria, and temporary guardian of his son. Lysias at first sent into Palestine an army of forty-seven thousand men, commanded by Ptolemy, Nicanor, and Gorgias. These generals were so confident of the entire defeat of Judas, that they invited a multitude of merchants to accompany their army for the purpose of buying Jewish slaves at a low rate.

Although the forces of Machabæus scarcely equalled the seventh or eighth part of those of the enemy, he did not despond, but confiding in the divine protection, and inspiring his little band with the same confidence, he prepared fearlessly to encounter his numerous foes. As they had contrived an ambush for him, he turned it against themselves, attacked separately the two divisions of their army when they least expected it, and threw them into irremediable confusion. Above nine thousand of them

were slain, and the remainder, most of them wounded, fled with the utmost precipitation.

Judas, who had wisely restrained his soldiers from gathering the spoils as long as the defeat of the enemy was incomplete, at length allowed them to plunder the camp, in which they found an immense booty. The merchants who had come to purchase the captives, were themselves taken with their riches, and sold. Greatly encouraged by this important success, and reinforced by the numerous soldiers whom it brought to their aid, the Jews set out to harass the rest of their enemies. As Timotheus and Bacchides, two lieutenants of Antiochus, were mustering fresh troops for the support of his interests in Judea, Machabæus marched against them, defeated them both in a great battle, and killed twenty thousand of their men.

The news of so many overthrows and losses threw Lysias into great perplexity; in obedience however to the strict orders left by the king, he made immense preparations for a new campaign: he accordingly levied an army of sixty thousand foot and five thousand horse, all chosen troops, and putting himself at their head, marched into Judea. This formidable army encamped at Bethsura, a city situated south of Jerusalem, and near the Idumæan frontier. Judas advanced against it with ten thousand soldiers, and confiding as usual in the assistance of God, he engaged the enemy, killed five thousand of them, and put the rest to flight.

Dismayed at the undaunted courage of the Jews, Lysias returned to Antioch, intending nevertheless to come and attack them again with still greater forces. Machabæus was thus left for a time undisputed master of the country. He took advantage of this favorable opportunity to recover the temple of Jerusalem from the Gentiles, and dedicate it again to the service of the true God, with solemn thanksgiving for the signal protection which the Almighty had lately granted to his people.

About the same time, Antiochus was traversing the upper provinces of his kingdom, to levy tribute and collect large sums of money which the impoverished state of his treasury demanded. Having been informed that the city of Elymais in Persia, and especially its famous temple, contained a vast amount of gold, silver and valuable furniture, he endeavored to bring it into his possession; but he received from the inhabitants a repulse, as disgraceful and unexpected as that sustained by his father Antiochus on a similar occasion.

This mortification was increased by the sad intelligence that all his armies had been defeated in Judea. On the receipt of this news he began to retrace his steps, breathing vengeance against

the Jews, and marching with all possible speed, that he might the sooner make Jerusalem the sepulchre of its inhabitants; but he was himself about to become the victim of a more just and powerful avenger. Whilst he was venting his blasphemous rage, he felt himself invisibly struck by the hand of God, and seized with excruciating pains in the bowels. His body moreover happened to be dreadfully bruised by a fall from his chariot; his flesh fell from him in pieces, or was eaten by swarms of worms, and the stench became intolerable to the whole army. Then it was that this wicked prince acknowledged, by an apparent though unavailing repentance, the justice of God's chastisements which lay heavy upon him. After taking measures and giving some orders for the regulation of the state during his son's minority, he died in a foreign land, a prey to agonizing tortures and grief* (B. c. 164).

The death of Antiochus Epiphanes delivered the Jews from a cruel foe, but not from all their enemies. In compliance with the plans he had previously adopted, Lysias again invaded Judea at the head of about one hundred thousand men. At the approach of this formidable host, the Jews earnestly invoked the divine assistance, and it was shortly after strikingly manifested in their behalf: for, "when they were going forth together with a willing mind, there appeared at Jerusalem a horseman going before them in white clothing, with golden armor, shaking a spear."† Encouraged by the celestial vision, they rushed upon their opponents with such lion-like courage, that twelve thousand six hundred of the enemy fell dead upon the field, many were wounded, and Lysias himself sought safety in a shameful flight.

Shortly after this defeat, the young king, Antiochus Eupator, accompanied by the same Lysias, entered Judea with a still more numerous army, and notwithstanding some losses and the vigorous resistance of the Jews, his overwhelming numbers enabled him to advance as far as Jerusalem, which he closely besieged. Fortunately for that city, when it was in the greatest danger of being taken, some afflicting news which the king received from Syria, obliged him to depart, having previously concluded a peace equally honorable and necessary to the Jews.

This peace, however, scarcely afforded any rest to Judas Macchabæus and his brave followers. As the country was likewise

* Observe the striking analogy between the kind of death endured by Antiochus, and that of another barbarous persecutor of religion, Maximian Galerius, mentioned in Modern History, pp. 95, 96.

† 2 Mach. xi, 9.

attacked by the neighboring tribes, the Ammonites, Idumæans, and others, he was obliged to pass his life, as it were, in one continued struggle for the deliverance of his people. But in all these trials he was well supported, on the one hand, by his courage and piety, on the other, by the divine protection. Wherever he went, he spread terror among his enemies, took their cities or fortresses, routed their armies with great slaughter, and delivered the country from their invasion. One of his most astonishing campaigns was that against a general called Timotheus,* who had gathered under his standard no fewer than one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, besides two thousand five hundred cavalry. Judas, with only six thousand warriors, fearlessly attacked him, put thirty thousand of his troops to the sword, scattered the rest, and returning without loss of time, besieged and stormed the two strong cities of Carnion and Ephron, where an additional force of fifty thousand of the enemy was destroyed.

The peace granted to the Jews by the Syrian court, was of short duration. This was owing to a sudden revolution which deprived Antiochus Eupator of his crown and life, and placed Demetrius Soter, his cousin, on the throne of Syria. The new sovereign was soon prevailed on by the enemies of Machabæus to recommence hostilities; he ordered Bacchides, governor of Mesopotamia, to march immediately into Judea at the head of an army. Although Judas could not at first prevent the progress of the enemy, he finally baffled his efforts, as he did also those of another army, commanded by Nicanor. This general, exasperated by a former defeat, vented his fury in blasphemies against the Almighty and his temple at Jerusalem; for which he was soon punished—Judas engaged with him in a bloody battle, and of his army of thirty-five thousand men, not one escaped to carry the news of the defeat to Antioch. The body of Nicanor was found among the dead; his right hand, which he had raised against the temple when he threatened to destroy it, and his head also, were cut off, and placed upon one of the towers of Jerusalem.

Judas availed himself of the short respite which this victory afforded him, to send an embassy to Rome. On the one hand, he saw himself continually attacked by all the forces of Syria, without being able to place any reasonable reliance on their treaties of peace; on the other, he had been informed that the Romans, equally famous for their generosity and valor, were always ready to support weak nations against powerful and ambi-

* A different personage from Timotheus, a lieutenant of Antiochus, already mentioned.

tious kings. This induced him to seek an alliance with the Roman people, in order to obtain their protection against the unjust attacks of the Syrians. His ambassadors were well received by the senate, and a decree was passed declaring the Jews friends and allies of Rome, and establishing a defensive treaty with them against their respective enemies. They even obtained a letter from the senate to King Demetrius, by which he was enjoined to desist from further hostilities against the Jews; but before the ambassadors returned, Judas Machabæus was dead.

As soon as Demetrius heard of the defeat and death of Nicanor, he gave the command of a numerous army to Bacchides, and sent him again into Judea. When this general arrived near Jerusalem, the forces of Machabæus did not exceed three thousand. Of these, many were so terrified by the number of the enemy, that they withdrew from the camp, leaving Judas only eight hundred soldiers, and thus increasing the disproportion of forces from one to seven, which it was before, to one to twenty-eight. This unexpected desertion, in the time of his greatest need, threw Judas into a momentary and painful dejection; resuming, however, his wonted courage, he fearlessly encountered the danger, and coming to battle, maintained the unequal contest nearly the whole day, with a valor, not only equal, but even superior to that of the most renowned Greeks and Romans. Nay, by feats of prodigious courage, he at one time broke and routed the stronger part of the Syrian army. But being simultaneously attacked in the rear and in front, he was at length overpowered by multitudes, and fell among heaps of the slain, thus crowning, by a glorious death, all his other noble and heroic deeds. Although his little army was forced to retire, they carried his body with them, and buried it in the sepulchre of his ancestors (B. c. 161).

Intense was the affliction created in the whole people by the death of their invincible leader; for a long time, they made the air resound with these words: "How is the mighty fallen, that saved the people of Israel!" Disastrous however and irretrievable as this loss appeared to the Jews, they were not entirely destitute of a remedy. Judas Machabæus left behind him, in the persons of his brothers Jonathan and Simon, two worthy successors of his power, and still more worthy heirs of his wisdom, zeal, and courage. It continued indeed to cost them many toils, dangers and bloody battles, to defend their country against its numerous enemies; yet they finally achieved its deliverance from the yoke of the Gentiles. This happy event, although completed some years later under Simon, may be referred, in a great measure, to the year B. c. 158, when Bacchides, unable any

longer to oppose the efforts of the Jews, made with them an honorable alliance, and withdrawing finally from Judea, allowed Jonathan to govern the country in peace.

THIRD PUNIC WAR, AND DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.

B. c. 149—146.

WHILST the Jews, favored by the Romans, were rising in strength, the Carthaginians, for a contrary reason, saw their power rapidly decline. Rome, notwithstanding the prodigious success that every where attended her arms, could not endure the sight of the prosperity of Carthage, a rival city which still contained seven hundred thousand inhabitants. For this reason, the Romans had constantly favored, though in an indirect way, the encroachments of Masinissa on the territory of the Carthaginians; and as the latter, being denied all satisfaction, took up arms against that prince, war was openly declared against them, under the plea that they had attacked an ally of the Roman republic (B. c. 149).

The two consuls, Manlius and Censorinus, were sent together on this expedition, with a powerful fleet and an army of eighty-four thousand men. Having landed on the African shore at a small distance from Carthage, they resorted first to a very ungenerous means, that is, an equivocal treaty, to strip that city of its means of defence, and then confidently advanced against it to commence the regular operations of a siege. But they met with much greater resistance than they had anticipated. The Carthaginians, exasperated in the highest degree, made bold and continual sallies to repulse the assailants, to consume their machines by fire, and to harass their foragers. The Roman generals of the ensuing year had neither more ability nor more success; they prosecuted the siege only in a slow and languishing manner, and were even worsted on several occasions.

The intelligence of these events occasioned some alarm at Rome. The people began to doubt the success of the war, which in fact grew daily more uncertain, whilst the war itself assumed a higher degree of importance than it seemed to have in the beginning. In this state of uneasiness, the Romans placed their hopes for the future in a young man equally conspicuous for his family, his name, and his virtue. This was Scipio Æmilianus, by birth the son of Paulus Æmilius the conqueror of Macedon, and by adoption the grand son of Scipio Africanus the conqueror of Annibal. Being appointed consul, though much under the age prescribed

by law, he took the command of the Roman troops near Carthage, and after restoring good order and discipline among them, so closely invested the city, that it soon became a prey to the most dreadful famine. A few vigorous assaults rendered him master of the wall and outward fortifications.

This first success enabled him to advance towards the very centre of Carthage; yet his progress in the streets was not sufficient to put him in possession of the place. The inhabitants defended themselves with the utmost obstinacy: they disputed every avenue, every house, and for six days in succession suffered uninterrupted and incredible slaughter, rather than surrender themselves. At last, fifty thousand persons, who had taken refuge in the citadel, accepted quarter, and were conducted under a strong guard into the country. But nine hundred Roman deserters, having no quarter to expect, set fire to a temple in which they had sought a temporary covert, and perished in the flames.

The Romans caused the conflagration to extend to the other parts of the town, whilst they themselves were eager in plundering it, and in securing as much booty as they could snatch from the ruins or from the fire. As for Scipio, their general, when he recollected the former glory and power of this famous city, the extent of its dominions and its great wealth, above all, when he reflected on the courage and magnanimity of its inhabitants, which made them, even when stripped of almost all resources, sustain for three whole years the hardships and calamities of a disastrous siege; he could not, it is said, refrain from tears at the unhappy fate of Carthage. Still, he literally obeyed the rigorous orders of his government, and caused the remaining buildings and fortifications to be entirely demolished. The whole adjacent country was added to the dominions of Rome, and destined thenceforth to be under a Roman governor.

Thus fell Carthage, the master-piece of African magnificence, the seat of commercial industry, the repository of wealth, and at the same time one of the greatest emporiums and one of the principal states of the ancient world. About a hundred years after its destruction, it was rebuilt by the orders, or according to the design, of Julius Cæsar, and rose again, under the succeeding emperors of Rome, to be the capital of northern Africa, which title it retained seven hundred years longer; but it was, at the close of that term, utterly destroyed by the Saracens, so that even its name and the vestiges of its existence are now hardly known in the country.

END OF GRECIAN INDEPENDENCE, AND DESTRUCTION OF
CORINTH.—B. C. 146.

SUCH were also the destinies of Corinth, then the chief city of the Achæans, whose destruction took place in the same year and in nearly the same circumstances with that of Carthage.

The Achæan republic, rendered so famous by the wisdom of Aratus and the victories of Philopœmen, continued some time after them to be the first state of Greece. Sparta and Corinth belonged to it. Athens and Thebes* had no longer any political importance. The Ætolians, who acquired about this time a certain celebrity, were nothing else than a race of wild and hardy warriors; the Achæans alone, among all the Greeks, maintained a noble attitude, particularly under the wise and firm administration of Lycortas, the father of Polybius the historian. But this prosperity came at last to an end. The avarice and rashness of their new leaders gave rise to many disturbances among them, and, when the Romans proffered their interference to settle the affairs of Peloponnesus, the Achæans were imprudent enough to provoke their resentment. They even dared to resist by force a people with whom the mightiest nations of the world were unable to contend; nor did a first defeat, inflicted on them by the prætor Metellus, remove their infatuation.

The consul Mummius at last made his approach towards Corinth with the Roman legions. The Achæans, on their part, boldly advanced to give him battle. They were so confident of victory, that they placed their wives and children on the summit of the neighboring hills, to be spectators of the combat; and they had prepared a large number of carts, to be loaded with the spoils which they would take from the enemy—so readily was success anticipated by this infatuated people.

Never was there more groundless and rash confidence; a few moments were enough for the consul to break and rout the Achæans on all sides. Diæus, their general, and one of the chief instigators of this unhappy war, fled in despair to Megalopolis, where he put an end to his own life by poison. Many Corinthians likewise abandoned their city, to find refuge elsewhere. Mummius having entered Corinth, gave it up to be plundered by his soldiers; they slew every man whom they found in it, and sold

* The city of Thebes, formerly destroyed by Alexander, had been rebuilt by Cassander (B. C. 317).

the women and children. The whole city was then fired, and its walls were demolished. All this was done, in compliance with the senate's orders, to punish the insolence of the Corinthians, who had lately presumed to violate the law of nations in the persons of four Roman deputies. This example of rigor so intimidated the other cities, that not one of them ventured to resist: the Achæan confederacy was buried in the ruins of Corinth, its capital, and Greece from that time was made a Roman province (B. c. 146).

Mummius at his return obtained triumphal honors, and the surname of *Achaicus*. During his triumph, he exhibited a large number of exquisite paintings and statues, which afterwards became one of the chief ornaments of Rome and other cities of Italy; but none of them entered the conqueror's house. For Mummius was a virtuous and disinterested citizen, as well as a brave warrior and an able general. So far had he preserved the simplicity of ancient times, that, while he directed the transportation of so many master-pieces of art from Greece to Rome, he seriously stipulated with the carriers that, in case any accident should happen, they would be responsible for it, and retrieve the loss that might be sustained in this respect, by procuring other paintings and statues at their own expense.

Polybius, the historian, whom we have just mentioned, was obliged to witness with his own eyes the calamities of his country. He had lately returned from Rome, where his wisdom and talents were held in high esteem by the first families of the republic, above all, by the family of Scipio Æmilianus. When the Roman commissioners, appointed to settle their recent conquest, departed from Greece, they requested him to visit all the cities which had been subdued, and to adjust their differences, until they should be accustomed to their new laws and form of government. Polybius discharged this honorable commission with so much prudence, justice and mildness, that no further disputes arose in Achaia, either with regard to the government at large or the affairs of private individuals. In acknowledgment of so great a blessing, statues were erected to him in different places, and at the base of one of them was an inscription stating "that Greece would have committed no faults, if she had from the beginning listened to the counsels of Polybius, but that, after her faults, he alone had been her deliverer."

After Polybius had established order and tranquillity in his country, he set out to rejoin Scipio Æmilianus at Rome, and then accompanied him to Numantia, at the siege of which he was present. When Scipio was dead, he returned into Greece;

and having enjoyed there, for six years more, the esteem, affection and gratitude of his beloved citizens, he died at the age of eighty-two years, no doubt with the grief of seeing Achaia no longer an independent nation, yet with the consolation of having done whatever he could to alleviate its real or apparent misfortunes.

The chief cause of the decline of Grecian power, and the fall of Grecian independence, was the discord which armed its different states against one another. As long as the Greeks were united, they overthrew and repelled numberless armies of invaders. But their patriotic spirit, constantly victorious over the attacks of barbarians, was subdued by their mutual jealousy: Sparta and Athens, in particular, engaged in long and bloody strifes for the support of their respective claims, and the only sure result which this conduct produced, was the diminution of their strength and national resources. The Persians, to whom they had proved formidable enemies, sought to weaken them more and more by encouraging division among them, favoring sometimes the one, sometimes the other party. The kings of Macedon also skilfully availed themselves of the same circumstance, to acquire a predominant influence among the Greeks. In fine, what the Persians had attempted, what the Macedonians had begun, — the subjugation of Greece, was achieved by the Romans; and this famous country, like every other part of the civilized world, was at length absorbed in the Roman republic.

Greece however, even under her conquerors, preserved a kind of sovereignty of which they could not deprive her, and to which even themselves rendered implicit homage. She continued to be the teacher of sciences and of the fine arts, and the model of refined taste in the productions of human genius. It was to an assiduous study of the Greek language and Grecian literature that Rome was indebted for the many accomplished orators, historians and poets, whose writings shed so much lustre on the Roman name, and rendered the Augustan age equal in many respects to the age of Pericles.

PART VI.

FROM THE END OF THE PUNIC WARS AND OF GRECIAN INDEPENDENCE,
OR THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE AND CORINTH (B. C. 146), TO
THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM AND CHANGE OF THE ROMAN COMMONWEALTH
INTO AN EMPIRE (B. C. 31).

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRODIGIOUS INCREASE OF ROMAN POWER, AND ON THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE CHANGE OF THE COMMONWEALTH INTO AN EMPIRE.

No one can read the history of ancient times, without being struck with surprise at the sight of a nation constantly advancing for more than seven hundred years, in strength, power, glory, and extent of dominion, till it obtained at length the command of the world. This nation was the Roman people. There was no retrograde movement in their designs, nor any real delay in their progress. From an obscure settlement on the banks of the Tiber, they rose at first gradually, and afterwards by gigantic steps, to universal domination. This fact, one of the most important in the history of mankind, is well calculated to interest the reader, and to kindle in him a desire to know by what means it was accomplished.

In the first place, we must acknowledge that the Providence of God was the primary cause of Roman greatness and prosperity. Almost from the beginning of their national existence, the Romans were conspicuous for many noble qualities: during several centuries, an honorable poverty and simplicity of manners, frugality, sobriety, courage, patriotism, disinterestedness, respect for law, fidelity to social and domestic duties,* etc. were

* Divorce was not of frequent occurrence among the Romans till the latter times of the republic, when corruption of manners had already made fearful progress. But it was not so in the preceding ages: five hundred years elapsed after the building of the city, before any divorce took place in Rome; the first of all occurred in the year B. C. 231. And still the Romans were no more than a heathen people. What a lesson, and what a sad rebuke for some Christian nations!

virtues of no rare occurrence among them; witness the conduct of Cincinnatus, Regulus, Fabricius, Curius, the Fabii, the Scipios, and many others. Yet, as these virtues, however praiseworthy, had no other foundation than human and natural motives, and were even often found by the side of harshness, vanity, ambition, or some other vice, they could not deserve a supernatural reward from the hands of the Sovereign Judge. But they seemed to entitle the people who practised them for so long a period, to a temporal recompense above other nations; and this was, in effect, the reward which heaven granted to the Romans, that is, the empire of the world.

The course of events was so disposed by Divine Providence in their behalf, that they were never attacked by too many enemies at once, but sometimes by one, and sometimes by another, in a kind of regular succession, and just when they themselves were possessed of adequate means *either* to defeat each attack, *or* to retrieve their losses, even with increased advantage. As an exemplification of the first case, the reader may recollect that they had to fight Antiochus the Great, only after the war against Philip of Macedon was prosperously ended, and that the Macedonian war itself did not take place, till the greatest danger created by Annibal no longer existed. As an instance of the second, it will be enough to produce the struggle of Rome against the Gauls. On one occasion, after the disastrous battle of Allia and the burning of the city by the Gauls (B. C. 390), God gave to the Romans the great Camillus, then an exile, to effect their happy deliverance. In another great emergency (B. C. 225), when a powerful host of the same nation were rapidly advancing towards Rome and conquering the troops who opposed their passage, the armies of the two consuls arrived at the same time, and without previous concert, from different points, and overtook the invaders near Telamon. The Gauls, thus hemmed in between two Roman armies, and compelled to fight on such unfavorable ground, were entirely defeated, and Rome was saved from their invasion.

Thus did Almighty God, in his just and all-wise Providence, watch over the safety of the Romans, remove obstacles from their way and facilitate their progress, till they reached the summit of human glory and prosperity. This was the recompense which he granted to their moral good works and civil virtues, as St. Augustine observes in many passages of his writings.*

As to the secondary causes, first of the greatness and power of

* E. g. *De Civitate Dei*, lib. v, c. xii, xv et xviii; and *Epist. cxxxviii ad Marcellinum*, nos 16 and 17.

Rome, and secondly of its subsequent decline as a republic; we shall find them both in the spirit and manners which distinguished the Romans at the various periods of their existence.*

Among all the nations of the ancient world, the Roman people were, beyond comparison, the loftiest in their sentiments and the boldest in their enterprises; the most prudent in council, the most steady in conduct, and the wisest in political maxims; the most laborious, indefatigable, courageous and patient; the most affectionate to their country; the most jealous of their liberty, and yet the most docile and submissive to their leaders and magistrates.

This reunion of different and apparently opposite qualities produced, on the one hand, the best sort of soldiers, and on the other, the most regular, consistent, firm and sagacious policy that ever existed.

To speak first of the Roman troops, it is manifest that, being composed of men remarkable for their strength, valor, patriotism, and all their habits of labor and obedience, they could not fail to be excellent. When headed by skilful generals, as was commonly the case, they might justly be looked upon as invincible.

The laws of military discipline were strict, and enforced with unflinching severity. Life was often at stake, not only for having deserted or fled and thrown away one's arms, but also for having gone forward and commenced to fight without the general's command. Victory itself was dangerous, and sometimes proved fatal to those who obtained it without superior orders. Such as surrendered to the enemy, or suffered themselves to be taken prisoners instead of fighting to the last for their country, if no extraordinary circumstance pleaded in their behalf, were thought unworthy of relief, and ceased to be reckoned as members of the republic. Thus for instance, after the battle of Cannæ, when Rome, exhausted by the severest losses, stood most in need of soldiers to defend her very existence, the senate chose to arm eight thousand slaves, rather than redeem eight thousand legionaries who had surrendered to the Carthaginians. In this urgent crisis, it was more strictly than ever enforced as an inviolable law, that a Roman soldier should conquer or die.

With courage and activity, the Romans joined an inventive genius and great proficiency in the science of war. The improvements which they did not find out themselves, they readily borrowed from their neighbors, and even from their enemies:

* Most of the following remarks are taken from Bossuet's *Discourse on Universal History*, part iii, c. 6; Rollin, *Traité des études*, vols iii and iv;—Ferguson, *History of the progress and termination of the Roman Republic*;—Montesquieu, *Grandeur et décadence des Romains*.

thus they learned from the sight of a Carthaginian galley, how to build vessels fit for war; from Pyrrhus, they took the art of encampments in which that prince excelled, and to it they themselves added the salutary practice of fortifying their camp with intrenchments and ditches, although the army should have to stay in it only one night. In a word, they adopted for their own use whatever they saw best in others, and derived from all nations the means to subdue them all. The mightiest states and the most warlike tribes were thus successively compelled to yield to their efforts. Rome triumphed over courage in the Gauls; over courage and discipline in the Greeks; over courage, discipline, and the most refined skill in Annibal; finally, such were her victories and conquests, that no nation ever surpassed or equalled the Romans in military glory.

But, as it is not sufficient for the prosperity of a nation to have brave troops and able generals, unless there be also a wise government, we should also consider with great attention, the character, views and policy of the Roman senate.

Never was there an assembly in which, for a long course of ages, objects of public administration were discussed with greater maturity, foresight, wisdom, concord, and zeal. Here were faithfully preserved the ancient maxims of the commonwealth. Here were contrived the best schemes for the welfare and glory of the state. What should appear still more admirable, was their conduct in times of great adversity or peril; through a loftiness of mind quite characteristic of the Roman people, their senate never assumed a more threatening attitude, never adopted more vigorous measures, than under such circumstances. Weak counsels were not so much as listened to, and the senators and officers of state showed themselves more firm, even after the most disastrous defeat, than after a decisive victory.

Let the reader call to mind the time in which the republic, still weak and in its infancy, was distracted at home by the inflammatory speeches of the plebeian tribunes, and attacked in the field by an illustrious and angry exile at the head of a powerful army of the Volsci; it was in this terrible situation that the Roman senate appeared most intrepid. The Volsci, always defeated before, but now constantly victorious under Coriolanus, were threatening Rome with the most serious evils, if their petition of certain rights and privileges was not granted. The city had no sufficient force to oppose to the enemy. Every thing was to be feared; still the senate issued this astonishing decree, that nothing should be yielded to a threatening foe, nor any treaty whatever concluded with him, till he should have withdrawn his

armies from the territory of the republic. They acted in like manner towards Pyrrhus; and, still more resolute towards Annibal, they would not so much as receive a deputy sent by this great general to make overtures of peace after his victory at Cannæ.

It was therefore a fundamental principle of Roman policy, never to make any concession to a victorious enemy. "Other nations, when in distress, could weigh their sufferings against the concessions which they were required to make; and among the evils to which they were exposed, preferred what appeared to be the least. The Romans alone spurned the advances of a victorious enemy; were not to be moved by sufferings; and, though they cautiously avoided difficulties that were likely to surpass their strength, did not allow it to be supposed that they were governed by fear in any case whatever. They willingly treated with the vanquished, and were ready to grant the most liberal terms, when the concession could not be imputed to weakness or fear. By such free and unforced concessions, indeed, they established a reputation for generosity, which contributed no less than their valor to secure the dominion they acquired."*

The conduct of the Roman senate was not less admirable towards their fellow-citizens, than steady and firm towards foreign enemies. The senators often evinced towards the people a truly parental condescension. Among numerous facts of this nature, we may adduce the liberal and humane decree, by which, in a time of great necessity, the leaders of the government not only imposed a higher tax upon themselves than upon the other Romans, as was commonly the case, but even released the poor citizens from all taxation, and said that the latter did enough for the service of the republic by their labor and the care of their families. These marks of disinterested kindness quite enraptured the minds of the people, and rendered them more than ever determined to do and suffer every thing for the service of so generous a country.

The government of Rome, whose approval was of itself a recompense, knew well how to bestow praise or blame, as circumstances required. Immediately after a battle, the consuls and other generals assembled the army, and distributed among the officers and soldiers the rewards and congratulations, and sometimes the reproaches, which they deserved; but they themselves generally waited for the decision of the senate, to know whether they should enjoy, or not, the honors of a triumphal entry into Rome. Praises were highly valued, because given after mature

* Ferguson, b. ii, c. 2.

deliberation; and reproaches were greatly apprehended, because addressed to sensible and lofty minds. The fear of military chastisements kept the Roman soldier within the bounds of duty, whilst the sense of national glory, and rewards properly distributed, raised him, as it were, above himself.

A nation composed of citizens and magistrates, generals and soldiers of this description, is conscious of its incomparable strength, never yields to despondency, and never believes itself devoid of resource. Hence the Romans stood undismayed, when Porsenna confined them within the walls of Rome; when the Gauls, after burning the city, closely besieged them in their last refuge, the capitol; when Pyrrhus terrified them by the sight of his elephants, and defeated their legions; and when Annibal, not to mention his previous victories over them, destroyed in the battle of Cannæ the most numerous and gallant army that they had ever equipped.

On the last mentioned occasion, the consul Terentius Varro, whose temerity had occasioned so signal a defeat, was received at Rome with great honors and public thanks, merely because in this dreadful disaster he had not despaired of the commonwealth. The senate redoubled its energy; the people took courage; new levies of troops were made, who fought like veterans; in a short time, Rome regained her ascendancy; and Annibal, successful as he had hitherto been, and formidable as he continued to be, could not resist her efforts. This great man, weakened by his own victories, did not receive from his country the same support which Rome gave to her vanquished generals; he was at length entirely defeated by Scipio, and with him fell the glory and power of Carthage.

Such was the fruit of Roman constancy, and in this manner did the Romans advance towards the conquest of the whole world. It is true that they from that time joined with courage and patience, a variety of means less just or less honorable: the splendor of their past success increased their ambition, and thirst after new glory and advantages frequently rendered them ungenerous. Such in particular was their conduct towards Carthage, Greece, and the last Macedonian kings. From this time especially, they applied themselves, on the one hand, to gain and secure allies, and on the other, either by artful negotiations or by open force, to disunite and weaken their enemies. Hence, indeed, no one should be surprised to see them, for some time longer, advance with rapid strides in the career of conquest; being now upheld by so much strength already acquired and so many means of future progress, they subdued powerful kingdoms with even greater

facility than they formerly conquered villages. But this height of prosperity soon produced a fatal reaction. Its effect on the nation at large, on the private citizens in particular, and on the magistrates, officers and leaders of the state, inflicted a mortal wound on the primitive spirit of the commonwealth, and prepared by degrees its change into an empire.

When the republic, says Sallust, had become prosperous by industry and justice; when powerful kings had been conquered in war, and numerous nations subdued; when Carthage, the rival of Rome, had ceased to exist, and all seas and lands had passed under the Roman sway: a deplorable change began to manifest itself in the manners of the whole nation. Men, whom neither hardships, nor dangers, nor adversities, had been able to overcome, were vanquished by repose and wealth. Ambition and avarice, the fatal source of all evils, grew in proportion to the extent of the empire:* avarice expelled fidelity, honesty, and other virtues, substituting in their stead pride, contempt of religion, extortion, and wide-spread venality; ambition introduced fraud and perfidy, afterwards party spirit, dissension, proscription, and bloodshed.

To the private citizens, the increase of territory and the conquests made by the state became the source of ruinous corruption. The treasures of the subdued provinces began to flow incessantly into Rome, and filled the coffers of private individuals, as well as those of the commonwealth. When there was no longer any peril threatening their prosperity, the Roman population, now recruited in a great measure from emancipated captives or slaves, became almost ungovernable, indolent, and eager, as it were, for nothing but gratuitous distribution of corn and the games of the circus.† Their affection was confined to those persons who gratified them by liberal gifts and by the frequency of public exhibitions, such as that of gladiators or combatants fighting for the barbarous diversion of the people. Besides these disorders, the former feuds between the patricians and plebeians, which had been suspended by the importance of foreign events, were renewed with increased animosity; and there needed but a spark to produce a dreadful conflagration in the very centre of the republic.

In fine, the offices of the state, the command of the armies, and the government of the provinces, as they now led their possessors to great fortune, began also to be coveted and sought with

* *Primo pecunie, deinde imperii cupido crevit; ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuisse.*—Sallust. *Catilin.* c. x.

† *Panem et circenses.*—Juvenal, *Sat.* x, l. 81.

the greatest avidity. Instead of the former illustrious men who strove only for the palm of merit in the service of the commonwealth, men of a factious spirit arose, who contended for the greatest share of its spoils; sacrificing the public good to private interests and animosities, they endeavored, by every means in their power, by bribery, intrigue, or violence, to draw the people and soldiers to their side, and make them subservient to the views of their lawless ambition. Accordingly, Rome was exposed during this period to the constant danger of dissensions and wars between her own citizens, till some daring, ambitious and uncommonly skilful leader might prevail over all his competitors, and become absolute master of the state.

This was, at the epoch which our narrative has reached, so manifestly the tendency of affairs at Rome, that Polybius, the historian, who lived at that time, foresaw and announced the approaching change of the Roman republic into a monarchy.* The recital of the ensuing events will plainly show the depth and correctness of his observation, while it will impart to the reader a knowledge of the conquests by which Rome completed the formation of her empire.

AFFAIRS OF THE ROMANS IN SPAIN.—B. C. 153—133.

Of all the countries which the Romans subdued, none offered them a more determined and protracted resistance than Spain. At the very epoch of their success in Greece and Africa, they met with a most terrible opposition from the Spanish tribes. On the one side, the Lusitanians, headed by Viriathus, on the other, the Numantines, often defeated them, and covered their generals with disgrace and shame. This contest was carried on for about twenty years, with some short intervals of repose, but still with extreme animosity; nor could it be otherwise brought to a termination, than by the death of Viriathus and the entire destruction of the city of Numantia.

This Viriathus was a Lusitanian, of low birth, but of lofty sentiments, possessing great energy of soul and an uncommon share of natural abilities. Having escaped from a dreadful massacre of the inhabitants of his district ordered by a Roman prætor, he became, from a hunter and shepherd, the chief leader of his exasperated countrymen. Either by open force or skilful stratagem, he frequently overcame the armies sent against him from Rome under the command of prætors and consuls: on

*Polybius, b. vi, Extracts 1 and 3.

one occasion particularly, with only six thousand followers, he defeated an army of nearly twenty thousand men, many of whom were killed. Viriathus, it is true, was himself occasionally defeated; yet, he never ceased to be as formidable to the Romans by his valor, as he was endeared to his soldiers by his moderation, disinterestedness and generosity. This hero, after having resisted the attacks of Rome for ten years, at length fell a victim to an odious treason contrived by a Roman consul, and was basely assassinated in his own camp and during his sleep (B. C. 140).

The death of Viriathus ended the war against the Lusitanians, but not the Numantine war, which, on the contrary, gave for several years longer immense trouble and vexation to the Romans. Those generals who were successively appointed to conduct it, either disgusted the natives by their breach of faith, or ruined their own troops by their imprudence. The city of Numantia alone, inconsiderable in itself, but remarkable for the courage of its inhabitants, withstood and baffled, during several years, all the efforts of these conquerors of the world. The assailants were often repelled with great loss, and compelled to abandon or interrupt the siege. It once happened that only four thousand Numantines put to flight a consular army of twenty thousand men, and, closely surrounding them in a narrow defile, obliged their leader, the consul Mancinus, to conclude a treaty of peace equally necessary to his troops and dishonorable to the Roman name.

The senate and the people of Rome were afflicted and ashamed to see their armies constantly defeated by an enemy comparatively so weak and so inferior in number. They at last determined to select a general both willing and able to retrieve the honor of the republic. The eyes of all were directed to Scipio Æmilianus, the conqueror of Carthage; he was therefore appointed consul, and set out for Spain. Here he found the army without subordination and discipline, and given up to luxury, indolence and licentiousness. The consul immediately understood that, before attempting to fight the enemy, he must restore order, and effect a thorough reformation among his own troops. He commenced this necessary work by removing from the camp whatever savored of effeminacy or mere comfort, and confined the soldiers to the plain necessities of life. He afterwards compelled them to make long marches, each soldier carrying his baggage, his arms, his provision of corn for fifteen or twenty days, and seven stakes for making intrenchments. At other times, for the mere purpose of inuring them to labor

and fatigue, he required them to dig the ground, build walls and erect palisades, which he caused a moment after to be demolished: "Let them," said he, "be covered with mud, since they dare not be covered with the blood of the enemy."*

In a short time, the condition of the army became entirely different from what it was before. The soldiers seemed to have been changed into other men, and they who formerly could not bear the sight or voice of the Numantines, were now ready to fight them with advantage in the open field. Scipio approached Numantia, and surrounded it with a line of intrenchments composed of a ditch and wall flanked with towers. Want of provisions was soon felt in the city; it gradually became terrible, and made so frightful ravages among the unfortunate inhabitants, that, after having exhausted all the means of support which necessity can suggest, they at last fed on human flesh. Starvation and the usual train of attendant evils had so far emaciated them, that they looked no longer like men, but like walking and ghastly skeletons. Finally, not to outlive their freedom, they killed one another: yet, a few among them, of less desperate feelings, surrendered to the Romans at discretion. Scipio reserved fifty of them for his triumph, sold the rest, and levelling their city to the ground, distributed the lands which had belonged to it among the neighboring tribes (B. C. 133). Although the Spanish peninsula was not yet entirely subdued, still the capture and destruction of Numantia firmly established the power of the Romans in that country. Shortly after, their legions, having completed the reduction of northern Italy by the defeat of the Ligurians, crossed the Alps and subdued likewise the southern part of Gaul, where they founded the cities of Aix and Narbonne.

INSURRECTION IN SICILY.—B. C. 135—132.

WHILST the Romans extended their conquests on different sides, they were very near losing the most ancient and valuable of their provinces, the island of Sicily. A vast number of slaves were engaged in cultivating, for the profit of Rome, that fertile and extensive territory, which was justly considered the granary and, as it were, the nurse of the commonwealth. These slaves, exasperated by the ill-treatment inflicted on them by their masters, revolted against them and flew to arms in every

* *Luto inquinari, qui sanguine nollent, jubebantur.*—Florus, *Epitome*, b. ii. c. 18.

part of the island. They chose for their chief leader a man called Eunus, a native of Syria, who took the insignia of royalty together with the name of Antiochus. His army rose in a short time to seventy thousand men; and it is thought, besides, that the total number of revolted slaves in Sicily was not less than two hundred thousand.

Thus organized, the insurgents committed frightful cruelties and depredations throughout the island. They conquered the Roman troops who attempted to stop their progress, and defeated four prætors in succession; so that it became necessary to send consular armies in order to suppress the revolt. After an undecisive campaign under the consul Fulvius, his successor, Calpurnius Piso, gave a severe check to the rebels near Messina. Still it was only a third consul, P. Rupilius, who succeeded in terminating the war by destroying great numbers of them, capturing their fortified places, and putting to death their principal leaders.

Rupilius made it the chief object of his care, to leave in Sicily no vestige of the late insurrection. With a body of chosen troops, he went through the island, and having entirely pacified it, made regulations which greatly pleased the people, and were regarded as the basis of public tranquillity (B. C. 132).

DISTURBANCES EXCITED BY THE GRACCHI.—B. C. 133—121.

THE destruction of Numantia, and the close of the war against the revolted slaves in Sicily, coincided with the beginning of the civil wars in Rome. Hitherto the warmest contests between the patricians and plebeians had been carried on, and their differences adjusted, without resorting to arms; the animosity of the parties did not go beyond a certain limit, and either the condescension of the senate or the moderation of the people prevented the effusion of blood. But we have now reached the period when ambition, interest and jealousy, concealed under an apparent zeal for the public good, prevailed over true patriotism, wise counsels and moderate government. Insidious and illegal attacks on one side, extreme measures and violent remedies on the other, gave rise to those bloody dissensions which, being often renewed with increased animosity, terminated in the downfall of the republic.

There existed an ancient agrarian law forbidding any Roman to possess more than five hundred acres of land, and it was also an ancient custom to distribute a part of the conquered ter-

ritories among the poor citizens. But these regulations had not been enforced for some centuries, and the wealthy families of Rome continued with impunity to enlarge their estates, which they caused to be cultivated by slaves; whereas the lower classes of the people had neither land enough nor sufficient lucrative employment to provide for their support. This inequality of fortune appeared to many persons an intolerable disorder, and one, too, peculiarly shocking in a republic. An attempt to suppress it by the revival of the agrarian law, was made by two illustrious brothers, Tiberius Gracchus and Caius Gracchus, who, besides being allied by birth and matrimonial connexions with the first families of Rome, were still more commendable for their talent, eloquence, courage and liberality.

The Gracchi were the sons of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who, though once raised to the censorship, twice to the consulate, and twice honored with a triumph, yet derived still greater dignity from his virtues. There had always existed an opposition between him and the family of the Scipios: but when both Publius and Lucius Scipio were persecuted by a powerful faction at Rome, Sempronius Gracchus had the generosity to declare himself in their favor and openly to take their defence, even against the tribunes his colleagues. It is believed that to his conduct on this occasion he was indebted for his subsequent alliance with their illustrious family; for towards the close of the life of that Scipio who conquered Annibal, he married Cornelia, Scipio's daughter, thus throwing new lustre around his own name. He died with a well deserved reputation for wisdom and virtue, and had a statue erected in his honor.

Cornelia, being left a widow, devoted her whole attention to the management of her house and the education of her children. Two of them, Tiberius and Caius, the objects of the present section, so faithfully corresponded to the cares of their mother, that though they manifested the happiest genius and disposition, it was thought they owed still more to education than to nature. Hence they became the peculiar object of Cornelia's glory and pride, as she on one occasion forcibly manifested in a conversation with a Campanian lady. This lady having first, with much self-complacency, laid her diamonds, pearls, and other precious jewels before the eyes of Cornelia, begged that she might see those of Cornelia herself. The latter, instead of answering, turned the conversation to some other object, till her sons returned from school. When they entered the room of their mother; "these," said she to the Campanian lady, "are my jewels and my ornaments:"—Words truly ad-

mirable, and containing a most important instruction for all mothers and children.

The two brothers became eminent orators, though there was a great dissimilarity both in their delivery and their language. The delivery of Caius was extremely energetic, and calculated to produce terror; that of Tiberius was milder, and tended to excite emotion. Likewise, the language of Caius was splendid and vehement; that of Tiberius, chaste and persuasive, and this difference in their oratory seems to have arisen from the difference of their tempers. Tiberius was mild and gentle; Caius was high spirited and uncontrolled, insomuch that he would often, in addressing the people, be carried away by the vehemence of his feelings, exalt his voice above the regular pitch, indulge in strong expressions, and, hurried along, as it were, by the fire of action, would move from one end of the rostrum to the other.

To guard against excess, he ordered his servant Licinius, a judicious man, to stand behind him during his harangues to the people, with a flageolet, and whenever he found him straining his voice or inclined to anger, to give him a softer key. This was sufficient to make him immediately abate the violence of both his action and language, and to resume a natural tone.

Such were the illustrious brothers Tiberius and Caius Gracchus. Their natural dispositions and mental acquirements added to their virtues, liberality, courage, temperance, etc. seemed to prognosticate in behalf of Rome a long series of great and important services. Unfortunately, these hopes were blasted by the nature of the course which they thought proper to adopt and which they too obstinately pursued.

The design in behalf of the poor citizens had every appearance of humanity and equity; still, in other points of view, it implied a great abuse of power. It tended to nothing less than to undermine the general security of property, by attacking possessions which, however unlawful they may have been in their origin, had quietly passed, through a long series of ages, from the former to the present owners by way of inheritance, dowry, or purchase made in good faith. To restore estates of this description to their original destination, was manifestly to introduce confusion and trouble into the bosom of innumerable families, and strangely attempt to enrich one portion of the citizens at the expense of the other. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the Gracchi endeavored to carry out their views, sometimes by illegal means, at other times with strong signs of resentment and animosity against the senate. Hence no one should be surprised that, although they may be praised in some

respects, for instance, for their disinterestedness and magnanimity, still they have been generally considered, even by the greatest men, as the leaders of a faction and the disturbers of public peace.*

Tiberius, the elder, being appointed plebeian tribune, undertook with great vigor to effect the revival of the agrarian law: so untiring were his exertions, and so well was he supported by the favor of the people against the opposition of the wealthy citizens, that he at last carried his point, and had the law republished. Still his popularity, owing to some despotic measures to which he had resorted, began to be on the decline. The senate, at the same time, forgetting their usual moderation, resolved to oppose violence to the practices of the tribune. They availed themselves, for this purpose, of the following circumstance: Tiberius, in a general assembly of the people, not being able on account of the noise to make himself heard, pointed with his hand at his head, to mean that his life was at stake. This gesture was maliciously interpreted by some to mean that he asked for a royal diadem. The senators, headed by Scipio Nasica and accompanied by their clients, ran forward to attack the unhappy tribune, notwithstanding the crowd by which he was surrounded. Tiberius fled, but having fallen and being overtaken in his flight, he was killed with three hundred of his partisans (B. C. 133).

Caius Gracchus, who was nine years younger than Tiberius, had scarcely any share in these first disturbances; he withdrew for a time from the public assemblies, as though he had no desire to avenge the death and pursue the projects of his brother. But no sooner was he himself raised to the dignity of tribune, than the people found in him a most zealous defender of their claims; and the senate, a most formidable opponent of their privileges and authority. By the magic power of his eloquence, Caius carried out whatever he proposed to the multitude, and by this means was enabled to make a variety of regulations more or less hostile to the patrician order, and some of them subversive of the established rules of government.

The senate devised a singular means to weaken the amazing popularity and influence of this daring officer; it consisted in making still greater concessions to the people than he had

* See in Plutarch's *life of Tiberius Gracchus*, the decided opinion of Scipio Æmilianus; also Livy, *Epit.*, b. 58--61; Cicero *De officiis*, b. ii, nos 43, 78, 79, and 80; St. Augustine *De Civitate Dei*, b. iii, c. 24; Bossuet, *Discourse*, part i, *ad ann.* 133 and 121, and part iii, ch. 7; Ferguson, b. ii, c. 2; etc.

made. Seeing their efforts attended with success, they at length resolved to attack him by open force. The consul Opimius, his personal enemy, marched against him with a body of chosen and well armed men, and easily put the attendants of the tribune either to the sword or to a precipitate flight. Caius, abandoned by that very people to whose interests he had sacrificed every other consideration, was not offered so much as a horse to make his escape. When he saw his enemies almost upon him, not to fall into their hands, he ordered a slave to kill him; the slave obeyed, and immediately after ran his sword through his own body, and died near his master. In this terrible affray, there perished with Caius about three thousand persons, whose dead bodies were thrown into the Tiber (B. C. 121).

Such was the unhappy end of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, whom a mistaken zeal rendered the disturbers of their country, whereas they might have been its best defenders and brightest ornaments. Together with them disappeared their projects and laws, but, as the sequel will show, not the sad example of those dissensions and violent contests which their proceedings had occasioned.

SCIPIO ÆMILIANUS.—HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER.

Among the victims of the late disturbances, there was one still more distinguished than the Gracchi themselves, viz. Scipio Æmilianus, the conqueror of Numantia and Carthage. He had just returned from the Numantine war, when, being publicly asked what he thought of the violent death of Tiberius Gracchus, he answered that Tiberius had deserved it by his illegal and factious proceedings.

This answer highly displeased the people, most of whom sided with the Gracchi. Scipio was aware of the circumstance, and beheld the rapid decline of his popularity; yet, he never deviated from the line of conduct which he had adopted, as the only one calculated to secure the welfare of the state. He moreover used all his influence to prevent the consequences of the late innovation, and with invincible firmness opposed the partiality of the commissioners who had been appointed to make a new distribution of lands among the citizens. This conduct was the more laudable, as Scipio might have been a gainer by the rigorous execution of the agrarian law; and, on the other hand, he was not ignorant of the machinations which the leaders of the popular party were contriving against his life. Neither the name and character, nor the virtues and exploits of this great man, could

shelter him against their violence : he was found dead in his bed, with evident marks of having been strangled during the night (B. C. 129). Scipio Æmilianus had lived fifty-six years.

Rome lost in him one of the most conspicuous heroes that her history could boast of; and, to use the expressions of Plutarch, "one incomparably the first, both in virtue and power, of the Romans of his time."* Party spirit and animosity did not allow the solemn celebration of his obsequies; but the intense sorrow manifested by every one who loved virtue, fully made up for this deficiency of exterior pomp. Even his former rivals in glory acknowledged his superior merit. Q. Metellus Macedonicus, one of the leading men in the state, but who had always been opposed to Scipio, directed his sons to attend the funeral of the deceased hero: "Go, my sons," said he, "you never will render this last duty to a greater man and a better citizen." Another senator of high rank publicly thanked the gods for having made Scipio a Roman; "because," said he, "the empire of the world must needs have been for that nation and country which produced and nurtured so remarkable a personage."

It was a peculiar feature in the character of Scipio Æmilianus, that, belonging to one illustrious family by birth and to another by adoption, he perfectly sustained and even increased the honor of both, as he excelled all his contemporaries in the arts of war and of civil government.† An intrepid warrior and an excellent general, he equally signalized himself in the inferior rank of an officer and in the chief command of armies. With valor and prudence he joined greatness of views, and such a firmness in maintaining military discipline, as contributed not less than his courage and skill to the success of his campaigns; though, under another respect, it is painful to behold the inexorable severity which, in compliance with the orders or views of his government, he used against Numantia and Carthage. His ability and application in civil affairs were admirable. Having no other object in view than the welfare of his country, he sacrificed to it every private interest; for the sake of it, he despised every danger; and died a victim to his generous devotedness. His private life was marked by the same nobleness of sentiments and conduct; to which he added an amiable simplicity of manners, beneficence, liberality, and mildness without excessive indulgence, as well as firmness without excessive rigor.

* Plutarch, in *Paulum Emil.*

† See again Plutarch, in *Paulum Emil.*, and Velleius Paterculus, *Hist. b. i, c. 18.*

Not Rome and Italy only, but Spain and Egypt, Greece and Syria, the west and the east, were allowed by turn to witness and admire the great qualities of Scipio. It was a practice of the Romans to send frequent embassies among their allies, in order to see how matters stood among them, and to settle the pretensions, or disputes of the various provinces. Scipio Æmilianus was appointed with Sp. Mummius and L. Metellus, two other distinguished Romans, to visit first the kingdoms of Egypt and Syria, both a constant prey to agitation and disturbances, and afterwards Asia Minor and Greece. Their instructions were to examine the present condition of these countries; to see how punctually the conditions of the treaties of peace concluded with the Romans were fulfilled, and to repress, to the best of their ability, the abuses and disorders which might come to their knowledge. The ambassadors acquitted themselves of their commission with so much prudence, wisdom and equity, and rendered so signal services to those whom they visited, by restoring order among them and adjusting their differences, that, as soon as they returned to Rome, deputies came from the different places through which they had passed, to thank the senate for having sent them persons of such ability and virtue. Scipio especially had been an object of the highest admiration.

It seems therefore, all things being duly weighed, that Scipio Æmilianus may be regarded as the most accomplished man of ancient Rome.* He united in himself the strict virtue of the Romans of old with the polished manners of later ages, and the qualifications of the general and statesman with the character of the good son, the affectionate relative, the faithful friend, and even the excellent orator and scholar. For, in point of literary merit, eloquence and poetry, he was thought by many not inferior to Lælius the orator, and Terence the poet; it was even believed that both he and Lælius had a share in the composition

* This is to be understood, not of absolute perfection, but of that natural accomplishment of which pagans were capable. Even the most virtuous of them had their faults and failings; nay, their very best actions were frequently tainted by motives of self-interest, ambition, thirst after human glory, and the like considerations. But these were not reputed vices among the gentiles; and besides they may, on several other occasions, have been guided by better motives, such as genuine patriotism, decorum or feelings of humanity, benevolence, compassion, and generosity. Hence, although their highest perfection cannot be compared with even the beginning of christian and supernatural virtue, yet the moral conduct of several of them, especially in the midst of errors and obstacles, is really deserving of praise and admiration. Such, among others, was the life of Scipio Æmilianus.

of the theatrical pieces of Terence. One thing is sure, namely, that Scipio lived in great intimacy with them both, as he also did with Panætius the philosopher and Polybius the historian.

One of the most interesting features of their friendship, was the simplicity with which these great men spent their leisure hours. When Scipio and Lælius were allowed to leave the confinement of business and retire to the country, they seemed to become children again, and freely indulged in the diversions and amusements of which young boys are so fond. They were often seen gathering shells and pebbles along the sea shore, to make them skip over the surface of the water. They did so merely for relaxation, but showed, however, by their choice of such an amusement, a candor, simplicity and innocence of manners, that cannot be too much admired in persons of their transcendent merit.

Such was the character and life of Scipio the Younger or Æmilianus. The cruel and shocking contrivance that put an end to his life, and still more so, the want of energy in ferreting out the authors of so great a crime, evidently showed how dreadful a change for the worse had already begun to take place in the minds, hearts and conduct of the Romans. This will still more appear as we advance in their history.

WAR AGAINST JUGURTHA.—B. C. 112—106.

At the time during which the Gracchi conducted the public affairs in Rome, Numidia was governed by Micipsa, the son of the famous Masinissa, who had been, towards the end of the second Punic war, the most useful ally of the Romans. Micipsa reigned in peace for the space of thirty years. This prince had two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal; but he adopted a third in the person of Jugurtha, his nephew, a youth of splendid talents, and remarkable for his courage and activity. By his last will Micipsa appointed Jugurtha, together with Adherbal and Hiempsal, heir to his kingdom. He died shortly after (B. C. 118), having previously recommended to the three brothers perfect concord among themselves, as the essential means and the surest pledge of prosperity.*

The advice was good, but given to no effect. Scarcely had Micipsa expired, when Jugurtha, whose ambition was still greater than his talents, resolved to reign alone, and for the execution of his project, did not hesitate to imbrue his hands in the blood of

* "Nam concordia," he said to them, "res parvæ crescunt, discordia maximæ dilabuntur."—Sallust, *Bellum Jugurth.*, c. x.

his adopted brothers. He attacked them both in succession, and put them to a cruel death.

The news of these heinous deeds was quickly spread in every direction, in Italy as well as in Africa. The Romans, under whose protection the family of Masinissa was placed, and who had hitherto contented themselves with embassies and remonstrances, at length openly declared war against Jugurtha. A first campaign conducted by L. Calpurnius had no other effect than the capture of several places, and a mock treaty, in which bribery had the greatest share, between that prince and the consul. To wipe off the disgrace of this transaction, it was determined to make Jugurtha come to Rome, to give an account of his conduct; he obeyed the summons, and without much reluctance set out for that city, where he knew that corruption and venality reigned to a frightful extent.

Besides the many influential persons whom his deputies and gold had already seduced, he succeeded, on his arrival at Rome, in bribing a tribune of the people, and completely winning him over to his interest. It was agreed that this officer would exert in his behalf the tribunitial power, which allowed its possessors to stop any kind of deliberation by a simple *veto*. When therefore Jugurtha was publicly ordered to answer the charges brought against him, the tribune forbade him to speak, and by his opposition put an end to all the proceedings. Justice and honesty were thus sacrificed; iniquity triumphed; and the Numidian prince applauded himself for his success. But, having carried his criminal audacity so far as to murder, in Rome itself, another grand-son of Masinissa, he was expelled from Italy, and hostilities recommenced.*

The new generals charged with the conduct of the war in Africa, did nothing but bring fresh ignominy upon the Roman name, either by their connivance at the designs of the king, or their incapacity. One of them suffered himself to be led into a variety of useless measures by the stratagems of Jugurtha; another, after being worsted in an attack directed against his camp, was obliged to accept of terms as disgraceful as those of the treaty of Caudium in the Samnite war. Affairs began to assume a more favorable aspect, only when the command of the legions in Africa was given to Cæcilius Metellus, a man equally commendable for his military skill and his incorruptible probity. His first care

* It is said that, when Jugurtha went out from Rome, turning towards the town, he exclaimed: "O venal city, which would soon perish, if it could find a purchaser—*Urbem venalem et maturè perituram, si emptorem invenerit!*"—Sallust, c. xxxv.

was to restore discipline and to revive courage among the soldiers, to whom these essential requisites seemed, before his arrival, to be totally unknown. Advancing then against Jugurtha, he gained signal advantages over him, and notwithstanding the courageous and well directed resistance that he met from this prince, subdued nearly the whole of his kingdom. He was on the point of reaping the fruit of so much labor, when the honor of terminating the war was snatched from him by one of his lieutenants.

This officer was the famous Marius, whose talents afterwards became so useful, and whose violent passions also became so fatal to his country. The beginnings of his career, especially as a soldier, are described thus by Plutarch: He was born of obscure parents, who supported themselves by labor. It was late before he came to Rome. Till then he remained in the country, and his manner of living there was perfectly rustic, if compared with the elegance of polished life; but at the same time it was temperate, and much resembled that of the ancient Romans.

He made his first campaign against the Celtiberians, when Scipio Africanus (the Younger or Æmilianus) besieged Numantia. It did not escape the notice of his general how far he was above the other young soldiers in courage, nor how easily he came into the reformation in point of diet, which Scipio introduced into the army. It is said likewise that he performed great exploits in the sight of this general, who, on that account, distinguished him with many marks of honor, so far as to invite him to his table. One evening, as the conversation happened to turn upon the great commanders then in existence, some person in the company, either to please Scipio, or for a real desire of information, asked, "where the Romans should find such an able leader, when he had departed this life." Upon this question, Scipio, putting his hand on the shoulder of Marius who sat next to him, said; "Here, perhaps." So happy was the genius of these great men, that the one, while but a youth, gave tokens of his future abilities, and the other from those beginnings, could discover the long series of glorious exploits which was to follow.

When afterwards Marius was appointed one of the chief officers of the army in the Numidian war, he considered his promotion as a way open to him for noble achievements. That war presenting many critical occasions, he endeavored to improve them all, and neither declined the most difficult service, nor thought the most servile toil beneath his rank in the army. Thus surpassing his equals in prudence and foresight, and vieing with the common soldiers in labor and abstemiousness, he entirely gained their affections. His glory, his influence, his reputation, spread

through Africa, and extended even to Rome; the men under his command wrote to their friends at home, that the only means of bringing the Numidian contest to a close, was to elect Marius consul; he himself earnestly endeavored to secure the public feeling to his cause, by using invectives and false reports against Metellus, and making splendid promises for a speedy termination of the war. The people being thus prepossessed in his behalf, looked upon him as the best general they could intrust with the command of the Roman army in Numidia, and readily gave him their votes for the consular dignity.

Metellus was deeply afflicted at this preference given by the Roman people to his ungrateful and envious lieutenant. Contrary however to his expectation, he met at Rome with a most flattering reception from all orders of the state, and obtained triumphal honors with the surname of Numidicus. As to Marius, being an excellent general himself and pursuing the war with great skill and activity, he easily completed the overthrow of Jugurtha; not however without adding negotiations to warlike efforts, and to victories won by his valor.

The Numidian prince had sought and obtained the assistance of Bocchus, king of Mauritania. The loss of two battles in succession made the latter waver in his alliance, and he resolved to conclude a separate peace with the Romans; for this effect, he sent deputies to Marius, who on his part sent his quæstor, the famous Sylla, to deliberate with the king on their respective interests. Sylla spoke to Bocchus with much art and address, and gave him to understand that, if he were sincere in his desire for peace, he ought to purchase the friendship of the Romans by an important service, that is, by delivering Jugurtha into their hands. The king was reluctant to betray one who was his ally, his kinsman, his relative; nay, he seemed at times much inclined to betray Sylla himself, and give him up to Jugurtha who repeatedly urged him to do so. But the Roman, not less eloquent than intrepid, at length carried the point. Private interest had more weight with Bocchus than all the ties of kindred, alliance, and friendship, and finally prevailed on this base and irresolute man to comply with the views of Rome. Having invited Jugurtha to an interview, he arrested him, loaded him with chains, and immediately gave him up to the Romans (B. c. 106).

This event, although the mere effect of intrigue on the one side, and perfidy on the other, put an end to the Jugurthine war. Sylla, on that occasion, acted as one excessively desirous of fame: instead of referring the glory of the transaction (if glory it can be called) to his general, he attributed the whole to himself, and

caused a seal to be made, representing him as receiving Jugurtha from the hands of Bocchus. He ever after carried that seal about his person, and constantly made use of it for his letters. This highly provoked Marius, who was naturally ambitious and could not endure a rival in glory; hence originated that violent and implacable quarrel between these two men, which almost ruined the Roman empire.

As to Jugurtha, he was made first, as was usual for captives of his rank, to grace the conqueror's triumph. He was then thrown into a dungeon, where, having suffered for six days the pangs of starvation, he expired in awful misery (B. C. 105); a death worthy of him who had, during his lifetime, immolated so many innocent victims to his insatiable ambition.

INVASION AND DEFEAT OF THE TEUTONES AND CIMBRI.

B. C. 105—101.

It seemed to be the destiny of Rome, never to terminate a war that was not immediately followed by another. The Romans had scarcely concluded their rejoicings at the defeat of Jugurtha and the triumph of Marius, when they found themselves exposed to total destruction from the attacks of northern barbarians. Countless bands of Teutones and Cimbri, who were joined in their march by other warlike tribes, had been for some time advancing from the north-east of Europe towards the western and southern countries. Besides their myriads of well armed warriors, they had their families along with them, and all this vast multitude wanted cities in which to settle, and lands on which they might subsist.

The courage of these barbarians, their spirit, and the force and vivacity with which they made an attack, may be compared to a devouring flame. Nothing could resist their impetuosity. Many respectable armies and generals (Carbo, Silanus, Cassius, etc.), employed by the Romans to guard their frontiers in Noricum and Gaul, were overcome; and the feeble barrier which they opposed to this new enemy, served only to encourage his pretensions and favor his progress.

To increase, as it were, the fury of the storm thus hanging over Italy, Rome had the imprudence, in the year B. C. 105, to intrust the command of her armies in Gaul to generals equally unskilful and presumptuous, the consul Mallius and the proconsul Cæpio. This rash step was the forerunner of the most bloody defeat ever experienced by the Romans. In a battle fought near the river Rhone, eighty thousand of their soldiers were slain, together with

forty thousand in the service of the army ; it is said that no more than ten Romans escaped from this dreadful carnage. Fortunately the conquerors, instead of invading Italy at once and advancing towards Rome, lost their time in other expeditions. This delay allowed the Roman people to recover from their terror, and muster new troops ; but their chief resource against the still impending danger was in Marius. The better to enable him to exert his talents and activity, by an unprecedented example in the annals of the republic, he was continued in the consulship for several years in succession.

He was consul for the fourth time, when the Teutones and Cimbri, having laid waste a considerable part of Gaul and Spain, resumed their former design of attacking Rome. They made two grand divisions of their army, and, while one intended to follow the ordinary road through Liguria along the sea-coast, the other, making a long circuit, undertook to penetrate into Italy by the valley of Trent. Marius opposed the first, composed chiefly of the Teutones and Ambrones ; and Catulus his colleague, marched against the Cimbri.

Marius stationed his legions at the confluence of the Isere and the Rhone, and fortified his camp in the most effectual manner. The barbarians, reproaching him with cowardice for taking these precautions, challenged him to a battle ; but the consul, well aware that this was not a proper opportunity for an engagement, like a wise commander, disregarded the challenge, and said to his men, who were surprised at his conduct, that their present ambition should be not to obtain triumphs and trophies, but to dispel the awful storm that threatened them, and to save Italy from destruction.

The enemy, then, not being able in any way to bring the Romans to a pitched battle ; attacked their intrenchments ; but they were received with a shower of darts from the camp, which destroyed a large number of them and compelled the rest to withdraw. They soon became weary of this state of things, and resolved to go forward, in the hope that they might cross the Alps without opposition and difficulty. Their immense numbers now appeared more clearly than ever, from the length of their train and the time which they occupied in passing. For it is said that, although they moved on without intermission, they were six days in going by the Roman camp, and some of them approaching it, insultingly asked the legionaries, "whether they had any commands to their families." (See in the Appendix § IV.)

The barbarians had no sooner passed, than Marius also removed his camp and closely followed them, using at the same time every precaution to avoid surprise. When he arrived

at the colony of Aquæ Sextiæ (now Aix in Provence), he resolved, without going further, to give them battle. Having chosen a spot extremely favorable to his army, he attacked the enemy with immense advantage, and in a combat which lasted two days, put the greater part of them to the sword. According to the Latin historians,* one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand barbarians were slain, and about eighty thousand, with Teuto-bochus their king, taken prisoners. Thus, one-half of the hordes that had been for several years so formidable to the Romans, was destroyed by the valor and skill of Marius, (B. C. 102).

This general, being now appointed consul for the fifth time, went to join Catulus, whose first exertions against the Cimbri, without any fault of his, had not been equally successful with those of his colleague. The overwhelming numbers of the invaders so terrified the legionaries under him, that many began to desert their colors; still, on the junction of the two armies, their courage was revived, and the generals determined to give another battle. But the Cimbri deferred the combat, pretending that they were waiting for the Teutones, at whose delay they wondered, either being really ignorant of their fate or not believing their defeat. For they punished with stripes those who brought them the news of the late engagement, and sent to ask of Marius lands and cities sufficient both for themselves and their brethren.

When Marius enquired of their ambassadors who their brethren were, they answered, "the Teutones." The assembly laughed, and Marius replied in a taunting manner: "Do not trouble yourselves about your brethren; for they have land enough, which we have already given them, and they shall have it for ever." The ambassadors, perceiving the irony, answered in sharp and scurrilous terms, assuring him that the Cimbri would chastise him immediately, and that the Teutones would do the same when they arrived. "And they are not far off," said Marius; "it would, therefore, be very unkind in you to go away without saluting your brethren." At the same time, he ordered the chieftains of the Teutones to be brought forward, loaded as they were with chains; for they had been taken prisoners after their defeat, as they were endeavoring to escape over the Alps.

No sooner did the Cimbri learn from their ambassadors what had passed, than they marched directly against Marius; but he, for the present, remained within his trenches. Then Boiorix,

* Livy's *Epitome*, b. lxxviii;—Velleius Paterc. b. ii, c. 11;—and Florus, though not equally explicit, b. iii, c. 3.

their king, with a small party of horse, approached the Roman camp, and challenged the consul to appoint a time and place at which they might meet, and decide by arms to whom the country should belong. Marius answered that the Romans were not in the habit of consulting their enemies about the place and time in which they thought proper to fight; still, he would gratify the Cimbri in this point. Accordingly, they agreed to fight the third day after, and chose for their field of battle the plain of Vercellæ, which was well adapted for the Roman cavalry to act with perfect ease, and convenient for the barbarians to display their numbers (B. C. 101).

Both parties kept their promise, and drew up their forces. Catulus received the enemy in front; Marius made a movement to assail them on their flank, but as they were concealed by the clouds of dust which every where rose from the plain, he for a time missed his way, and, it appears, could not engage the Cimbri, till they had already been repulsed with great loss by the troops of Catulus. Marius at least concurred in completing their overthrow, by attacking them when they were already quite exhausted by their own efforts, their loss on the field of battle, and the heat of the day. One hundred and twenty or forty thousand of them were slain with their king Boiorix; sixty thousand submitted to be taken prisoners. The remainder perished by their own hands; and this numerous host, so terrific and threatening a few hours before, disappeared, as it were, in a moment from the face of the earth.*

On receiving at Rome the news of this decisive result, the whole city resounded with joy. Extraordinary marks of gratitude were conferred on Marius; and, besides the honors of a solemn triumph, which he enjoyed together with Catulus, he received from the people the flattering title of third founder of Rome, which placed him in their esteem next to Romulus and the great Camillus.

* According to certain memoirs cited by Plutarch, "the baggage was plundered by the soldiers of Marius; but the other spoils, with the ensigns and trumpets, were brought to the camp of Catulus, and the latter availed himself chiefly of this fact, to show that the defeat of the Cimbri had been achieved by him and the legions which he commanded. It appears, indeed, that a warm dispute arose between his troops and those of Marius, which of the two had the greater share in the victory; and some ambassadors from Parma, who happened to be in the Roman camp, were chosen as arbitrators. The soldiers of Catulus led them to the field of battle to see the dead, and clearly proved that the Cimbri were killed by their javelins, because Catulus had taken care, before the conflict, to have the shafts inscribed with his name. Nevertheless, the whole honor of the day was ascribed to Marius, on account of his former victory and his present superiority of power;" for he was then a consul, whereas Catulus acted only as a proconsul.—Plutarch, in *Caïum Marium*.

MARIUS CONTINUED.—WAR OF THE ALLIES, OR THE CONFEDERATE WAR.—FIRST WAR AGAINST MITHRIDATES.—CIVIL WAR BETWEEN MARIUS AND SYLLA.—VICTORIES, POWER, ABDICATION, AND DEATH OF SYLLA.—B. C. 100—78.

We place these different wars and facts under the same title, not only because they occurred during the same period of time, but especially on account of their close connexion with each other.*

It would have been fortunate for Marius, if, satisfied with the honor which he had gained at the head of armies, he had withdrawn from public affairs. But his ambition could not brook the idea of being reduced to the occupations of private life. By dint of intrigues, he succeeded in being re-elected consul a sixth time, and, having no military expedition to conduct, found employment for his restless mind by joining a faction of demagogues, whose sole object was to excite new disturbances in the republic. His jealousy was particularly directed against the illustrious Metellus Numidicus, whom he caused for a time to live in exile; and still more so against Sylla, whose reputation for skill and valor daily increased. The latter, although but the second in command during the late war, both under Marius himself and Catulus, had gained much glory by his exploits and services. He was, moreover, on his own part, too proud and too lofty in his pretensions, to bear with patience the envious opposition of Marius. New incidents added fuel to their animosity, and this disposition seemed ready to break out into open hostilities, when the war of the allies required the exertions of both Marius and Sylla for the defence of the commonwealth, and delayed the effects of their mutual resentment.

The various nations of Italy had long petitioned for the title of Roman citizens. Their reasons for obtaining this privilege were, that they paid considerable taxes; that in time of war they furnished more than one-half of the Roman armies; that the commonwealth was greatly indebted to their valor for the high degree of power and glory which it enjoyed, and consequently, it was but just that they should be admitted to share in the privi-

* See Livy's *Epitome*, b. lxix--xc;—Freinshemius, *Supplem. to the same books of Livy*;—Florus, b. iii, c. 5, 18, 21—Velleius Paterculus, b. ii, c. 14–20;—Plutarch's *lives of Marius and Sylla*;—Ferguson's *Rome*, b. ii, c. 6, 7;—Vertot, *Revolutions Romaines*, b. x and xi;—Crevier (Rollin's continuator), *Histoire Romaine*, vol. ix and x;—etc.

leges of a state, whose empire they had contributed so much to extend. But the senate and the people of Rome generally disliked to accept for their equals men whom, under the specious name of allies, they were used to consider as the subjects or vassals of the republic. Accordingly, the Italians determined to wrest by force of arms what they could not obtain by mere request. They sent into the field numerous bodies of troops, not inferior in resolution, courage and discipline, to the Romans themselves, with whom they had so often fought against foreign enemies. The senate, on their part, were not idle in making preparations for the approaching conflict. They hastened to muster a larger number of legions than was customary, and distributing them into various bodies for the purpose of acting in various places at once, put them under the command of all the ablest generals of the republic. Such was the origin of what is called in Roman history the War of the allies, or the Confederate war—*Sociale bellum*.

This war occasioned many bloody engagements, pitched battles, captures or surrenders of cities, and other similar events whose particulars are little known. "It cost," says Velleius Paterculus, "the lives of more than three hundred thousand men, the flower of the Italian youth." During the years B. C. 90—89, victory repeatedly passed from one side to the other, and the two hostile parties did little else than inflict and incur losses, without abating their pretensions and animosity. Towards the end, indeed, the Romans gained signal advantages; yet the senate, perceiving that even their victories were hurtful to them, by depriving the commonwealth of many brave defenders, began to alter their line of conduct towards the Italians, though they did so with caution, taking great care to preserve the dignity of the Roman name. They at first granted the title of Roman citizens to those only who had persevered in their alliance with Rome; but they, afterwards, extended it to such among the confederates as consented to lay down their arms.

This policy was perfectly successful. The ardor of the enemy was greatly damped by the hope of obtaining in this easy manner the object of their wishes. The several tribes of Italy hastened to make a treaty, and the Romans, with their usual magnanimity or prudence, conceded in behalf of divided and weakened enemies, what they had refused in the time of their confederacy and greatest vigor. There only remained to carry on the contest, the Samnites and Lucanians, the ancient enemies of Rome; and even these, in maintaining it for some years longer, displayed more animosity than real strength, nor did they keep the field

otherwise than by joining in the civil feuds which shortly after distracted and harassed the commonwealth.

During the war of the allies, the reputation of Sylla increased, whilst that of Marius decreased in the same proportion. The latter now seemed slow in his attacks, as well as dilatory in his resolutions, whether it was because age had chilled his martial ardor (for he was more than sixty-five years old), or because, as he himself acknowledged, the fatigues of war were above his bodily strength. However, he took care to give the enemy no advantage over him, and once he even defeated them in a great battle, in which at least six thousand of them were killed. But pretending soon to be incapacitated for the service by his infirmities, he resigned the command. Sylla, still full of vigor and activity, had acted in a very different manner: by the combined exertions of his courage and skill, he won several battles, subdued important cities, and performed so many memorable things, that he was considered by the citizens at large as a great general, by his friends as the greatest in the world, and by his enemies as the most fortunate. Under such circumstances, it was easy for him to obtain the dignity of consul, and together with it the command of those legions that were destined to fight against the famous Mithridates, king of Pontus.

Mithridates, a talented and warlike, and at the same time, an ambitious, unjust and savage prince, was, next to Annibal, the most implacable enemy of the Romans. His empire chiefly consisted of territories lately acquired by force of arms. His troops amounted to nearly three hundred thousand, with whom he conquered Asia Minor and Greece, whilst a fleet of four hundred vessels made him master of the neighboring seas and of many islands. These forces were under the command of able generals; but Mithridates himself was their chief commander, and, when he did not lead them in person, he at least directed their principal operations. The conquests which he had most at heart, were those of Cappadocia and Bithynia, two neighboring kingdoms: he wrested them from Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes, their sovereigns and the allies of Rome; and to destroy, with the least possible delay, the influence of that city, and secure his own power over all the east, he caused about a hundred thousand Romans or Italians who inhabited Asia Minor, to be slaughtered on the same day (B. C. 88).

This barbarous act, added to the other aggressions of Mithridates, deserved severe and prompt chastisement. The charge of inflicting it was confided to Sylla, then a consul, who immediately began to prepare every thing for his departure. But Marius

could not see, without the utmost jealousy, so important a commission given to any one but himself; by intrigues and violence, during the absence of Sylla from Rome, he caused the appointment to be changed in his own favor. The consul, not having yet left Italy and being apprised of this insult, returned at the head of his legions, entered the city as a conqueror, and, though he used great moderation towards the generality of the citizens, put the chief partisans of his envious competitor either to death or to flight.

Marius himself, whom the senate, at Sylla's request, declared a public enemy, was one of the fugitives. Being closely pursued, he narrowly escaped with his life, and was obliged first to conceal himself in marshes, and then to cross the sea and seek a shelter on distant shores, amidst the dreary ruins of Carthage. Even there he was not safe. For, he had scarcely landed with a few of his men, when an officer came from Sextilius, the Roman governor in Africa, to forbid him to set his foot in that region; otherwise, Sextilius would obey the decree of the senate, and treat him as a public enemy. Marius, hearing this, was struck with grief and indignation; he uttered not a word for some time, but regarded the officer with a menacing aspect. At length this man asked what answer he should carry to the governor? "Go, and tell him," said the unhappy exile with a sigh, "that thou hast seen Marius a fugitive, sitting on the ruins of Carthage!" This was, indeed, a striking coincidence, and a forcible exemplification of the vicissitudes of human prosperity. Marius continued to exemplify it in his person, by wandering in search of a hospitable land, till a new change (to be afterwards noticed) in the state of affairs recalled him to Italy and to Rome.

In the interim, Sylla with his legionaries had set out for the east, and commenced a vigorous war against Mithridates. Finding Greece occupied by the troops of this prince, he began his military operations with the siege of Athens, and carried that city by storm after a long and brave resistance. From thence he proceeded to Chæronea in Bœotia, where he found himself opposed by an army three or four times as numerous as his own, and amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men. They were under the command of Archelaus, the ablest, perhaps, among all the generals of Mithridates. It was not the intention of this general to give battle to the Romans, but rather, by a dilatory war, gradually to undermine their strength; his chief officers, however, at length prevailed on him to fight, and all prepared for a general engagement. This was perfectly in accordance with the views of Sylla. He made the necessary preparations, and so well did he concert his measures and animate his troops, that he gained

a complete victory; of so many myriads of the enemy's soldiers, only ten thousand escaped the swords of the Romans.

Shortly after, he obtained another signal advantage, in the plains of Orchomenus, over a new and powerful army sent by Mithridates into Greece. The beginning of the action was very unfavorable to the Romans; several bodies of their troops, terrified by a sudden attack of the barbarians, gave way and fled. At the sight of this panic, Sylla dismounted from his horse, seized one of the colors, and fearlessly advancing towards the enemy, cried out to those around him that were flying: "It is glorious for me to die here; as for you, Romans, when you shall be asked where you abandoned your general, remember to say that it was at Orchomenus." These reproaches and his example revived the courage of his soldiers; they returned to the charge, and repulsed the enemy. A similar attack which the troops of Mithridates made a short time after the first, likewise ended in their defeat. Finally, a third engagement completed their overthrow. They experienced such a loss, that the fens were filled with the blood of the slain, and the small lakes of the neighborhood with dead bodies; Archelaus, their general, escaped only by remaining for the space of two days concealed in the marshes. From thence he went to Chalcis, where he occupied himself in collecting the remnants of his two armies (B. C. 86).

Mithridates, dismayed both by these defeats and by other losses suffered at the same time in Asia, commissioned Archelaus to make proposals of peace. This general was aware of the necessity which urged Sylla to return speedily to Rome for the recovery of his party, now oppressed there and nearly crushed by that of Marius: he offered him the money, vessels and troops of his sovereign to make war in Italy, provided the undisturbed possession of Lesser Asia should be left to Mithridates. Sylla's indignation was roused at this offer; still he dissembled his feelings for a moment, and in his turn exhorted Archelaus to make himself king in the place of Mithridates, promising to aid him in this enterprise, provided he would deliver the fleet under his command into the hands of the Romans. Archelaus protested, and declared his detestation of such perfidy. "Why!" exclaimed Sylla, "you, the slave, or at best, the friend of a barbarian king, look upon it as baseness to betray your master; and dare you propose the like treason to Sylla, the Roman general! As if you were not that Archelaus, who at Chæronea fled with a handful of men, the sad remains of one hundred and twenty thousand; who concealed himself two days in the marshes of Orchomenus; and left the roads of Bœotia blocked up with heaps of dead bodies."

Archelaus was thunderstruck at this answer; he lowered his pretensions, and accepted all the terms which Sylla thought proper to impose on the king of Pontus. But when the king himself was desired to ratify the treaty, he showed great reluctance with respect to two of its conditions, the delivery of his vessels, and the surrender of Paphlagonia. "What," said Sylla with animation, "does Mithridates pretend to keep Paphlagonia, and refuse the vessels which I have demanded? Mithridates, I say, who ought rather to have entreated me, on his knees, to spare the man who has slain so many Romans." The king was obliged to yield. He lost by this treaty his conquests, his navy, a great part of his treasures, and was confined to the former limits of the kingdom of Pontus; a loss much embittered by the contrast of the great designs he had formed, added to the odium of the many crimes he had committed to gratify his ambition.

Whilst Sylla caused the Roman power to be respected abroad, he was, in consequence of the animosity of the party opposed to him, ill requited at home for his services. During his long absence, Marius had re-entered Rome, and being supported by numerous bands of factious men and slaves, he employed them in destroying his real or imaginary opponents. Such of the citizens, even the most illustrious senators and magistrates, as were obnoxious to him and would not or could not make their escape, were mercilessly put to death. The slaughter was extended to a multitude of other persons whose only crime was to be possessed of great wealth, or to have ever so little incurred the suspicions of the vindictive Marius. It was understood by his partizans that his refusal to return a salutation should be considered as a death warrant. Rancor and exasperated ambition had rendered him a real monster of cruelty. His very friends did not approach him without fear; and as the meanest retainers of his party had their personal resentments as well as himself, and took this opportunity to indulge their passions, the city resembled a place taken by storm, and every quarter of the city was a theatre of robbery, violence and murder. This frightful state of things continued without intermission five days and five nights.

Nor was the evil confined to Rome; all Italy felt the effects of the implacable fury of Marius. Every road, every town, was full of assassins, pursuing and hunting the unhappy victims of his suspicion. Few of the latter escaped. They could trust neither friends nor relatives, and most of them were betrayed by those in whose dwellings they had sought shelter. As to Marius, the chief author of so many evils, being yet at a very advanced age not less ambitious than cruel, he caused himself to be appointed

consul for the seventh time, not by the people, but by Cinna, the other consul. In the mean while, the fear of Sylla's return gave him incessant uneasiness. He was agitated with nocturnal terrors, and betrayed symptoms of a distracted mind. Either to avoid a new misfortune, or to shake off the pressure of increasing alarms, he began to indulge in the excessive use of wine, and fell sick of the pleurisy, of which he died on the 7th day of his illness, the 17th day of his last consulate, and in the 70th year of his life (B. C. 86), leaving behind him a name more worthy of the execration than of the admiration of posterity.*

After the death of Marius, the government continued in the hands of his abettors. Many of the senators and other citizens, obnoxious to the prevailing party, took refuge with Sylla. This general himself was declared a public enemy; his house was demolished; and his children, with Metella their mother, having narrowly escaped the pursuit of their enemies, fled to their father in Greece. So many unpleasant tidings did not change Sylla's mind and conduct with regard to the war which he was still waging against the king of Pontus, nor induce him to make any concessions to the enemies of Rome. He declared indeed his intention to avenge the blood of his friends and punish the disturbers of the commonwealth, but not till he had forced Mithridates to make reparation for the wrongs he had done to the Romans or their allies. Having at length settled the affairs of the east by a treaty equally honorable to the Roman name and to himself, he set out for the west at the head of forty thousand brave veterans, devoted to the cause of their general. With this force he landed on the shores of Italy, and found that amazing preparations had been made against him by the party of Marius. His enemies, who had been joined by the Samnites and Lucanians, were supposed to have, at different stations, upwards of two hundred thousand men under fifteen generals.

Against so many opponents, who, happily for him, did not well combine their efforts, Sylla dexterously and successfully employed stratagem blended with valor. Carbo, one of the chief leaders in the opposite party, said, on this account, that in Sylla he had to contend both with a fox and a lion, but that the fox gave him the greater trouble. Moreover, the great reputation of this general drew numbers of soldiers to his standard, and being ably seconded by Crassus and Pompey, who then began to signa-

* *Fuit Caius Marius, quantum bello optimus, tantum pace pessimus... in bello hostibus, in otio civibus infestissimus.*—Velleius Patere. b. ii, c. 10, 16.

lize themselves, he every where prevailed over the party of Marius.

Still, a decisive battle fought under the walls of Rome, was very near snatching from him the fruit of all his labors. The last of the enemy's armies was under the command of Telesinus, the Samnite, an experienced and intrepid man, worthy of being an antagonist of Sylla and Pompey. Having deceived these two generals by a skilful march, he reached by night the neighborhood of the Roman capital, which he knew to be almost defenceless. The day following, Sylla followed him closely, and when he arrived found the enemy preparing to force the gates of the city. He gave orders for an immediate attack. The conflict, carried on between two armies of determined valor and rendered still more furious by inveterate hatred, was obstinate in the extreme, and victory remained for a long time doubtful. The left wing of Sylla's army, being attacked by the whole strength of the Samnites, was much distressed, and at first compelled to give way; but the right wing under Crassus was completely victorious. The action, so varied in its results throughout different parts of the field, became at length completely decisive in behalf of the Romans. Telesinus, whilst animating his troops by word and example, fell covered with wounds, and together with him nearly the whole of his army was cut to pieces; for Sylla had ordered to give no quarter. This battle was a death-blow to the party of Marius, and prostrated it for ever in Italy (B. c. 82).

Until this period, Sylla's conduct in his capacity of magistrate and general had been praiseworthy, or at least generally excusable. Had he ceased to live on the day on which he conquered the rest of his enemies, he might have seemed worthy of his fortune, and of the surname of *fortunate*, or prosperous, which he liked to assume. But from this time forward, he appeared chiefly as an odious tyrant. His prosperity, his resentment of personal wrongs, and perhaps an idea that the state was to be purged of its evils by the death of all their authors, changed his former moderation into unflinching rigor, and made him sully the glory of his triumph by cruel and bloody retaliation. The day after his victory over Telesinus and the Samnites, he put to death several thousand soldiers of the Marian party, who had surrendered to him under promise of life. Even that butchery was only the beginning of the terrible executions which he contemplated. Causing himself to be invested by the people, or rather investing himself, with unlimited power and the dictatorial dignity for an indefinite time, he doomed to death the remnants of the vanquished with

unabated animosity. The lists of proscription were put up not only in Rome, but in all the cities of Italy. Neither the temple, nor the paternal roof, nor the hospitable hearth, was any sure protection against murder; and those who were sacrificed to party spirit and private resentment, were not to be compared in number with those who perished on account of their wealth. There were put to death for one or the other of these reasons, about two thousand senators and knights, and a far greater number of other citizens or allies, whose blood flowed like a stream in some parts of Italy.

When these dreadful executions began to subside, the dictator set himself about enacting various regulations, and endeavoring to restore the commonwealth, as far as possible, to its former state. He revived or increased the penalties against crimes peculiarly hurtful to society, such as perjury, the adulteration of coin, poisoning, and assassination. Being aware how often and how much the tribunitial power had been misused, he considerably weakened it, and replaced the chief authority in the hands of the senate and patrician order. These measures were wholesome and expedient; not so, however, was the course which he pursued in behalf of the troops who had fought under his banner, and whose number had increased to more than a hundred thousand men. As a reward for their services to his cause, he distributed among them the lands of those who had belonged to the opposite party. Besides the violence implied in this measure, subsequent leaders of parties in the state learned, from his example, how to gain the legions over to their interests, and, by immense largesses, to attach them much more to their persons than to the republic.

Sylla, by this time, had governed the state for two years with absolute power, and public opinion or flattery, repeatedly expressed in his behalf, seemed to have sanctioned his authority, when he resolved to lay it down of his own accord. In fact, this singular man, to the astonishment of every one, freely resigned that high station, the highest indeed ever obtained by any Roman, which he had only reached through torrents of human blood. But, although he had now reduced himself to the condition of a private citizen, he continued to inspire so much respect or fear, that among the myriads of persons who had to consider him as the destroyer of their relatives and friends, not one thought or dared to avenge them by his death.

Sylla spent his leisure hours, first in country amusements and the composition of his memoirs, and then also, to his own cost, in licentiousness and debauchery. His excesses occasioned or

increased a distemper, which carried him off in the sixtieth year of his life (B. C. 78). Like Marius, he had been successively a most useful instrument and a most terrible scourge to his country; and he himself expressed the exact truth about his character, when he prepared the following inscription to be engraved on his tomb: "Here lies Sylla, who never was outdone in good offices by a friend, nor in acts of hostility and revenge by an enemy." "Being rapacious in a high degree," says Plutarch, "he was still more liberal; and in preferring or disgracing whom he pleased equally unaccountable. . . . He would sometimes put men to cruel tortures on slight grounds, and sometimes overlook the greatest crimes. He would easily take some persons into favor after the most unpardonable offences, while he took vengeance on others for small and trifling faults by death or confiscation of goods. These things can be no otherwise reconciled, than by admitting that he was severe and vindictive in his temper, but occasionally checked those inclinations, when his own interest was concerned."*

Such is the judgment of Plutarch on Sylla; a judgment adopted by the generality of historians, and unfortunately too well substantiated by facts. Still, there are not wanting grave authors who, without intending to justify Sylla altogether, yet think much less unfavorably of this famous Roman with respect to his character as a politician, his motives, and the acts of his public life. Such, in particular, is the view taken of the subject by the learned Ferguson, in his *History of the progress and termination of the Roman Republic*.† Whether the view be accurate or not, is left to the judgment of the reader; but the following quotation will serve at least to throw much light on this important part of Roman history.

"Sylla's resignation throws a new light on his character, and leads to a favorable construction of some of the most exceptionable part of his conduct. When, with the help of the comment it affords, we look back to the establishments he made while in power, they appear not to be the act of a determined usurper, but to be fitted for a republican government, and for the restoration of that order which the violence and corruption of the times had suspended.

"That he was actuated by a violent resentment of personal wrongs, cannot be questioned; but it is likewise evident that he felt on proper occasions for the honor and preservation of his

* Plutarch, in *Syll*.

† See b. ii, 7, towards the end of the chapter.

country, in the noblest sense of these words. . . . In his capacity of a political reformer, he had to work on the dregs of a corrupted republic.—Where the gangrene spread in such a body, it was likely to require the amputation-knife: however violent the remedy, there is reason to believe that Sylla deemed it absolutely requisite;—and although the effect fell short of what is ascribed to fabulous legislators, yet to none ever were ascribed more tokens of magnanimity and greatness of mind.*

“There remained, in the city, at his death, a numerous body of new citizens who bore his name. . . . numbers throughout the empire, who owed their safety to his protection, and who ascribed the existence of the commonwealth itself to the exertions of his great ability and courage: numbers who, although they were offended with the severe exercise of his power, yet admired the magnanimity of his resignation.

“When he was no longer an object of flattery, his corpse was carried in procession through Italy at the public expense. The fasces, and every other ensign of honor, were restored to the dead. Above two thousand golden crowns were fabricated in haste, by order of the towns or provinces he had protected, or of the private persons he had preserved, to testify their veneration for his memory.

“His merit or demerit in the principal transactions of his life may be variously estimated. His having slain so many citizens in cold blood, and without any form of law, if we imagine them to have been innocent, or if we conceive the republic to have been in a state to allow them a trial, must be considered as monstrous or criminal in the highest degree: but if none of these suppositions were just; if they were guilty of the greatest crimes, and were themselves the authors of that lawless state to which their country was reduced, his having saved the republic from the hands of such ruffians, and purged it of the vilest dregs that ever threatened to poison a free state, may be considered as meritorious.”

* We present here in a few words, taken nearly all from the author himself, what he says at much greater length in two successive paragraphs.

EXPLOITS OF SERTORIUS IN SPAIN, AND OF SPARTACUS IN ITALY.—B. C. 80—71.

AFTER the year B. C. 82, the party of Marius was prostrated in Italy; but it continued some years longer in Sicily, Africa, and Spain; to Pompey was reserved the honor of crushing its last remains in these various regions. Africa and Sicily did not cost him much trouble; but he had terrible difficulties to encounter in Spain. Here the struggle was carried on with great vigor and success by Sertorius, probably the best man, and, beyond all comparison, the ablest general of the Marian party. No leader of an army, during the period of the civil war, surpassed him in wisdom of measures, boldness of execution, intrepidity in danger, and especially skill in taking advantage of the mountains, passes and defiles, in a word, of every part of the country. In this respect, he was a second Annibal; and the Spaniards, among whom the memory of the great Carthaginian leader was not yet obliterated, gave him the name of that famous general. He deserved it the more, as he knew, like him, by a happy mixture of justice, moderation and liberality, how to acquire and preserve a wonderful influence over the minds of his soldiers.

The natives themselves were taught to place an unbounded confidence in Sertorius; and the astonishing increase of his power, far above what they could reasonably expect, confirmed them in this disposition. For, with scarcely eight thousand men at first, he maintained the contest against four Roman generals, who had a hundred and twenty thousand foot, six thousand horse, and cities without number under their command; whilst he, at the commencement of his campaigns, had no more than twenty cities. Yet, with so trifling a force he subdued several great nations, took many cities, and won many battles. The great Pompey himself, one of the generals sent against Sertorius, was severely handled by him; being worsted a first and second time, he ran the risk of still greater loss, when he was rescued from it by the timely assistance of his colleague, Metellus Pius. As Metellus was much older than Pompey, Sertorius said on this occasion: "If the old woman had not been here, I would have flogged the boy well, and sent him back to Rome."

But Sertorius himself had in his own camp a secret enemy much more to be feared, than those who opposed him in the field. This was Perpenna, his second in command, an ambitious and

jealous man, who, on account of his high birth and parentage, could not bear to hold an inferior rank in the army. To reach the object of his ambition, the title of commander-in-chief, he treacherously invited Sertorius to a repast, during which he caused this great man to be murdered by a band of assassins (B. C. 73). In consequence of this melancholy event, the war in Spain was soon brought to an end; Pompey defeated with the greatest ease the remains of that party, put Perpenna to death, and returned with Metellus Pius to Rome, where they enjoyed together the honors of a triumph.

The struggle against Sertorius and Perpenna was not yet ended, when a new and more dangerous contest broke out in Italy. There prevailed among the Romans a barbarous custom of making slaves meet in mortal combat, for the amusement of the people, or the diversion of their masters. These unfortunate men were chiefly Thracians and Gauls or Germans, but bore the common name of *gladiators*. Seventy or eighty of them, having escaped from their place of confinement, retired to some fastness on the ascent to Mount Vesuvius, whence they began to harass the neighborhood with a terrible warfare. They acknowledged for their leader Spartacus, a Thracian captive, whose talents, courage and magnanimity raised him far above the servile condition to which he had been reduced. Success increased his numbers; multitudes of slaves from every quarter flocked to his standard, and in a short time gave a very serious appearance to the insurrection.

Spartacus, by his valor and conduct, and even by his wisdom and generosity, acquired as much authority as if he had been a legal commander. He employed many of his followers in fabricating arms, and formed the multitudes that resorted to him into regular bodies, till at length he collected an army of seventy thousand men, which overran the country to a great extent. He had already defeated the prætors Clodius, Varinus and Cossinius with all their forces; so that it became necessary to send another prætor, Arrius, and the two consuls Gellius and Lentulus, at the head of their respective armies, against this formidable enemy. But these new generals, although they obtained at first a great advantage over a separate body of the insurgents, were in their turn signally defeated by Spartacus; shortly after, he likewise repulsed the proconsul Cassius and the prætor Manlius, and by this fresh series of victories, not only retrieved his loss, but even was enabled to raise the number of his men to a hundred and twenty thousand.

The Romans, greatly embarrassed and thrown into some degree

of consternation, at length committed the conduct of their troops in Italy to Marcus Crassus, the same who had given proofs of judgment and courage in the civil wars under Sylla. Crassus assembled no less than six legions, with which he went in search of the enemy. Upon his arrival in Lucania, he cut off ten thousand men, who were stationed at some distance from the main body of their army, and pursuing his advantage, endeavored to shut up the rest of their troops in the narrow peninsula of Bruttium. Having failed in this measure, owing to a bold contrivance of Spartacus who forced the lines during the dark, he at least closely followed him, harassed him in his flight, and by another attack skilfully prepared and well directed, again destroyed a large number of gladiators.

The two leaders, at length, came simultaneously to the resolution of hazarding a general and decisive battle. Spartacus, in order to show his full determination to conquer or to die, killed his own charger in presence of all, saying that, "if he were victorious, he would have plenty of horses, and if conquered, he would not stand in need of any."* He fought, indeed, with the most undaunted valor, and made his chief attack where he understood that the Roman general was posted. He intended to decide the action by forcing the Romans in that quarter; but, after much bloodshed, after he had killed two centurions with his own hand, and made, to the last, extraordinary exertions of courage, he himself was wounded, overwhelmed by superior numbers, and slain.

His death gave a complete victory to the Romans; as they allowed no quarter, the carnage was frightful, and no fewer than forty thousand of the insurgents were put to the sword. Moreover, soon after the battle, many of the fugitives having rallied and formed a body of five thousand, fell into the hands of Pompey, who had just arrived from Spain, and were cut in pieces. This trifling and easy advantage furnished his vanity with a pretence for boasting that, not Crassus, but *he* had rooted out the very seeds of the rebellion. History has been more equitable, and every one admits that to Crassus, and to his equally judicious and brave conduct, incontestibly belongs the honor of having terminated so dangerous a war (B. C. 71).

*Plutarch, in the *life of Crassus*.

SECOND WAR AGAINST MITHRIDATES.—SPLENDID VICTORIES OF LUCULLUS.—PRIVATE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THIS GENERAL.—B. C. 74—67.

MITHRIDATES, the king of Pontus, had been principally occupied, since his treaty with Sylla, in devising the proper means to renew the war with success. Aware of the difficulties created by Sertorius against Rome, he availed himself of them to execute his own designs. Having again mustered numerous forces, he attacked the possessions or allies of the Romans situated near his frontier, and soon recovered the ground which he had recently lost in that portion of Asia. Cotta, one of the consuls for the year B. C. 74, far from being able to check his advance, was himself defeated in two battles; and the conqueror then proceeded to attack Cyzicum, an important maritime city on the shore of the Propontis, and invested it with three hundred thousand men by land and four hundred vessels by sea.

Such was the situation of affairs, when the other Roman consul arrived at the head of his legions. This was Licinius Lucullus, formerly one of Sylla's lieutenants during the first war against Mithridates, and now an excellent commander himself, the more worthy of admiration, as the first period of his life did not seem to promise any thing very remarkable in this respect. He had spent his youth in forensic studies; and whilst he exercised the office of quæstor in Asia, the province had always enjoyed peace. But his natural genius made ample compensation for his want of adequate experience. Having employed the time of his journey from Rome to the east, partly in consulting expert warriors, and partly in reading books of history, he arrived in Asia an able commander, though he had left Italy with only an imperfect knowledge of the art of warfare.*

But the science of war was but a secondary quality in Lucullus. He displayed, during his expedition, other qualities still more worthy of esteem, such as magnanimity towards Cotta, his rash and envious colleague, to whom he gave speedy relief in misfortune; humanity towards his soldiers, whose blood and lives he spared as much as he could; justice and unflinching zeal, to repress the rapacity of the Roman farmers and usurers in the

* *Ingenii magnitudo non desideravit usûs disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in rebus gestis legendis; in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Romæ profectus rei militaris rudis.*—Cicero *Acad. Quæst.* b iv, n. 2.

countries of Asia; in fine, generosity and kindness towards even prisoners of war. These noble actions and virtues do more honor to Lucullus, than all his splendid victories.

Mithridates, as we before remarked, had laid siege to Cyzicum, a town of considerable importance, and occupied himself in battering the place with a vast number of engines. But the defence was not less vigorous than the attack, and the besieged made prodigious exertions to repel every effort of the assailants, either burning their machines, or in a thousand other ways endeavoring to render them useless. What encouraged most effectually the inhabitants of Cyzicum, was the promise which Lucullus had made to them, that if they continued to defend themselves with courage, he would surely prevent their city from being taken by Mithridates.

He fully redeemed his pledge, and did even more than he had promised. Taking possession of a neighboring height, he, from this advantageous post, so annoyed the besiegers by cutting off their detachments and convoys, that he made them experience all the horrors of famine, and finally compelled them, after fruitless efforts during nearly two years, to abandon their undertaking. Mithridates withdrew by sea, whilst his generals had orders to lead the remnant of their army by land to Lampsacus. Lucullus pursued these fugitives, and overtaking them near the river Granicus, killed twenty thousand of them and made a great number of prisoners. It is said that the enemy lost in this campaign nearly three hundred thousand men, including soldiers and servants of the army.* The royal fleet met with an equally disastrous overthrow; after being twice defeated by Lucullus, it was almost entirely destroyed by a tempest on the Euxine sea.

The first fruit of so many victories won in a short time, was the reduction of all Bithynia. The conqueror then advanced by the way of Galatia, and entering Pontus, transferred the seat of war into the heart of the king's dominions. Mithridates still made some show of resistance, but was again routed with his whole army; nay, the victorious Romans followed him so closely, that he was on the point of becoming their captive, but, either by accident or by the contrivance of that prince, a mule loaded with gold came between him and his pursuers. The attention of the soldiers was immediately turned to the precious treasure, and while they were contending about their booty, a much more important prey, the king himself, escaped from their hands (B. c. 72).

Mithridates, being now stripped alike of all his conquests and

* Plutarch, in *Lucull.*

even of his hereditary kingdom, hastened to seek a refuge at the court and obtain the assistance of his son in law, Tigranes, king of Armenia. This monarch, who, on account of his great power and extensive dominions, was called *king of kings*, was the personification of the despotism and pride of oriental sovereigns. On the present occasion, he assembled an army of fifty-five thousand horse, of which number seventeen thousand were clad in steel, a hundred and fifty thousand heavy-armed infantry, and twenty thousand archers or slingers; besides thirty-five thousand pioneers, whose presence gave to the army an appearance of still greater strength and number. Lucullus, always indefatigable and intrepid, fearlessly advanced against this numerous host, at the head of a body of troops whose whole number did not amount to fifteen thousand.

Tigranes, at the sight of this handful of men, could not refrain from smiling, and said: "If they come as ambassadors, they are too many; if as soldiers, too few." While he thus indulged with his courtiers in railleries and jests, Lucullus was preparing to attack him. Some Roman officers remarked to their general that this was a very *inauspicious* day, because on that very day, the sixth of October, Cæpio's army had been defeated by the Cimbri; "Well," replied Lucullus, "I will make it an *auspicious* one." Having said this, and animated his soldiers, he instantly led them against the enemy. It required but a moment to break these countless battalions bristling with iron and steel, and to throw them into irremediable confusion. They did not even strike a blow and attempt to defend themselves, but fled in disorder, or rather only endeavored to fly, and being slaughtered with the greatest ease, they lost one hundred and fifty thousand men; whereas the conquerors had only five men slain in the tumult of the action, and about one hundred wounded.

This battle reflected considerable lustre on Roman valor and discipline. The troops of the republic had never engaged, in a pitched battle, so great a number of enemies with so few soldiers, that is, in the proportion of one to twenty; nor had they ever gained so signal a victory with so trifling a loss. Lucullus, above all, had won immortal honor both in this particular action and in the whole campaign. The ablest and most experienced persons in the science of war observed that it was his peculiar praise, to have defeated two of the mightiest kings in the world by methods entirely different; the one by a quick, and the other by a slow process. For he ruined Mithridates, when in the height of his power, by protracting the conflict; and on the contrary, he overthrew Tigranes by the celerity of his movements (B. C. 69.)

The result of his last victory was the submission of many countries in the neighborhood, and the capture of the royal city of Tigranocerta, the booty and spoils of which enriched his army. The vanquished monarch, learning wisdom from his defeat, now sought the friendship of the king of Pontus, in whose absence he had purposely fought the last battle, in order not to lose any portion of that glory which he had anticipated. The two kings levied another army consisting of seventy thousand foot, and thirty-five thousand horse. Yet, with this superior force, they did not venture to encounter Lucullus in a regular engagement; their plan was to weaken him by degrees, to harass him by frequent skirmishes, and to endeavor to intercept his convoys, till he should be compelled to quit the country for want of provisions. This mode of warfare, had his opponents persevered in it, might have thrown serious difficulties in the way of Lucullus. The Roman general neglected nothing that might bring them to a decisive action; he drew a line of circumvallation about their camp, laid waste the country before their eyes, but all to no purpose. He therefore marched against Artaxata, the capital of Armenia, where Tigranes had left his family and nearly all his treasures, expecting that the king would not suffer that city to be taken without making an effort in its defence.

This last expedient succeeded; Tigranes, rather than abandon so important a place, resolved to fight, and advanced against the Romans. Lucullus, on his part, eagerly prepared for battle. He so animated his troops by word and example, that the enemy, at the first onset, fled in every direction. No flight, however, appeared more disgraceful than that of Mithridates; for he could not resist even the shouts of the Romans. The defeat of the barbarians was entire, although the slaughter was not so great as in the battle of the preceding year.

Lucullus, emboldened by success, resolved to complete the subjection of the Armenian states. But among the many great and noble qualities of this general, one was wanting: he had not the talent to win the affection of his troops by kindness; or, perhaps, he disdained to obtain it at the cost of firmness and discipline. His legions, particularly two of them, had already given several marks of indocility; but when he wished, after his late victory, to go forward and finish the work which he had so gloriously begun, they openly mutinied, and refused to follow him any farther. This invincible conqueror of so many enemies was thus checked by his own troops in the most prosperous part of his career. Being superseded in the command of the army, he returned to Rome, where prejudice, party-spirit and jealousy prevented him,

for a long time, from obtaining the triumphal honors which he had so well deserved.

Lucullus spent the remainder of his life in comparative obscurity; he took little part in the affairs of government, and being possessed of immense riches, henceforth made use of them to enjoy repose. Nothing was more splendid than his houses, his villas, his gardens, and especially his banquets. His furniture was of the most costly kind, and his daily repasts remarkable for the varied and exquisitely dressed dishes served up at his table. On a certain day, as he was taking his evening repast by himself, and saw but a moderate supper, he called the steward, and expressed his dissatisfaction. The steward answered that, as no body was invited, he had not thought it necessary to make a greater provision: "What," exclaimed his master, "did you not know that Lucullus was to sup with Lucullus?"

As this refined magnificence was the subject of much conversation in Rome, Cicero and Pompey, then the greatest personages of the state, desired to know it from actual observation. For this purpose, they addressed Lucullus one day in the *forum*, when he appeared perfectly disengaged. Cicero was one of his most intimate friends; and, although a serious altercation had occurred between Lucullus and Pompey about the command of the army in Asia, yet they continued on terms of friendly intercourse, and used to converse freely and familiarly with each other. Cicero, after the usual salutation, asked Lucullus whether he was at leisure to receive company; he answered that "nothing would be more agreeable," and pressed them both to come to his house. They went together with him, but would not allow him to say any thing to his servants, lest he should order them to make some addition to the supper provided for himself. Only, at his request, they suffered him to tell the steward in their presence, that he "would sup in the Apollo;" which was the name of one of his most magnificent rooms. By that single word, he eluded the vigilance of his two illustrious guests; for each of the dining rooms in the house of Lucullus had its particular allowance of provisions, service of plate and other furniture, a circumstance well known to the servants. Now, the stated expense of an entertainment in the Apollo was fifty thousand drachms (at least five thousand dollars); and the whole sum, says Plutarch, was expended that evening. Pompey and Cicero were not less surprised at the magnificence of the feast, than at the expedition with which it was prepared.*

* Plutarch in *Lucull.*

This manner of living was, it is true, more worthy of an eastern prince than of a Roman general; but it should be observed that, whilst Lucullus indulged in such pomp and refinement, he also made a noble and generous use of his riches, in obliging his friends, patronizing learned men, and collecting books or masterpieces of art, etc. A still greater service rendered by him, though at less cost, was the transplantation of the *Cerasus* or cherry-tree, which he found near the city of Cerasus in the kingdom of Pontus, and which he made known in Europe.

Lucullus, after the close of his campaigns in Asia, lived ten years. At his death he was much and deservedly regretted by the Romans; for, notwithstanding his profuse magnificence, it would have been difficult to find a man of more exact and strict probity. As he had constantly proved himself a generous master, an affectionate relative, and a patriotic citizen, as well as an able general, he left behind him the reputation of having been Sylla's equal in military glory, and by far his superior in civil and social virtues.

WAR AGAINST THE PIRATES.—EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESS AND REPUTATION OF POMPEY.—B. c. 67.

WHEN Lucullus could no longer control the Roman legions in Asia, the two kings of Pontus and Armenia soon recovered the possession of their states. The former, besides, defeated several bodies of Roman troops. This new advantage of Mithridates occasioned some uneasiness at Rome, and the people began to look on Pompey as the only one who could effectually deliver them from this implacable and relentless enemy.

Pompey was now in the most conspicuous part of his career. Fortunate in all his undertakings, he had just obtained most signal success in a war against the pirates of the Mediterranean sea. These pirates, a medley of different nations, although they all went by the name of Cilicians, had become within a few years absolute masters at sea, from the Asiatic shores to the coasts of Spain and the strait of Gibraltar. They interrupted commerce, cut off the free communication between the islands and the continent, infested the maritime provinces, and having at their command upwards of a thousand vessels well equipped and directed by skilful pilots, they extended their depredations to every place within their reach, to Africa, Sardinia, Sicily, and even to the mouth of the Tiber and almost to the very walls of Rome.

Some expeditions had already been sent against these formidable banditti; but they either failed, or produced only a partial

and transient check. The boldness as well as the strength of the pirates was constantly on the increase. The difficulties of commerce and national intercourse, the scarcity of provisions even at Rome, and the insults offered to the Roman power, increased in the same proportion; and besides many temples, more than four hundred cities had been taken and plundered by these corsairs. To put an end to so many evils, it was thought expedient to invest Pompey for three years with extraordinary power at sea, and to supply him with all the forces and means requisite to effect the entire overthrow of piracy. For this purpose, five hundred ships, with one hundred and twenty-five thousand men and a large amount of money for the necessary expenses, were placed at his disposal.

From the beginning of the campaign, Pompey displayed singular prudence and judgment in the distribution of his forces; he divided the whole of the Mediterranean into thirteen parts, appointing a lieutenant for each, to whom he gave command of a squadron; by thus stationing his galleys in all quarters, he completely hemmed in the pirates, and was enabled to drive them all before him. He himself, with sixty of his best vessels, went to attack them where the greatest effort was to be made. His plans were eminently successful. He indeed displayed during the whole expedition so much intelligence and activity, and was so ably seconded by his lieutenants, among others by the celebrated Varro, that, instead of the space of three years allowed for the discharge of his commission, three months were sufficient to annihilate the piratical power. All the forces of these plunderers, their men, fleets, harbors and strongholds, dockyards and military stores, fell within that short interval, into the hands of the Romans.

The defeat of the pirates was so complete, so decisive, that, of all their hostile squadrons, which a short time before infested all maritime countries and even blockaded the mouth of the Tiber near Rome, not a galley was now to be seen over all the vast extent that stretches from the coasts of Spain to the most eastern part of the Mediterranean sea.

THIRD AND LAST WAR AGAINST MITHRIDATES.—FURTHER CONQUESTS OF POMPEY.—AFFAIRS OF PONTUS, ARMENIA, SYRIA, AND PALESTINE.—B. C. 66—68.

POMPEY had just achieved this memorable exploit, when news reached him from Rome that he had been appointed to a new charge, namely, the conduct of the war against Mithridates. He

did not disappoint the confidence reposed in him, and the final overthrow of the king of Pontus was the result of one short campaign. This prince, whom the victories of Lucullus had so much humbled, evidently could not oppose, for any length of time, a general like Pompey; being forced to engage in a battle near the Euphrates, he experienced so signal a defeat, that no resource was left him but a precipitate flight. The king of Armenia, unwilling to support his cause any longer, refused him every kind of shelter and assistance, declared him an enemy, and set a price of a hundred talents upon his head.

In this distress, the unhappy monarch, although abandoned by others, did not yet despond. Going forward, with all possible speed, he advanced, notwithstanding a thousand obstacles, along the coasts of the Euxine sea, and finally reached the Cimmerian Bosphorus, where one of his sons possessed a princely establishment. Pompey pursued him at first, but not being able to overtake him, contented himself with chastising by severe defeats the Albanians and Iberians, two warlike tribes of Mount Caucasus, who had attempted to oppose the passage of the Romans (B. C. 65).

Most of the eastern states were at that time in a deplorable condition. Above all, the kingdom of Syria, formerly so flourishing and extensive, had been reduced to the lowest degree of weakness by foreign attacks, civil dissensions, and the incapacity or profligacy of its sovereigns. As it happened to be in some measure involved in the cause of Tigranes whom the Romans had previously defeated, Pompey seized upon this occasion to subdue that kingdom, and made it a Roman province (B. C. 64).

From Syria he was called into Palestine. The new sovereignty of Judea, founded by Judas Machabæus and his brothers Jonathan and Simon, had continued in the line of their descendants; but it did not preserve long the high degree of respectability and power which it had enjoyed under the first Machabees, and under Hircanus I, the worthy son and successor of Simon. Whilst Pompey was extending throughout the whole east the influence and authority of Rome, the sovereign power among the Jews was disputed by two brothers, Hircanus II and Aristobulus. They appealed to the Roman general for the adjustment of their differences. Pompey summoned them before him, and having listened to their reasons, easily perceived that the better claim was on the side of Hircanus; Aristobulus, on his part, easily conjectured that the decision would be against him, and to avoid such a result, he prepared to assert his pretensions by open force. This conduct exasperated Pompey, who immediately marched his troops towards Jerusalem, and entered the city as a conqueror. He re-

instated Hircanus in the dignity of high-priest, but took from him the title and insignia of king; he moreover obliged the Jews, not only to restore the cities and territories which they had conquered from the Syrians, but likewise to pay a considerable tribute to the Roman government.

Thus did the unhappy discord of two brothers become a source of evils for the Jewish nation, and the greatest among the natural causes of its decline. It changed the friendly protection which the country had sought and obtained from the Romans, into a beginning of subjection to their power, as the Jews themselves, however reluctantly, acknowledged under the form of tribute.* Nor did the course of their national depression stop here. A few years later, the leaders of the government at Rome transferred the Jewish sceptre to a foreign prince, the famous Herod the Idumæan. This transaction is the more worthy of notice as it was, conformably to the prediction of the holy patriarch Jacob,† one of the signs immediately preceding the coming of the Messias, whose temporal birth really occurred before the end of Herod's reign.

While Pompey was engaged in these momentous affairs, the career of Mithridates was drawing to its close. This restless and indefatigable prince, who could no longer face the Romans in Asia, had resolved to carry the war from the Euxine shores, through the greater part of Europe, into Italy. But his soldiers had not the same courage with himself. They refused to follow him in this perilous and gigantic expedition, and openly revolted against him, proclaiming his son Pharnaces, king in his place. This young prince was more eager than any one to deprive his father of both crown and life. Mithridates, reduced to this terrible extremity, and utterly unable to escape, distributed poison among the persons of his family, and took some himself; still, as the frequent use which he had made of antidotes prevented, it is said, the poison from having its effect on him, he had recourse to a more expeditious means, and caused himself to be despatched with a sword, at the age of seventy-two, after a reign of sixty years (B. C. 64 or 63).

Thus perished the famous Mithridates Eupator, who during thirty years had waged war against the Romans. His death, occasioned by the horrid crime of parricide, is dreadful even to relate; unfortunately for the character of that prince, it had been too well merited by his own crimes, and may be viewed as a part of the just punishment of one who, in order to gratify his jealousy, resentment and ambition, spared neither his mother, nor wives, nor

* See Josephus, *Jewish Antiq.* b. xiv, c. 5—8.

† Gen. xlix, 10.

children, nor myriads of friends and foes. In other respects and in natural talents, Mithridates was a remarkable man, a vast genius, a scholar acquainted with twenty-two languages; a politician, a warrior, a general, and, by his implacable animosity against the Romans, another Annibal; one, too, who resisted them longer than any other monarch or commander, and who could not be fully overthrown but by the successive attacks of three of the ablest generals of Rome.*

When Pompey was informed of his death, he returned to the north of Lesser Asia, where many affairs were yet to be settled. Pontus remained a Roman province; Tigranes was acknowledged king of Armenia, and Pharnaces allowed to possess the kingdom of the Bosphorus under the protection of the Romans. Care was likewise taken to bestow suitable rewards both on the victorious legions and on the faithful allies of the republic. After making all these arrangements, Pompey at last set out for Italy, and made his entry into Rome, with a pomp and solemnity proportioned to the greatness of his exploits: the solemn inscriptions prepared for his triumph stated that he had conquered the pirates and twelve oriental nations, and besides the capture of eight hundred galleys, had subdued nineteen hundred cities or fortresses. He brought into the public treasury, in money and in gold or silver vessels, the value of twenty thousand talents (at least twenty millions of dollars), and, by the vast acquisition of territory he had made for the state, caused its revenues to be nearly doubled.

But, in the midst of all this splendor and glory, the most honorable circumstance for Pompey, and one, too, which no Roman before him could claim, was, that his third triumph was over the third quarter of the earth, after his former triumphs had been over the two other continents. His first triumph was over Africa, the second over Europe, and the third over Asia; so that the three together seemed to declare him conqueror of the world.

* This is, in substance, the idea which the Greek and even the Roman historians give us of Mithridates.

"Ponticarum gentium rex," says Florus, "omnium longe maximus Mithridates: quippe cum quatuor Pyrrho, decem et septem anni Annibali suffecerint, ille per quadraginta annos restitit, donec tribus ingentibus bellis subactus, felicitate Sullæ, virtute Luculli, magnitudine Pompeii consumeretur."—b. iii, c. 5.

The following are the words of Velleius Paterculus: "Mithridates, Ponticus rex, vir neque silendus, neque dicendus sine cura, bello acerrimus, aliquando fortuna, semper animo maximus, consiliis dux, miles manu, odio in Romanos Annibal."—b. ii, c. 14.

CONSULATE OF CICERO.—CATILINE'S CONSPIRACY DETECTED AND SUPPRESSED.—B. C. 63—62.*

WHILST Pompey was extending the glory of Rome to the extremities of the world, and only one year before his return, the very existence of the commonwealth was threatened by a most dangerous conspiracy. Sergius Catiline, a senator of high rank, great bodily strength, daring mind, and consummate profligacy, conceived the awful design of slaughtering the senate, firing the city of Rome, and overturning the republic. For the execution of this horrid plot, accomplices were needed. Catiline secured a large number of them, by applying to persons equally profligate with himself, men lost to every sense of honor and duty, and loaded with debts and crimes. Citizens of this description were then easily found in Rome. The expected abolition of their debts, the plunder of the rich, and the hope of preferments and dignities in the new government to be created by their intervention, were so many ties which attached them to their desperate leader.

Catiline was not so much occupied in the organization of his plot, as not to endeavor, by every means in his power, to obtain the supreme magistracy in the government which he intended to overthrow; nay, he hoped that the dignity of consul, if he could once possess it, would be the best means to promote his secret views. He therefore presented himself among the candidates for the consulship. In a city in which almost every preferment could be obtained through cabal and intrigue, there was a strong probability of success in his favor. Most happily for all good citizens and for the state at large, the secret of the conspiracy began to be disclosed by one of the accomplices. The information, imperfect as it was, spread great terror among the people; Catiline was rejected, and all the suffrages fell to M. Tullius Cicero, his competitor.

No better choice could have been made in the existing crisis. The name of Cicero awakes the idea of the highest talent, eloquence, and patriotism. He had already pleaded at the bar with extraordinary renown; he had honorably acquitted himself of the offices of quæstor, ædile and prætor, and manifested in every employment his love of justice and zeal for the public good. The

* From Velleius Paterc. b. ii, c. 24; Plutarch, in the *Life of Cicero*;—the eloquent speeches of Cicero himself; and especially Sallust's admirable work on the *Conspiracy and War of Catiline*.

more he advanced in the career of honors, the more these valuable qualities appeared in him, and, together with them, exquisite judgment, prudence, vigilance, activity, and in a word, all the necessary qualifications to rescue the state from a terrible and pressing danger. This great man was appointed consul, with C. Antonius for his colleague, for the year B. c. 63.

Catiline, rendered still more furious by the ill-success of his intrigues, determined to dispatch Cicero by assassination. Two of the conspirators were directed to obtain admittance into the consul's house under pretence of a visit, and to murder him without delay; but Cicero received timely intelligence of this daring attempt, and rendered it abortive. He, moreover, placed guards and bodies of troops in every quarter of the city, so that Rome wore the appearance of a fortified and well garrisoned place threatened with a siege.

So many vigorous measures did not intimidate the man against whom they were directed. He still presumed to take his seat in the senate. As his criminal projects were now sufficiently known, he received no salutation; on the contrary, all the senators removed from him, and vacated the seats near that which he occupied. The consul, fired with indignation at the sight of so much audacity united with so much guilt, addressed him in the most vehement language, as one convicted of high-treason and worthy of death. Catiline endeavored in vain to vindicate himself; the senators, more and more indignant, interrupted him with cries of traitor, conspirator, public enemy, and parricide. Transported with rage, he abruptly left the assembly, and quitting the city, hastened to join the troops whom his partisans had assembled for him at some distance from Rome.

But the chief accomplices of Catiline still remained in the capital, men of high standing, and, like him, ready for every crime; at his departure, he had given them directions to procure, by every means in their power, the murder of the consul and the firing of the city. Cicero, ever watchful, detected and exposed these new machinations, and had the happiness to prevent their execution. By his orders, which were ratified by the senate, the ringleaders of the plot were arrested, convicted, and immediately condemned to suffer capital punishment.

In all this proceeding, Cicero was vigorously supported by Cato surnamed the Younger, one of the most distinguished senators and influential persons of his time. This virtuous citizen, then about thirty-three years old, had followed from his early years a course very different from that of the degenerate Roman youth, and, both by disposition and education, was averse to the law-

less principles which had crept into the politics and manners of the age. On the day on which the fate of the conspirators was to be decided in the senate, he perceived that most of the senators, persuaded by the eloquence of Julius Cæsar, whose ambitious principles tended rather to encourage than suppress innovations, were inclined to milder measures than the safety of the republic demanded. This filled his soul with sentiments of indignation and alarm. He boldly protested against the pusillanimity of his colleagues, as well as the dangerous tendency of Cæsar's views. He spoke with so much eloquence, vehemence and energy; he depicted in such vivid colors the virtue of the consul, the wretchedness of the conspirators, and the greatness of the public danger in the threatened subversion of the state, as well as the ruin and conflagration of the city, that a complete change was wrought in the minds of the senators. They retracted their former votes, and agreeably to the opinion of both Cato and Cicero, unanimously decreed the death and immediate execution of the criminals.

The news of their punishment was a thunderbolt for Catiline. Deprived of all hope and resource in Rome, where the influence of his party had been destroyed, he determined, by a rapid march towards the north of Italy, to cross the mountains, and escape with his followers into Gaul. But he found it impossible to execute his design; and seeing himself beset by two Roman armies, resolved to hazard a battle. After exhorting his troops to conquer or die, he set them an example of courage, and with indomitable fury rushed against his opponents.

This example was faithfully imitated: of all the followers of Catiline, none perished without having fought bravely, and most fell in the very spot which they had first occupied. Their desperate leader fell together with them, covered with wounds. He was found among heaps of the dead, still breathing, and showing on his countenance the same fierceness and audacity which had always actuated him, and caused him to be so much dreaded by all virtuous citizens. His bloody designs perished with him; and Cicero, to whose activity and zeal Rome owed her preservation, received from the gratitude of his citizens the glorious surname of *Father of his country*.

CATO THE YOUNGER.

ALTHOUGH Cato the Younger acted only a secondary part in the great events of his time, his virtue however placed him so high in the public esteem, and gave him such an influence among

the good citizens of Rome, that scarcely any character mentioned in ancient history is more deserving of notice. Besides this, nothing perhaps affords a better insight into the state of affairs at that period, than the life of this illustrious Roman.

Cato the Younger was the great-grandson of the famous censor Cato, who lived in the interval between the second and third Punic wars. The austere virtues of the one had ranked him with persons of the greatest reputation and authority in Rome. The enthusiastic and unflinching patriotism of the other, the object of this article, rendered him still more illustrious. It is related of him, that from his infancy he discovered in his voice, his look, and his very diversions, a steadiness and firmness of soul which neither passion nor any thing else could move. He pursued every object he had in view with a vigor far above his years, and a resolution that nothing could resist. Those who were inclined to flatter, were sure to meet with a severe rebuke; and with regard to those who attempted to intimidate him, he was still more inflexible.

Whilst Cato was yet a boy, during Sylla's administration, his preceptor often took him to pay his respects to the dictator. The house of Sylla at that time looked like a place of execution, so great were the number of people put to death by his orders. Cato, who was in his fourteenth year, seeing the heads of many illustrious personages carried out, and observing that the bystanders deplored these scenes of blood, asked why there was no body who would undertake to kill that man. "The reason," answered his preceptor, "is because they fear him still more than they hate him." "Why then," said Cato, "do you not give me a sword, that I may kill him, and deliver my country from slavery?" When the preceptor heard him speak thus, and saw the stern and angry look which accompanied his language, he was greatly alarmed, and closely watched him afterwards, to prevent him from attempting any rash action.

Cato had the happiness to be under excellent masters. His favorite study was the Stoic philosophy, the best suited to his disposition. He eagerly embraced the course of a moral and virtuous life; but among all the virtues, he evinced the greatest attachment to justice, and justice, too, of that severe and inflexible kind which is biassed by neither favor nor compassion. Hence, although humane and compassionate in private society, he was in public the inexorable avenger of wrongs. Seeing that a great reformation was needed in the customs and manners of his country, he determined to take a stand against the corrupt fashions of the time. Not that he affected to be noticed on this account; but

he wished to acquire the habit of never being ashamed of any thing but what was really shameful, and of disregarding what depended only on human opinion. Even in the midst of riches, he chose a simple and frugal manner of living, took most laborious exercise, inured himself to all the inconveniences of the weather, and travelled on foot at every season of the year.

Cato served as a volunteer in the war with Spartacus, but could not signalize his courage and activity as he desired, because the war then was ill-conducted. Still, amidst the effeminacy and luxury which prevailed in the army, he faithfully observed discipline, and when the occasion offered itself, behaved with so much spirit and valor as well as coolness and capacity, that he appeared not in the least inferior to Cato the Censor. Gellius, his general, made him an offer of the best military rewards, which he refused, saying that he had done nothing worthy of such a recompense.

He was shortly after sent into Macedon in the capacity of tribune, and had the command of a legion. In this post, he thought it no great nor extraordinary thing to be distinguished by his personal virtue; it was his ambition to make all the troops under his care, like himself. With this view he abated nothing in the requisite and proper use of his authority, but, at the same time, called reason to its assistance. By instruction and persuasion, no less than by rewards and punishments, he succeeded so well, that it was difficult to say whether his troops were more peaceable or warlike, more valiant or more just. By his virtue, his magnanimity, and especially by doing first what he commanded others to do, he so perfectly won the respect and affection of all, that, when his commission expired, the soldiers could not refrain from tears at his departure, and gave him such marks of esteem, as few generals met with from the Romans in those times.

But Rome itself was to be the chief theatre of Cato's eloquence and magnanimity. On his return to that city, and as soon as he was admitted to offices of state, he declared and showed himself the open enemy of injustice, fraud, intrigue and corruption; his manly spirit of integrity appeared in every thing, though he evinced it chiefly in fulfilling the office of *quæstor* or public treasurer. Before assuming this charge, he had qualified himself for it, by acquiring a thorough knowledge of all the laws and matters connected with its various obligations. By his indefatigable application and zeal, he so well cleared this important branch of the administration of the many abuses that had crept into it, and of the corrupt practices of its officers, as to render the treasury

more respectable, than the senate itself; and it was commonly thought and said, that Cato had given to the quæstorship all the dignity of the consulate.

He performed in the same manner the functions of tribune of the people, and prætor, to which he was successively appointed. Yet, in no capacity, perhaps, did he appear so worthy of praise, as in that of senator. Whenever the senate was summoned, he was the first in his place, and the last to withdraw; he would, on such occasions, neither absent himself from town, nor undertake any other business. For, his attention to the concerns of government was not, as is too frequently the case, guided by views of honor and profit, nor the mere effect of chance or humor; but he thought "that a good citizen ought to be as solicitous about the public good, as a bee is about her hive."

In deliberations, measures for the support of order and morality were sure to find in him a powerful defender; those of a contrary nature, a formidable opponent. He made it a point to oppose Clodius, the seditious demagogue so famous in the history of those times, who was always proposing some dangerous law or some change in the constitution, or accusing the most respectable persons before the people. But Cato defended the cause of these injured persons so well, that Clodius was forced to withdraw in great confusion, and leave the city. As Cicero, who had been deeply interested in this particular for a near relative, came to thank his friend, Cato said to him: "You ought to thank our common country, whose welfare is the spring of all my actions." Indeed, very different in some respect from this great orator, he cared little for human applause: he preferred, according to the expression of Sallust, rather to be good than to appear so; but the less he sought after glory, the more it followed him.* His reputation and the esteem entertained for him were so great, that Cicero once said that Cato might do without Rome, but Rome could not do without Cato.†

Yet this distinguished man was never raised to the consulship, although he once presented himself as a candidate for that dignity. His failure, however, was in some measure a new homage to his virtue. As bribery, fraud, and intrigues had the greatest share in the election of magistrates, Cato moved and procured decrees from the senate against these infamous practices; the measure highly displeased the people, because it cut off at once

* *Esse quam videri bonus malebat; ita quo minus gloriam petebat, eo magis absequebatur.*—Sallust, *Bellum Catilin.* n. 54.

† Plutarch, *in the life of Cato the Younger.*

the means of cultivating favor and making use of bribes, and thus rendered the lower order of citizens poor and insignificant. On the other hand, Cato had personally too much elevation of sentiments, too much dignity, to court the popular favor by entreaties or flatteries. Under circumstances of this description, and with so little chance of success in his behalf, it is not to be wondered that he lost the consulship. Nor did the loss afflict him, at least in any perceptible degree: whilst an accident of this kind filled other candidates with shame and sorrow, Cato was so little affected by it, that he anointed himself to play at ball, and walked as usual after dinner with his friends in the forum.

But if he failed to obtain the consular dignity, he at least ably supported the consuls, whenever occasion required. This he did most effectually, as has been already related, during the turbulent times of Catiline, when the state was threatened with total subversion. Next to Cicero's vigorous counsels and conduct, the energy of Cato, in that dreadful danger, most contributed to save the commonwealth and the city of Rome.

After this tempest was over, new storms arose, which called forth, more than ever, the efforts of his patriotic zeal and fortitude. He had then to contend against both Pompey and Cæsar, the two most aspiring men of the state, who wished to have the whole authority in their hands. He boldly opposed the doubtful measures of the one and the crafty ambition of the other, and with much personal danger, endeavored to remove the new perils that threatened the existing government. Nor did the want of success ever turn him from the line of duty which he had adopted: he persevered in that course with unabated constancy to the end of his life; not being able to save the public liberty, he perished with it, and was buried, as it were, under its ruins. Happy would it have been for his character and reputation, if he had not tarnished the lustre of his otherwise admirable conduct, by excessive sternness, by obstinacy, and by suicide!

FIRST TRIUMVIRATE,—POMPEY, JULIUS CÆSAR, AND CRASSUS.—B. C. 60.

WE have now to speak at greater length of Julius Cæsar, that famous Roman whose name is so prominent in the history of the world. No nation ever produced a more gifted individual as to natural talents, no politician exercised a more extensive and powerful influence over his contemporaries, no leader of armies won more laurels and erected more trophies in every part of the earth.

Besides these titles to imperishable fame, Cæsar was characterized by an unbounded liberality, and a generosity and clemency towards his enemies which almost surpassed the glory of his exploits. Even in point of strictly mental endowments, he challenges unqualified admiration. The rapidity of his conceptions seemed to equal the lightning's speed; his genius appeared vast as the universe; his language was dignified and at the same time almost irresistible; amidst the turmoils of politics and war, he wrote annals which have ranked him among the best historians; and, as an orator, he would have been the successful rival of Cicero, had he chosen to follow the career of eloquence.

Unfortunately, both for others and for himself, he chose to follow a very different course: his aim was to become, by all means, exclusive and absolute master of the empire. To the attainment of this object he sacrificed every thing, his repose, his safety, his existence, his country, and the tranquillity of the world.

Caius Julius Cæsar was born in the year B. C. 99, of the ancient and noble family of the Julii. Some maintain that his birth was accompanied with many presages of future greatness. If, indeed, we were to believe that nature gives of its own accord an intimation of future events, we should not be surprised that its most ominous signs were employed to mark the birth of a personage destined to change the face of the whole political world, and to place Rome herself, with all the nations she had conquered, under the iron rod of military government.

At the age of eighteen, Cæsar was placed by Sylla in the list of the proscribed, for disobedience to his orders. He was saved, however, by the intercession of some common friends, and as they insisted that there was no necessity of putting such a boy to death: "Beware of him," said Sylla; "your sagacity is limited indeed, if you do not see many a Marius in that young man;" a remark which proved at once the penetration of Sylla, and the early appearance of something extraordinary in Cæsar.

When the words of Sylla were reported to Cæsar, he at first concealed himself in the country of the Sabines, and afterwards embarked for Asia. Shortly after he was taken by pirates, who asked him twenty talents for his ransom. Cæsar laughed at their demand, as implying their ignorance of the quality of the person whom they had made prisoner, and instead of twenty, he promised them fifty talents (at least fifty thousand dollars). To raise the money, he sent most of his attendants to different cities, and in the mean time remained among the corsairs. Although they considered murder as a trifle, he did not betray the least symptom of fear; nay he held them in great contempt, and, when-

ever he went to sleep, if they annoyed him by their clamors, sent them orders to keep silence.

Cæsar lived in this manner among them as if they had been his guards and not his keepers, for the space of thirty-eight days. Fearless and secure, he joined in their diversions, wrote poems and orations which he rehearsed in their presence, and when they expressed no admiration, called them a set of ignorant people and barbarians. He gained such an ascendancy over their minds, that he often threatened to punish them by crucifixion; whilst they, taking his language in jest, were delighted with the manners of their captive, which they ascribed to a facetious disposition. But as soon as the money was brought for his ransom, and he had recovered his liberty, he manned some vessels in the port of Miletus, and embarking again, pursued and took his captors. He left them prisoners at Pergamus, whilst he himself hastened to Junius Silanus, the prætor or proconsul of Bithynia, and applied for an order to have them executed; being refused by this officer, he made his way back with still greater celerity, and, before any contrary instructions could arrive, caused the banditti to be crucified.

On his return to Rome after the death of Sylla, he began to exert his manifold talents to gain partisans. The eloquence with which he defended persons under indictments, procured him considerable influence; and, by his engaging manners, address and condescension, he easily found access to the hearts of the people. At the same time, the magnificence of his suite and his manner of living gradually increased his power, and brought him into the administration. Those who envied him, imagined that his pecuniary resources would be soon exhausted, and therefore made no great accounts of his popularity; but when it had reached such a height as scarcely to admit of any restraint, and manifested a tendency to ruin the constitution, then, says Plutarch, they discovered, though much too late, that no beginnings are to be despised, because small beginnings become great by continuance, and the very contempt which is at first entertained for them, gives them an opportunity to acquire a strength which is almost irresistible.

Cicero seems to have been the first who suspected the dangerous tendency of Cæsar's political designs. The project of this ambitious man against the state more and more visibly appeared in his increasing efforts to gain popular favor by exhibitions and largesses, in his exertions to revive the party of Marius, and in the language that he occasionally used in presence of his friends. Having one day come to a small town, they who accompanied him took occasion to say, by way of amusement: "Can there be

in this village any rivalry for office, any contentions for precedence, and such envy and ambition as we see among the great?" Cæsar answered with great seriousness: "I had rather be first here than second in Rome." On another occasion, seeing, according to Suetonius,* a statue of Alexander the Great, or, according to Plutarch,† reading a portion of that conqueror's life, he paused, sighed, and burst into tears. Being asked the reason of so much affliction, he exclaimed: "Do you think I have not sufficient reason to grieve, when Alexander, at my age (thirty-three years), had already conquered the world, and I have not yet performed one glorious achievement."

In consequence of this principle of ambition and glory, he from that time gave himself up entirely to the agitations of public life, and having obtained the government of Spain, applied to business with great activity and diligence. His first care, when he arrived in his province, was to increase the number of the troops under his command. He then marched against the Gallicians and Lusitanians, defeated them, and advancing as far as the ocean, reduced cities and nations on his way, that had not hitherto felt the Roman yoke. With the same ability which he displayed in the conduct of the war, he supported the dignity of Roman governor, no less in the civil than in the military department. By this means, he gave tranquillity to the province, confirmed and extended the Roman power, and gained great reputation for himself.

After this expedition, Cæsar, having returned to Rome, set more seriously than ever to the work of undermining the established form of government, and gradually concentrating the whole authority of the state in his person. In so dangerous an attempt, he proceeded with cautious and artful steps. This crafty politician was well aware that his designs would be opposed by Cato, Cicero, and other illustrious citizens, the enemies of all political innovation and sincerely attached to the cause of the republic. To prevent or paralyze their efforts, he closely united his interests with those of Pompey and Crassus, the two most powerful men in Rome, the one on account of his renown, the other on account of his wealth, and formed with them the famous confederacy known under the name of *First Triumvirate* (B. c. 60). They agreed to take such measures in support of one another, and give such a turn to the course of public affairs, as to retain the chief power of the state constantly in their hands. Cæsar intended, of course, that the greatest share of authority should belong to himself; hence, every one of his political acts tended ultimately to

* In *C. J. Cæsar*, n. 7.

† *Life of J. Cæsar*.

this end, and he had the talent to make his very colleagues the tools of his ambition.

He first succeeded, through their influence, in being appointed to the consulship for the ensuing year (B. C. 59). He had no sooner entered upon this office, than he directed all his efforts to weaken the influence of the senate, and to ingratiate himself with the people. For that purpose, he made and enforced motions not so suitable to a consul as to a seditious tribune, and rousing the hopes of the populace about the distribution of corn and the division of lands, proposed bills entirely calculated to please the plebeian party. As the cautious and patriotic party of the senate opposed them, Cæsar was furnished with the pretext that he had long wanted. He protested with great warmth, "that they threw him into the arms of the people against his will; and that the rigorous and disgraceful opposition of the senators laid him under a painful necessity of seeking protection from the commoners." He did so, and during his consulate never more consulted the senate on any affair.

The other consul was Calpurnius Bibulus, a friend of Cato, and like him an intrepid defender of liberty. Being supported by the most distinguished senators, he vigorously opposed every motion in favor of the agrarian law, but to no purpose; Cæsar drove his opponent from the forum by open force, and caused the law to pass without further resistance. Bibulus finding that his opposition not only was unsuccessful, but even exposed his life to danger in the public assemblies, remained shut up in his house during the remainder of the year, and contented himself with publishing edicts and manifestoes against Cæsar's tyranny. The latter laughed at the protests of his colleague, and assuming the whole administration, continued to act as if he had been sole consul and sole magistrate. Hence in dating the year during which these transactions occurred, instead of being called the year of the consulate of *Julius Cæsar* and *Calpurnius Bibulus*, it was called by some wag the consulate of *Julius* and *Cæsar*.

This able adventurer, though suspected of the deepest and most obnoxious designs, was still deeper in laying his measures for their execution, than even his keenest opponents imagined. He had already been successful in his effort, as supreme magistrate, to set at defiance the whole power of the senate and the regular forms of government. The next and chief step which he took for the carrying out of his views, was to have himself appointed proconsul for five years, with the whole territory of Gaul, both Transalpine and Cisalpine, for his province. This commission gave him what he most earnestly desired, a fair occa-

sion to display his military skill, a sure means to increase his fame, and above all, a numerous army placed at his disposal and devoted to his interest.

CONQUEST OF GAUL BY JULIUS CÆSAR.—B. C. 58—50.

THE province of which Cæsar obtained the command, comprehended, as has just been observed, under the denomination of the two Gauls, considerable territories on both sides of the Alps. Cisalpine Gaul included all the northern part of Italy, from the mountains to the Rubicon near Ariminum, and from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian or Tuscan sea. Transalpine Gaul, thus called from its being situated beyond the Alps with regard to Rome, comprised the whole territory from the Mediterranean sea to the Rhine and the Meuse. The southern part of this tract already formed a Roman province; the remainder of the country was divided into three principal parts, occupied by the Aquitani, the Celtæ, and the Belgæ, nations differing in language, establishments, and customs.

"The several Gallic tribes were usually independent of each other, but on great occasions a general council of the nation was summoned, especially when preparations were made for any of the great migrations which proved so fatal to Greece and Italy. Their superior valor rendered these tribes very formidable to all the southern nations; it was commonly said, that the Romans fought with others for conquest, but with the Gauls for actual existence. But from the time of the subjugation of their country by Julius Cæsar, their valor seemed to have disappeared together with their liberty; they never revolted, except when the extortions of their rulers became insupportable; and their efforts were neither vigorous nor well-directed. In no province did Roman civilization produce greater effects than in Gaul; many public works of stupendous size and immense utility were constructed; roads were constructed and paved with stone; durable bridges were built, and aqueducts formed to supply the cities with water. The ruins of these mighty works are still to be found, and they cannot be viewed without wonder and admiration."*

Such was the nation and country in which Cæsar, after having shown himself at Rome an intriguing citizen and a factious magistrate, appeared as the greatest of warriors. Gaul became the theatre of so many illustrious exploits, as almost threw into the shade the preceding achievements of the greatest Roman generals, whilst it is probable that they never were surpassed afterwards,

* Taylor, *Manual of Ancient History*, pp. 243, 244.

and perhaps never will be surpassed by those of any conqueror. The particulars of this famous war may be seen in the admirable annals or *Commentaries* written by Cæsar himself. No people however brave, no army however numerous, could resist him. In less than ten years, he took eight hundred towns, conquered three hundred nations or tribes, and defeated, in a series of engagements, three millions of men, one million of whom were slain on the field of battle, and as many taken prisoners. This multitude of exploits and victories might at first seem incredible; yet they can hardly be called in question, since the account of them is corroborated by the testimony of Plutarch, in the life of Julius Cæsar, and besides Cæsar himself, by other Roman historians, Suetonius, Florus, etc.

His first expedition in Gaul was against the Helvetians and Tigurini, who, after having burnt twelve of their own towns and four hundred villages, endeavored to traverse the Roman province in search of new settlements. Their total number amounted to nearly four hundred thousand persons, ninety-two thousand of whom were able to bear arms. Cæsar pursued them so closely in their march, and gave them such overthrows, that of this great multitude, only one hundred and ten thousand survived; and they avoided entire destruction, only by agreeing to return to their own territory.

Cæsar directed his next effort against numerous bands of Germans, who, under their king Ariovistus, had lately invaded that part of the country lying between the Rhine and the Saone. He went in search of them, and, after messages and negotiations had been tried to no purpose, he attacked their position, and defeated them with great slaughter. Ariovistus fled with his surviving followers as far as the Rhine, which he passed in a small canoe. Numbers of his people perished in attempting to follow him, and the greater part of those who remained behind, were overtaken and put to the sword by Cæsar's cavalry. Although Cæsar himself does not mention any particular number of the slain,* the loss of the Germans in this short campaign alone is said by others to have amounted to no less than eighty thousand.†

Having thus ended his first expedition, he left the army in winter quarters, and repaired to Cisalpine Gaul, which was a part of his province, in order to watch the course of affairs and political transactions at Rome. Great numbers of persons came from the capital to pay him their respects, and he sent them all away satisfied, some with presents, and others at least with hopes. He did

* *Comment. de Bello Gall.* b. i, c. 52—54.

† See Plutarch, in the life of Julius Cæsar.

the same during the following years, and carried on a variety of state intrigues, on the one hand conquering his enemies by the arms of the Roman citizens, and, on the other, gaining the Roman citizens to his cause by the money of his enemies.

As soon as he had intelligence that the Belgæ, who were then the most powerful people of Gaul, and whose territories occupied a third part of the whole country, had taken up arms in vast numbers to check the progress of the Romans, he marched to that quarter with incredible expedition.* He found them ravaging the lands of those Gauls who were allies to Rome. Having carefully watched their motions for a time, he so vigorously attacked the main body of their troops at the passage of a river, and made such a slaughter of them, that the stream was filled with the dead, and bridges were formed of their bodies. The pursuit was equally disastrous and bloody; the survivors scattered in every direction, and such of the insurgents as dwelt along the sea-coast, were subdued with little or no resistance.

There still remained unconquered the Nervii, who were considered the fiercest among all the Belgic nations. After they had secured, as well as they could, their families and most valuable goods in a forest at a great distance from the enemy, they marched through their woods to the number of sixty thousand, and fell upon Cæsar as he was fortifying his camp, and when he had not the least idea of an attack. They first routed his cavalry, and then surrounding the seventh and twelfth legions, killed or wounded nearly all the officers. Had not Cæsar snatched a buckler from a private legionary, put himself at the head of his broken forces, and received timely aid from the other legions, in all probability the Romans in this place would have suffered an entire defeat. Even though encouraged by this bold act of their leader and fighting with a spirit above their strength, they were not able to rout the Nervii. These brave men maintained their ground, and were cut to pieces on the spot. Of six hundred Nervian chiefs, only three senators were saved, and of an army of sixty thousand men, only five hundred escaped the fury of the conquerors.

The Attuatici, descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, and inhabitants of a district below the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, were on their march to join the Nervii, when they heard of this unfortunate action; the news induced them to return to their own country. Being pursued by Cæsar, they shut them-

* The force of the Belgæ consisted or was intended to consist of more than three hundred thousand warriors. The army of Cæsar at this time may have amounted to about sixty thousand men, Romans and auxiliaries.

selves up in their principal fortress. On his approach they offered to surrender; and when commanded to lay down their arms, they threw such a quantity of weapons from the battlements, as almost to fill up the ditch to the height of the ramparts. Cæsar however delayed, for their own sake, to take possession of the place till the following day. But the besieged abused this act of humanity and kindness of their conqueror; and, either wishing to deceive him or repenting of their submission, they again took up arms during the night, and in a sally endeavored to surprise the Roman army. Four thousand of the assailants were killed in this desperate attempt, and the remainder, being forced back into the town, were, in consequence of their breach of faith, sold as slaves, to the number of fifty-three thousand persons.

This was the conclusion of the second expedition of Cæsar in Gaul, which rendered him master of the whole eastern frontier as far as the Rhine and the Meuse. Many other districts had likewise given signs or made offers of submission to the Romans. The next campaign (B. C. 56), although less conspicuous for great battles, was equally remarkable for a rapid succession of exploits and conquests. All the country from the Seine to the extremities of Armoricum, and from the northern coast to the neighborhood of the Pyrenees, was placed and kept under subjection either by Cæsar in person, or by his lieutenants, the principal of whom were Labienus, and Crassus, the son of the triumvir.

Gaul, exhausted or terrified by so many losses, remained quiet for a time. Still there was not wanting to Cæsar and his legions occasions for new combats. The Usipetes and the Tenchteri, two great German nations, driven from their territory by the superior force of the Suevi, had crossed the Rhine at the northern extremity of Gaul, to make conquests. Their number amounted to four hundred and thirty thousand, including women and children. Cæsar marched against them with his usual celerity, and met them whilst they were yet stationed on his frontier: he attacked their camp by surprise; easily overcame the few that took up arms to oppose him, and instead of the humanity which he had showed to the Attuatici two years before, he put that multitude of unfortunate people to the sword, without distinction of sex or age.

All the roads from the camp to the river were strewn with the bodies of the slain; those who attempted to escape by swimming, perished in the waves, and a part only of the cavalry succeeded in recrossing the Rhine and reaching the German shore. In all probability, no fewer than four hundred thousand Germans lost their lives on that day.

Accustomed as the Romans were at that time not to spare their

enemies, persons of more humane disposition could not but be shocked at the recital of this dreadful slaughter. Hence, when it was proposed in the senate to vote a public thanksgiving for the late victory, Cato moved that Cæsar should be delivered up to the injured nations, that he might expiate by his own sufferings so many acts of injustice, and that thus the divine vengeance might fall on their author rather than on Rome. Cæsar, in his turn, sent to the senate letters full of invectives against Cato; he laid the blame on the Germans, and with more or less sincerity and truth, charged them with a breach of faith. Having succeeded in inducing the senate to decree nothing against him, he fearlessly pursued the course of his wars and victories.

This indefatigable man had resolved to carry the terror of his arms beyond the Rhine, and to attack the nations of Germany on their own ground. His pretence for this attempt was to chastise the tribes of the Sicambri for giving shelter to the fugitives who had escaped from the last massacre; but his true motive, says Plutarch, was the ambition to be the first Roman that ever crossed the Rhine in a hostile manner. In pursuance of his design, he threw a bridge over that river, though the stream in that place was remarkably wide and rapid. By almost incredible exertions, this immense bridge was finished in ten days, and his army passed over it without opposition, while the Sicambri, terrified at his approach, fled, and concealed themselves in their forests. Cæsar laid waste their country, burnt their habitations and villages, and enlisted the feelings of the better disposed Germans in behalf of Rome; he then returned into Gaul, after having spent only eighteen days in Germany.

But his expedition into Britain discovered the most daring spirit of enterprise; for he was the first who entered that part of the ocean with a fleet, and carried war into an island whose very existence was doubted. Indeed, some writers had represented it so incredibly large, that others disputed its reality, and considered both the name and the thing as fabulous. Yet Cæsar undertook to conquer this island, and to extend the Roman empire beyond the limits of the hitherto known world. He sailed thither twice from the opposite coast in Gaul, and fought many battles, the result of which was more injurious to the Britons than advantageous to the Romans. Nor did he terminate the war as he desired: he merely received some hostages; and, having fixed a certain tribute to be paid by the natives, he returned to Gaul, where his presence was much needed.

His first care was to provide winter-quarters for his troops. As there was, in consequence of excessive drought, almost a fam-

ine in the country, he was obliged, in order to obtain provisions for his legions, to separate them and to place their quarters at a distance from each other; a step which would otherwise have been highly imprudent. But, whether a necessary or an impolitic measure, the circumstance was noticed by the Gauls, who being still averse to the Roman yoke, and rather oppressed than subdued, did not fail to turn it against their conquerors. Their armies soon reappeared in the field, and began to insult the Romans in the stations which they occupied. The strongest and most numerous body of the insurgents was that of Ambiorix, a valiant chieftain in northern Gaul, who attacked Sabinus and Cotta, two of Cæsar's lieutenants, and cut them off with their whole party. After this, he went with sixty thousand men and besieged the legion under the command of Q. Cicero, the brother of the great orator; and although these brave Romans, encouraged by the example and exhortations of their commander, made a resistance even above their strength, they were on the point of being forced in their encampment.

The barbarians, having failed in their first attacks upon it, undertook to carry it by a regular siege. The experience they had acquired in their previous wars against Cæsar, and the direction of some prisoners, taught them to approach slowly the Roman station. They first made a line of circumvallation consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide and a breastwork eleven feet high. To this work they added various machines, turrets, targets, etc. and, availing themselves of a high wind, threw burning darts and other missiles into the thatch with which the huts of the camp were covered. The fire, aided by so many circumstances, rapidly spread itself in every direction. The barbarians ran with loud cries to the attack of the palisade, as to an assured victory; but such was the energy of the Roman soldiers, that, although covered by the darts of the enemy, surrounded by the flames, and aware of the destruction that was actually taking place of their baggage by fire, they did not so much as look behind them, but fought with the utmost valor. Their gallant conduct obtained what it deserved; the assailants were repulsed at all points with considerable loss.

Among the numberless exploits performed on that day, one deserved particular notice. Two centurions or officers, Pulsio and Varenus, had for a long time disputed about their superior courage. In the present engagement, and during the hottest part of the battle, Pulsio cried out to Varenus: "This is the proper occasion to decide our quarrel; let us try which of the two will show the greater intrepidity." Having said this, he

threw himself among the enemy, and was instantly followed by Varēnus. Pulsio at first killed one of the assailants, but soon found himself surrounded by a multitude of others. Varenus ran to his assistance, and rescued him from his peril; but the moment after, Varenus himself, having also killed an enemy, fell into exactly the same danger. Pulsio, in his turn, came and delivered him from this perilous situation. Both of them being thus still unhurt, attacked the Gauls again with redoubled vigor, and having made a dreadful havoc of them, re-entered the camp, covered with glory. It thus happened that their exploits were perfectly equal; each was indebted to the other for the preservation of his life; and their dispute still remained undecided.*

Yet these extraordinary feats of the Romans did not rescue them from their distress; nay, the danger increased every day, as most of them were wounded and unable to fight, whilst all their letters to Cæsar were intercepted by the enemy. The intelligence at last reached the head-quarters of the Roman army: Cæsar set out without losing a moment, and having speedily collected a body of soldiers which did not exceed seven thousand, hastened to the relief of Cicero. The Gauls, aware of his movements, left the siege and went to meet him; for they despised the smallness of his force, and were confident of victory. The armies arrived at nearly the same time on the opposite sides of a brook. Cæsar, in order to increase the enemy's presumption, affected to secure and fortify his camp, and so contracted its limits, as to make the number of his men appear much smaller than it was in reality.

At this sight, the Gauls, trusting to their multitude (*sixty* against *seven* thousand men), thought that they had nothing to fear but the escape of their enemy; they accordingly passed the rivulet with a view to force the Roman lines. As soon as they arrived near the camp and began their attack, Cæsar, by a sudden sally of all his troops, threw them into the utmost confusion, killed a large number of them, and routed the remainder (B. C. 54). By this victory he not only relieved Quintus Cicero, whom he joined the same evening, but likewise checked the spirit of insurrection in those parts; and for greater security remained the whole winter in Gaul, visiting all the quarters, and keeping a watchful eye over the motions of the inhabitants. Moreover, in the room of the troops whom he had recently lost under Sabinus and Cotta, he received a reinforcement of three entire legions.

* Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset, neque dijudicari posset uter utri virtute antefendus videretur.—*De Bello Gall.* l. v, c. 44.

But, notwithstanding all the precautions, efforts and victories of Cæsar, there still lurked in the minds of the vanquished Gauls an intense desire to recover their freedom. Hitherto, the seeds of hostility had been privately scattered in the more distant parts of the country by the chieftains of the bravest nations; they now prepared to combine their efforts in order to make one grand and general attack. No later than the ensuing winter, their ill-suppressed animosity everywhere suddenly burst into an open flame, and all the posts of the Romans were threatened with destruction. This formidable league was headed by Vercingetorix, a young prince of the nation of the Arverni, whose energy and heroic courage soon gathered under his banner a very numerous army.

Never was Cæsar involved in greater difficulty than on the present occasion; never, too, did he display to greater advantage his military and inventive genius, his wonderful activity and boldness. He had separated his troops for their winter-quarters, and had repaired as usual to the southern limits of his province, to watch the course of political events at Rome, when the news of the Gaulish insurrection suddenly reached him in northern Italy. He quickly retraced his steps into Transalpine Gaul, and with a body of cavalry, went over ice and snow, and across a thousand other obstacles, to rejoin his legions in the north. Having succeeded in reuniting them into one body, he led them against the principal cities and strongholds of the enemy: he took most of these, and, either as a retaliation for the past or a warning for the future, treated them with great severity.

Vercingetorix, on his part, was not idle. Although careful to avoid a general engagement, he constantly followed the Romans at a proper distance, watched their motions, and annoyed them in their march. If he could not prevent them from invading his own territory and besieging his chief city,* he at least obliged them to retire without having been able to take that place, and even after a defeat of a portion of their army. It is true, Vercingetorix was in his turn defeated by Cæsar in a battle of the cavalry; but this victory was not obtained by the latter without a sharp conflict, considerable personal danger, and the loss of his sword which fell into the hands of the Arverni, and which they suspended as a trophy in one of their temples.

Notwithstanding these difficulties and partial losses, Cæsar always kept that preponderance in the field of battle, which was the natural effect of his unparalleled skill and the superior disci-

* This was Gergovia, a place well fortified and situated on a hill, at the distance of about five miles south of Clermont, the present capital of Auvergne. Both the name of that fortress and its ruins are still extant.

pline of his troops. Vercingetorix, having lost in the late engagement a very considerable part of his cavalry, withdrew, and sought a stronger position. The Romans followed him, till they again met him on the heights where the Seine and a number of other streams have their source. Here the Gaulish leader with his numerous infantry of eighty thousand men, took his station at Alesia, a place advantageously situated on a hill and between two rivers; but no advantage of numbers or situation could be a match for the daring and inventive genius of his enemy. With an army less numerous by ten thousand men than that of the Gauls, Cæsar undertook to shut them up in that position, which otherwise seemed inaccessible. He effected his design by a double line of trenches, redoubts, and a thousand other fortifications; the one directed against the Gaulish army thus enclosed, and the other against every attack from without. These two lines extended over a circumference of twelve or fourteen miles; and, what is still more astonishing, so stupendous works appear to have been constructed by the Romans in the space of a few weeks.

Against these vast preparations the whole strength of Gaul was exerted in vain, and finally exhausted. An army of two hundred and forty-eight thousand men had been assembled from the different parts of that country, and approached Alesia for the relief of the besieged. They marched with great confidence to attack the Roman intrenchments. Having failed a first and second time, they renewed their attempt on another day, and, according to Cæsar himself,† carried it on with the most determined bravery, whilst Vercingetorix and his followers made a vigorous sally from the town. All was to no purpose. The Romans, protected by their fortifications, their superior discipline, and the genius of their leader, stood firm in every post and repelled every assault, destroying great numbers of the assailants. The Gaulish troops from without were at last dispirited by their repeated failures and losses: they fled in different directions; while those within the town, destitute of all hope, at length agreed to surrender. Among the captives, twenty thousand *Ædui* and *Arverni* were reserved by Cæsar to serve for a time as hostages, in order to secure the subsequent fidelity of their respective nations. The others underwent the ordinary fate of prisoners, and in this capacity were divided as plunder among the troops. As to their valiant leader, Vercingetorix, whose magnanimity had shone forth to the end, it is very probable that,

† *De Bello Gall.*, b. vii, c. 83—87.

like other captive chiefs on such occasions, he was destined to grace the future triumph of his conqueror (B. C. 52).

Thus was the death-blow given to the national independence of Gaul. Many partial attempts at resistance were afterwards made by various tribes; but these were quickly suppressed by the rapidity of Cæsar's movements. In order to strike terror throughout the country, he did not hesitate to commit acts, which he may have deemed necessary, but which often savored of cruelty against the victims of his ambition. Very soon, however, he adopted measures dictated by his natural clemency, and sought to complete by mildness the reduction of a people whom no force of arms could subdue. This new line of conduct, supported by his extraordinary fame and talents, proved eminently successful. All Gaul at length acknowledged the superiority of Rome (B. C. 50); aversion was changed into affection, and among all ancient nations, Gaul was one of the most proficient in the arts, sciences, and civilization of the Romans.

DISASTROUS EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST THE PARTHIANS.—B. C. 53.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the late victorious campaigns in Gaul, another expedition took place in the east, quite different in its character and result. A new treaty concluded at Lucca between the triumvirs (B. C. 56) had produced the following agreement: Cæsar was to continue for five years more in the military department of Gaul; the province of Spain together with Africa was assigned to Pompey, and that of Syria to Crassus. This partition of the provinces, approved by the people notwithstanding the opposition of Cato and others, had enabled Cæsar to pursue the course of his conquests. Pompey was allowed to stay in Rome, and to govern his province through his lieutenants, Afranius, Petreius and Varro. In fine, Crassus, overjoyed at his promotion to the government of Syria, prepared every thing for his departure into the east.

It was the desire of Crassus to enjoy an equal degree of glory and influence with the other triumvirs, and he expected to obtain in Asia the same military and political advantages that were likely to be acquired by his rivals in Europe. His chief object, an object by no means included in his commission, was to wage war on the Parthians, the only great power, besides Rome, then extant in the known world. Nor did he consider Syria and Parthia the limits of his good fortune. He also intended to penetrate into the Bactrian and Indian regions as far as the eastern ocean,

and to make the expeditions of Pompey and Lucullus in Asia appear the mere sports of children, when compared with his own. He was indeed so much taken up with this extravagant idea, that when, at the beginning of his campaign, and after some trifling success, Parthian ambassadors came to complain of his breach of the existing peace, Crassus said that he would give them his answer at Seleucia, a city on the banks of the Tigris. Upon which, Vagises, the oldest of these ambassadors, laughed, and holding up the palm of his hand, replied: "Crassus, hair will grow here, before you arrive at Seleucia."

To these schemes of unjustifiable ambition, Crassus added robbery and sacrilege. In his passage through Judea, he invaded and carried off all the treasures contained in the temple of God at Jerusalem. This was the first act of his expedition, as also the beginning of his misfortunes: he who had hitherto appeared an able and experienced commander, seemed afterwards entirely abandoned to a spirit of rashness and blindness which led him from error to error, till he met the disastrous death which his injustice and rapacity deserved.

In the year B. C. 53, Crassus, with an army of more than forty thousand men, crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma to go in quest of the Parthians. He was advised to follow the course of that river, till he reached the neighborhood of Seleucia, whilst a fleet laden with provisions was to secure the support of his troops in a hostile country; and as the river itself would prevent him from being surrounded, he would always have it in his power to fight upon equal terms. But an Arabian chieftain in whom he placed great confidence, prevailed upon him to direct his march towards the east, in order to come up the sooner with the enemy.

This resolution, suggested by a traitor, was the most rash, and proved the most disastrous, that could have been taken. The Romans, by following this new direction, advanced at first through a smooth and easy country, but, after a few more marches, found themselves in sandy and barren plains, without shade, herbage, and water. At no great distance from Carræ in Mesopotamia, they were met by innumerable swarms of Parthian cavalry, which attacked them on all sides. Even the first charges made dreadful execution among the legionaries. It would have been a great advantage for them to engage in a pitched battle and come to close conflict; but this was rendered impossible by the tactics of their foe. The principal way of fighting used by the Parthians consisted in wheeling about with great swiftness, and discharging an incessant shower of arrows, which they hurled with the greatest dexterity and violence, piercing every thing within their reach. In

this trying situation, the Romans knew not how to act. If they continued steady in their ranks, they received mortal wounds, and if they advanced against the enemy, they were equally exposed to meet with the same fate; for the Parthians fled before them, and not only could rally with extreme facility, but even kept up a continual discharge of their murderous missiles whilst they retired.

Against opponents of this description valor and discipline were of no avail. Young Crassus, the same who had signalized himself in Gaul under Cæsar, endeavored in vain, with a choice portion of the army, to make an impression on the barbarians by a vigorous charge; both he and his followers perished in the attempt. The enemy's attack was then directed with fresh energy against the main body of the Roman troops. While the light cavalry harassed them on their flank, and galled them with their arrows, the heavy-armed Parthians charged them in front with their pikes, which they hurled with such force that they often pierced two men at once.* The loss, consequently, was dreadful on the side of Crassus, and his defeat irretrievable. Plunged in the bitterest affliction, he began to recede with the rest of his troops, but again suffered himself to be deluded by a traitor, and to be entangled by him in difficult and marshy places that retarded his march, and caused the unhappy fugitives to be again overtaken by the enemy.

To complete their misfortune, Surena, the Parthian general, added stratagem to superiority of force: wishing to take Crassus alive, he proposed, with great apparent moderation, a private interview between himself and the Roman general. Crassus, compelled by his own soldiers to accept of the proposal, had no sooner come to the place of meeting, than, in consequence of an affray that ensued, both he and his chief attendants were put to the sword. His head was severed from his body and carried as a trophy to Orodes, the Parthian king. Some authors relate that this prince caused melted gold to be poured into the mouth, to insult by this significant action the insatiable avarice of Crassus.† The sad remnant of his army escaped by different routes to Syria, where their arrival there in a pitiful condition, by exhibiting the extent of their disaster, showed at the same time the just punish-

* Plutarch, in the life of M. Crassus.

† Or, in the energetic and somewhat bombastic style of Florus, "to torture by this metal, after death, the body of him whose soul had, during life, been consumed by a most violent thirst for gold.—*Aurum enim liquidum in rictum oris infusum est; ut, cujus animus arserat auri cupiditate, ejus etiam mortuum et exangue corpus auro ureretur.*"—Florus, *Epitome*, b. iii, c. 2.

ment of an expedition undertaken for no better motive than personal ambition and cupidity.*

This overthrow cost the Romans no less than thirty thousand men, viz. twenty thousand slain and ten thousand prisoners. It must have been the more painful to their national feelings, as it was quite unexpected. On previous occasions, they had sometimes experienced signal defeats; but this happened before their state had attained that astonishing degree of power and glory which it now enjoyed. At this time, Rome was everywhere triumphant, respected and dreaded by all nations: she had subdued the mightiest states of Europe, Asia, and Africa; and but lately had crushed the powerful kings of Armenia and Pontus, as well as the warlike tribes of Gaul and Germany. Yet, in the zenith of her greatness, she saw her glory suddenly dimmed and blasted in an attack upon a people recently formed out of the assemblage of those eastern nations, whose valor she was accustomed to despise.

The check received by Crassus from the Parthians was a blot on the Roman name, which the victories gained shortly after by Cassius and Ventidius over the same enemy could not remove. The standards and prisoners taken in the battle of Carræ still remained in the hands of the conquerors; and not till thirty years later, under the reign of Cæsar Augustus, did the Parthian king consent to restore them to the Romans. This last transaction alone was at the time considered a glorious triumph; so much were the subjects of the empire humbled, even at that time, by the recollection of their defeat, and so seriously did they believe it incumbent on them to efface, if possible, the smallest vestige of so signal an overthrow.

Julius Cæsar, in order to avenge the affront which the Parthians had lately inflicted on Rome, was on the point of marching against them, when he was put to death by his enemies in the senate. Mark Antony formed the same design; but it turned to his disgrace. During several centuries, the Romans ever regarded new attacks upon the Parthians as the most important of their wars. Their ablest and most warlike emperors, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, Septimius Severus, etc. made them the chief object of their attention, and the surname of *Parthicus* was, among all honorable titles, the most flattering to their vanity. If sometimes the Romans crossed the Euphrates, and pursued their conquests beyond that river, the Parthians, in their turn,

* Compare the disaster of Crassus with the similar and well merited reverse of Julian the apostate in his war against the Persians, who had succeeded the Parthians in their empire. (Modern History, pp. 112, 113.)

did the same from the opposite direction, and carried their arms and ravages into the Roman provinces. If they met with defeats, they also gained victories. In a word, the Romans could never succeed in bringing them under their sway; and the Parthian nation was like a wall of brass, which, with impregnable force, resisted the most violent attacks of their power.

RIVAL PRETENSIONS OF POMPEY AND JULIUS CÆSAR.—CIVIL WAR.—BATTLE OF PHARSALIA, AND DEATH OF POMPEY.—
B. C. 50—48.

THE death of Crassus was, in another respect, dreadfully fatal to the Roman republic. With much less ability and merit than either Cæsar or Pompey, he had maintained a sort of equilibrium between these famous men, his colleagues in the triumvirate. When this intermediate power was destroyed by his death, there was no longer any restraint on their rival pretensions. Each aimed at possessing the highest rank and acting the first part in the state. On one hand, Pompey, having long exercised the chief influence and a sort of princely authority among the citizens, was unwilling to part with these prerogatives; on the other, Cæsar had expressly declared and shown that he would never be satisfied with the second place. The latter could not bear a superior; the former would endure no equal.*

The general corruption of the times, licentiousness, violence, extortion, bribery, the sale of public offices and contempt of the laws, had reached the highest pitch among the Romans. Pompey, by his authority and influence, might have put some check to these disorders; but he connived at them for a time and purposely suffered them to increase, in order that their very excess might compel the Romans to place their whole confidence in his abilities and appoint him dictator. If he failed as to the precise object of his wishes, he at least obtained what was equivalent to it, the extraordinary distinction of being named sole consul, with permission, but no obligation, to have a colleague. This unprecedented favor perfectly satisfied the ambition of Pompey, by placing him alone at the head of the government, while it was more gratifying still to his vanity to acquire dignities by the free choice of the citizens than by recourse to arms, and to possess admirers rather than subjects.

* *Nec quemquam jam ferre potest Cæsare priorem,
Pompeiusvè parem.*—Lucan. i, 125—26.

The power of Cæsar had a still stronger support in the affection of a brave, numerous and triumphant army. The legions, which he had so often led to victory, were accustomed to follow him through every difficulty with the utmost confidence; and the same soldiers, who, under any other general, would have been insignificant troops, fought and served under him with invincible courage and constancy. He had thus strongly attached them to his person and fortunes, first, by the example of his heroism, which made him, notwithstanding the delicacy of his constitution, share in their greatest dangers and hardships; secondly, by the extreme care with which he always provided for their subsistence and safety; and finally by the splendid rewards and largesses that he bestowed on them, not only as a recompense for past services, but likewise as an earnest of future favors. It was well known that he did not accumulate riches for his own luxury and convenience, but for the purpose of rendering them a common treasure, and the reward of distinguished bravery. By these means, both officers and soldiers were taught to rely on the success and protection of their general; and this consideration, aided by a variety of other incidents, led these men, who ought to have been champions of the state, to support the individual pretensions of Cæsar, and to devote themselves to the zealous defence of his person and interest.

This artful politician was not less careful to advance his cause at Rome, than among the troops. Not being able, as long as the Gaulish war lasted, to act personally in that capital, he conducted every thing there through a number of zealous partisans. By letters, directions, intrigues, and money, he exercised a powerful influence over the assemblies of the people, and even frequently over the deliberations of the senate. Having in this manner obtained first the prorogation of his command in Gaul, he afterwards obtained the unexampled privilege of being a candidate for the consulship, even whilst absent and at the head of an army.

It is true that Pompey and other friends of the government at last perceived the ulterior object of Cæsar's ambition; and some, indeed, had mentioned it long before, but to no purpose. Now at length, they took measures to repeal the extraordinary concessions that had been made to him, or at least to render them nugatory; unfortunately, the power of Cæsar had been suffered to increase for too long a time, and had become so formidable as to set at defiance the tardy efforts of his opponents. This bold commander was already approaching with a select body of his troops. It is said that having reached the banks of the Rubicon, a small river which formed the limit of his province, he stopped

a moment to weigh the greatness of his undertaking, and shuddered at the idea of its consequences. Then plunging into the abyss of futurity, in the words of those who embark on arduous and doubtful projects, he cried out: "The die is cast," and immediately crossed the stream. By this daring act, Cæsar openly declared war against the commonwealth, whilst he affected, under specious pretences, to ascribe the evils that were to follow from the present state of things, to his opponents at Rome.

The whole country was thrown into the greatest consternation; on all sides, people fled from their habitations, and communicated their alarm to the capital. Pompey, who had not expected so sudden an attack, and had relied too much on his own power for the raising of a sufficient force, was found unprepared for the conflict. Cato, however, had several times put him on his guard against Cæsar, as, for instance, when he plainly said to him: "Now, indeed, the burden is preparing for your own shoulders; it will one day fall on the republic, but not till it has crushed you to the ground." The advice was then lost on Pompey, whose security on this subject went so far, that, when some persons observed in his presence how difficult it would be to oppose his rival, if the latter should advance in a hostile manner towards Rome, he answered that, "by merely stamping with his foot upon the ground, he would fill Italy with his legions." The event soon proved the contrary; and when Pompey began to perceive his error, it was already too late.

Cæsar was advancing with fearful rapidity. He not only took possession of all the cities in his way, but gained daily accessions of strength from the garrisons and bodies of troops which were destined to oppose his march, but which chose on the contrary to declare in his favor. There was not a moment to lose; nearly all the senators and magistrates of the republic, with Pompey at their head, left Rome, and having by a precipitate flight reached the harbor of Brundisium a little before Cæsar's arrival, had just time to sail thence on their way to Epirus, or the eastern side of the Adriatic sea (B. C. 49).

It required Cæsar only sixty days to oblige all his opponents to evacuate Italy. Being yet unable, for want of vessels, to pursue them to the opposite coast, he turned towards Rome, and entered it as a master. Fears had been entertained lest he should act in the same manner as Sylla and Marius had done on a similar occasion; but his clemency and mildness dispelled these alarms. The only violence which he used on this occasion was his seizure of the common treasury. He took from it immense sums of money to defray the expenses of the war, and thus turn-

ed the pecuniary resources of the republic against the republic itself.

After a short stay in Rome, Cæsar set out for Spain, to attack the numerous troops of his rival in that country. They consisted of five legions, five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry, equal in number to eight legions or forty thousand soldiers: so as to make an aggregate of about seventy thousand men, under the command of Afranius and Petreius, two of Pompey's lieutenants. Varro, the third lieutenant, took little part in the contest. This prospect of affairs in the Pompeian party made Cæsar say "that he was going to fight troops who had no general, and would return to fight a general who had no troops."* Both he and his army had to undergo many dangers and fatigues in their Spanish campaign; so great however was the superiority of his genius over ordinary skill, such as was possessed by Afranius and Petreius, that he not only induced the natives to declare in his favor, but actually obliged the five Roman legions to lay down their arms, and surrender without the honor of a battle.

This masterly and short expedition, which was soon followed by the reduction of Marseilles, submitted the whole west to the power of Cæsar. Having no longer any apprehension on that side, he determined to carry the war into the east in pursuit of Pompey, who had by this time collected a formidable number of men and vessels. To attempt the conveying of troops across the Adriatic sea in presence of such a force, might have been an act of rashness in any one except Cæsar; but this was for him an ordinary undertaking. Fearless of danger, he embarked twice to execute his design; and it was on one of these occasions that, whilst on board of a boat, and seeing the mariners nearly overpowered by the tempestuous weather, he bade them "not be afraid, as they were carrying Cæsar and his fortunes." He effected the passage of his legions with the success and celerity that characterized all his movements, and came in sight of Pompey near Dyrrachium.

These two able commanders then began to employ against each other all the arts of warfare, marches, private encounters, fortifications, etc. Still, they did not come to a general engagement. The most important action consisted in a vigorous and well directed sally made by Pompey against Cæsar's lines, a portion of which was forced; and when the latter endeavored to retaliate, his troops met with a resistance which threw them into great con-

* *Ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu.*—Sueton. in *Jul. Cæsar*.

fusion, and occasioned the loss of many officers and soldiers. It is commonly thought that Pompey, on this occasion, might have obtained a complete and decisive victory, had he not, through excessive caution and fear of an ambuscade, declined to follow up his success.

Cæsar and his troops, although sadly disappointed in their hopes, did not on that account yield to despondency. The check which they had just suffered, merely induced them to alter their plan of operations, and to leave the neighborhood of Dyrrachium in search of a more favorable spot. They found such a one in the plains of Pharsalia in Thessaly. Pompey arrived soon after with all his forces, and stationed them on a height, at the distance of thirty stadia, or about three miles, from Cæsar's camp. And here also the two rivals applied themselves to watch closely each other's movements, and sought to take advantage of every propitious circumstance that might offer itself; till at length both came to the determination to decide their quarrel at once by a general battle (B. C. 48).

Independently of auxiliaries on each side, the army of Pompey amounted to forty-five, and that of Cæsar to twenty-two thousand legionaries. The latter, perceiving that Pompey's cavalry was far superior in number to his own, placed six cohorts (or three thousand men) as a body of reserve behind his few squadrons, with orders to fall on the enemy's horse, when these would attempt, as he expected, to turn his flank. To these cohorts he expressly declared that he placed in them his chief hopes of victory.

The signal was no sooner given than the veterans of Cæsar advanced, and charged the enemy in front. They were received with perfect order by their motionless opponents, and the action very soon became general along the whole line. The horse of Pompey, as was expected, put the cavalry of Cæsar to flight at the first charge, and, together with a body of archers and slingers, were hastening to turn the flank of the enemy: just at this moment, the six cohorts, purposely drawn up to oppose them, appeared with pikes in their hands, and aimed their blows, according to their leader's order, at the face of their opponents. These splendid horsemen, astounded and dismayed at this sight, stopped on a sudden, fell into the utmost confusion, and fled to the neighboring heights. The archers and slingers, deserted by the horse, were easily put to the sword; nay, Pompey's left wing, being attacked in the rear by the six cohorts which had defeated his cavalry, began to give way. Cæsar, in order to increase the impression he had already made, brought forward fresh troops to

the front of his own line, and while his reserve continued their exertions, made a general charge which the enemy no longer endeavored to withstand. All fled in disorder through their own camp, and were pursued by the victors with great slaughter, especially of their auxiliary troops.

The victory of Cæsar was complete. He lost only two hundred soldiers and thirty officers; and killed fifteen thousand of the enemy, made upwards of twenty-four thousand prisoners, and took a hundred and eighty colors with nine Roman eagles or legionary standards.*

Pompey, as soon as he saw, at the beginning of the action, the dastardly flight of his cavalry, had returned to his tent in great dejection of spirit. Being soon told that the conquerors were already forcing his intrenchments, he changed his dress, mounted a horse, and passing through a gate of the camp, escaped to Larissa; thence, by following the valley of Tempe, he reached the sea-shore, where he embarked with a few attendants and friends in quest of some hospitable land. Egypt seemed to offer them the most secure shelter, because the sovereigns of that country were under essential obligations to the Romans in general, and to Pompey in particular. But what justice and gratitude could be expected, in time of adversity, from base and interested souls? As Pompey then appeared a vanquished fugitive, this was enough for the court of Egypt to resolve upon his utter ruin. Invited to land, he no sooner approached the shore, than a band of assassins murdered him in the sight of his wife Cornelia, who made the air resound with her lamentations.

Thus perished a man who had been considered for thirty years the greatest of the Romans. The manner of his death showed to the world a striking instance of the instability of human things, and an exemplification of the sad reverses to which those are commonly exposed who, in times of political excitement, undertake to be the leaders of the state. Of the three famous men who composed the first triumvirate of Rome, we have already seen two, Crassus and Pompey, suffer a violent death. It will not be long before we see the third and most powerful of the three, Julius Cæsar, experience in his turn a similar, and even a more terrible catastrophe.

* Cæsar, *De bello civil.*, b. iii, c. 99.

CIVIL WAR CONTINUED.—VICTORIES, DICTATORSHIP, AND
DEATH OF JULIUS CÆSAR.—B. C. 48—44.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar set out in pursuit of Pompey. It was not till he arrived at Alexandria, that he learned the death of this great man, formerly his friend and colleague, whose head was then presented to him by one of the chief murderers. He beheld with horror that awful sight, and shed tears on witnessing Pompey's misfortune. But he was soon obliged to protect his own life against the same faithless persons by whom that illustrious man had been put to death.

As Roman consul, Cæsar thought proper to interpose his authority between Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and his sister, the famous Cleopatra, for the conciliation of their rival claims. The young king, highly displeased at this interference, the result of which tended to equal his sister with himself, immediately gave unequivocal proofs of his resentment: all the royal forces were directed to surround and attack Cæsar in the quarter in which he had intrenched himself, with only three or four thousand soldiers. Even in this critical situation, he baffled all the efforts of the assailants, till at length, having received several reinforcements, he assumed the offensive, and boldly attacking the Egyptians in their camp, put a vast number of them to the sword. The king endeavored to save himself by flight, but was drowned in the Nile, and his premature death was regarded as a punishment of that inflicted on Pompey.

The indefatigable Cæsar, after this new series of exploits, passed over to Asia, and marched against Pharnaces, the son and assassin of Mithridates. That wicked prince had taken advantage of the Roman civil war to recover the kingdom of his ancestors, and had even made extensive conquests in the north of Lesser Asia. The sudden appearance of Cæsar at the head of a few legions was enough to crush this recently acquired power. His progress was so rapid that, in a letter to one of his friends at Rome, he expressed it by these three words: *Veni, vidi, vici*—"I came, I saw, I conquered."* (B. C. 47).

With almost equal rapidity did he destroy the Pompeian party in Africa. The leaders of that party, Metellus Scipio, Cato, and other distinguished men, by uniting their forces had collected there ten legions under their standards. They had, besides, a

* Plutarch and Sueton., in *Jul. Cæsar*.

numerous fleet, an excellent cavalry, one hundred and twenty elephants, and large bodies of auxiliary troops furnished and commanded by Juba, the king of Mauritania, their ally. This powerful combination of forces seemed to forebode the decline of Cæsar's fortune: however it served only to give it more splendor, strength and solidity; in a campaign of less than six months, he defeated all his opponents, and subdued a vast extent of territory, of which he made a Roman province. The battle of Thapsus (B. C. 46) was not less decisive in his favor, than the battle of Pharsalia had been two years before. His troops vied with him in courage, and his victory was so complete, that Cato, Scipio and Juba, unwilling to survive the sudden failure of both their hopes and resources, chose to put an end to their lives, rather than throw themselves on the conqueror's mercy. Cato died in the city of Utica, and for this reason is frequently surnamed by historians, *Utican* or *Uticensis*.

Cæsar had now prevailed over his enemies in every part of the world; the west and the east, the north and the south, had been subdued by his arms, and pacified by his wisdom and clemency. After so many brilliant deeds of every description, he returned to Rome, where extraordinary honors awaited him from the senate and the people. He was appointed Censor for three years, with full power to dispose of the honors and offices of the state, and Dictator for ten years, with the unexampled privilege of being preceded by seventy-two lictors. During the course of one month he enjoyed four separate triumphs: the first, for his conquests in Gaul; the second, for his victories in Egypt; the third, for the defeat of Pharnaces; and the last for the overthrow of the king of Mauritania. As to his victories over Pompey and other Romans in the civil war, they were not considered fit objects for triumphs.

Cæsar, having thus obtained the grand object of his wishes, the possession of a real sovereignty in Rome, endeavored to reconcile the public mind to his government by acts of generosity towards his enemies, the grant of considerable rewards to his officers and soldiers, public games, and the distribution of valuable gifts among one hundred and fifty thousand citizens of the lower and poorer classes. He even entertained all the people at a repast, for which twenty-two thousand tables were prepared. The enormous expenses incurred on these occasions, were defrayed out of the vast amount of money which he had brought from his conquests, that is, the sum of about sixty millions of dollars. It is probable that these popular measures were not less successful in gaining the consent of the multitude to his absolute power,

than his arms had been in subduing the leaders who opposed him in the field.

Nevertheless it must be admitted; however illegal were the means of acquiring this power, that many of Cæsar's acts were in themselves, as might have been expected from so able a personage, worthy of a great sovereign. His authority was often exercised in enacting useful decrees, suppressing abuses, encouraging agriculture, the sciences and the arts, and opposing new barriers to the perpetration of murder and other crimes. As the ancient Roman calendar was very deficient, and the cause of great confusion in the computation of time, Cæsar reformed it with great though not complete success, on the principles established by the Egyptian astronomers. Nothing connected with government escaped the vigilance or was beyond the reach of his vast genius. Such, indeed, was the extent and vigor of his mind, that he could at the same time read or write, give audience, and dictate to a secretary; nay, when his whole attention was bent on transacting by letters affairs of the highest importance, he might be seen dictating as many as four letters to four different secretaries at once. For these reasons Julius Cæsar is commonly thought to have been, with respect to natural talents, the most surprising man that ever lived.

Events, by their magnitude and rapid succession, kept pace, as it were, with the force and prodigious activity of his soul. During his short stay in Africa and in Rome, the sons of Pompey, Cneius and Sextus, had mustered numerous troops in Spain. By placing themselves at the head of their father's adherents, gathering those who had survived preceding defeats, and making additional levies, they rendered their party almost as formidable as ever. This new state of affairs required nothing less than the presence of Cæsar himself; he therefore embarked for Spain, where he met with perils and difficulties worthy of his undaunted courage. His exploits, as usual, were great and important, even from the beginning of the campaign. The decisive action, and fortunately the last in this bloody struggle, took place near Munda, a city not far from the sea, in the southern part of the country.

The first charges of the combatants presented an unusual spectacle: notwithstanding the well known valor of Cæsar's troops, the Pompeians, by their equal bravery and superior numbers, threatened them with an entire defeat. Those legions, so frequently victorious before, but now meeting with the most determined resistance from legionaries and veterans like themselves, began to give way, and seemed prevented only by shame from being completely routed: the danger, indeed, was so great, that

Cæsar thought of killing himself, and at one time appeared determined to do so. Dismounting from his horse, he seized the sword and shield of a private soldier, and advanced to the distance of only ten paces from the enemy. His example, his exhortations, his peril, revived the courage of his troops, and especially the tenth legion, a body of intrepid veterans, who had signalized themselves in all his wars. The fight was renewed with increased fury, though victory still remained in suspense; till an untimely movement made by Labienus decided the fortune of the day. This general, formerly one of Cæsar's lieutenants, but now one of the chief leaders in the Pompeian party, despatched five cohorts to the defence of his camp, which was threatened with an attack. As the cohorts were leaving the field of battle, Cæsar, whether with sincerity or through artifice, cried out that the enemy were flying; and this report, being soon spread through the two armies, filled one with hope and the other with terror. The Pompeians, who until then had valiantly kept their ground, began, in their turn to give way, broke their ranks, and fled in great disorder.

From that moment, the slaughter, as usual, turned chiefly against the fugitives. There fell on their side thirty thousand men, among whom were three thousand Roman citizens of rank, with Labienus and Accius Varus, another distinguished general of this party. Besides the slain, seventeen officers of rank were taken, together with thirteen Roman eagles or legionary standards. Of the two sons of Pompey, the elder, Cneius, perished soon after in his flight, and the younger, Sextus, made his escape by concealing himself in the mountains of Celtiberia (B. c. 45). The loss of Cæsar amounted to one thousand of his bravest warriors, besides five hundred wounded. As he retired after the battle, he said to his friends that on other occasions he had fought for victory, but this was the first time he had been obliged to fight for his life.

The victory of Munda gave peace to the world, yet did not afford any solid content to the victor himself. It might seem that, in this extraordinary exaltation and prosperity, Cæsar had nothing more to desire, and that he must have been the happiest of mortals; the case proved exactly the reverse. By a very natural effect of the emptiness of human things, the heart of this famous conqueror was an incessant prey to agitation or disgust, and even occasionally to aversion for life; it was a fathomless abyss which nothing could fill, a kind of furnace continually needing new fuel to feed its devouring activity. He had scarcely freed himself from the dangers and difficulties of the civil war,

when he began to think of new expeditions and conquests. His present desire was to make war on the Parthians, and after subduing them, to cross Hyrcania, and marching along by the Caspian sea and Mount Caucasus into Scythia, to carry his conquering arms through the countries contiguous to Germany, and through Germany itself; and finally to return by Gaul to Rome; thus finishing the circle of the Roman empire, as well as extending its bounds to the ocean on every side.

But, while Cæsar was planning this vast scheme, he was not aware that his own existence, which appeared so secure after the defeat of all his enemies, was more seriously threatened than ever. He had, it is true, after the battle of Munda, returned in triumph to Rome and received there every sort of distinction: he was declared *Imperator*, perpetual dictator, the father of his country, etc; nay the temples were filled with his statues; and festivals, religious rites and sacrifices were impiously decreed to him as to a god. Still a precipice yawned beneath his feet. The extravagant honors paid to him, proceeded partly from servile adulation, partly from a design of his secret enemies to render him odious, and Cæsar himself greatly contributed to create a dislike against him in the hearts of many, by the despotic and haughty manners he occasionally assumed. He desired above all to wear the insignia and the name, as he already possessed all the power, of a king. This pretension, which he very imperfectly concealed, was the immediate cause of his ruin. A conspiracy was formed against him by the two famous prætors Cassius and Brutus, with sixty other citizens of distinction, most of whom were even senators, and under essential obligations to Cæsar either for the preservation of their lives, or the possession of their dignities.

The conspirators appointed for the execution of their design the day on which Cæsar expected to receive from the senate the royal diadem, and the title of king for all the countries subjected to Rome, with the exception of Italy. As he entered the senate chamber, they rose, as if to do him honor, and conducted him to his seat. At this moment, Cimber, one of the chief conspirators, affected to present him with an earnest petition, and being refused, took hold of the dictator's robe, as if to urge the entreaty. Cæsar exclaimed: "This is violence." As he spoke these words, Cimber threw back the robe from his shoulders; this was the signal agreed upon, and called out to the other accomplices to strike. Servilius Casca aimed the first blow. Cæsar started from his place, and, in the first moment of excitement, like a lion in the midst of hunters, endeavored to defend himself. But he soon perceived that resistance was vain. Being already wounded,

and seeing so many swords and daggers directed against him, he wrapped himself up in his gown, and fell, without further struggle, at the foot of Pompey's statue. Some historians add that Cæsar, perceiving among the conspirators Brutus, to whom he had long shown marked affection, mournfully exclaimed: "Thou, too, my son;" and from that moment resigned himself to his fate, and expired covered with wounds in the midst of his murderers (B. C. 44).*

Such was the deplorable end of this famous personage, who, in order to gratify his ambition, had deluged almost every part of the earth with the blood, not only of foreign enemies, but likewise of Romans slain in war. It can hardly be denied that he had merited a violent death, by subverting the government and trampling under foot the laws and liberties of his country. Yet, since the existing situation of affairs, the degeneracy of manners, and the natural course of events, manifestly demanded a change in the constitution and government of Rome, it was in some measure a happiness that the change should be effected by such a man as Cæsar; the ruling power could not come into abler hands. Hence the act of his enemies not only savored too much of ingratitude and perfidy, but was, at the same time, too illegal and impolitic, to deserve praise. Their conduct tended not to restore the freedom of the state, but on the contrary, to plunge both the city and the provinces into an abyss of new calamities, civil wars, and bloodshed, till the proud Roman republic ceased to exist.†

Cæsar himself had foreseen these evil consequences of his death. Among other remarks which he made about the dangers with which his life was threatened, he often observed that the prolongation of his days was much more important to the public than to himself. As for himself, he had long since acquired power and glory enough. But should he happen to fall by a premature and violent death, the state would lose its peace and tranquillity, and experience, more than ever, the evils of civil war.

The sequel will prove the accuracy of these forebodings of Cæsar. His murderers themselves became the victims of the new broils occasioned by their rash conduct, and it is remarkable that scarcely any one of them survived him by more than three years; most of them, within that short and turbulent interval, met a disastrous fate. Some were slain in battle, others were put to death

* Sueton. in *J. Cæsarem*;—Plutarch, in *the lives of Julius Cæsar and Marcus Brutus*.

† See the train of poetical imagery and beautiful lines of Virgil, who was a contemporary to all these events, on the subject of Cæsar's death and of the many evils by which it was followed.—*Georg.* i, ll. 466—497.

by order of their enemies, and others killed themselves with the very daggers that had served for Cæsar's assassination.

Julius Cæsar was killed in the fifty-sixth year of his life. As he did not commence the first of his grand military expeditions, the conquest of Gaul, before he was forty-two years of age, he therefore performed the exploits, which have rendered his name so conspicuous, in the brief space of fourteen years.

He, moreover, entertained various projects for the utility and splendor of the Roman nation: Not to mention again his determination to march against the Parthians, and avenge by their defeat the overthrow and death of Crassus; he resolved to drain the great Pontine marshes which rendered the air quite unhealthy, and much of the land unserviceable in the neighborhood in Rome; to open a communication between the Ionian and Ægean seas, by cutting through the Isthmus of Corinth; to erect moles, and build convenient harbors along the coasts of Italy; to open wide roads over the Apennines; to dig a navigable canal from the Anio and Tiber to the sea at Terracina; to rebuild Corinth and Carthage; to erect splendid edifices in Rome; to establish public libraries; to revise the whole code of Roman laws, and reduce it to a better and more accessible form, etc. These were the momentous projects of Cæsar; projects worthy of his unparalleled intelligence and courage, but which time did not allow him to accomplish. These designs, however, were not entirely lost, and some of them were put into execution under Cæsar Augustus.

ROME AFTER THE DEATH OF CÆSAR.—SECOND TRIUMVIRATE COMPOSED OF MARK ANTONY, OCTAVIUS CÆSAR, AND LEPIDUS.—BATTLE OF PHILIPPI, AND RUIN OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.—B. C. 44—42.

TERROR and dismay prevailed in Rome after the death of Cæsar. His enemies, although applauded by many, did not receive from the people those marks of universal approbation which they had expected. On the contrary, Mark Antony, Cæsar's intimate friend and colleague in the consulship, by making known his beneficent intentions and legacies to the people, easily incensed the multitude against his assassins; so that they deemed it expedient to shelter themselves for a time in the capitol, and, after a short stay, to leave the city altogether. Antony then applied more than ever to concentrate the principal authority in himself, and, notwithstanding the eloquent denunciations of Cicero against both his profligate morals and his arbitrary administration, he contin-

ned to exercise it for a time in the most despotic manner. It was manifestly his intention to succeed the late dictator, and he would probably have carried his design into execution, had he not been prevented by a new competitor, who then appeared for the first time on the stage of public affairs, and, although much younger than Antony, far surpassed him in judgment, prudence and skill.

This young rival was Caius Octavius (afterwards Cæsar Augustus), the grand-nephew and adopted son of Julius Cæsar. He had been residing for some time in the east, engaged in the pursuit of his studies and in military exercises, when he received the news of his uncle's fate. This melancholy event surprised and greatly perplexed him, but did not damp his courage. Though he was scarcely nineteen years old, he already possessed the skill and depth of an able politician, together with the grasping views of an ambitious leader. Having hastily returned to Rome, he presented himself as the heir of J. Cæsar, and in this capacity obtained considerable riches, which he spent in increasing the number of his partisans, and in acquiring popularity among the citizens at large. He at the same time affected great zeal for the republic, great respect for the senate, and great deference for Cicero in particular, pretending to be guided in all things by his advice.

Under these auspices, and in concert with the two consuls Hirtius and Pansa, Octavius was active in checking the high pretensions and alarming power of Antony. The latter was not only defeated near Mutina (or Modene), but even compelled to evacuate Italy, and to retire with the remnant of his forces across the Alps into Gaul. Here he advantageously retrieved his losses by the addition of several legions to his party. On the other hand, Octavius, whose views were suspected by the most zealous republicans, saw his late services despised, and himself on the point of being stripped of the chief command in his own army. Having removed this danger by his prudence and resolution, he began to alter his line of conduct. He pretended to have his eyes opened by the conduct of his actual opponents at Rome, and therefore, as he had previously joined the senate against Antony, he now, with equal earnestness, joined Antony against the senate.

This event entirely changed the aspect of affairs. There was no sufficient force in Italy to resist the joint armies of these two leaders; so that it became absolutely necessary to yield under this new usurpation. To strengthen their cause, they chose an associate in the person of Lepidus, a man of great wealth and of some influence in the state, but weak, of mean capacity, and consequently not likely to be feared in the disputes that might

arise among them about superiority. Such was the origin of the second triumvirate, which proved still more fatal than the former to the liberties of Rome and the lives of the Romans (B. C. 43.)

The new triumvirs, after having assumed all the powers and distributed among themselves the chief provinces of the state, entered Rome at the head of their troops. After the example of Marius and Sylla, they drew up proscription lists against all the chief abettors of the opposite party. The lists, besides the opportunity which they afforded for acts of private revenge, marked out for death, some say, one hundred and thirty senators, others, three hundred senators and two thousand knights, including several relatives or former benefactors and friends of the triumvirs, who were not ashamed to sacrifice them to their private interests.

Of these unhappy victims of their ingratitude and cruelty, the most distinguished, as well as the most universally regretted, was Cicero. This great orator had incurred the hatred of Antony, by constantly opposing his tyrannical views and profligate conduct with all the power of eloquence. Sensible of the danger which now threatened him, he had withdrawn to one of his villas near the sea, full of perplexity and apprehension as to his future destiny; his servants prevailed upon him to leave that spot, and to set out for a place of greater safety. In compliance with their earnest entreaties, Cicero began to hasten towards the sea shore, when a body of soldiers overtook him, before he had left the walks of his garden. He caused the litter to be stopped, and calmly presented his head to the soldiers. The countenance of a man so well known to every Roman, now worn out with fatigue and dejection, and disfigured by neglect of the usual attention to his person, touched even the persons who had come to assist in his murder: they covered their faces, while their centurion performed the office of an assassin. By three strokes the head of Cicero was severed from his body, and together with the hands carried to Rome, and exposed to public view from the very *rostrum* on which this admirable man had so often appeared to defend innocence or vindicate the laws of his country.

No act of the triumvirs drew greater odium on them, and especially on M. Antony, than the murder of Cicero. It seemed as if eloquence, literature and philosophy had been put to death with so talented a personage; and it was remarked that Antony had not so much doomed Cicero to capital punishment, as Cicero had, by his very execution, doomed Antony to eternal shame. Posterity, says Velleius Paterculus, will always detest the barbarity of the one, while it will ever admire the virtues as well as the exquisite talents of the other. It will never cease to con-

sider Antony as a usurper, who made a dreadful use of his transient prosperity and fortune; and to acknowledge in Cicero a real friend of humanity, an excellent citizen worthy of the high preferments to which his merit alone raised him, and an accomplished orator whose eloquence prevented the Romans from being surpassed in genius by those whom their arms had subdued.*

Simultaneous with the death of Cicero, the work of proscription was carried on with frightful violence, and even, in many respects, to a greater extent than its authors had originally projected: plunder, exactions, forfeitures and murder seemed then the order of the day; scenes of death, or of the most frightful nature, everywhere prevailed. An end was at last put to this course of tyranny, and the attention of the triumvirs was directed to a different and most important object. Brutus and Cassius had, by this time, collected immense forces in the east for the vindication of public liberty; Octavius and Antony, for the opposite reason, and for the support of their assumed power, set out from Rome at the head of their legions, and crossing the Adriatic sea, advanced as rapidly as possible against the enemy.

The two armies came in sight of each other near the city of Philippi, on the confines of Macedonia and Thrace. This was the spot destined to witness one of the most memorable battles ever fought, not only by the Romans; but by any nation, whether we consider the importance of the cause or the number of the combatants. The result was to be the preservation or the irretrievable downfall of a republic which comprised nearly the whole civilized world; the troops on each side amounted to at least one hundred thousand, Romans or auxiliaries. Their camps were so disposed, that Brutus was opposite to Octavius, and Cassius to Antony. Brutus attacked Octavius with so much vigor, that, in a moment, the legions of the latter were broken, routed, and pursued with dreadful slaughter into their camp; the camp itself was forced, and Octavius, then seriously indisposed, narrowly escaped being slain or taken a captive: But in another part of the field, Antony gained over Cassius the same signal advantage which Brutus had obtained over Octavius. Cassius thought that all was lost; and yielding to the impulse of despair caused himself to be killed by his freedman Pindarus, before he could receive any news of the success of his colleague. His death raised the hopes of the triumvirate, while it dejected the minds of the republican party. A few days after, Brutus, deeming it

* M. Cicero, qui omnia incrementa sua sibi debuit, vir novitatis nobilissimæ, et ut vitâ clarus, ita ingenio maximus, qui effecit ne quorum arma viceramus, eorum ingenio vinceremur.—Velleius, b. ii, c. 24 and 37.

necessary to hazard another battle, did, it is true, every thing that the bravest and most expert general could do in his situation; yet he was entirely defeated, and in his distress followed the example of Cassius, by putting an end to his own life.*

The death of Brutus and Cassius extinguished every probable hope of the restoration of the commonwealth. The liberty of the Roman people may be justly said to have been buried with them in the plains of Philippi; the more so, as a vast number of their chief abettors perished on the same occasion, and most of their troops were either cut in pieces, or surrendered to the victorious party (B. C. 42).

The poet Horace, then in his twenty-second year, was present at the battle of Philippi in the capacity of tribune or commander of a legion on the side of Brutus. As he himself relates, his courage did not appear in any remarkable degree; on the contrary, he threw away his buckler, and fled.† Although he preserved his life and liberty, he lost all his fortune, which was confiscated to the profit of the conquerors; and we owe in a great measure to his distress on that occasion, those effusions of classical poetry which will for ever elicit the admiration and form the delight of the Latin scholar.‡ He had no reason to complain of his new avocation; and the patronage of Mæcenas, Octavius'

* One of the characteristic features of those ages and countries in which licentiousness and infidelity prevail, is that people easily persuade themselves to seek in voluntary death a remedy to their present evils. This is, however, a practice condemned both by reason and religion. The wisest among the Gentiles themselves considered suicide both as a want of courage, and a crime against the will and sovereignty of God. "Pythagoras," says Cicero (*De Senect.* n. 73), "forbids a man to quit his station, unless by the command of the Supreme Ruler, that is, of God." Socrates speaks to the same effect in Plato's *Dialogue on the immortality of the soul*. He declares that a philosopher, that is, a true friend of wisdom and virtue, never will kill himself: "This is not allowed," says he, "even to those for whom death might be better than life. For, the Almighty has placed us in this world as in a station, which we ought not to quit without his order."

If then Cato, Brutus, Cassius, and many others, committed suicide, the reason is because, instead of listening to the voice of sound reason, they suffered themselves to be misled by the principles of a false religion or false philosophy. The mind of Brutus, moreover, had been excited by the supposed apparition of a frightful ghost, which is said to have showed itself twice in his tent, as a presage of his impending and disastrous fate. This, notwithstanding his apparent firmness and tranquillity, may have contributed to his despair.—See Plutarch, in *his life of Brutus*; and Florus, *Epit.* iv, 7.

† Hor. b. ii, *Od.* 5.

‡ b. ii, *Ep.* 2.

friend and minister, who became acquainted with his poetical talent, abundantly repaid him for whatever he had lost at Philippi.

OCTAVIUS AND MARK ANTONY CONTINUED.—NEW CIVIL WAR.
BATTLE OF ACTIUM, AND CHANGE OF THE ROMAN COMMONWEALTH INTO AN EMPIRE.—B. C. 42—31.

OCTAVIUS and Antony, after their victory at Philippi, made between themselves, and without any regard for the weak Lepidus, a new partition of the Roman provinces. Octavius kept possession of the west, and the east was allotted to Antony. The latter set out with six legions and a numerous body of horse, to visit the regions which had been placed under his immediate control. By the ease and affability of his manners he gained great popularity in Greece; but his sojourn in Asia and Egypt became extremely prejudicial to his glory, by the opportunity which he found in these countries to indulge in his inclination for a sensual and dissolute life. Suffering himself to be enslaved by a wretched passion for Cleopatra, the queen of Egypt, he seemed to have lost, in the company of this profligate woman, all sense of virtue and decorum, as well as all regard for his most valuable interests.

Octavius, on the contrary, having returned to Rome, neglected no means to strengthen and secure his power. He skilfully turned every fault of his opponents to his own profit; he crushed by vigorous measures those who attempted or feigned to attempt the revival of the republican party, such as L. Antonius in the Peruvian war, and Tiberius Nero in the province of Campania; in fine, he attached the soldiers more and more to his cause by rewards and largesses, and even succeeded in obtaining the esteem and affection of the citizens at large, by many acts in which he displayed a mild and useful exercise of his power, and the efficient regard he began to manifest for the public prosperity.

In these various measures of war and administration, Octavius was admirably sustained by his two illustrious friends, Agrippa and Mæcenæ, the one a skilful general and admiral, the other a sagacious and wise statesman. The first, by his courage and military abilities, was able in every war to fight with success the battles of the young triumvir; the second, by his industry, his temper, his choice of friends, and his fitness to soften the public manners by diverting the minds of men from objects of distress to the pleasant occupations of literary genius, was well qualified

to smoothen all the difficulties in the way of the civil administration. Although it had not yet fully appeared in what degree Octavius was to commit his affairs to such able hands, his discernment in choosing them might be considered as the presage of a fortune not depending on accidents, but founded on a real superiority of judgment and skill. He himself, in the interim, deeply matured his plans, in order to prevent his chief colleague from gaining any ascendancy, and in order to secure his own preponderance in the whole empire.

Two new wars, which simultaneously broke out in the west and the east, greatly contributed to give additional strength to one of the two parties, and cast much discredit on the other. The first of these contests was carried on between Octavius and Sextus Pompey (a son of Pompey the great), who headed a sort of middle-party between the triumvirate and the republic. Having escaped with his life from the battle of Munda, he gradually collected the sad remnant of the republican forces; and assembling a numerous fleet, made himself master of Sicily, Sardinia, and all the seas between Africa and Italy. This enabled him to reduce the Italian cities, and Rome in particular, to very great distress and famine, by precluding the usual importation of corn from foreign countries.

Before an open rupture took place between Sextus and the triumvirs, negotiations had been resorted to, and a peace had been concluded; nay, the reconciliation appeared so sincere, that the leaders on both sides invited each other to a feast. Sextus gave the first entertainment on board his vessel. While the guests were enjoying themselves, Menas, once a slave of the great Pompey, but now emancipated, and the first officer in the fleet of his son, whispered to him that he had now a favorable occasion to revenge the death of his father and brother, and to recover the rank of his family, by dispatching or detaining captive the authors of their calamities. "Let me cut the cable," said he, "and put out to sea; and you will be master not only of Sardinia and Sicily, but of the whole Roman empire." "This might have been done by Menas, without consulting me," replied Sextus; "but my word is sacred, and must not be broken." The guests accordingly were suffered to depart unharmed, without even being made sensible of their danger, and they gave entertainments in their turn; nay, additional articles were adopted at these feasts to confirm the treaty which they had just concluded.

This treaty however did not last more than one year (B. C. 39—38): mutual complaints about the non-observance of some of its terms led, during the absence of Antony, to open war between

Octavius and Sextus. The hostilities were carried on principally at sea, with great vigor and animosity on both sides. Several battles were fought, and severe losses inflicted on the Octavian party; still nothing decisive was done during the whole space of two years. At last, the superior skill of Agrippa, lately appointed admiral of the fleet of Octavius, completely decided the struggle in his favor: in a great naval battle fought near the shores of Sicily, he, with the trifling loss of only three ships, destroyed or captured nearly the whole hostile fleet, consisting like his own of three hundred vessels, no more than seventeen of which escaped to Messina (B. C. 36). Sextus, deprived by that single blow of his principal and almost only support, set out for Asia, where he shortly after perished in an ill-concerted attempt to revive his fortunes.

The late victory of Octavius was followed by another transaction equally favorable to his interest. As Lepidus gave him, at that very time, some real or apparent subjects of complaint, he profited by the circumstance to strip this imprudent colleague of the little share of power hitherto allotted to him in the triumvirate: by his dexterity and the influence of his name, he induced all the troops of Lepidus to abandon their general, and to pass to his own side. As to Lepidus himself, he did not insult him in his misfortune, but being satisfied with depriving him of his command, he left him until death in possession of some honorary titles.

But Octavius himself, notwithstanding his success, was at first involved in great difficulty. By the surrender of the land troops of Sextus Pompey, and the further addition of the legions of Lepidus to his own, he was found to be the master of all the troops that had been employed in the late war, whether as friends or as enemies. His fleet consisted then of nearly six hundred galleys with store-ships and transports; his land-army comprised forty-five legions, which, though supposed to be incomplete, may have amounted to upwards of two hundred thousand men. To these he joined from fifteen to twenty-five thousand horse, and about thirty thousand light infantry. All these forces had been levied for different masters and in different provinces of the empire; they were persons of different characters; some originally slaves, others freemen; natives of Spain, Gaul, Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa, mingled with Italians and Romans; adherents of Julius Cæsar or of Pompey, of Antony, Octavius, or Lepidus. It was certainly difficult to dispose of an assemblage consisting of parts so various and discordant. Those who had come over from Sextus Pompey and Lepidus were to be retained by indul-

gence and favors; and those who had been the original support of Caesar's fortunes, had strong claims on his kindness. All were sensible of their consequence, and felt persuaded that the fate of the empire was in their hands.*

Octavius saw the necessity of assigning different quarters to the various parts of this numerous army, before any cabals could be formed, and a mutinous spirit have time to work on their mind. But it was, at the same time, exceedingly dangerous to attempt the separation of troops thus disposed, before granting to them all the rewards and gratuities which they expected. Octavius saw the peril that menaced him. He was far from having at his disposal the means to satisfy the pretensions of the whole army; yet he did not shrink from the arduous task, and on this occasion, as on others of a similar nature not unfrequent in times of civil wars, he succeeded by his prudence in extricating himself from the difficulty. The more ancient legions were separately appeased by the grant of a portion of their request, and prevailed upon to accept their discharge from the service. Military honors and gifts were bestowed on other officers and soldiers who had signalized themselves by their bravery; and the rest were satisfied with the distribution of some money, accompanied by the promise of much more splendid rewards in future. Finally, care was taken not to leave them idle, but they were led or sent to a variety of expeditions against the Pannonians, Dalmatians, and other Illyrian tribes whose restlessness annoyed the frontiers. In these wars, Octavius gave many and undoubted proofs of personal courage, and, either in person or through his lieutenants, obtained complete success.

The power of this celebrated man began, at that period, to be solidly established. His conduct at first had rendered him an object of mistrust and terror; but owing to his subsequent moderation, benevolence, and exertions for the public good, those sentiments of dislike and hatred were gradually superseded by affection and esteem. Hitherto he had been constantly surrounded by competitors or assailed by enemies; but the whole west was now under his undisputed control, and public admiration was entirely on his side. It would indeed have been unjust not to admire so much success in so short a term of years; so many victories won over the barbarians; four civil wars prosperously ended, at Mutina, Philippi, Perusia, and in Sicily; the whole force of Lepidus and Sextus Pompey subdued, and added by the

* This description of the army under Octavius is taken almost literally from *Ferguson* (b. v, c. 7) and *Crevier* (vol. xv, p. 428); both of whom have followed in their narrative Appian and Dio Cassius.

conqueror to his own; in a word, so much done by one not yet thirty years of age: all this was certainly calculated to produce in the minds of the people a sort of veneration, which, constantly upheld and even increased by a series of glorious actions, became one of the strongest supports of his greatness.

The case of his remaining colleague was exactly the reverse. A life of dissipation, extravagance and licentiousness tarnished the lustre of the otherwise great qualities of Antony, and rendered him more and more contemptible in the eyes of the Roman people. Even in his campaigns, and notwithstanding the splendor of his military talents, he fell very short of the prosperity that everywhere accompanied the arms of his rival. Whilst Octavius was waging war against Sextus Pompey, Antony undertook his grand Parthian expedition, in which the whole glory was for his lieutenant Ventidius, and the disgrace for himself.

The career of Ventidius was checkered with a variety of incidents. During his youth, he had been taken prisoner in the Social war, and led to Rome to serve for the conqueror's triumph. Being then reduced to very great distress, he at first served as a private soldier, and signalized himself by his courage. Julius Cæsar, that excellent judge of personal merit, promoted him to higher functions, and successively raised him to the dignity of senator, tribune of the people, and prætor. He was still in possession of this last office, when, after the premature death of the two consuls Hirtius and Pansa, he was appointed by the triumvirs to fill one of the two vacant places in the consulship, till the end of the year B. C. 43.

In all the contests which arose towards this time about the sovereign power in Rome, Ventidius attached himself to Mark Antony, and served him with courage and fidelity. Being sent by him to arrest the progress of the Parthians in Asia, he signally defeated them in three battles, thus gaining in a short time more victories over them than had ever been gained by any Roman general. Triumphal honors were decreed to Ventidius for these victories, and the people saw with admiration one who formerly had entered Rome as a captive, now enter it as the conqueror of the only nation in the world that set their power at defiance.

This general might have pursued his advantage over the Parthians to a much greater extent, and even have made them tremble for their empire. But he feared to provoke the jealousy of Antony by doing more in this respect; he was even fearful that he had already gone too far, and his apprehensions were by no means groundless. The triumvir, awakened as it were from his lethargy by the victories of his lieutenant, hastened to the

scene of action, and assumed the whole command of the troops, endeavoring in this manner to reap the fruits of an expedition so gloriously begun by another. His jealousy or vanity turned only to his shame and disappointment.

The force which he mustered for the continuation of the war, consisted of sixty thousand Roman foot, and ten thousand horse who, though chiefly Gauls and Spaniards, were reckoned as Romans; the number of the allies, including cavalry and light-armed soldiers, amounted to thirty thousand. This formidable host struck terror even into distant nations, and alarmed all Asia, but it was rendered perfectly useless by the precipitation of Antony. He ought certainly to have wintered in Armenia, that he might give repose and refreshment to his men, after a march of a thousand miles: instead of this precaution, he hurried forward, and in his haste left behind him the military engines, amongst which was a battering ram eighty feet long. These engines followed the army on three hundred carriages: but they were not allowed to reach their destination; the Parthians, by a skilful and bold attack, destroyed them all in the way, and put to the sword the numerous detachment that accompanied them, that is, about ten thousand soldiers with their commander Statianus.

This loss greatly discouraged the Romans. The king of Armenia, their most powerful ally, withdrew from the camp in despair; and, on the other hand, while they were employed in the siege of Phraata, a considerable city, the Parthians came upon them with great insolence and contempt. Antony, being well aware that inaction would lead to an increase of despondency among his troops, led out ten legions and the whole cavalry, under pretence of foraging. His real object was to fight; but he firmly believed that this ostensible pretext would be the only method of drawing the enemy after him, and bringing them to a battle. After some progress through the country, he observed them moving at no great distance, and watching an opportunity to attack him in his march. At this moment, he feigned an intention to retire; accordingly, he passed the army of the barbarians which was drawn up in the form of a crescent, but he had previously directed the horse to charge the enemy briskly, as soon as the ranks of the latter would be within reach of the legionary troops. The Parthians were struck with astonishment at the order of the Roman army, whilst they observed them passing at regular intervals without confusion, and brandishing their pikes in silence.

When the signal for battle was given, the Roman horse rushed to the attack; the Parthians, though somewhat surprised, received

it with firmness. As soon, however, as the infantry also came to the charge, their shouts and the clashing of their arms so frightened the enemy's horses, that they were no longer manageable, and the barbarians fled without coming to a battle. Antony closely pursued them, in hopes that this action would in a great measure terminate the war. But, when his cavalry had followed them a great distance, he found that he had not slain above eighty of the enemy, and thirty only were taken prisoners. Hence, his victory was both incomplete and unavailing; the vanquished, having easily rallied, began to harass the conquerors by desultory attacks, and the Romans experienced a great deal of trouble in reaching their camp. To add to their vexation, their companions had been defeated during their absence by the garrison of Phraata, and their works round this place had been demolished.

So many difficulties and losses convinced Antony of the necessity of retreating. It was a painful though indispensable measure. From the place of their encampment till they re-passed the frontiers of the enemy, the Roman troops had to fight their way across valleys and mountains, and against incessant attacks of the Parthian cavalry. The march, it is true, was conducted with a skill and valor worthy of the generals and armies of ancient Rome: during an interval of twenty-seven days, the time of this retrograde march from Phraata, the Parthians were defeated in eighteen engagements. But these victories of the Romans had no other effect than to protect their retreat, and, in other respects, the expedition of Antony was a complete failure. On reviewing his army after they had reached a safe place, he found that their loss amounted to twenty-four thousand men; and he lost eight thousand more, in his march during winter from Armenia to the Roman province of Syria.

To this ill-success of his arms, Antony after his return added new excesses in dissipation and extravagance, into which his passion for Cleopatra betrayed him, and the report of which rendered him extremely odious and unpopular at Rome. In order to gratify that ambitious and vicious woman, he was not ashamed to dismember in her behalf the Roman provinces of the east, and to divorce his own virtuous wife Octavia, the sister of his colleague. Octavius did not fail to turn so many unpardonable faults to his advantage. He obtained a decree from the senate, depriving Antony of all consular and triumviral authority, and pronouncing Cleopatra an enemy of Rome. Antony, on his part, proffered a variety of charges and recriminations against Octavius, and, from this moment, the two rivals determined to decide their quarrel by force of arms.

Their preparations for the impending conflict were adequate to the importance of the cause.* Octavius assembled an army of eighty thousand foot and twelve thousand horse, with a fleet of two hundred and fifty vessels well equipped and well manned. The forces of Antony were still more numerous; his land army consisted of a hundred thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, besides a large number of auxiliaries; and his fleet amounted to five hundred galleys, many of which had been furnished and were commanded by Cleopatra in person. The whole Roman power, with its various allies, took a share in this momentous contest; it was the east fighting against the west for the possession of the world.

These two powerful armaments met at the entrance of the Ambracian gulf, near the promontory of Actium. Contrary to his interest, to the advice of his ablest officers, and probably to his own better judgment, Antony, through condescension to the queen of Egypt, chose to commit his fortunes to the hazard of a sea-fight, rather than to the well known valor of his numerous legions. The engagement began at noon of the second of September, while the two land-armies, from the opposite shores of the gulf, were spectators of the combat. After the battle had lasted for a few moments, a skilful movement of Agrippa began to occasion some confusion in the centre of the enemy's line. The event, however, was still undecided, when the ship of Cleopatra was seen to withdraw from the action, and steer with full sail in the direction of Egypt. She was followed by sixty other vessels, nay, by Antony himself, who, blinded by his passion, was more concerned about the presence of the queen, than the preservation of his fortune, his honor, and his troops. This shameful flight completely decided the day in favor of Octavius. After some further resistance on the part of Antony's force, the whole fleet, and a few days after, the land-army consisting of nineteen brave legions, seeing themselves deserted by their general, surrendered to the conqueror (B. C. 31).

This important victory left Octavius without a competitor in the empire; all the allies and Roman provinces of the opposite party hastened to make their submission, and acknowledge his laws. Antony and Cleopatra were, it is true, still alive, but their final overthrow was easily achieved in the ensuing year. By the connivance of Cleopatra herself, Octavius met with scarcely any opposition in his attack upon Egypt: Antony, after a vain show of resistance, killed himself at his approach; the queen hesita-

* See Plutarch, in the *life of Antony*.

ted to do the same, as long as she entertained hopes of an honorable treatment from the victor, but as she soon perceived that he intended to lead her away captive, she also put an end to her life, having, it is said, procured a basket of figs to be brought to her, in which lay a venomous serpent whose bite caused her death. With Antony ended the civil war; with Cleopatra fell the second Egyptian kingdom after a duration of nearly three hundred years, and Egypt was thenceforth reckoned a Roman province.

The battle of Actium was the conclusion of the grand drama which changed the Roman republic into a monarchy: by the defeat of Antony and the previous abdication of Lepidus, Octavius remained sole and absolute master of this great empire. Although he did not assume the title, he possessed all the authority of a sovereign, and so secured it during a long life, as to transmit it without opposition to the princes of his family.

Octavius proceeded with consummate prudence in this ambitious and successful career. After having crushed his competitors by force of arms, he applied himself to reconcile the public mind to the present order of things by beneficence and moderation. He skilfully procured the unanimous consent of the senate to acknowledge him as the head of the government; and, while he concentrated the ruling power in his person, was careful to retain, in the exercise of it, the outward forms of the commonwealth. By these various means, he gradually accustomed the Romans to their new political constitution, and became, under the name of *Augustus*, the real founder of that famous monarchy which thenceforth was properly called the *Roman Empire*.

We have related in succession all the principal events which led to this momentous change, and at the same time made known its natural causes. Enough, it is hoped, has been said to render them familiar to the reader. But it becomes Christians to raise their minds to a higher order of reflections, and to behold in the series of human revolutions, the ruling hand of God's providence, directing them all, not less mightily than sweetly, to the accomplishment of his own adorable designs. The Messiah, or Saviour of the world, who had been promised, foretold, and expected during four thousand years, was now going to appear on earth, and to establish his religion among men by the destruction of idolatry. It was proper that HE who is called in Scripture THE PRINCE, THE LORD, THE KING OF PEACE,* should be born in a time of profound and universal peace. Moreover, the Roman

* Isa. ix, 6; 2 Thess. iii, 16; Hebr. vii, 2.

empire, by its vast extent and the intimate connexion of its various parts throughout the world, was intended to open an easier access to the preaching of the Gospel, and represent in a vivid manner the unity and universal diffusion of the Church of Christ.

All these circumstances occurred under Augustus, and Augustus himself was the instrument prepared by Almighty God to put an end to all civil dissensions, and establish tranquillity among the nations of the earth. This then was the epoch marked out in the eternal decrees for the temporal birth of CHRIST, the beginning of his Gospel, and the establishment of his religion. "In the days of those kingdoms," had said a prophet, "the God of heaven will set up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed; and his kingdom shall not be delivered up to another people: and it shall break in pieces, and shall consume all these kingdoms: and itself shall stand for ever."* Such is, therefore, the grand object of God's designs in the government of this world: the establishment of the kingdom of his Incarnate Son; a kingdom to whose formation, as to their ultimate end, the kingdoms of the earth are referred; a kingdom infinitely preferable to all temporal goods; a kingdom of justice and peace, of charity and truth, connecting heaven with the earth and time with eternity; in a word, an indestructible and eternal kingdom, to the possession of which every man should incessantly aspire.

* Daniel ii, 44.

PART VII.

LAWS AND POLITY, ARTS, MANNERS, AND CUSTOMS OF ANCIENT NATIONS.*

THE reader would be but imperfectly acquainted with ancient history, if he confined himself to the recital of battles, conquests, and political events; he should also know the laws and manners of those early ages, and the origin or degree of perfection of the arts which were then known and practised. For this reason, in the course of the present work, care was taken to introduce remarks on these interesting objects, as they presented themselves in the history of each of the most flourishing empires and states. Still, many details, however worthy of notice, were unavoidably omitted. This deficiency we shall now supply, by placing before the reader a general view of the laws and polity, the agriculture, commerce and navigation, the military art, and the manners and customs of the most celebrated nations of antiquity, whose history has been the object of this volume.

LAWS AND POLITY.

Very little can be said about the particular organization of the earliest societies with regard to polity and law. One thing only is certain, that they must have been, at least most of them, very deficient in their jurisprudence, and in great want of the necessary means of maintaining public order and tranquillity. Men had, it is true, the principles of natural law to guide their steps and regulate their actions; but the application of these principles to the various occurrences of life, if left to the direction of private individuals, was too precarious and uncertain, and at variance with too many passions and opposite interests, to offer a sure guarantee for the preservation of social order; on the other hand, the generality of mankind are not so inclined to practise virtue for virtue's sake, as to need no additional incentive to the fulfilment of their duty. Hence, it became necessary to join

* See Goguet, *De l'Origine des Lois, des Arts, et des Sciences*; Rollin, *Histoire Ancienne*, especially vols. x--xiii;—Barthélemy, *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce*, vols. i--iii;—Kennett's *Antiquities of Rome*;—etc.

positive laws to the natural precepts, and to enforce the observance of them all by various penalties to be inflicted by the governing power.

Although we have little else than conjectures as to the special manner in which the laws of early states were decreed, it may be asserted in general that their enactment, seldom the effect of foresight, was usually called for by the physical and moral situation of mankind in those times, commonly by the distress and sufferings of the people, often by the perpetration of crime and the necessity of preventing its recurrence. Thus the experience of evils already suffered obliged the Athenians to apply to Draco, and afterwards to Solon, for a code of laws. In like manner a state of anarchy among the Medes caused Dejoces, a man of great prudence, wisdom and integrity, to become the legislator and first king of that nation.

All men easily understood that the constitution of a city or state resembled that of the human body. The body is composed of the head and members; and among the members, some are more useful or necessary than others, yet all contribute to the good of each, and still more to the benefit of the whole system.*

We see also among the members of a state or the inhabitants of a city, an identity of wants and a reciprocity of services establishing among them an admirable connexion. Sovereigns, governors, magistrates, and other great or wealthy personages, like the rest of mankind, stand in need of dwellings, clothing and food. The merchant, the mechanic, the workman, the farmer, etc., in their turn, stand in need of patronage, protection and security, in order to succeed in their respective professions. If all were rich, there would be no laborers; if all were laborers, there would be no rulers of the people nor generals of armies. It is this mutual dependence of men on one another which has founded cities, and assembled together a multitude of persons endowed with different talents and following different employments; talents and employments alike requisite for the good of society, and all conducive to that end, provided every individual continues faithful to the duties of his station, and does not seek to encroach on the rights and property of others.

Hence, there is every reason to believe that the first positive laws had a reference to such objects as are requisite for the very existence and preservation of society: for instance, the establishment of the rights of property, the punishment of robbers and

* See Plato, *De Legibus*; and in Livy, b. ii, the ingenious allegory proposed by Menenius Agrippa to the discontented plebeians of Rome.

murderers, the conditions and formalities of marriage, etc. Next came the regulations concerning the partitions of lands, the mode of inheritance, the form of sales and other contracts; in a word, the principal actions of civil life, and the interests of the different classes and members of society. Without doubt, those regulations varied according to the natural dispositions of the nations or tribes for whom they were issued, and the peculiar circumstances in which men were placed. Generally speaking, the law granted considerable power to fathers over their children, to masters over their slaves, and to creditors over their debtors, even when insolvency was the mere effect of misfortune; nay, this power was sometimes carried to a frightful excess, and savored of barbarity, as happened among the Spartans and Romans, though not among the Athenians, who, on the contrary, treated their slaves with great mildness.

With regard to penal laws, they were both numerous and severe among ancient nations. The legislators of old did not think it an act of humanity and prudence to let heinous crimes pass unpunished, and to spare the guilty at the risk and cost of the moral and virtuous portion of society; foreseeing, on the contrary, that, notwithstanding all the advantages of civilization and education, there would never be wanting individuals ready to disturb the public peace, threaten the rights or even the life of their fellow-men, they deemed it their bounden duty to secure the human family against these dangers. This they endeavored to effect by the enactment of various penalties to be inflicted on the guilty, even capital punishment when the importance of the case required it, in order that the wicked man might be terrified by the sad fate of others like himself, and be efficaciously prompted to check the violence of his passions. Such was the origin of penal laws, a painful though necessary remedy against the frailty of human nature. Still, as civil enactments could not then, any more than they can at present, reach every crime, and necessarily left many evil deeds to be punished by divine justice alone in a future life, they were directed only against those crimes which attacked religion, public order, the security or welfare of the state, the essential peace of families, and the lives, character and property of the citizens: such as impiety, sacrilege, perjury, treason and rebellion, calumny, theft, adultery, homicide, and the like.

Still it was not enough to possess laws, unless there existed at the same time a competent and lasting power to watch over their integrity, to promote their observance, to interpret them authoritatively, and to settle the differences that might arise among citizens. The administration of justice is one of the chief supports

of society. In the earliest times, fathers were the respective judges of the complaints and disputes of their children; but when many families had associated themselves to live together under one common rule, it became necessary to have also one common arbiter, possessed of sufficient impartiality to make a just application of the law among so many claimants, and invested with sufficient authority to enforce its execution. The different nations or tribes endeavored to secure this advantage to themselves, not only by the adoption of some political form of government,* but likewise by the appointment of tribunals having jurisdiction over every rank and every member of the state. The most celebrated of these ancient tribunals were, besides the Jewish Sanhedrim, the council of the thirty judges in Egypt, the Amphictyonic council in Greece, the Areopagus in Athens, the Ephori at Sparta, and the Censors at Rome.

We may also reckon among the earliest legal institutions, the adoption of certain methods to record, authenticate, and transmit the principal transactions of civil life. The public good always required that affairs of great moment, such as mutual obligations, sales and purchases, titles to property, marriages, judgments, and the like, should possess a degree of publicity sufficient to establish the fact of their existence and insure their execution. Hence, formulas for various kinds of deeds were invented and introduced among civilized societies, magistrates appointed to enforce the observance of laws and contracts, and certain places assigned where evidences and documents relative to these objects might be deposited and consulted. This, however, could not be done in the beginning of societies. As the art of writing was probably not yet known, deeds and contracts were made verbally; and, in order that proofs of these transactions might not be wanting, they were made in public and before witnesses, for instance, among the Hebrews, at the gates of cities.

As long as the laws themselves could not, at least easily, be committed to writing, other methods were adopted to provide for their transmission to future ages. The most usual, besides practical observance and oral tradition, was to put them in verse easy to be remembered. But when the art of writing began to be generally known, that is, upwards of fifteen hundred years before the coming of Christ,† it greatly facilitated the transmission of laws, as

* See, on the formation of governments, Part I, p. 20.

† Cadmus is commonly believed to have carried the alphabet from Phœnicia into Greece in the year B. C. 1519, a date sufficient of itself to justify our assertion; but it must be further added that the alphabet may have been in use very long before Cadmus. The art of writing was certainly known, at least to some oriental nations, from the time of the

well as of historical events, to the latest posterity. Thus were preserved in writing the laws given to the Israelites in the desert, nay, the principal of them were engraved on tables of some hard materials; and this was also the case, among others, with the laws of Solon in Athens, and those of the Twelve Tables at Rome.

Not to speak here of Moses, the inspired legislator of the Hebrews, the most renowned among all the law-givers of antiquity were Menes or Mneves in Egypt; Minos in Crete; Lycurgus in Sparta; Numa Pompilius in Rome; Pythagoras, Charondas and Zaleucus in the Grecian colonies and cities of southern Italy, called for this reason *Græcia Magna*; Solon in Athens; Confucius in China; Zoroaster in Persia, and Zamolxis in Scythia. The laws which they enacted for their respective nations, enjoyed a longer or shorter existence, in proportion as they were more or less perfectly adapted to the circumstances of place, time and persons, the nature of the government, the character of the people, the good or bad example of influential persons, foreign intercourse, and a variety of other incidents. Of all the codes of ancient and profane jurisprudence, the most remarkable in point of duration were those of Egypt, Sparta, and Rome.

None of them, however, can be seriously compared in any point of view with the Hebrew legislation. It was the peculiar privilege of the Hebrews, or Israelites, to receive their law from

holy patriarch, Job, since he speaks of it in the book which bears his name (ch. xix, v. 23, 24) in a very clear and explicit manner. Now Job is commonly thought to have been almost a contemporary of Jacob, and very probably began to live in the eighteenth century before the coming of Christ; this plainly supposes, for the use of the alphabet, a still earlier period than that of Cadmus.

Moses, a contemporary of the latter personage, speaks of writing in many places of his books, and alludes to it as a practice already well known (see Exod. xvii, 14, and xxxiv, 27;—Deuteron. xxviii, 61, and xxix, 20, 27, etc.) Under Josue, the immediate successor of Moses in the guidance of the chosen people, there existed in Palestine a city called Dabir, whose former name had been Cariath-Sepher, that is, *the city of letters* (Jos. xv, 15); whence there can be no doubt but that the knowledge and use of the alphabetical letters were very ancient among the Chanaanite nations. In fine, the art of writing was referred to so remote an antiquity among the Egyptians, that they claimed for Mercurius or Hermes, one of their first legislators, the merit of the invention, although it seems equally probable that this important and truly sublime discovery, the greatest effort perhaps of the human mind (if it ought not rather to be thought an immediate gift of God to our first parents), was made by the Assyrians, or rather the Phenicians, as Lucan says in the third book of his Pharsalia:

Phœnices primi, famæ si creditur, ausi
Mansuram rudibus vocem signare figuris.

Pharsal. b. iii, l. 220—21.

God himself through the ministry of Moses; hence that law, though a mere preparation for a still better one, far transcended the reach of human wisdom. The precepts of the Decalogue alone include, in a very narrow compass, a greater number of moral and necessary truths, than all the prescriptions of human philosophy and legislation can afford.

To speak only of that part of the Mosaic dispensation which comprised the civil polity of the Hebrews, even this surpassed by far every other code of laws in the propriety and excellency of its enactments. Being intended to last until the coming of the promised Messias, that is, during the space of fifteen hundred years, it had the extraordinary privilege of never undergoing, all that time, any of those alterations which so easily occurred in the polity of contemporary states. The Mosaic law had established such an order and provided so well for future contingencies, that, when they occurred, there was no need of modifying it in any manner; a circumstance which alone might suffice to prove its divine origin. Had Moses been left to the natural resources of his genius, how great soever they were, he certainly would not have found out by his own unaided efforts a code at the same time so comprehensive and so perfect as to answer, from the beginning, every important emergency; nor could he have so far anticipated whatever might happen during the course of many ages, as to render unnecessary any modification in its multiplied and various regulations. This no human legislator has ever done; nor could Moses himself have done it, had he written or acted singly as a man, and without having been inspired in the production of the Jewish law by God's eternal and unerring wisdom.

AGRICULTURE.

THERE is a much greater connexion between agriculture and laws, than might appear at first sight; for most of the civil laws owed their origin to agriculture. The cultivation of the soil requires much care, exertion and labor. They who first applied to it, were obliged to seek assiduously after the means requisite for its success; these researches naturally gave rise to different arts calculated to procure the necessary implements or to secure the fruits of husbandry; the arts, in their turn, produced commerce, and commerce incessantly multiplied the different interests of the different members of society. All these objects needed regulations; so that agriculture, by its various bearings and effects, occasioned the enactment of a great number of laws, whilst it

was itself repeatedly encouraged by the laws and institutions of civilized countries.

Agriculture is both the most ancient and the most useful of all social arts. It may justly claim as early an origin as the world itself, since it began to be practised in the earthly paradise, when man still possessed the treasure of his primitive innocence. Almighty God placed him in this delightful garden "to dress it and keep it,"* not indeed with painful labor, but with easy care, which would furnish him at the same time an occupation, an amusement, and an occasion to admire in the productions of the earth the wisdom and boundless liberality of his Maker.

But when the sin of Adam came to disturb this beautiful order, and, independently of the evils entailed on the soul, drew upon him the sentence that condemned him "to eat bread in the sweat of his face,"† then the Almighty turned his amusement into a chastisement, and subjected him to a succession of toils which would not have been his lot, if he had remained a stranger to moral evil. The earth becoming, as it were, rebellious against him in punishment of his own revolt against God, produced thorns and thistles, so as to require strenuous efforts to restore its fertility, and to derive from it the tribute of its produce, of which man's ingratitude had rendered him unworthy.

Nevertheless agriculture, painful as may be its pursuit, has become, through a singular effect of God's mercy, extremely advantageous to men, and the chief as well as most assured support of the human family. Although mines of gold and silver should be exhausted; although diamonds and pearls should remain hidden under the earth and at the bottom of the sea; although the various arts which have no other object than comfort and embellishment should disappear, and commerce itself considerably decline, the fruitfulness of the earth improved by assiduous labor would alone be sufficient, at least generally speaking, to supply the necessary wants of the community.

Hence agriculture was highly valued and carefully practised from the beginning. Having been in use before the deluge itself, it was resumed immediately after that event, and from Noe, whom Holy Writ describes as a husbandman, passed to his descendants. The dispersion occasioned by the confusion of languages at Babel, and the numberless incidents of every kind to which this event must have given rise, obliterated the knowledge of that precious art from the minds of many families, or rendered it otherwise impracticable; yet, it was subsequently revived among them, and besides it was never lost in the societies that

* Gen. ii, 15.

† Gen. iii, 19.

continued to inhabit the plains of Sennaar or chose the neighboring districts for the place of their residence. There is every reason to believe that the same important knowledge was preserved by a few of the colonies that removed to a greater distance; namely, by such as settled themselves from an early period in countries the soil of which was promising, easily cultivated, and naturally rich and fruitful.

These assertions are all substantiated by facts. The best annals of antiquity give us to understand that, up to the first ages subsequent to the dispersion of men, the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt, applied to agriculture. Among the Babylonians this art dated its origin at so remote a period, that it seemed coeval with their national existence; nor will this be doubted, if, independently of the testimony of Berosus, we reflect ever so little on one incontestable fact of their history. Moses relates that Assur and Nemrod, the one a grandson and the other a great-grandson of Noe, built Ninive, Babylon, and several other cities;* now it would be very difficult to conceive how they could have succeeded in this enterprise without the help of agriculture, which is so necessary for supplying, during a long period, any considerable assemblage of people.

In like manner, the knowledge and practice of agriculture among the Chanaanites and Phenicians dated from the primitive times; the tradition of their writers on this point is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, in which we read that Isaac (about the year B. c. 1800) sowed in the land of Chanaan or Palestine, and reaped a hundred-fold.† The soil of Egypt also was very well cultivated almost from time immemorial. Abraham, during a certain year of great scarcity, travelled from the land of Chanaan as far as Egypt, in order to provide against famine; and Jacob, in similar circumstances, sent his sons thither to buy wheat for the support of his family (B. c. 1917 and 1703).

The art of agriculture was communicated by these early states to other climes and countries. Thus the Greeks, according to their own historians, received it from Egyptian settlers, and the Romans received it from Africa and Greece. The wisest nations constantly entertained for it an esteem, proportionate to its importance; and the ablest legislators or sovereigns always considered its encouragement one of their most important obligations.

In Persia, those governors in whose provinces agriculture flourished, received great praises and rewards; on the contrary, punishment awaited those who neglected to watch over this important object. The second king of Rome, Numa Pompilius,

* Gen. x, 10-12.

† Gen. xxvi, 12.

who so well understood and so exactly fulfilled the duties of a sovereign, first divided the Roman territory into several districts, and afterwards causing the farmers to come into his presence, praised those who had been successful, and reproached those who had been negligent in cultivating their lands.

Ancus Martius, the second successor of Numa Pompilius, after his example, recommended nothing so much to the people, next to respect for religion, as the cultivation of lands and the raising of cattle. This relish for agriculture was long preserved among the Romans; and, in subsequent times, he who neglected his duty in that respect, drew upon himself the animadversions of the Censorian tribunal.

It had been ascertained by long experience that the cultivation of lands, and the raising of cattle (which may be considered, if not a branch of agriculture, at least, an art connected with it), are, for every nation that applies to these objects, a certain and inexhaustible source of plenty and wealth. Never was agriculture more highly esteemed nor more carefully practised than in Egypt, where in fact it constituted a special object of the care of government; and no country perhaps was at first more populous or more prosperous. The land of promise, or Palestine, although a district of no considerable extent, supported also an incredible number of inhabitants, because it was cultivated with immense and assiduous care. What history relates of the wealth and prosperity of many Sicilian towns, particularly Syracuse, of the multitude of its inhabitants, the number of its troops, the flourishing state of its navy, and the splendor of its edifices, might be taken for mere exaggeration, if it were not equally attested by all ancient authors. To what was that city, with a territory of no great extent, indebted for its prosperity and its ability to bear so many expenses, except to the fertility of its soil—which fertility was carefully put to profit by the Syracusans?

What has been already said regards the productions of agriculture in general. As to wheat in particular, which is the principal and most valuable among the productions of the earth, the most renowned countries for abundance and fertility in this respect, were those just mentioned, Palestine, Egypt, and Sicily, and besides these, Northern Africa, Sardinia, and Thrace.

To begin with the last, we learn from Demosthenes, in two of his orations, that the Athenians drew from one Thracian city alone, Byzantium, two millions four hundred thousand bushels of wheat every year. It appears, moreover, that Thrace supplied several other towns or countries with the same article; a sufficient proof of the extraordinary fertility of that region.

We may judge of that of Palestine from what the Holy Scripture says, in many places, of the abundance of wheat and other productions with which the land was commonly blessed.*

Sicily, on account of its astonishing fertility, received the appellation of *granary and storehouse* of the Roman people; in fact, from that island Rome procured, for a long time, nearly all the wheat that it needed both for the support of its inhabitants and the subsistence of its armies. Sardinia also, according to Livy's testimony, afforded a large quantity of wheat to the Romans. The same was done by Egypt, when that country had become a province of the Roman empire, and when Rome itself, the capital city of those vast dominions, had considerably increased in size and population. This famous capital annually received from Egypt twenty millions of bushels of wheat, and so necessary to its support was this enormous supply, that without it the people were sometimes exposed to the danger of starvation. Commonly, however, there existed other resources to provide for their subsistence.

Africa *proper*, for instance, was not far behind Egypt in usefulness and fertility. If we may credit Pliny the Elder (b. xviii, ch. 10), there was a certain district of Africa in which the soil, for one bushel of corn, yielded one hundred and fifty bushels; nay, it sometimes happened that one grain produced nearly four hundred grains, as was stated in letters written by some Roman governors of that country. This fact, if true, must have very seldom occurred; but the same Pliny assures us that, in Sicily and Egypt, it was no rare thing to see one grain produce a hundred; and, on this account, he takes notice of the kind attention of Divine Providence, which has ordained that the plants destined to supply the usual food of men, and consequently the most useful and necessary, should likewise be the most plentiful and productive.

Not only some peculiar district, but the whole coast of northern Africa was generally very fertile. This was one of the causes of the opulence and great resources of Carthage, which enabled that famous republic easily to support numerous armies in time of war, and powerfully assist her allies in time of peace. During the struggle between Rome and Philip III, king of Macedon, the Carthaginian ambassadors supplied the Romans with fifteen hundred thousand bushels of barley or wheat, and the ambassadors of King Masinissa furnished the same quantity.

These examples, to which many others might be added, are sufficient to convince every one of the great fertility with which several countries were favored, and of the high esteem entertained

* Deuter. vii, 13, and viii, 8.—Psalm. iv, 8, and lxiiv, 14, etc.

by ancient nations for agriculture. Another evidence of this latter truth may be found in the multitude of authors who then wrote on the subject of husbandry; Varro counted fifty of them among the Greeks alone; and he himself, as well as Cato the Censor, Virgil, and Columella, likewise elaborately wrote on the various branches of agriculture. Mago, a Carthaginian general, had done the same in a learned work of twenty-eight volumes. Even crowned heads, such as Hiero II, king of Syracuse, Attalus Philometor, of Pergamus, and Archelaus, of Cappadocia, left treatises on the same subject.

Columella, the most recent of the authors just mentioned, laments with great force and eloquence the contempt into which agriculture had begun to fall at his time, that is, under the reign of Tiberius. "I see in Rome," says he, "schools for philosophers, rhetoricians, etc.; nay, for cooks and hair dressers, but none for agriculture. Still, we might prosper without the other arts, and there have been and will be flourishing cities without them; but we cannot subsist without agriculture, since it is the only sure support of mankind.*

"Moreover, of all the means that we may adopt to increase or preserve our fortune, is there any one more honest or more innocent than the cultivation of lands? Could any reasonable person set less value upon it than upon the art of war, which gathers spoils only at the cost of so much human blood and the ruin of so great a number of our fellow-beings? Or upon commerce, which requires so many persons to leave their country, to brave the dangers of the sea, to encounter the fury of waves and tempests, and to spend a large portion of their existence in foreign and distant countries? Or upon the practice of usury, so odious in itself and so fatal in its consequences? Could any one presume to compare these things with husbandry, that harmless and innocent manner of life, which nothing else than relaxation of morals could bring into contempt and deprive of nearly all its utility?"

These remarks are certainly correct. A land covered with crops, trees, plants and flocks, is without doubt more valuable for men than a country which produces gold and silver. The latter, without the former, would be unable to save them from heat, cold, and other inconveniences, especially from hunger; the wealthy man, destitute of the productions of the earth, would die of starvation upon heaps of money. The farmer, on the contrary, sees all around him, in his well cultivated fields, an abundance

* *Sine ludicris artibus . . . olim satis felices fuere futuræque sunt urbes; at sine agricultoribus nec consistere mortales nec ali posse manum festum est.*—Columel. lib. i. in proem.

of most useful riches, which he, indeed, acknowledges with lively gratitude as so many gifts of the liberal hand of his Creator, but which are besides the more agreeable to him, as he is also indebted for them to the instrumentality of his care, industry and labor, and to the active part which he took in their production.

Independently of these immediate and happy effects of agriculture, it has moreover given rise, on various occasions, to a multitude of useful discoveries. To it several of the most important arts and sciences owe their origin or their improvement. This was the case, not only with mechanics and the working of wood and metals for the fabrication of divers necessary instruments, but also with geometry, surveying, and astronomy, of which, for this reason, as also of geography, we will here say historically a few words, and thus close the present chapter on agriculture.

Necessity or interest led to the invention of *geometry* and *surveying*. The partition of estates and lands, the determination of their respective limits and the just distribution of taxes, required some knowledge and application of the principles of geometry. Hence the earliest of civilized nations, the Babylonians, the Egyptians and the Phenicians, are believed to have been soon acquainted with the fundamental truths and practical application of that science. Yet, the two greatest geometricians of antiquity were both of Grecian origin; Euclid, who was a contemporary of Alexander the Great and wrote an excellent work on geometry; and Archimedes, whose genius defended Syracuse for three years, at the time of the second Punic war, against all the forces and attacks of the Romans.

Astronomy is nearly as ancient as the world. The brilliancy of the heavenly bodies and the regularity of their course must, from the beginning, have attracted the notice of men; afterwards sagacious persons naturally endeavored to derive rules based on the remarks of those who had gone before them, for the purpose of ascertaining the periodical return of the seasons and settling the order of agricultural operations. The Babylonians or Chaldeans are thought to have led the way, and to have been the most skilful in the science of astronomy as known to the ancients; they were, however, nearly equalled in this respect by both the Egyptians whose knowledge of the solar year of 365 days may appear surprising for its antiquity (see p. 25), and the Phenicians, who began, towards the year B. C. 1250, to steer their course at sea, not any longer by the constellation of the Great Bear, as appears to have been done before, but by one of the stars of the Little Bear, much nearer to the pole.

About six hundred years before the Christian Era, Thales, one

of the Seven Sages, carried astronomy into Greece, and succeeded in foretelling eclipses with considerable accuracy, among others, an eclipse of the sun which took place on the 9th of July, B. C. 577. The greatest astronomers after him, till the Roman emperor Antoninus Pius, were Anaximander of Miletus, a disciple of Thales, Meton of Athens, Hipparcus of Nice, and Ptolemy of Pelusium. Anaximander is believed to have taught, first of all, the exact obliquity of the ecliptic, and perhaps also the sphericity of the earth, and to have been the inventor of artificial globes and geographical maps. Meton first used the *golden number*, that is, a cycle of 19 years, after the lapse of which the new moons return, in regular succession, to the same days on which they occurred during the preceding cycle. Hipparcus and Ptolemy drew up a catalogue of the fixed stars then known (1022 in number), and by their sagacious observations on the motions of the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, probably carried the science of astronomy to the highest degree of perfection which it could reach without the use of our astronomical instruments. Pythagoras and his disciples also made great progress in that science, and, contrary to the general opinion of their time, taught what is now admitted by all astronomers, that the earth moves round the sun, and that the sun is in the centre of the world, (or planetary system).

Geography, which is so closely connected, if not with agriculture, at least with astronomy and geometry, owed its origin, as a science, to journeys, voyages, commerce, and maritime expeditions. As appears from the books of Moses and Josue, it was known, at least to a certain degree, at a very early period in some countries, particularly in Egypt and Palestine. Its greatest progress, however, dated only from the conquests of Alexander and the Romans. Hence, notwithstanding the high reputation enjoyed by Homer and Anaximander for their skill in that science, the best geographers of antiquity were beyond comparison men of much later ages, for instance, Ptolemy the astronomer, and Strabo, a native of Cappadocia. The regions of the earth then known, were central, western, and part of southern Asia; Ethiopia and Egypt, with the rest of northern Africa; and nearly the whole of Europe.

COMMERCE.

NEXT to agriculture, commerce may be justly considered the most fruitful source of social advantages to mankind. In the first place, men are indebted to it, if not for the invention, at least for the improvement and rapid progress of arithmetic; for the art of drawing up accounts, keeping registers, and conducting factories; for the use of weights and measures, etc. All these, however, constitute neither the greatest nor the direct and immediate advantages of commerce.—If agriculture renders nations happy and secure, commerce renders them wealthy and powerful. It is no exaggeration to say that, of all the natural bonds of civil society, commerce is one of the strongest and most effectual; it is, in fact, the very best means to connect together the different parts of the earth by a reciprocity of services. It spreads or tends to spread abundance and ease everywhere. By it the whole world becomes, as it were, one and the same family; the riches of one people are made the riches of another, and reciprocally the advantages arising from the soil or from industry possessed by the latter, are communicated to the former, thus enabling men to enjoy many conveniences of life which, without commercial intercourse, they never would have known or possessed.

The origin of commerce nearly coincides with that of society. It naturally arose from the different circumstances in which men were placed; from the diversity of their talents or industry; and from the variety of earthly productions, fruits and other advantages of different countries. Mere exchanges at first took place between private individuals and families: the successful hunter gave a part of the game he had killed, for some of the eatables growing in his neighbor's field; he who had reaped more wheat or corn than he needed for the support of himself and his family, exchanged some of it for a proportionate quantity of honey, fruit, oil and other necessities.

Necessity thus gave rise to commerce. In a short time, the knowledge and experience of its utility, together with a desire to procure every possible convenience, increased it and enlarged the sphere of its action; it gradually extended from city to city and from province to province, till, by the continual addition of new means, facilities, discoveries and successes, it finally comprised the whole world.

Long before this, men had perceived the embarrassment and difficulty which usually attended the primitive manner of conducting trade. On a thousand occasions, the articles to be exchanged

were far from having the same value; indeed, it seldom happened that the price of one object was exactly or even nearly the same with that of another. The case, likewise, must have frequently occurred that sellers could not afford what the purchasers wanted, and vice versâ; and besides, several articles of trade could not be divided, even when occasion required, without losing either the whole or at least a considerable portion of their value. For these reasons, it became necessary to find out an easier method for trading, and to adopt in common, by universal consent, some representative of the value of every kind of mercantile objects, and thus settle the worth of each of them, so as to facilitate the performance of all commercial transactions. It was soon perceived that metals, by their solidity, brilliancy and other qualities, were the best fitted for this purpose; gold, silver and copper or brass, were therefore introduced into commerce, and universally adopted by civilized nations as representatives of the value of all articles of trade.

We learn from Sacred History that the use of specie or coin was known at a very early period.* Abraham, having purchased a burying place for his wife and family, gave for it four hundred sicles of silver, of common current money (B. C. 1859). He himself, on a previous occasion, had received a thousand pieces of silver from Abimelech, king of Gerara; and Joseph, his great-grandson, was sold by his brethren for the sum of twenty pieces of silver to some Ismaelite and Madianite merchants that were going to Egypt (B. C. 1728).

This latter fact, in particular, plainly shows the antiquity of commerce in certain countries. The Madianite merchants, just mentioned, were coming from Galaad with their camels, carrying spices, and balm, and myrrh, which they intended to sell in Egypt. A traffic of this kind necessarily supposes that commerce was already in full operation, and even embraced a great number of objects, inasmuch as the productions just mentioned are rather luxuries than matters of necessity.

But the most important objects of trade were corn and wheat. Egypt, on account of its fertility, was conspicuous in this respect, and in times of famine proved an ample resource for other countries; witness the protracted scarcity which occurred during the life of Jacob, when that kingdom, by the wise management of his son Joseph, was enabled, not only to support its own inhabitants, but even to supply foreigners from all the neighboring provinces with provisions of grain.† There existed so regular a communication between these various countries, that Jacob, whose residence

* See Gen. xx, xxiii, xxxvii, etc.

† Gen. xli, 57.

was in the land of Chanaan, became very soon apprized of the abundance of corn which was found in Egypt; nay, people had already conceived the happy idea of establishing inns or resting places in the way, for the convenience of travellers.*

It is true, however, notwithstanding all this, that the ancient Egyptians were not peculiarly remarkable as a commercial nation; and the same may be said of the Assyrians and Babylonians, although they are believed to have carried on an extensive trade through the river Euphrates and the Persian gulph. The palm in this respect ought to be awarded, among the states of remote antiquity, to the Phenicians and their chief colony, the Carthaginians. Never was there a clearer proof of the height of power, glory and wealth, which a nation may attain through an assiduous and almost exclusive application to commerce.

The Phenicians occupied a narrow neck of land along the coast of the Mediterranean sea. This tract possessed no great advantages for agriculture; and the city of Tyre itself was built upon a barren soil, whose productions bore no proportion whatever to the number of its inhabitants. Various resources of another kind amply supplied this deficiency: the Phenicians possessed very good harbors, especially in their chief cities Sidon and Tyre; their natural genius, moreover, fitted them so well for all the operations of trade, that they applied to it with the greatest success, and appear even to have been the first to introduce maritime commerce, particularly that which requires voyages of long duration and to a considerable distance. As Mount Libanus and other mountains in the neighborhood furnished them with excellent timber for the construction of their ships, they in a short time equipped numerous fleets, which boldly advanced farther and farther across unknown seas for the sake of mercantile enterprise. Nor did they confine their course to the coasts and harbors of the Mediterranean sea, but, passing the Strait of Gadez (now Gihralter), they entered the Atlantic, and extended their commerce both to the left and to the right, along the shores of western Africa and western Europe.

In the meanwhile, their population rapidly increased from the great number of strangers attracted by the desire of gain and the facility of acquiring wealth. This enabled them to establish several colonies abroad, among others the famous colony of Carthage, which, by preserving the industrious, active and bold enterprising spirit of the early Phenicians, was not surpassed by Tyre itself in the extent of commercial business, and far surpassed it in extent of dominion and in the splendor of its military exploits.

* Gen. xlii, 27.

What profane authors relate of the industry, commerce, riches and magnificence of Tyre, is fully corroborated by the testimony of sacred writers. "Is not this," exclaims Isaias, "your city, which gloried from old in her antiquity . . . Tyre that was formerly crowned, whose merchants were princes, and her traders the nobles of the earth?"* Another prophet, Ezechiel, is still more explicit, and his words on the subject are the more worthy of notice, as they convey a full idea of the commerce of ancient nations. They are as follows:

"Tyre, that dwelleth at the entry of the sea, being the mart of the people for many islands . . . The Carthaginians, thy merchants, supplied thy fairs with a multitude of all kinds of riches, with silver, iron, tin, and lead. Greece, Thubal, and Mosoch, they were thy merchants: they brought to thy people slaves and vessels of brass. From the house of Thogorma they brought horses, and horsemen, and mules to thy market. The men of Dedan were thy merchants: many islands *were* the traffic of thy hand; they exchanged for thy price teeth of ivory, and ebony. The Syrian was thy merchant by reason of the multitude of thy works: they set forth precious stones, and purple, and brodered works, and fine linen, and silk in thy market. Juda and the land of Israel, they were thy merchants with the best corn: they set forth balm, and honey, and oil, and rosin in thy fairs. The men of Damascus were thy merchants in the multitude of thy works, in the multitude of divers riches, in rich wine, in wool of the best color. Dan, and Greece, and Mosel, have set forth in thy marts wrought iron: stacte and calamus were in thy market. The men of Dedan were thy merchants in tapestry for seats. Arabia, and all the princes of Cedar, they were the merchants of thy hand: thy merchants came to thee with lambs, and rams, and kids. The sellers of Saba and Reema, they were thy merchants, with all the best spices, and precious stones, and gold, which they set forth in thy market . . . What city is like Tyre, which is become silent in the midst of the sea? Which by thy merchandise that went from thee by sea, didst fill many people: which by the multitude of thy riches, and of thy people, didst enrich the kings of the earth."†

Thus it seems as if all the merchandise of the world was gathered in that city alone, and the various tribes of the earth were her tributaries rather than her allies; the extent of her commerce knew indeed no other boundaries than those of the known world. For this reason did she regard herself as the queen of the sea,

* Isa. xxiii, 7, 8.

† Ezechiel, ch. xxvii.

and the common emporium of nations; she gave them in exchange for their treasures, the produce of other countries imported by her vessels, and the works of her own industry, which were at the same time very numerous and valuable.

Whilst Sidon, the mother-country of Tyre, was celebrated for the fabrication of linen, cloth, tapestry and precious veils; for the art of working metals and wood, the invention of glass, etc.; Tyre itself was renowned for its ivory-works, the dyeing of cloth and stuffs, above all, the use and application of the purple-color, that had been originally discovered, it is said, by a mere accident. A shepherd's dog, tormented by hunger and finding nothing wherewith to satisfy it, took and broke between his teeth a shell on the sea-shore. Blood having gushed from the shell-fish immediately stained the dog's mouth with a beautiful color, the sight of which filled every beholder with admiration. The Tyrrians, with their usual industry and skill, quickly sought to apply this discovery to the art of dyeing, nor was the experiment in vain; their efforts proved perfectly successful, and they gave to the purple so high a value in the judgment of antiquity, that the use of it was almost exclusively reserved for sovereigns, princes, and other great dignitaries of states.

It has been related in another part of this volume (p. 97), that the ancient city of Tyre was destroyed by Nabuchodonosor, after a very arduous and painful siege which had lasted thirteen years. Mention was also made in the same place, of the new city of Tyre, built immediately after the destruction of the first, in a neighboring island. It soon regained the empire of the sea, and continued in the same career of enterprise and traffic with at least as much success and prosperity as before, till, being itself taken by Alexander the Great (see p. 232), it lost its powerful navy, extensive trade and immense revenues, and yielded its lofty title of emporium of all the east, to the rising city of Alexandria.

Whilst the Phenician capital underwent so many revolutions, Carthage, the principal of its colonies, had become very flourishing. After the first difficulties which it had to encounter, commerce gave it a rapid increase, and in the course of time rendered it so powerful, that it was able to contend with the Romans for the empire of the west. Its geographical position was still more advantageous than that of Tyre. Placed at an equal distance from both extremities of the Mediterranean sea, it could easily reach them by means of its fleets; and the northern coast of Africa, a vast and fertile region in the midst of which it stood, supplied it with all things necessary for the subsistence of its population.

These Africans, adding to so many advantages that of a natu-

ral aptness for navigation and trade, an aptness acquired in Phenicia, became so skilful at sea, that, according to the testimony of Polybius, they had in this respect no equals in the world. In this way did they prosper and increase, and finally reach such a height of power, that, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted on them by the first and second Punic wars, they had still, at the beginning of the third, no fewer than three hundred cities of northern Africa in their possession, besides a population of seven hundred thousand inhabitants in Carthage alone.

In more ancient times, the Carthaginians had extended their sway not only over all that coast which extends from the great Syrtes near Libya to the straits of Gadez, but even over another large extent of country south of those straits, where Hanno, one of their greatest men, established several colonies and built many cities. They likewise subdued a considerable portion of Spain, and under Asdrubal, the successor of Amilcar Barcas and the immediate predecessor of Annibal in the command of their troops, founded there the celebrated colony and city of Carthago Nova. Sardinia also, with an extensive part of Sicily, had formerly submitted to their laws.

The immediate cause of all this greatness, as we have just remarked, was the astonishing relish for trade which pervaded that nation. The Carthaginians spared neither time, care, nor expense, to enlarge and improve their commerce; this was, it may be, said their predominant passion and the chief end of all their endeavors. The other arts and sciences were generally neglected and disregarded at Carthage, nor was there any one who professed himself to be an orator, a philosopher, or a poet, as the attention of youth was directed, from their infancy, to the various parts of mercantile business. Skill in traffic was reputed the best portion of their inheritance, and, as they added their own reflections and industry to the experience of their fathers, it is not to be wondered at, that the Carthaginians became so conspicuous in the world as a commercial nation.

Ambition, as frequently happens, was the occasion of their ruin. It cost them dear to exchange the ordinary and pacific course of traffic for the glory of arms and the advantages of conquests. Their state, which commerce had rendered so flourishing, experienced a diminution of population and strength, from the necessity of continually raising troops for new expeditions and providing reinforcements for their armies. On the other hand, their fleets, which formerly carried merchants and mercantile objects, were henceforth used principally to convey soldiers and implements of war; their citizens became warriors; their magis-

trates, generals. Some of the latter, it is true, gained for themselves and their country immortal honor on the field of battle; but this military prosperity was of short duration, and could prevent neither their decline, nor their entire overthrow.

Let us now return to the eastern nations. The conquest of Tyre and the foundation of Alexandria by Alexander produced a great change in commercial relations, especially throughout the east; the tide of extensive traffic left the former, to concentrate itself in the latter city, whose situation was the best that could be desired to become a centre of communication between the various nations of the then known world. Alexandria was able to maintain an easy intercourse with the regions of Asia, through the isthmus of Suez and the Red sea; through the same sea and the river Nile, with Ethiopia; and through the Mediterranean, with the other parts of western Asia, all northern Africa, and nearly all Europe. As to the inland commerce, there was also every facility afforded by both the navigation on the Nile or numerous canals with which Egypt was intersected, and by means of caravans or companies of travelling merchants, so useful for their personal safety and the transport of their goods.

The consideration of these advantages led Alexander to the conclusion that a city built on such a spot, and favored besides with an excellent harbor, might become one of the most flourishing and wealthy cities on earth. His expectations were fully realized, if not during his life, at least shortly after his death. The Ptolemies, his successors in the possession and government of Egypt, took an assiduous care to encourage and improve the rising commerce of Alexandria; their exertions proved so beneficial, and the trade carried on by that city was rendered so prosperous and so extensive, that both Tyre and Carthage, formerly so much celebrated in this particular, were almost buried in oblivion.

Among all the Egyptian kings of that period, Ptolemy Philadelphus was the most zealous and successful in patronizing commerce. To secure the execution of his designs, he maintained at sea numerous fleets, the bare enumeration and description of which, as found in Athenæus, can hardly be read without astonishment. Besides a hundred and twenty vessels of extraordinary size, there were four thousand other ships for the service of the state and the advancement of commercial interest; and this number, if we take every thing into consideration, was not excessive for the extent of his dominions. Philadelphus was the sovereign of a vast empire, founded by the valor and prudence of his father Ptolemy Lagus, and comprising (besides Egypt), Libya, Palestine and Phenicia, with a part of Arabia, Ethiopia and Syria; also se-

veral provinces of Asia Minor, that is, Lycia, Caria, Cilicia and Pamphylia; in fine, Cyprus and many other islands.

The number of cities belonging to this extensive monarchy amounted to nearly four thousand. They were situated in some of the most fertile countries of the world; but Philadelphus, not satisfied with this advantage, undertook to make his kingdom the principal seat of all the commerce between the east and west, and succeeded in the attempt. He not only rendered maritime trade perfectly active and secure by means of his numerous fleets, but moreover founded a city on the western shore of the Red sea, to receive all the merchandise from Arabia, India, Persia and Ethiopia; he then opened an easy communication between that sea and the river Nile, by means of a canal and a high-road that traversed the whole country by the side of each other; and finally he established inns along the road for the convenience of merchants and travellers.

This facility of transport and travelling made the city of Alexandria a sort of universal emporium, and caused the riches of the whole earth to flow abundantly into Egypt. The amount of wealth obtained from commerce was enormous, since, notwithstanding the great moderation of the Ptolemies in the laying of taxes, the duties alone in the above named city produced a yearly revenue of probably fifteen millions of dollars; and Philadelphus left at his death more than a hundred millions of pounds sterling in the treasury.

Tyre, Carthage and Alexandria were, beyond comparison, the most commercial cities of antiquity. Trade, however, was carried on with great activity, though not with equal splendor nor upon so large a scale, in several other places, such as Corinth, Rhodes, Marseilles, and generally in the cities of Grecian origin.

As to the Romans, they never thought it in accordance with their national character, to make a peculiar profession of commerce.

NAVIGATION.

COMMERCE and navigation are intimately connected, if not in their first origin, at least in their effects and destination; supporting and improving each other, they prosper or decline together. If navigation is indebted to the spirit of commercial enterprise for its progress and discoveries, commerce likewise owes to navigation its most brilliant success. For this reason, while we spoke at length of the one in the preceding section, we unavoidably touch occasionally upon the other; yet much remains to be said on the interesting subject of navigation.

Of all the arts which require sagacity and genius, there is none, perhaps, more honorable to the human mind than the art of navigation; so much so, that it might seem, in some measure, to exceed the ordinary limits of man's courage and intelligence. What is more admirable, in the whole natural range of human actions, than to see a weak and frail being reach every part of the globe across the immensity of seas, direct either a small bark or an enormous vessel on the broad ocean, and not only brave the fury of winds and waves, but even turn them to his own use, and enable himself through their means the sooner to arrive at his destination? Is not this well calculated to inspire men, not with self-esteem and pride, but with a lively sense of gratitude to the Author of all good, who has endowed them with so many precious faculties?

Independently of the conclusion that might be drawn from the recollection of Noe's ark, the idea of navigation must have been suggested to the minds of men by the sight of logs, branches, and various pieces of wood, floating on the waters. Without doubt, this art, like all other arts, except those absolutely necessary for human life, was very imperfect in the beginning. Rafts or logs joined together, trunks of trees carved in a certain fashion, and small boats or canoes, were at that time, as they are still among uncivilized tribes, the only vessels possessed by men; the size, bulk and solidity of those vessels increased only in proportion with man's experience, his boldness and courage animated by success, as well as the intended length of his subsequent voyages. It is thought, or at least conjectured, that the idea of using oars, rudders and sails, came successively from an attentive consideration of the manner in which fish move in the water, and birds in the air;* but necessity alone was probably sufficient to lead the earliest navigators to devise the use of anchors.

Whether these conjectures be well founded or not, it is certain that the first attempts at navigation took place at a very remote period, and near the epoch of the Deluge. Moses relates that "the islands of the gentiles" were divided among the sons of Javan, a grand-son of Noe. It is plain also from other sources, that very early colonies passed from Egypt and Phenicia into

* Some think that the practice of sails may have originated in the curious spectacle presented by the animal called *Nautilus*. Its shell has somewhat the figure of a shallop; consequently the animal, when the sea is calm, uses it as a boat, employing six of its tentacula as oars, and uplifting two, which are spread out as sails. If the sea becomes rough, or an enemy appears, the sails and oars are instantly drawn within the shell, and the shallop sinks.

Greece; certainly both Greece and other maritime countries were thus reached only through the means of navigation.

The Phenicians, in particular, were the most skilful and experienced seamen during those ages of remote antiquity, and to them was ascribed the honor of having first known how to steer, and to direct their course at sea by observing the stars. It was with the assistance of the Phenicians that Solomon, the third king of the Hebrews, succeeded in equipping a fleet, and carried on a prosperous commerce with distant regions. "King Solomon," says the sacred writer, "made a fleet in Asiongaber, which is by Ailath on the shore of the Red sea, in the land of Edom. And Hiram* sent his servants in the fleet, sailors that had knowledge of the sea, with the servants of Solomon. And they came to Ophir;† and they brought from thence to king Solomon four hundred and twenty talents of gold."‡

It was also by the help of the Phenicians that Nechao, the Egyptian king, successfully carried on a still more arduous undertaking. By order of this prince, and under the guidance of seamen of that nation, a fleet set sail from the shores of the Red sea, for the purpose of circumnavigating Africa and returning to Egypt through the strait of Gadez (now Gibraltar), and the Mediterranean sea. This order was faithfully executed. The Phenicians, on leaving the Red sea, entered the Southern ocean, and constantly followed the coast on their right. When the season of autumn arrived, they landed in a favorable spot, sowed grain there, waited for its maturity, and having reaped the harvest, reembarked in order to prosecute their expedition. They spent two years in circumnavigating Africa, before they reached the strait of Gadez; then entering the Mediterranean, they came to the mouth of the Nile in the third year of their voyage.

The Carthaginians scarcely yielded to the Phenicians, their ancestors, in boldness of enterprise and success in navigation. During the sixth century before the Christian era, they commissioned Hanno, an experienced admiral, to explore the western coast of Africa; he did so, and judging from his own relation, which is still extant, he went as far, at least, as the fifth degree of north latitude. It is even highly probable that America was known to the Carthaginians; that they were delighted with the fertility of the land; but that the senate, for this very reason,

* King of the celebrated city of Tyre in Phenicia.

† *Ophir*, a rich and distant country, some say, of Southern Asia, others, of Eastern Africa.

‡ 3 Kings ix, 26—28.

would not countenance any further pursuit in that direction, for fear of depopulating their republic (see *Modern History*, p. 352).

It is, however, true that ancient voyages were, generally speaking, neither very long, nor to be compared with those undertaken and executed in modern times. The reason of this difference is very simple and natural. The mariner's compass was unknown to the navigators of old, and they had no other guide to steer their course, than the sun during the day, and the stars during the night; when, on account of the clouds, this guidance failed them, they knew no longer in what direction they advanced, and they wandered at random and at the mercy of the waves. For this reason, they made it a general rule not to steer far from the coasts, nor undertake voyages to a great distance across the sea; and it must be confessed that the dangers of navigation, owing to the same circumstance, were then much greater than they are at present. The mariner's compass, which began to be used only during the crusades, has removed these difficulties: whatever may be the state of the atmosphere in the day-time or during the night, the magnetic needle, by its directive property, always tells the pilot of the direction in which he is actually going, and of the course he has to take. Hence, it is in a great measure to the knowledge of this singular property of the magnet, which the ancients did not even suspect, that modern nations have been indebted for the discovery of America and the circumnavigation of the globe.

In the beginning, and for a certain length of time, the use of a navy was probably confined to purposes of trade or colonization; perhaps also the desire of pillaging coasts and maritime towns, or a spirit of conquest and adventure, had some share in it. This last seems to have been the cause of the famous Argonautic expedition of Jason and other Grecian princes across the Euxine sea, about the year B. C. 1253. Shortly after, the Greeks equipped their famous fleet of twelve hundred ships for the Trojan expedition; still we do not read of any naval battle fought between them and the Trojans, and the same is to be remarked of the fleet prepared by Sesostris, the Egyptian king, for the conquest of the maritime provinces situated near the Red sea. Navigation therefore was not yet applied to regular operations of war on the sea itself; this required a greater bulk in the ships and greater boldness or experience in their crews, than could be supposed to exist during the first ages, and it may be conjectured to have first taken place only about the sixth or seventh century before the coming of Christ.

From that time, there existed among the ancients, as is the case among us, two kinds of ships, some intended for merchant

vessels or transports, and others destined for war. The former were called by the Latins *onerariæ naves*, from their destination, and the other, *longæ naves*, from their peculiar form; as in the following sentence of Livy (b. xxv, n. 27): "*Bomilcar centum triginta navibus longis et septingentis onerariis profectus.*" Since, moreover, the use of oars was much more frequent then than at present, the long vessels were again of different sorts; there were those which had only one row of oars, for instance, fifteen, twenty-five, or fifty oars on each side of the vessel; and others had two or more banks of oars placed obliquely over one another, being for this reason called *biremes*, *triremes*, *quinqueremes*, etc.

To the Corinthians was attributed the honor of having changed the ancient form of vessels, and of having, first of all, built ships supplied with three, and perhaps five banks of oars. Syracuse, a colony of Corinth, successfully undertook to imitate the mother-country, and even surpassed it in this respect. The frequent and protracted wars in which the Syracusans were engaged against the republic of Carthage, obliged them to bestow special care on their navy; and this, added to other favorable circumstances, contributed to render Syracuse one of the greatest maritime powers of that period.

Generally speaking, Greece in early times was not much distinguished for her naval strength. As to the Spartans in particular, it had been one of the chief objects of Lycurgus's legislation not to allow them the possession and use of a regular navy; his reason for this measure was to prevent, as much as possible, intercourse with strangers, lest it should weaken the severity of those maxims he had sought to establish among his people, and alter the simplicity of their manners. The practical contempt in which industry, commerce, and the arts were held at Sparta, must have been an insuperable obstacle to the improvement and prosperity of her navy; hence it naturally happened that the Spartans, for a long time and till they were engaged in distant and difficult wars, had but very few vessels.

The same remark applies to the republic of Athens during the first period of its existence, till the battle of Marathon (B. C. 490). Themistocles, whose sagacious mind dived, as it were, into futurity, and foresaw what was further to be feared from the Persians, directed all the attention and solicitude of his countrymen towards the increase of their navy. Having prevailed on the Athenians to raise the number of their vessels to two hundred, he, by this prudent foresight, enabled his country to avert the awful storm with which it was threatened.

Things were in this situation, when the formidable armament

of the Persians under Xerxes came to attack Greece. Their fleet, independently of three thousand smaller vessels and transports, consisted of more than twelve hundred galleys, having each three banks of oars, with two hundred and thirty men. The other ships, one hundred and twenty in number, furnished by the European allies of Persia, had each two hundred men on board; and as the Athenian galleys that went, sixty-five years later, to the attack of Sicily and Syracuse, carried an equal number of persons, this may be supposed to have been the usual amount of men in ancient vessels of war.

It would be difficult to tell how many, out of this amount, were destined to fight, and how many belonged to the crew. Historians say very little on this particular; Plutarch, however (in the life of Themistocles), speaking of the Athenian galleys which fought at Salamis, states that each of them had no more than eighteen combatants, fourteen of whom were heavy armed men, and the remaining four were archers.

This assuredly was a very inconsiderable amount; yet, the Athenians did not the less, on that account, show in this famous battle an undaunted courage, which contributed most to the victory. They afterwards continued to signalize themselves at sea during the whole course of the Persian war, particularly at Mycale, and in the celebrated battles under Cimon at the mouth of the river Eurymedon and near the island of Cyprus. Their navy persevered in a flourishing and prosperous condition during the whole administration of Pericles. The superior number of their vessels enabled them for a long time, at the period of the Peloponnesian war, to cope even successfully with most of the other Grecian states. But the Sicilian expedition, which they undertook contrary to the advice of their wisest and most experienced leaders, gave a deadly blow to their maritime preponderance; the superiority of power they had long enjoyed at sea, was utterly destroyed by the last battle which they fought in the harbor of Syracuse.

Still, this overthrow, however signal and complete, did not entirely ruin the affairs and resources of the Athenians. They partially recovered from the terrible blow just inflicted on them by that unfortunate expedition; nay, with a fortitude and energy worthy of a magnanimous people, they equipped new fleets, which enabled them again to contend for victory and superiority at sea. The reader may recall to mind the brilliant success they still obtained in some naval engagements, and particularly at the celebrated battle near the Arginusæ islands, in which their fleet of one hundred and fifty vessels, under the command of ten generals, signally defeated the Lacedæmonians and the brave admiral Calli-

cratidas. No later than the ensuing year, they were in their turn so completely vanquished by Lysander at Ægos Potamos, that, of a hundred and eighty Athenian vessels, only nine escaped with Conon, one of their leaders (see p. 178).

The naval power of Greece was revived after the death of Alexander the Great, when his immediate successors fought both by land and sea, to possess themselves of some portion of his vast empire. Above all, the navy of Antigonius and of Demetrius, his son, was for a long time, on a most respectable footing. The latter, on one occasion, had under his command a hundred and eighty galleys, with which he gave an entire overthrow to the Græco-Egyptian fleet under Ptolemy Lagus; in another, he steered with three hundred and thirty vessels to the relief of Athens, then occupied by Cassander; and finally, at a later period, he equipped no fewer than five hundred ships for the invasion of Asia, though his design, for various causes, never was put in execution.

This Demetrius, well known in history under the surname of Poliorcetes, was endowed with a wonderful genius, not only for the invention of military engines to be used on land, but also with regard to the construction of ships and galleys. Every one was surprised at the greatness as well as the number of his works; for no man, before his time, ever saw a galley with fifteen or sixteen banks of oars. Afterwards, indeed, Ptolemy Philopator built one of forty banks of oars: its length was two hundred and eighty cubits or nearly four hundred and fifty feet, its breadth about sixty feet, and its height to the top of the prow, at least seventy-two or seventy-five feet. Four hundred mariners belonged to it, exclusive of the rowers; who were no fewer than four thousand, and the decks with the several interstices were capable of containing near three thousand soldiers. This, however, was mere matter of curiosity; for so enormous a galley differed little from an immoveable building, and was calculated more for show than for use, as it could not be put in motion without great difficulty and danger.

But the ships of Demetrius had their use as well as beauty; with all their magnificence of construction, they were equally fit for fighting, and though admirable for their size, were still more so for the swiftness of their movements. His friends were astonished at their bulk, and his very enemies admired their beauty. Lysimachus, who of all the princes of his time was the bitterest enemy of Demetrius, desired him once to show him his engines of war and his galleys in motion; and he was so struck with the sight, that he immediately retired.*

* Plutarch, in *Demetr.*

Still, if every thing is taken into consideration, it will be admitted that the Carthaginians and the Romans were the greatest naval powers of antiquity. The former had always been remarkable as such, almost from the foundation of their republic; the latter, on the contrary, during the first five centuries of their existence, hardly knew any thing about fleets and galleys manned for war. Being constantly engaged, all that time, in fighting and subduing the nations or tribes of continental Italy, they stood in no need of maritime forces; and even at the beginning of the Punic wars, they were still deficient in this point to such a degree, as to be under the necessity of borrowing vessels from their neighbors for the transportation of their troops into Sicily.

Yet, the Romans at this time soon perceived that they could not cope with the Carthaginians, so long as the latter were masters at sea; they therefore determined to raise a navy of their own, and fight their opponents by sea as well as by land. A Carthaginian galley that happened to be stranded on the Italian coast, was made use of by them as a model; and such was their earnestness for the accomplishment of the work, that, at the close of two months, they had equipped a hundred galleys, having each five banks of oars, and twenty others having three. They also drilled rowers and sailors with great diligence and care, and their efforts proved so successful, that, in the very first naval battle fought by them (B. c. 260), they defeated the Carthaginians.

Four years later, exertions upon a much larger scale were made by the two parties. The Romans put to sea no fewer than three hundred and thirty ships, having on board a hundred and forty thousand men, under the command of the two consuls, Manlius and Regulus. The Carthaginians opposed them with a still more numerous fleet, since it consisted of three hundred and fifty or sixty vessels, carrying, it is said, upwards of a hundred and fifty thousand men. These armaments of two mighty republics, which led to the decisive battle of Ecnomus, near the coast of Sicily, may be justly regarded as the most powerful and formidable that ever appeared at sea. The only naval forces that might bear a comparison with them, were those of the Greeks and Persians in the battle of Salamis, and of the two opposite parties of the Romans in the battle of Actium between Octavius Cæsar and Mark Antony—both of them mentioned in this volume; finally, those of the Christians and Turks in the battle of Lepanto (A. D. 1571), when the Christians, with about two hundred and forty ships, defeated and almost annihilated a Turkish fleet of nearly three hundred vessels, inflicting on them a loss of two hundred and forty or fifty galleys and thirty-five thousand men, besides the

liberation from their hands of fifteen thousand prisoners or Christian slaves.

The last illustrations and particulars belong, not only to the art of navigation, but also to the military art, of which we have now to speak more directly and at greater length, though, according to our custom, in a merely historical manner.

MILITARY ART.

It is an unfortunate fact that, ever since the fall of our first parents, the spirit of discord has made dreadful ravages upon earth. Quarrels and fights were almost coeval with men, because envy, the chief cause of public as well as private animosities, most easily finds its way to the human heart; it was envy, indeed, that spilled the first blood and caused the first death, as the Holy Scriptures give us fully to understand.*

When, after the dispersion of mankind, a certain number of families agreed to live together, the interests of the private individuals who composed these associations became in some measure common to all. Then also hostilities began to take place between the different tribes, some, under the wretched influence of revenge, ambition and cupidity, attempting to inflict, and others, under the better plea of necessity, intending to repel injuries. The first wars, however, were nothing more than transient inroads; parties of marauders set out, the enemy's territory was invaded and laid waste, its buildings were destroyed, its cattle and herds carried off, and its inhabitants led away captives. The warring parties were not then bent on making conquests; as revenge or jealousy was the main object of those early expeditions, no sooner was this object sufficiently attained, than the campaign was over, and every one returned to his own settlement.

These views were changed and modified, when the number of families subjected to the same rule became so great as to form a nation or political body under a sovereign; then ambition arose and began to unfold its many schemes of aggrandizement. Monarchs thought of enlarging their dominions. For this purpose, they carefully reflected on the means of ensuring success, and endeavored to make warfare an art; whilst, on the other hand, they proposed to themselves, in their military expeditions, motives different from a mere desire of annoying an enemy, and aimed at deriving greater and more lasting advantages from their campaigns than the bare effects of a transient invasion. The political

* Gen. ch. iv, and 1 John iii, 12.

art joined its interests with the cravings of ambition, and directed the latter in its proceedings. Sometimes, too, humanity exercised a beneficial influence in the midst of public contests; a certain check was put to the ravages of war, and means were sought to keep the vanquished under subjection, rather than mercilessly devote them to entire ruin. Such was the origin of the first empires that existed in the world. They acquired more or less extent, in proportion to the degree of ambition, skill and prosperity of the sovereigns by whom they were founded.

The first instance recorded in writing of a war undertaken for the sake of conquest, is traced to the times of Abraham, nineteen hundred years before the Christian era. The book of Genesis, describing the life and actions of this holy patriarch, in order to show how constantly he was favored and protected by God, relates on that occasion how a war broke out between many princes of the neighborhood.

Chodorlahomor, king of the Elamites, had subdued the kings of the Pentapolis, a beautiful and fertile district, thus called from the five cities it contained, the same that were afterwards destroyed by fire from heaven. He kept them under his control during twelve years; but in the thirteenth year, they endeavored to shake off the yoke and to regain their independence. This fact supposes that Chodorlahomor had made a moderate use of his victory, since he had left the kings of those five cities in possession of their thrones, very probably on condition that they should, every year, pay him a certain tribute.

Whatever their particular situation or discontent was, these princes revolted, formed a confederacy, and joined their forces against the king of the Elamites; whilst he, on his side, made great preparations to meet the emergency, and having secured the assistance of three other kings, his neighbors or allies, marched the following year against the insurgents. He gained a signal victory over the five allied monarchs, took and plundered their principal cities, carried off whatever was valuable in them, and led away their inhabitants captive. The sequel of this expedition is well known. Abraham, informed that Lot his nephew was among the prisoners, armed three hundred and eighteen of his servants, with whom he pursued the conquerors, and attacking them during the night, gave them so signal an overthrow, that he was enabled to recover all the booty and prisoners.*

The Holy Scriptures mention scarcely any other wars and conquests connected with this period. The profane historians, likewise, are generally silent on this point; for, the Assyrian

* The whole narrative may be seen in Genesis, ch. xiv.

king Ninus, and Sesostris, king of Egypt, whom they represent as two mighty conquerors, probably lived at a much later period; and we know, moreover, but few particulars respecting their military expeditions. Still, it cannot be doubted that warfare was known in those countries at a very early period.

From time immemorial, the public revenues of Egypt were divided into three portions; one of which was for the king and his household, another for the ministers of religion, and a third for the support of the army. Consequently, it was a custom or law among the early Egyptians, to maintain bodies of troops, nay, considerable forces for the defence of their country.

These assertions, taken chiefly from Diodorus Siculus, are supported by a few passages of the sacred writings. Moses, in the book of Genesis, mentions a chief captain of the Egyptian army, and speaks of him as a man of great importance and authority; this refers to the times of Joseph, a son of Jacob and great-grandson of Abraham. Some time after, under Moses himself, King Pharaoh, as soon as he heard of the departure of the Israelites from Egypt, pursued them with great numbers, both of infantry and cavalry.* The rapidity with which this numerous army was assembled, supposes an established system of war, and great attention on the part of the Egyptian government always to have at hand many bodies of troops, well equipped, and ever ready to go wherever any emergency might require. These facts are sufficient to show that Egypt was one of the first countries in which the military art made some progress.

It is, however, true that this kingdom was, generally speaking, far less conspicuous for its proficiency in war than for the arts of industry and peace. Except during the reign of Sesostris and a few other monarchs that were engaged in foreign wars, the Egyptians confined themselves to their internal affairs, and usually applying but little to the cultivation of a warlike spirit, were much oftener conquered than conquerors.

The prize of military skill and valor would indeed, among ancient nations, be more justly awarded to the Assyrians and Babylonians, and still more so to the Persians under their first sovereigns, Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius Hystaspes; still all these were far surpassed in this respect by the Greeks, and subsequently by the Romans. Of what courage must not the Greeks have been possessed, not only to repel the innumerable armies, but even to shake and finally overthrow the formidable empire of Persia! Above all, what must not have been the energy, constancy, and abilities of the Romans, to conquer successively the

* Exodus, ch. xiv.

mightiest states, the most warlike nations, and nearly every part of the civilized world! Hence, in the particulars we are going to present about the military tactics of the ancients, most of the facts and illustrations that we shall adduce, will be taken from Roman and Grecian history; not, however, altogether excluding instances derived from the history of other nations, particularly the Carthaginians, whose power, for a time, was so great, and success in war, so glorious.

On account of the multiplicity of objects to be mentioned in this matter, there will be a proportionate number of titles and sections.

§ I. ENLISTING AND LEVYING OF TROOPS.

NOTHING certain can be said about the manner in which troops were levied, and armies formed during the primitive ages. It appears that all the citizens, except old men, women, and children, were then reputed able, and, in case of war, required to act as soldiers; and this accounts for the numerous armies that were easily raised even in small countries, especially in Palestine.

In subsequent ages, at least among civilized nations, a selection was made of the stoutest men, or such as appeared most fit for war, to compose an army. Finally, it was thought proper to designate out of the multitude of citizens, a certain number of individuals solely for the profession of arms; and the idea was suggested, probably more by experience than bare reflection, of maintaining at all times regular bodies of troops, in order to be constantly prepared for every danger and every sudden attack. This was the practice, among other instances, of the ancient Egyptians, and of the Persians, at least since the time of Cyrus and Darius.

Among the Greeks, the Lacedæmonians were, properly speaking, nothing else than a nation of soldiers. They knew neither the arts nor sciences; they applied not to traffic; they did not so much as practise agriculture, but left their fields to be cultivated by slaves. All their laws, their education, their manners and customs, in a word, the whole of their national constitution and character, whatever may have been their legislator's intention, naturally and exclusively tended to make them a race of hardy warriors. And so, indeed, they were. Never did there appear in all antiquity soldiers more inured to hardships, more undaunted, or better trained to military exercises, and to discipline, obedience, feelings of national honor and unreserved devotedness to the glory and interests of their country, than those raised under the vigorous influence of Lycurgus's legislation.

They were comprised in two classes: the *Lacedæmonians* properly so called, who inhabited the country or district of Laconia, and the *Spartans*, or citizens and inhabitants of Sparta, the capital of the whole state. The latter were considered the choicest men of the nation, and upon them alone were conferred the dignities, magistracies and preferments of their republic; in fact, nearly all of them could be placed with justice at the head of armies. Every one, however little versed in ancient history, knows what advantage the arrival of one Spartan officer, Xantippus, brought to the dispirited Carthaginians during the first Punic war; and how quickly another, Gylippus, delivered Syracuse from the imminent danger to which that city was exposed from the victorious army of the Athenians under Nicias (see pp. 175–176.) How wonderful, too, was the heroism and intrepidity of those three hundred Spartans who, having King Leonidas at their head, stopped for a long time the innumerable troops of the Persians in the defiles of Thermopylæ, and did not lose their lives, till they had, with the assistance of a few allies, put twenty thousand of their opponents to the sword! The total number of the citizens of Sparta amounted, at this period, to about eight thousand men.

The age prescribed by the Spartan law for military service, extended from thirty to sixty years; men under or above that age were left for the defence of the city. Slaves never were enlisted among the troops except in cases of urgent necessity, and even then, they were but lightly armed. At the time of the Persian invasion, thirty-five thousand of them fought in the battle of Plataea, where they accompanied five thousand Spartan and five thousand Lacedæmonian warriors, thus making an aggregate amount of forty-five thousand men, nearly one half of the whole Grecian army. This probably was the highest number of native troops ever raised, and the greatest personal effort ever made by that nation. Their cavalry was not remarkable, their navy still less so, as it never had been the intention of Lycurgus that his countrymen should become powerful at sea; hence it happened that, although the course of subsequent events obliged the Lacedæmonians to have vessels for the support of their national influence, they never possessed any considerable fleet of their own, or at least they never had such a one without the help of their allies.

Athens was a larger and more populous city than Sparta. In the time of Demetrius Phalereus, about three hundred years B. C., it reckoned seventy thousand inhabitants, among whom there were found twenty thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and forty thousand slaves.

All the young Athenians, when they reached the age of eighteen years, inscribed their names in a public register, and pledged themselves by a solemn oath to serve and defend the republic on every occasion to the best of their power; this oath bound them to the military service, if required of them, till the age of sixty. Each one of the ten tribes that formed the body of the state, was obliged to furnish a certain number of soldiers, to serve either by land or sea. Under Pericles, and towards the end of his administration, the navy consisted of three hundred galleys, and the land troops of sixteen thousand men, besides an equal number destined to the defence of the city, the harbor, and the citadel. Such was, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the amount of the Athenian forces, as recorded by Thucydides the historian, a contemporary, and himself an Athenian.

These armies both of Athens and Sparta, if not very numerous, were at least full of courage, boldness, intrepidity, and almost invincible. They did not consist of wanderers or hirelings, strangers to feelings of national glory, little concerned about the success of the war, and often ready to sell their services to the highest bidder; but they were composed of the choicest men of these two warlike republics, soldiers inured to all the dangers of war, and the more determined to conquer or to die, as they fought their battles for whatever is naturally most dear to men in this life—liberty, the defence of their families, the glory of their country, etc. Among troops of this description, desertions from the army were seldom heard of, and, consequently, there was scarcely any punishment decreed against deserters, because patriotism, honor, and family ties, were motives strong enough to bind soldiers like these invariably to the line of their duty.

At Rome, the levies of troops were commonly performed by the consuls, and as the consuls were annually elected, so the enlisting of soldiers also took place every year. The age determined by law for the military service, extended from seventeen to fifty; but no one, during the flourishing times of the commonwealth, could be admitted as a soldier, who was not a Roman citizen and had not some property; in order that both his free condition and the fortune he possessed, however inconsiderable this might be, should be a pledge of his brave and gallant behaviour. Once only, after the terrible losses inflicted by Annibal on the republic, necessity obliged the government to arm slaves; and even that single exception was accompanied with the extraordinary precaution of asking them individually, beforehand, whether they readily and spontaneously agreed to be enlisted as soldiers. Sometimes, too, persons detained in prison for debts or some

other cause were released from their imprisonment, and called upon to take a share in, and contribute to, the preservation and welfare of their country; but this very seldom occurred.

The Roman troops, therefore, consisted only of citizens and members of the state. Most of them, before becoming soldiers, had lived in the country, to attend their farms and cultivate the ground with their own hands, and thus not only had acquired, by hard labor, an increase of bodily strength and a vigorous constitution, but were already used to that sober, toilsome and painful manner of life, which the military service requires. The other young Romans, who were born and sojourned in Rome itself, hardly received a more delicate education. The continual exercises of the *Campus Martius*, the races to be run on-foot or horse-back, and the custom they had contracted of throwing themselves into the Tiber, in order to wipe off, by swimming, the dust and sweat which covered them, were assuredly an excellent apprenticeship for war. Troops composed of such men, and well trained in military discipline and subordination, must have been undaunted in battle.

Before proceeding to the levy of soldiers, the consul in office notified the people of the day on which all the Romans able to bear arms, were to assemble. When that day came, the military tribunes or commanders of legions partitioned by lot the several tribes among themselves, and then selected, out of these tribes, such citizens as seemed to them the best fitted for war, not all at once, but successively and four by four, endeavoring to put together those who were equal or nearly equal in age, size and bodily strength.

The enlisting went on in this manner, till four legions were completed. The levies being finished, the tribunes of every legion singled out a soldier to pronounce in their presence the solemn oath, by which he obliged himself to obey the commanders in all things to the best of his power, be ready to attend whenever they ordered his appearance, and never leave the army without their consent. After he had ended, the whole legion, passing one by one, ratified this oath; every man crying out, as he passed: "*Idem in me, I pledge myself to the same.*"

Next to the taking of the oath, the tribunes appointed a day and place for the troops to make their appearance. Here the youngest soldiers of a low condition in life, were set apart to serve as light-armed infantry under the name of *Velites*, a name which denoted their swiftness and expedition; the next in age formed a body called the *Hastati*, from their principal weapon in ancient times, that is, a spear or *hasta*; the stoutest men composed

another body, called *Principes*; and the oldest, another, called *Triarii*. In battles, the first line was formed by the *hastati*; the second, by the *principes*; and the third, a kind of reserve, by the *triarii*, who, being the choicest, bravest and most experienced warriors of the whole army, were for this reason kept to fight in cases of extreme danger; when, for instance, the first two lines had been broken and disordered. The light infantry or *velites* did not, in battles, form a separate body, but were partitioned and scattered among the lines, or in loose order placed before the army, to exert themselves as the occasion required.

Two complete legions were generally allotted to each consul, but the number of soldiers who composed a legion, was not always the same. In the beginning, it amounted to three thousand only; it was subsequently increased to four or five thousand, and even reached at a certain period upwards of six thousand. The ordinary number was four thousand and two hundred, with three hundred cavalry; and so it stood in the time of Polybius.

A consular army was, however, much more numerous than the preceding observation might lead the reader to suppose; for it comprised, besides the specified average of Roman soldiers, an equal amount of infantry furnished by their allies, and double their number of cavalry. Moreover, in times of great danger or wars of great importance, such, for instance, as the second Punic war and the great civil struggles which in the end convulsed the republic, the number of troops was considerably increased, being sometimes carried to ten or twelve, and sometimes to sixteen or twenty legions.

Every thing being taken into consideration, the Roman infantry was the best in the world; and next to it, similar praise is due to that of the Greeks, including the Macedonians. It was not exactly the same with the cavalry; as far as we can judge from the campaigns of Alexander the great, Annibal and others, the best seems to have been the Thessalian, Numidian and Parthian cavalry.

As to the defensive and offensive arms of both infantry and cavalry among the ancients, those of the first class were the helmet, the shield or buckler, and the cuirass or coat of mail; and those of the second were chiefly the sword, the lance or spear, the short pike or javelin, and the arrows. Some used slings, and some battle-axes, with terrible effect. Wooden towers placed on the backs of elephants, and chariots armed with scythes, were likewise employed by several nations; but the use of these machines was neither universal nor lasting. As experience taught that, besides the great encumbrance they necessarily occasioned, they often proved unavailing, and sometimes were more prejudicial to

their own troops than to the enemy, they never obtained the approbation or confidence of the most warlike nations, and gradually fell into total disuse.

§ II. IMMEDIATE PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPENING OF A CAMPAIGN.—APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL.—DEPARTURE, MARCH, ENCAMPMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF THE ARMY.

WHEN all things were put in readiness for the beginning of an expedition, the armies set out from their capital city on the day specified; not however before they had implored the divine assistance, and earnestly endeavored, by sacrifices and supplications, to conciliate it to their cause. This was a very general custom among the ancient nations, never to embark in a war or any great enterprise without previous acts of religion. They were, with the only exception of the Jews, unfortunately mistaken about the objects of their worship, and foolishly asked of false, imaginary and senseless deities, what they ought to have asked only of the true God, the creator of heaven and earth; yet, their conduct in this point plainly shows, to the great shame of modern infidelity, how strongly impressed they were with the sense and belief of Divine Providence, and how fully convinced of this capital truth, that there is a Sovereign Being who regulates the destinies of empires as well as other events, that all things are subject to him, that he is the author of all good and nothing can be obtained without his assistance.

This was the reason why Cambyses I, king of Persia and father of Cyrus the Great, thought that the best advice he could give to his son was, never to undertake any thing without having previously consulted heaven and offered sacrifices. As we learn from Xenophon, Cyrus always followed this advice with scrupulous exactness; and Xenophon himself, a great general as well as philosopher, constantly did the same.

All the heroes of Homer are represented by this great poet as deeply imbued with religious principles, and careful to have recourse to the divinity in all their wants and dangers.

Alexander, at the beginning of his grand expedition against the Persians, did not leave Europe and reach Asia, till he had invoked the gods that were supposed to preside over both those countries.

Annibal also, before commencing the second Punic war against the Romans, repaired to Cadiz, for the purpose of fulfilling a vow, and of imploring the protection of Hercules for the success of his enterprise.

The Greeks were very punctual in acquitting themselves of what they thought to be their religious duty, and, above all, endeavored to ascertain the will and secure the favor of their gods.

No nation, however, was more faithful in the use of these practices than the Romans, whether before their wars and during their dangers, to obtain succor and relief, or after their victories and conquests, to express their feelings of gratitude. Instances of this may be found in almost every page of Roman history.

Another common practice of the ancients in reference to warfare, was that the same persons who were invested with the chief authority in the state, led the armies to the field and conducted their military expeditions. Besides the numberless instances recorded in Scripture of Jewish kings being the only generals of their troops, we see the like among the Egyptians in the persons of Sesostris, Sesac, Nechao; among the Assyrians and Babylonians, in Ninus, Nabuchodonosor, Neriglissor; among the Persians, in Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius Hystaspes, etc.; among the Spartans, in Leonidas, Agesilaus, Cleomenes; among the Macedonians, in Philip and Alexander the Great; among the Carthaginians, in Amilcar Barcas and Annibal; finally, among the Romans, in their sovereigns, and subsequently in their dictators and consuls.

The Athenians had, in this respect, a custom quite peculiar to themselves, and not less curious than liable, by its nature, to evil consequences: an excessive love of liberty, and apprehension or a certain kind of jealousy against their greatest men, made them often change the commanders of their troops and elect new ones, even to the number of ten for one year. This gave occasion to Philip, the Macedonian king, to make this witty remark, that he exceedingly wondered at the good fortune of the Athenians and at their being able to find ten generals every year, whilst he, during the whole of his life, had not been able to find more than one, that is, Parmenio.

It is true, however, that the Athenian people were careful, in times of dangerous and important wars, to place no others than officers of truly great merit at the head of their troops. This, if not always, at least commonly happened; and hence, during an interval of two hundred years that elapsed between Miltiades and Demetrius Phalereus, we find a very large number of eminent generals who led the armies of that republic, and who carried to the highest pitch the military glory of Athens, such as Miltiades himself, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Pericles, Chabrias, Phocion, etc. The Thebans, although very particular likewise about their rights and liberty, acted nearly in the same manner, and the history of their bloody struggle against Sparta shows the two

greatest men that Thebes ever produced, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, constantly at the head of their armies. Such, in fine, was also the conduct of the Romans during the long period of the commonwealth: to the excellent choice they generally made of their dictators or consuls, were they principally indebted for their astonishing success in war.

To speak more particularly of the Roman commanders, and of the manner in which they discharged their official duties; they not only took in person the command of the troops, but set out together with them, and went on foot at the head of the legions. Since the far greater force of the Roman armies was infantry, it was deemed expedient and just that the general should be one of their number. This obliged him to set to all an example of courage and patience in the greatest hardships; and it must, indeed, have been wonderfully encouraging for the soldiers to see their dictator or consul doing first what he required of them, and cheerfully undergoing like themselves every fatigue, every inconvenience, and every difficulty of the march, whether it came from the roads, the weather, the climate, or other circumstances.

Hence, this practice lasted more than the republic itself, and continued to be observed under the empire, especially by the most warlike emperors, Trajan, Septimius Severus, Alexander Severus, etc.

The march of the legions was about twenty miles a day; a long route for an army, if we take notice that the Roman soldier, besides his helmet, shield, sword and javelin, all of which he looked upon as his own members, had also to carry his baggage, provisions for at least fifteen days, and a stake, the whole amounting to fifty or sixty pounds.* This might exceed belief, were it not otherwise known that the young Romans were previously trained by violent exercise to these painful and harassing marches.

The stakes they had to carry in their march, were for the purpose of providing themselves with solid intrenchments during the night. This was one of the chief rules of their military discipline, never to make a stay, though but for one night, either on their own or on a hostile territory, without being protected by a regular and fortified camp, in order to avoid, as it were, even the possibility of a surprise. For the same reason, they did not engage in a battle, until their intrenchments were completed. As the success of arms is uncertain, the Romans wished to secure a shelter for their troops in case of an overthrow; in fact, a fortified camp checked the progress of the enemy, received the fugitive soldiers, prevented a complete rout, and facilitated a second en-

* See Veget. *De re militari*, lib. i, c. 19; and Cicer. *Tuscul.* ii, n. 87.

gement in which victory might reward their efforts; whereas, without such a place of safety, an army might be vanquished without resource and exposed to the danger of entire destruction. Rome knew this from sad experience: it had been for want of such precaution, that is, not having provided a good encampment for the troops, that the battle which they fought at Allia was so disastrous, and their defeat irreparable.

From this epoch, the Romans were more exact than ever in forming their camp. They displayed in it so much art and regularity, that Pyrrhus and Philip III of Macedon, two very able commanders, expressed their admiration at it, and confessed that this was not the disposition of barbarians, such as the Greeks called all nations besides themselves.

A truly admirable order reigned in the camps as well as marches of the Roman troops, and a strict discipline guarded them against licentiousness and theft. Their faults against either subordination, or truth and justice, or any other part of their military duty, were punished, in proportion to the degree and nature of the guilt, with the bastinado, with degradation from a higher to a lower rank in the army, or some other marks of dishonor, and sometimes even with death. It is very remarkable that, when the soldiers had failed in their obligations and showed a reluctance to perform them, or an uncommon effort was required of them to repel some great danger, they were called to a sense of their duty by the revival and even the increase of the former strictness of discipline. Scipio Æmilianus, having accepted the command of legionaries that had often been defeated by the Numantines, condemned them to every kind of painful works and marches, for the mere purpose of using them to the hardships of war. Marius, the better to prepare his soldiers for a decisive action against the Teutones, began by causing them to dig immense ditches and turn the course of rivers; and Sylla, in his expedition against Mithridates, imposed such labors on his troops, that they loudly asked for the combat as the end of their excessive fatigues.

Even in the ordinary times or intervals of war, the soldiers were not suffered to remain idle. The new levies were made to practise running and leaping in their full armor, the throwing of the spear or javelin, the shooting of arrows, and other military exercises, twice a day; and the veterans, once. Every one was required to keep his arms perfectly clean and polished. They engaged in fictitious combats, in which their officers and the generals themselves often took a share. Finally, if no enemy was to be fought for a certain time, the soldiers were employed in works

of great importance, with the view both of keeping them from idleness and of promoting the public welfare; such were those extensive and magnificent roads, in various parts of the empire, which received, from their origin and authors, the name of *viæ militares*.

But nothing, perhaps, can give us as adequate an idea of what Roman soldiers were able to do, as what was really done by the soldiers of Cæsar in Gaul. When he besieged the city of the Attuatici, he surrounded it with a rampart twelve feet high, and well protected all around by a large number of wooden forts, the whole circuit including fifteen miles; and all this, together with a variety of military engines, was finished with so wonderful an expedition, that the enemy thought, as they themselves confessed, that the Romans were assisted in these attempts by some divine power.* In a previous expedition against the Helvetii, who intended to penetrate into Gaul, the same general, with the assistance of only one legion and some provincial soldiers, had raised a wall nineteen miles long and sixteen feet high, with a ditch for its defence, in order to prevent the passage of the enemy.† Yet, far more remarkable than either of these were his fortifications before Alesia in Burgundy, described by himself at large in his seventh book (ch. 72-74). Such was their strength and magnitude, that by their means he successfully protected his army of seventy thousand men, against eighty thousand in the town, and two hundred and forty thousand foot and eight thousand horse who had come to succor the besieged (see p. 390).

After viewing these facts, to which many others of the same kind might be added, it will not appear astonishing that soldiers who could achieve such stupendous works, should become conquerors of the world.

§ III. BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS.

THE ablest commanders always thought it their duty to settle beforehand the plan of their campaigns; to examine whether they ought to attack or stand upon the defensive; to acquire an exact knowledge of the country which was to be the theatre of the war; also, of the number and quality of the enemy's troops, and even, if possible, of their very designs, for the purpose of thwarting and defeating them by judicious measures; to foresee the principal incidents that might possibly occur, and to provide against them, as well as against manifest dangers, by every resource that prudence and experience could suggest; in a word, to

* Cæsar, *De Bello Gall.* b. ii, c. 30-31.

† *Ibid.* b. i, c. 8.

take all proper and practicable means to insure victory. This may be illustrated by various examples.

From a public discourse delivered by Pericles on the subject of the Peloponnesian war, it is easy to perceive how much this great man excelled in foresight and military science. He regulated the manner of carrying on hostilities, not for one year only, but for the whole time of their duration, and he did so with admirable prudence and sagacity, from the perfect knowledge he had of both the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces. He prevailed on his countrymen not to hazard a battle against their numerous opponents, but rather to suffer the transient devastation of their lands in Attica, while their fleet would amply retaliate by plundering and laying waste all the coasts of Peloponnesus. He exhorted them above all, with the promise of certain victory, not to undertake foreign conquests; and to the neglect of the latter advice, and the attempt to subjugate Sicily, may we attribute the entire failure and downfall of the Athenians.

Never was there a bolder and wiser plan than that formed by Annibal to carry the war into Italy, and attack the Romans upon their own ground. With consummate skill he prepared every thing for the execution of his design; the crossing of rivers, of mountains and of hostile countries, did not stop him: having foreseen the difficulties and obstacles he was to encounter, he surmounted them all; and his victories were so rapid, so signal and so multiplied, that Rome was for a time on the brink of ruin.

The idea of Scipio to change the principal seat of the war by passing over to Africa, was not less ably concerted, and proved still more successful. Many specious reasons, however, opposed that new scheme, as it seemed much more natural for the Romans to defend their own country, than to invade distant territories; first to drive Annibal from Italy, and then to go forward and attack Carthage. Yet, the manner in which the expedition was conducted, and its speedy result, showed that Scipio had judged best, and not only was right in his expectations, but that his plan had been the effect of exquisite prudence.

As the prosperous issue of a war or campaign is principally attached to success in battles, one of the chief cares of a general was to consider and see whether it was proper to give battle, or to decline an engagement; for either measure, if not resolved upon with judgment and caution, might prove very prejudicial. Mar-donius, the Persian commander, fell miserably at Platæa with his whole army of three hundred thousand men, for not having followed the advice of Artabazes, one of his best officers, who exhorted him not to hazard an action against the Greeks. It was

also in opposition to the prudent counsel of Memnon the Rhodian, that the satraps of Darius Codomanus engaged, near the river Granicus, in a combat the result of which was so fatal to the interests of the Persian empire. In fine, the blind temerity of the consul Terentius Varro, who disregarded his colleague's remonstrances, brought upon the Romans the woful defeat of Cannæ; whereas the delay of a few days might, and probably would, have forced Annibal to leave Italy for want of provisions.

On the contrary, Perseus, the Macedonian king, lost the opportunity of defeating the Romans, by neglecting to attack their whole force briskly after the rout of their cavalry, which event had spread great confusion and dismay among them, and by not putting to profit the warlike ardor of his own troops, who were already encouraged by this partial success.

The great Pompey himself committed a similar fault at Dyrrachium, where, after forcing the lines of Julius Cæsar, he might have entirely defeated him, if he had known how to pursue his advantage. In all great enterprises, especially in war, there are decisive moments upon which success chiefly depends; the paramount point is to seize upon those favorable opportunities, which, once lost, will probably never return.

When a combat was resolved upon, or otherwise unavoidable, the general endeavored to set his troops in battle array as advantageously as possible. There was and could be no uniform way of doing this, owing to the different circumstances of place, national customs, etc.; yet, as a general rule, the infantry was placed in the centre, and the cavalry on the wings; those who had elephants or chariots armed with scythes, usually placed them in front of the army to make the first attack, or at the extremity of the wings, to protect their flanks. Among several nations, the army was formed in one line, having from eight to twenty-four or thirty men in depth; but some others formed it in three lines, separated by proper intervals, the one behind the other; and this latter practice was long and much in use among the Romans, for we find it employed at different periods by their best generals, for instance, Scipio Africanus in the battle of Zama, and Julius Cæsar in the battle of Pharsalia.

The better to understand this disposition of the Roman troops, it ought to be remembered that, when drawn up in battle array, the *hastati* were placed in front of the army in dense and firm bodies; the *principes* behind them, but not quite so close; and after them the *triarii* so far from each other, that, in case of danger and distress, they could receive both the *principes* and the *hastati* into their ranks. The *velites* or light infantry were not

drawn up in this regular manner, but scattered up and down in front or at the wings of the army: on them devolved the duty of beginning the combat, which they did by throwing arrows, or by skirmishing in flying parties with the nearest troops of the enemy, If, by a very rare occurrence, they happened to prevail, they prosecuted the victory; but, upon a repulse, they fell back by the flanks or through the passages left open between the various corps of the legions, and rallied again behind the first line or in the rear. When they had thus retired, the *hastati* advanced against the enemy, and, in case they found themselves overpowered, retiring gradually towards the *principes*, they fell into the intervals of their ranks, and, together with them, renewed the fight. But, if the *principes* and the *hastati* thus joined were too weak to sustain the fury of the battle, they all fell back into the wider intervals of the *triarii*, and then all together being united into a firm mass, they made another and more impetuous effort; if this assault proved likewise ineffectual, which happened but seldom, the day was entirely lost for the infantry, there being no farther reserve.

This manner of arraying the infantry among the Romans, was exactly like the order of trees which gardeners call the *Quincunx*. As the reason of that position of the trees is not merely for beauty and figure, but in order that every particular tree may have room to spread its roots and branches, without entangling and hindering the rest; so in this array of the Roman legions, the army was not only set out to the best advantage for order and regularity, but every particular soldier had free room to use his weapons, and to withdraw into the void spaces behind him, without occasioning any disturbance or confusion.

The method of rallying thus three times has been considered almost the whole art and secret of the Roman discipline in battles. It was next to impossible, at least in the ordinary course of events, that victory should not follow this practice, if duly observed; for, in every engagement, the legionaries must have been thrice unsuccessful before they could be routed; and the enemy must have had the strength and resolution to overcome them in three successive encounters, for the decision of one battle. Now, it was certainly very difficult to obtain these repeated advantages over troops so brave and undaunted as the Romans generally were; whilst most other nations, and even the Greeks, drew up their whole army in one line, trusting themselves and their fortunes to the success of a single charge, which, if lost, was almost necessarily followed by entire defeat.

There existed several other peculiarities in the ancient manner of engaging and of fighting battles. For instance, it was a

favorite custom with the soldiers of divers nations to utter loud cries or strike their bucklers with their swords, whilst advancing to attack the enemy; this they did probably in order to excite their courage, to nerve themselves against the fear of death, and to strike terror into the hearts of their foes. Sometimes the troops went coolly and slowly to the combat; at other times, when they were at no great distance from the enemy, they rushed on him with impetuosity. Such was the conduct of the Athenians at Marathon, and of Cæsar's veterans at Pharsalia.

The Roman legionaries were used, as soon as they came sufficiently near to their opponents, first to hurl their javelins against them, and immediately after to come, sword in hand, to close conflict. The Macedonian phalanx, when brought to action, attacked at once, and in a compact body, with their levelled lances; and if they were favored by the evenness of the ground, their shock was irresistible. During this close fighting, the greatest efforts were made, the greatest courage and energy were displayed, and the fortune of the day was commonly decided.

When at length the enemy's ranks were broken and put to flight in some part of the field, the usual danger for the victorious party was their too eager pursuit of the fugitives, and their consequent neglect of the other portions of the army. This imprudence occasioned the loss of many and very important battles, in which victory might otherwise have been easily secured; for instance, the battle of Cunaxa, lost by Cyrus the Younger; of Ipsus, by Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes; of Raphia, by Antiochus the Great; of Mantinea, by Machanidas, the Spartan tyrant, etc. Skilful leaders acted in a very different way, and were very careful, after defeating some portion of the enemy's troops, to turn their own victorious men against the centre, the flanks, or the rear of the hostile force still engaged in combat; and it was this difference of conduct that procured or facilitated the decisive victories of Thybarra, Marathon, Arbela, Cannæ, Zama and Pharsalia, gained respectively by Cyrus, Miltiades, Alexander, Annibal, Scipio Africanus and Julius Cæsar.

Generals of consummate ability and experience, like those just mentioned, and some others equally renowned, carried still farther their precautions in battle, to ensure a happy result. After obtaining exact information of the various circumstances and objects which surrounded them, they endeavored to turn the wind, the sun, rivers, woods, mountains, the nature of the spot, the very temper and views of their foes, in a word every thing, to their own advantage. Thus acted, among several instances, Epaminondas at Leuctra and Mantinea; Cyrus again at Thybarra;

Scipio in the attack of the hostile camps of both Asdrubal and Scyphax; Annibal at Trebia, Thrasymenes, and above all at Cannæ; and Julius Cæsar at Pharsalia and Tapsus.

There was a still greater display of military skill made by the same leaders in the conduct of their whole campaigns. Here they evinced an uncommon merit and talent in the command of armies, by the wisdom and maturity of their designs; the preparation and choice of the best measures for their execution; the sagacity with which they foresaw both the obstacles to be removed, and the means to be employed for their removal; their attention to watch, and their care to improve every favorable opportunity; vigilance in the midst of prosperous events; presence of mind in dangers; constancy in disappointments and reverses; energy after losses and defeats; in a word, so remarkable a degree of genius and activity, resolution and courage, as never to be dismayed by unforeseen accidents or difficulties, and never to yield and fail except under absolutely insuperable obstacles. These combined qualities show the eminent general, and entitle some of the expeditions related in ancient history, to be pronounced master pieces of military science. (See Appendix, § v.)

The following may be justly regarded as belonging to this class: the campaigns of Cyrus against the Babylonians and Lydians; of Epaminondas against the Spartans; of Alexander against the Persians; of Annibal against the Romans; of Scipio against the Carthaginians; of Marius against the Teutones and Cimbri; of Sylla, Lucullus and Pompey against Mithridates; and of Cæsar in Gaul, Spain and Africa.

It plainly follows from what has been hitherto said, that, whatever share the soldiers, officers and subordinate generals may have in the success of a war or campaign, it principally depends on the commander-in-chief, if, all things and circumstances being otherwise equal, he is sufficiently qualified for his high office. This, Timothy the Athenian, a son of the illustrious Conon and an illustrious general himself, expressed by saying, that he valued an army of stags led by a lion, more than an army of lions led by a stag. Numberless facts might be adduced to show the correctness of his assertion. Independently of the example of Xanthippus at Carthage and of Gylippus at Syracuse; what rendered the Thebans for a long time victorious over all their enemies, but the talents of their great leader Epaminondas? What raised the kingdom of Macedon from its obscurity to a very high degree of prosperity and power, but the abilities of only two princes, Philip and his son Alexander? And, before that time, who changed the almost unknown tribe of the Persians into one

of the most celebrated nations of the world, and their small kingdom into a vast and powerful empire, but the incomparable skill and brilliant exploits of ONE hero, the great Cyrus?

§ IV. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FORTIFIED PLACES.

THE ancients did not signalize themselves less in the art of attacking and defending fortified places than in the other parts of war; nor were sieges, especially when directed against the capital cities of states and empires, less important than they are at present, nor are they consequently less deserving of the attentive and serious consideration of the student.

The idea of fortifying cities and other important places must have naturally presented itself to the mind of nations engaged in war against one another. The annals of history testify that there existed such fortifications, consisting of ditches, walls, towers, etc., if not in the primitive ages, at least at an early period among the Chanaanites, the Hebrews, the Assyrians, the Trojans, the Greeks and the Romans. Hence the manner of attacking and defending places of this description became one of the chief objects of military science.

There were different methods of attempting the capture of a fortified city: 1. *Blockade*, to prevent any person from leaving the town; to hinder at the same time the introduction of convoys, and thus produce famine among the inhabitants; 2. *A sudden and brisk attack*, to carry the place at once by storm; and 3. *The use of military engines*, for the purpose of annoying the besieged with a shower of missiles, or breaking open the gates, if possible, or battering the walls and ramparts, so as to make a breach and facilitate an assault. These three methods, or two of them at least, were sometimes successively employed in the same siege; when used separately, the first of the three was the safest, but most tedious, and could protract a siege to a considerable number of years; and hence the siege of Tyre by Nabuchodonosor II lasted thirteen, and that of Azetum by Psammiticus, king of Egypt, twenty-nine years. The second method was the shortest, but most perilous; and the third, as far as we can judge, was the most usually practised.

When the assailants anticipated a long resistance, they fortified their own camp with a double line of intrenchments; the one, called *contravallation*, was intended to protect them against the sallies of the garrison, and the other, *circumvallation*, against any attack from exterior troops coming to the assistance of the besieged. This manner of conducting a siege was used particularly

by the Lacedæmonians against Plataea, by the Athenians against Syracuse, by the Romans against the city of the Veientes, and by Julius Cæsar against Alesia.

The first difficulty for the besiegers was to fill up the ditches, and to approach without much danger the walls and ramparts of the place. The first object was accomplished by means of fascines, that is, small branches of trees bound up together in bundles and mixed with earth, which they threw in great quantities into the ditch. In order to effect the second, they employed not only trenches, oblique roads and passages under ground, but likewise a great variety of engines, such as those designated by the Latin authors under the names of *vineæ*, *musculi* and *testudines*. Those called *vineæ* were composed of timber, posts and wicker hurdles, forming a roof under which the soldiers came safely to the walls of a tower, and then scaled them. The *musculi* and *testudines* were made of boards, and covered over with raw hides, to protect the assailants against the darts and blows of the besieged, while the former approached either the ditches, to fill them up, or the walls of the town, to undermine them with pick-axes and other instruments. There was moreover this difference between the *testudines* and *vineæ*, that the *testudines* were borne upon wheels; whilst the *vineæ*, being comparatively light, were carried by the very soldiers whom they sheltered and protected.

Besides these machines, purely artificial in their construction and frame, the Roman legionaries knew how to form a similar one and to the same effect, simply with their targets or shields. They raised these targets in such a manner, that they closed together above their heads, and so defended them from the missive weapons of the enemy.

The engines hitherto described were primarily intended for the defence of the soldiers; the offensive machines are yet to be mentioned. Of these the most celebrated was the *Artes*, or hanging and battering ram, of which the historian Josephus gives the following description: "The ram," says he, "is a long beam like the mast of a large ship, strengthened at one end with a head of iron somewhat resembling that of a ram, whence it took its name. This is hung by the midst with ropes to another beam, that lies across a couple of strong posts, and being thus hanging and equally balanced, it is by a great number of men violently thrust forward and drawn backward, and so shakes the wall with its iron head; nor is there any tower or wall so thick and strong as to resist its force and repeated assaults."*

Plutarch relates that Mark Antony, in the Parthian war, had

* *De Bello Judaico*, b. iii, c. 15.

provided a battering ram of eighty feet in length. Vitruvius mentions others of still larger size, and to this, no doubt, the strength of the engine was in a great measure owing. The ram was put in motion by a whole company of soldiers, and when these became wearied, they were replaced by another company; so that the ram played continually and without intermission, being usually covered with a *vinea* to protect it from the attempts of the enemy.

The most renowned among the other offensive engines were the *Scorpio*, the *Catapulta* and the *Balista*. The *scorpio* was employed in throwing the smaller darts and arrows; the *catapulta* in throwing javelins and spears; and the *balista* in casting forth large stones and pieces of rock. These machines, especially the latter, sent their missiles with a violence which almost exceeds belief; still it cannot be reasonably questioned, as it is expressly related by very many ancient and judicious authors. Vegetius declares that the *balista* discharged its missive weapons with such rapidity and force, that they broke to pieces every thing in their way. Athenæus mentions an engine of this kind no more than three feet long, which sent darts to the distance of five hundred paces; and others, according to Vitruvius, cast forth to the distance of a hundred and twenty-five paces, stones that weighed not less than three hundred pounds. Josephus relates that, at the siege of Jotapat, where he was the chief actor on the side of the Jews, a soldier standing near him had his head carried off by a stone that was thrown by a Roman engine three furlongs or eighteen hundred feet distant; whilst other stones, cast forth with the same or still greater violence, killed the combatants on the breach even behind their companions, broke the angles of towers, and destroyed the battlements.*

From these facts it is easy to conclude that the military engines used by the ancients, in a great measure answered the same purpose as the musketry and artillery of modern nations. The number of those machines on particular occasions was in proportion to the power and resources of the belligerent parties, as also to the importance of the place to be conquered or defended. The Romans employed upwards of a hundred and sixty of them for the siege of Jotapat just mentioned; and they had a still greater number at the siege of Jerusalem which followed shortly after, that is, forty *balistæ* and three hundred *catapultæ*.† When Scipio took Carthago Nova in Spain, he found that city supplied with four hundred *catapultæ* and eighty-five *balistæ*, all of which consequently fell into his power. Finally, the account given by

* *De Bell. Jud.*, b. iii, c. 16 and 17. † *Id.* c. 12; and b. v, c. 25.

historians of the siege of Rhodes under Demetrius, and of Cyzicum under Mithridates, gives us fully to understand that these two great commanders employed an incredible number of machines, though without much success.

Finally, there was another sort of military engines (the moveable turrets), more formidable than all the rest, because, independently of their magnitude, they were at the same time defensive and offensive. These turrets were made of beams and thick boards joined together like the frame of a house, and running upon wheels. Their height was proportioned to their size and bulk, and sometimes surpassed that of the walls, ramparts and even towers of the city to be besieged, having many divisions or stories, between which there was a communication, and which carried soldiers with engines, ladders, bridges, and other necessities for a vigorous attack. The wheels of the machine were concealed within planks, to defend them from the enemy; and the men who had charge to drive them forward, stood behind in the most secure places; as to the soldiers within, they were protected by raw hides thrown over the turret, in such places as were most exposed. A city was in imminent danger of being taken, if such enormous machines could once succeed in approaching the wall.

The besieged, on their side, were not idle nor slow in preventing or counteracting the effects of so many contrivances prepared for their destruction. They sometimes opposed chains, boards, hides or new walls to the strokes of the *rams* and *balistæ*; at other times, and often with success, they endeavored to break or dismantle and disable them, by throwing on them beams and large stones from the top of their ramparts; or, by means of torches and combustible materials, to consume them by fire; or, finally, by digging the earth beneath through a passage opened under the wall, to make them sink by their own weight, and thus render them perfectly useless. They were careful, besides, to provide themselves with all sorts of weapons proportionate to those of the enemy, and to turn against the assailants the same instruments of terror and death to which they themselves were exposed. To the enemy's engines, they opposed engines; to mines, countermines; to assaults, vigorous sallies, and by these means often succeeded, either in protracting their defence for months and years, or in forcing the enemy altogether to abandon the siege.

Sometimes the leader of the besieging army, perceiving that all his efforts and the ordinary contrivances of war proved unavailing, had recourse to some extraordinary method and stratagem, such as the turning of a river, the opening of a subterraneous road under the walls into the city, etc. The first of those methods

was made use of by Cyrus for the conquest of Babylon, and the second by Camillus against the city of Veii.

The various kinds of military engines that have been mentioned, were invented at very different periods and in different places. Ezechiel, in his prophetic description of the siege and ruin of Jersusalem,* makes mention, not only of engines in general, but of battering rams in particular. The invention or first use of testudines and balistæ among the Greeks was ascribed to Artemon of Clazomena; who followed Pericles to the siege of Samos in the year B. C. 441; but the most famous of this kind were contrived by Demetrius Poliorcetes for the attack of Rhodes, and by Archimedes for the defence of Syracuse against the Romans (see pp. 245 and 295).

Most of these inventions and machines are no longer of any use, having been totally superseded by the use of gunpowder and artillery.

§ V. CLOSE AND ORDINARY RESULTS OF WARS AMONG THE ANCIENTS.

It only remains, for the completion of this subject, to say a few words of the manner in which the ancients concluded their wars and treated their vanquished enemies.

The treaties of peace that put an end to their contests, were couched in few but very comprehensive words. What greater interests were ever to be settled between two nations than those of the Romans and Carthaginians at the close of the first Punic war, which had lasted nearly twenty-four years without intermission, and inflicted immense losses on the two parties? Yet all their differences were adjusted in the few following lines, drawn up by the victorious consul Lutatius: "There will be, if the Roman people approve of it, peace between Rome and Carthage under these conditions. The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sicily. They shall not wage war against Hiero and the Syracusans, nor against their allies. They shall restore, without ransom, all the prisoners they have taken during the war. They shall pay to the Romans two thousand two hundred silver talents in the space of twenty years." Some of these conditions were modified by the Roman government, and made more severe; yet the terms remained substantially the same. A similar conciseness may be perceived in the treaty which closed the long struggle between the Greeks and Persians; in that which followed the Peloponnesian war between the Greeks themselves; etc.

* Ezech. iv, 2; and xxi, 22.

As to the manner in which the vanquished nations were treated by their conquerors; by none, generally speaking, were they better used than by the Persians. This is proved, not only from the example of the Jews, who constantly found in the Persian monarchs protectors and friends rather than masters, but also by that of the Ionians, who, even after their revolt and complete overthrow under Darius Hystaspes, received from that prince a code of regulations the most equitable and the best calculated to revive their former prosperity. The same mildness was commonly displayed towards private individuals: governors and generals who had revolted, were easily pardoned, provided they made their submission; and even Greeks, notwithstanding the injuries which they or their people had inflicted on Persia, were sure, when banished from their own country, to find an honorable asylum at the Persian court. Thus Demarates, one of the kings of Sparta, being driven from the throne by an intrigue, was in his misfortune kindly received by Darius; and so was, likewise, the illustrious Athenian Themistocles by Artaxerxes Longimanus. Hence the Persians, whom the Greeks called barbarians, were very often less barbarous and more generous than the Greeks themselves.

The Athenians, however, as also the Romans, frequently deserved the praise of moderation and mildness towards their vanquished enemies; but frequently too, they treated them harshly, e. g. the Athenians on several occasions relative to their prisoners of war, and the Romans in their conduct towards the Carthaginians and the Numantines. This harshness and severity were carried to still greater lengths by the generality of other nations. Nothing indeed can be more painful, in the reading of ancient history, than to behold the dreadful effects of the fury commonly exercised by the conquerors against the conquered, the destruction and desolation of the invaded countries, the plundering of cities, and the slaughter or captivity of their inhabitants; for such is the sad spectacle presented to our view almost every where in the history of the Assyrians, Babylonians, Lacedæmonians, Carthaginians and others. Whence we cannot too highly value the benefit conferred by Christianity upon mankind in the introduction of a much milder spirit among nations, even for the time during which they are engaged in war against one another;* an

* This is what a famous French publicist, by no means suspected of too much partiality in behalf of Religion, has expressly acknowledged in these words: "Si l'on voulait se mettre devant les yeux les massacres des rois et des chefs Grecs et Romains, la destruction des peuples et des villes par ces mêmes chefs, les ravages de Timur et de Gengiskan qui

observation, this, perfectly applicable to the other occurrences of human life, and which, in fact, we will have more than once occasion to repeat in the following chapter.

GENERAL MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF ANCIENT NATIONS.

THE manners and customs of the different nations form, without doubt, one of the most interesting, but at the same time, one of the most difficult parts of their history. In order to become sufficiently acquainted with them, it is necessary to observe the peculiar characteristics of the different ages, climes, countries and people; the spirit and genius of the latter, and the ideas which they entertain on the general principles of morality, on religion, on the particular virtues and vices, and the various duties of society. It even requires, in some degree, to penetrate into the interior of families, and see the usages of private and domestic life, as well as of civil and social intercourse. Finally, there should be a sufficient knowledge of the influence which the arts have, in all ages, exercised over the conduct of men with regard to both the necessities and conveniences of life. Now, who does not perceive that it must be a very difficult task to become well informed on so many and so different objects, especially when they refer to remote antiquity? For this reason, we shall content ourselves with mentioning only the chief points that have been transmitted to us on the subject of ancient manners and customs.

The manners and customs of a nation owe their origin to a multitude of causes, prevailing opinions, education, the degree of civilization, deficiency or improvement in the arts, political tranquillity or disturbances, climate, the manner of providing food, etc. A series of unforeseen events and circumstances may also greatly influence the formation of a national spirit; and as there is an incredible variety of all such objects, causes and incidents, it is not at all surprising that there should be, or should have been, so great a diversity of customs and manners in different countries.

On the other hand, it is equally certain that nations have, at all times, generally agreed on certain objects; for, besides the great principles of morality which Almighty God has imprinted in the hearts of all men, and without which no society could subsist, many usages regarding merely the ordinary course of life, were common to all ages and countries, such as certain *insignia* or exterior marks of distinction for persons invested with authority,

ont dévasté l'Asie, on trouverait que l'on doit au christianisme, et dans le gouvernement un certain droit politique, et dans la guerre un certain droit des gens, que la nature humaine ne saurait assez reconnaître." Montèsquieu, *Esprit des lois*, liv. xxiv. c. iii.

the practice of solemn feasts and repasts on great occasions, and the custom of celebrating momentous events, or the deeds of conspicuous men, by songs and canticles.

The earliest societies have been always celebrated in history for their simplicity of life and manners. In a certain sense, this plainness and simplicity cannot be denied, since we find it almost every where alluded to in the writings of Homer, Hesiod, and especially those of Moses, which are by far, even in a natural point of view, the most respectable and authentic record of early history. Still, with the exception of a few personages sincerely addicted to the practice of virtue, it would be an incorrect idea to imagine that the plain manners of the ancients supposes in them an exemption from vices, and an innocence in their morals proportionate to their apparent candor. Such an opinion would be entirely at variance with the numberless deeds of cruelty, revenge, pride, ambition and licentiousness, ascribed to remote antiquity by both sacred and profane historians. It is easy to perceive that ignorance of almost all our discoveries, arts and means of industry, was the principal cause of that primitive state of things; there certainly was no great merit in the men and nations of those times, in abstaining from conveniences of which they had not the least idea.

Thus, to speak of the most usual objects, it does not appear that, in the beginning of most societies formed immediately after the dispersion, there was any thing like our spoons, forks, plates, knives, glasses, tumblers, bottles, napkins, etc. The deficiency was probably supplied by earthen or wooden cups and vessels, for glasses and tumblers; by large leaves and bark of trees, for plates; by a sort of dagger or any sharp instrument, for knives; by little sticks, for spoons and forks; etc. The same deficiency must have prevailed in the garments, houses and furniture. It is true that things did not long remain in this destitute condition: better customs were gradually introduced; improvements took place in food, dress and lodgings; several useful instruments were invented; yet, many other conveniences still remained unknown, without which, life would seem to us very unpleasant. For instance, the Greeks themselves, however proficient they became in the fine arts, were strangers to the use of stockings, linen, candles, saddles and stirrups, glass for windows, etc. Spectacles, watches and clocks, wind and water-mills, the mariner's compass, printing, etc., a *fortiori* were completely unknown to them. Most of these valuable discoveries have had a much later origin, as they only occurred in the medieval times of modern history, and in those very ages which afterwards have been so unjustly accused of complete ignorance and darkness. What should appear most re-

markable, with regard, not only to the Greeks, but to the ancients at large, is that, being well acquainted with the manner of employing cotton and flax, as well as wool, for the fabrication of their stuffs and tissues, they hardly knew the use of linen; and this was one of the chief reasons which obliged them to have so frequent recourse to baths, for the sake of cleanliness.

These remarks should not, however, prevent us from admiring and praising what is truly deserving of praise in the simplicity of the ancients. Thus, notwithstanding the contrariety of modern usages, it is peculiarly pleasing to behold, throughout the history of remote ages, princes, lords, and other conspicuous or wealthy persons, as also their sons and daughters, employing themselves in ordinary domestic occupations, fetching water, feeding their flocks, waiting on their guests, taking a personal share in the culinary department, etc. Examples of this plain way of acting are frequently found in the lives of the ancient patriarchs, as related by Moses (Gen. ch. 18, 24, 27, etc.), and of the chief personages described by Homer (in the *Ilias* and *Odyss.*, *passim*).

It is equally interesting to see how hospitality was practised in remote ages, first as far as regards the table and what constituted a solemn repast. The holy patriarch Abraham, who was very rich and still more hospitable, certainly treated his guests in the best manner he could; yet, when he received three heavenly messengers in human shape, he offered them neither a great variety of meats, nor food delicately dressed: but a calf, very tender and good, chosen by himself and boiled without any other preparation, together with cakes, butter and milk, composed the whole repast.* The entertainments given and received by the heroes of Homer, were very similar;† and this plainly shows that the splendor of repasts at this early period consisted more in the abundance of solid and substantial food than in dainties and variety, though, nevertheless, game and venison, as well as fruits and vegetables, were not absolutely unknown.

We learn from the same sources, that it was customary to show one's regard for a person, by helping him to a larger portion than the other guests. In this manner the patriarch Joseph treated his youngest brother Benjamin, in the repast which he gave to all his brothers in Egypt;‡ in the same manner Agamemnon acted towards Ajax, and Eumæus towards Ulysses.§ This custom may have arisen from their preconceived idea of the honor attached to great abundance of meat, or, as some believe, from the fact that the men of those times, being stouter in body and con-

* Gen. xviii, 6-8.

† Gen. ch. xliii.

‡ *Ilias*, b. ix, and *Odyss.* b. xx.

§ *Ilias*, b. vii, and *Odyss.* b. xiv.

stitution, were in the same proportion greater eaters than we generally are.

Yet it was the common practice in Palestine about the epoch of the patriarchs, in Egypt and among the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war, to take no more than two meals a day, one at noon or about noon, and another, more abundant and substantial, in the evening. The meats were served up already carved, and each guest received his separate portion. They ate sitting, and not lying on beds, as was subsequently the custom among the Persians and other oriental nations, and among the latter Greeks and Romans. In wine countries, at least in Greece, wine mixed with water was the usual beverage; other nations contented themselves with pure water, milk, beer, or hydromel, a decoction of water and honey.

Poetry and music were much relished by the ancients, especially by the Israelites and the Greeks, above all by the Athenians. From different facts of their history and legislation, it may also be concluded that, if not most, at least many persons both at Athens and in Judea knew how to read, though probably a much smaller number knew how to write. There were schools, both public and private, to train children in mental and bodily exercises, and higher schools for those who intended to become more proficient in the science of religion, or in the other sciences and arts. Such were, the schools of the prophets among the Jews; the philosophical schools of Greece; and, under the Ptolemies, the astronomical school of Alexandria, which produced so many illustrious men, Hipparchus, Erasthenes, Sosigenes, etc.

To resume the description of more common and more ancient practices: the custom of testifying internal grief for the death of parents and relatives, not only by tears and other natural signs, but also by exterior marks of merely human institution, existed from time immemorial. The book of Genesis speaks of Abraham and others as having performed the duties of mourning for their deceased wives, and relates at great length the solemn mourning that took place for Jacob among his sons and their Egyptian friends. The particular manner, length of time and other circumstances which accompanied mourning, are little known, except the fact that there was some change in the dress, and that peculiar garments were appointed for widows. In the usual occurrences of life, the Hebrew women were extremely reserved, and willingly made use of veils to appear in public.

Besides these rules of propriety, the inhabitants of Palestine and of the neighboring regions had many correct ideas on the politeness which men owe to each other, and the observance of which strengthens the bonds and constitutes the charm of society.

Their manner of salutation was quite respectful, since they bowed profoundly to those whom they wished to honor. A special courtesy was shown to foreigners and travellers. They were loaded with kindnesses, and not only received what they needed, but had the use of every thing that might contribute to their comfort. As they wore only sandals, which left the foot perfectly exposed to dust and mud, the first thing provided for them when they came to a house, was clear water to wash their feet. We read in the Scripture that the patriarchs never failed to comply with this duty towards their guests; and another act of politeness practised in their regard, was to accompany them a certain distance when they resumed their journey.

The urbanity of the Greeks during their *heroic times* was much of the same description; it consisted in saluting each other by name, with a gesticulation of the right hand accompanied by some obliging words. One of their chief rules of civility, when they extended hospitality to strangers, was to wait for some days before asking them the object and motives of their visit.

The custom of making presents, as a token of gratitude, or through pure liberality, was already very much in use; these presents were sometimes quite valuable both as to matter and form, such as rich and splendid robes and garments, golden bracelets or chains and ear-rings, basins and other vessels, likewise of gold or silver. The fabrication and use of these objects prove moreover that, notwithstanding the general simplicity of early ages, some arts tending to mere decoration and ornament had already much advanced, and there began to reign a certain pomp and luxury among the Asiatic nations.

The propensity of these nations to splendor and show seemed continually to increase, and after having made a considerable display among the Egyptians, the Phenicians and the other inhabitants of Palestine, reached its highest degree in the Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian empires. It is truly astonishing how far the sovereigns of these vast monarchies carried magnificence and pomp in their palaces, furniture, dress and retinue, and to what degree they amassed gold and silver. Unfortunately, those very kingdoms were at the same time a prey to frightful vices, such as dissoluteness and effeminacy, the chief causes of their decline and the forerunners of their impending ruin, to be, as it were, a terrible warning to all future generations, that not in wealth and luxury do the real greatness and happiness of nations consist, but in the practice of public and private virtues.

The same remarks are applicable, in a great measure, to the Greeks and Romans for the time when they themselves, by their victories and conquests, had attained the summit of worldly prosperity.

There must be admitted, it is true, some honorable exceptions: 1. In favor of the Athenians, who, notwithstanding the disorders and vices of many among them, yet, as a nation, always respected the laws of decency and evinced a special horror for the vice of intemperance; and, 2. Of several great personages of Rome, e. g. Scipio *Æmilianus*, *Metellus Numidicus* and *Cato Uticensis*, all of whom, not to mention others less celebrated, evinced in their general conduct a morality worthy of the former and flourishing times of the republic. But how few, comparatively speaking, there were of this description, and how easily they disappear from the sight of the observer in the universal confusion and depravity of their age!

What, for instance, do the records of those later ages tell us about the very nations previously the most renowned for their moral qualities and habits? The austere life of the Spartans had yielded to avarice and sensuality; the industrious activity of the Athenians was changed into luxury, curiosity and indolence; the masculine virtues of sobriety, frugality, honorable poverty and laborious life, practised for a long time by the Romans, were now superseded by the contrary vices. Simultaneously with this decay of morals among the latter, the fertile fields of Italy were converted into flower-gardens, groves, places for sumptuous baths or parks for hunting, to gratify the fanciful taste of wealthy individuals; and the number and duration of their repasts, the abundance, variety, delicacy and seasoning of their meats, were carried to an inconceivable degree of refinement.

To this luxury of the table, the Romans, in the latter days of their commonwealth, joined an inordinate relish for shows, games and theatrical representations. To satisfy their inclination in this respect, they did not confine themselves to dramatical exhibitions, but required the costly sports of the amphitheatre or *circus*, in which, at first, animals of a chosen kind, especially lions and elephants, were made to fight against one another, afterwards men against beasts, and finally men against other men under the name of *gladiators*. These last, in their inhuman combats, became the favorite spectacle of the Romans, and, sometimes to the number of more than a hundred or a thousand, shed the blood of one another for the purpose of solemnizing the funerals of some famous personage, or for the mere diversion of barbarous spectators.

Add to this the common practice of bribery, venality of offices, extortion, oppression of subjects, allies and conquered provinces; the cruel treatment inflicted on children, slaves and insolvent debtors; the frequency and facility of divorce; the frightful licentiousness that pervaded not only the Roman people, but the generality of heathen nations; the adulteries and incests, plots,

treasons, murders, parricides or fratricides, which so often occurred during those perverse ages, especially in great cities and in the courts of sovereigns; the obscene or inhuman rites by which the people worshipped their false deities; in a word, a deluge of vices and crimes that covered, together with idolatry, nearly the whole face of the world: such was the abyss of evils in which mankind was then plunged, and from which there was no hope of recovery by human means.

It required indeed the special interference of God to check so dismal, so extensive and so deeply rooted an evil. It required a divine light and doctrine to dispel the darkness and errors of idolatry; and divine precepts, heavenly examples and supernatural assistance, to purge the world from the crimes that every where prevailed: and this was effected by Christ, the Incarnate Son of God; by his life, death and resurrection, and by the preaching of his Gospel. Not that all disorders have really disappeared; because, unfortunately, there always have been and always will be men disposed to shut their eyes against the light, and to reject the divine ordinances in all or in part, in theory or in practice. Yet, how great, how striking for an attentive observer, is the difference between the times of heathenism and those of Christianity. How many unjust and inhuman laws discarded! How much ignorance about moral and religious principles, dispelled! How many crimes, very common before, no longer or scarcely heard of! How many barbarous and infamous rites destroyed! How many cruel and atrocious customs abolished! In fine, how many pure and sublime virtues every where substituted in the place of disorder and vice, or deeds of heroic and heavenly perfection, in the place of merely human and moral decorum!

Here above all must appear the complete dissimilarity of the two grand epochs of mankind. Whilst ancient history shows only here and there a few individuals practising moderation, clemency, liberality, disinterestedness, fortitude and the like, and that, often, from very imperfect motives: modern history shows the religion of Christ, not only establishing pure and genuine virtue wherever it found men disposed to receive it, not only causing innumerable persons to lead a life entirely and constantly virtuous; but producing models of perfection and sanctity, of voluntary poverty, continency, and self-denial for God and the neighbor's sake, in all ranks and employments, in all periods and circumstances of life, finally in all countries and all ages, as well those of comparative ignorance, as those of knowledge and erudition. This was a spectacle totally unknown to the pagan world, and reserved exclusively to the times of the Christian era.

APPENDIX.

THIS Appendix will contain six Illustrations, or confirmatory proofs of the views taken by the author of this History concerning some important points.

The first of these illustrations, mostly taken from Bossuet's *Discourse on Universal History*, has reference to the succession of ancient empires, and is intended to vindicate the order and manner in which it has been set forth (pp. 89-100), contrary indeed to the opinion of Justin and Diodorus Siculus, but quite in accordance both with Holy Writ and with the most judicious authors of antiquity. This passage of Bossuet is well deserving an attentive perusal, and will be found replete with sound information and criticism.

2. Another, though much shorter, extract from the same eminent writer, will throw much light on the opinion expressed in page 148 of this volume (text and note), concerning the precise time in which King Xerxes ceased, and Artaxerxes Longimanus began, to reign in Persia. This is a momentous and highly useful question towards ascertaining the commencement of the 70 weeks spoken of by the Prophet Daniel, that were to elapse until the coming of the Messiah.

3. The third addition is intended to explain the reasons why Annibal, whose plan of attack had been so successful at Cannæ, did not adopt and follow the same in the battle of Zama, and to vindicate this great general's conduct on the latter occasion.

4. The victory of Marius over the Teutones near Aquæ Sextiæ (p. 345), is justly considered one of the most signal events of ancient Rome. It could have been related at much greater length and with many important details; but, as it was neither proper, nor consistent with our general plan, to introduce so many particulars about one special fact, a fourth illustration, entirely taken from the interesting narrative of Plutarch, will now make up for this apparent deficiency.

5. Lest the judgment we have passed in different places (e. g. pp. 242, 301, 382, 467, etc.) on the greatest among ancient conquerors should to any one appear ill-founded, we will here adduce, as an excellent proof of its accuracy, what Napoleon Bonaparte, in one of his conversations at St. Helena, said of Alexander, Julius Cæsar and Annibal, and of the respective claims of those famous men to the admiration of posterity.

6. The concluding part of this Appendix will be a summary view of the state of literature among the ancients, especially the Greeks and Romans.

§ I. SUCCESSION OF ANCIENT EMPIRES.

THE reader may have noticed, that our narrative of Cyrus' life and actions is very different from what Justin the historian says of that prince; that this author does not mention the second Assyrian empire, nor those famous kings of Assyria and Babylon so much spoken of in Bible history; and, in fine, that our statement throughout does not well agree with what the same author relates of the three first empires, that is the empire of the Assyrians, which became extinct in the person and by the death of Sardanapalus; the monarchy of the Medes, whose last sovereign was Cyaxares II, the uncle of Cyrus; and the Persian empire, founded by the same Cyrus and destroyed by Alexander the Great.*

To Justin may be added Diodorus Siculus, and several other Grecian and Latin authors whose writings are still extant, who differ in their narrative from what has been stated and related in this work, as being more consonant to Sacred History.

Should any one be surprised of this difference, he ought to take notice that profane historians seldom agree perfectly among themselves. The Greeks, for instance, have left us several contradictory accounts of the actions of Cyrus. Herodotus mentions three of them, besides the one which he himself has chosen to follow;† nor does he say that this one was founded on the testimony of more ancient or more respectable authors, than the others which he rejects. He also remarks that the death of Cyrus was variously related,‡ and that he has embraced on this point the opinion which to him seemed the more likely, without supporting it by any further proof. Xenophon, who served in the Persian army of Cyrus the younger, the brother of Artaxerxes Mnemon, had far better means of investigating the life and death of the former Cyrus in the annals and tradition of the Persians; and no one, ever so little versed in the knowledge of antiquity, will hesitate to prefer, after the example of St. Jerom,§ Xenophon, so wise a philosopher and so skilful a general, to Ctesias, a fabulous author whom most of the Grecian writers have copied, as Justin and the Latins have copied the Greeks; and even to Herodotus himself, however judicious otherwise the latter may be. The reason of this preference is because the history of Xenophon, not only is better connected and more rational in itself, but it enjoys, besides, the advantage of being more consonant to Holy Scripture, which, independently of its divine inspiration, deserves to be preferred to all Grecian histories, from the mere fact of its antiquity and the intimate connexion of the affairs of the Jewish people with those of the other Oriental nations.

As to the first three monarchies, what most of the Grecian authors have written of them, was looked upon as suspicious by the wisest men of Greece themselves. Plato shows in general terms, and under the name of Egyptian priests, that the Greeks were deeply ignorant of

* Justin, *Hist.* b. i, c. 3-6.

† Ibid. ch. 214.

‡ Herod. b. i, ch. 95.

§ St. Hieron. in *Daniel*.

historical antiquities;* and Aristotle reckons among story-tellers such as had written on Assyrian history.†

The reason of their mistakes is, because Grecian historians were comparatively recent, and being desirous to please their countrymen, always so fond of curious things, by the recital of the events and revolutions of old, they made up their narrative of confused materials, which they were satisfied to set in a pleasing order, without much minding their accuracy and truth.

And, indeed, the order of succession which they ascribe to the first empires, is manifestly incorrect. For, after relating the fall of the Assyrians under Sardanapalus, they represent the Medes, and then the Persians, successively and separately possessing the empire of Asia; as if the Medes had inherited the whole power of the Assyrians, and the Persians had established themselves by expelling the Medes.

But it appears certain, on the contrary, that when Arbaces roused the Medes against Sardanapalus, he did nothing but procure their freedom, without at all subjecting the empire of the Assyrians to their power. Herodotus distinguishes the time when they became free, from that epoch when King Dejoces began to reign over them;‡ and the interval between these two epochs, according to the ablest chronologists, must have been of nearly forty years. It is moreover certain, from the concurring testimony of this great historian and of Xenophon,§ not to mention here several others, that at the very time during which, we are told, the Medes possessed the empire of Asia, there were in Assyria very powerful kings, whose monarchy Cyrus overthrew by the conquest of Babylon.

If then most Grecian historians, as well as the Latins who have followed them, do not mention those Babylonian kings; if they give no place to that mighty kingdom among the empires whose succession they pretend to relate; finally, if we find hardly any thing in their narrative concerning those famous monarchs, Theglathphalasar, Salmanasar, Sennacherib, Nabuchodonosor, so much renowned in the Bible and in Oriental histories: this omission ought to be attributed to nothing else than either the ignorance of the Greeks, more eloquent in their descriptions than exact in their researches, or to the loss we must have suffered of their best historical writings.

Indeed, Herodotus had promised to write a separate history of the Assyrians;|| a history, however, which is not extant, whether it was lost, or whether he had no time to compose it. At all events, we may rest assured that we would have found in it the sovereigns of the second Assyrian empire, since Sennacherib, who was one of them, is mentioned in another book of that great historian, as king of the Assyrians and Arabs.¶

Strabo, who lived about the time of Augustus, relates in substance** what Megasthenes, an author much more ancient and nearly contem-

* Plato in *Tim.*

† Aristot. *Polit.*

‡ Herod. b. i, ch. 96.

§ Herod. *ib.* Xenoph. *Cyrop.* b. 5, 6, etc.

|| Herod. b. i, ch. 106 and 184.

¶ Herod. *ib.*, ch. 141.

** Strab. b. xv, *circa init.*

porary with Alexander the Great, had written of the great conquests achieved by Nabuchodonosor, king of the Chaldeans, namely: that this prince went through Europe as far as into Spain, and carried his victorious arms even to the pillars of Hercules. *Ælian* speaks^o of Tilgamus as king of Assyria, that is to say, beyond any doubt, the same who is called *Theglath* in Scripture; and we have in Ptolemy an enumeration of the sovereigns that ruled over the ancient empires, among whom is found a long series of Assyrian monarchs unknown to the Greeks, and which it is easy to reconcile with Sacred History.

It would take too long to relate what we find written on the same subject in the Syrian annals, in Berosus, in Abydenus and in Nicholas Damascenus. Eusebius of Caesarea† and Josephus‡ have preserved for us valuable fragments of all these authors, and of a great many others besides, whose writings were then entire, and whose testimony confirms what the Holy Scripture relates both of the antiquities of Oriental nations at large, and of Assyrian history in particular.

As to the monarchy of the Medes, which most profane historians now extant reckon as the second in the series of great empires and apart from that of the Persians, it is certain that Sacred History always joins them together; and, besides the authority of Holy Writ, the very order of facts plainly shows that the latter is the only true statement.

Before Cyrus, the Medes, although conspicuous and powerful, were eclipsed by the superior greatness of the Babylonian kings. But Cyrus having, through the combined forces of the Medes and Persians, subdued the kingdom of Babylon, it was but natural that the vast empire of which he was the founder and second sovereign, should take its name from that of the two allied nations. So it really happened; and hence the monarchy of the Medes and the monarchy of the Persians were one and the same empire, although the glory of Cyrus caused the name of the Persians to prevail in history.

It may, moreover, be said, that before the Babylonian war, the Medes having extended their conquests towards the West in the direction of the Grecian colonies of Asia Minor, became for that reason celebrated among the Greeks, who therefore ascribed to them the empire of Upper Asia, because they were unacquainted with the other monarchs of the East. It thus happened that the kings of Ninive and Babylon, much more powerful than those of Media, yet much less known to Greece, have been almost entirely forgotten in those histories written by Grecian authors which are still extant, and the possession of superior power during all the time that elapsed between Sardanapalus and Cyrus, has been, through mistake, attributed to the Medes alone.

There is no need, therefore, to take much trouble in endeavoring to reconcile on this point profane with Sacred History. For, as to what regards the first empire of Assyria, the Scripture speaks very little of it, and mentions neither Ninus, its founder, nor any of his successors, except Phul, because their history had nothing common with the his-

* *Ælian, Hist. anim. b. xii, ch. 21.*

† *Euseb. Præp. Evang. b. ix.*

‡ *Joseph. Antiq. b. ix, last ch.—x, ch. 11; and Contr. App. b. i.*

tory of the chosen people of God. As to the second Assyrian empire, most Greeks were either entirely ignorant of it, or having known it but imperfectly, confounded it with the first.

Whenever, then, any one will oppose to our statement the testimony of those Grecian authors who relate in a different manner the succession of the three first monarchies, and suppose that the first empire of the Assyrians was succeeded by that of the Medes, and not by the second Assyrian empire, which the Scripture shows to have been so powerful; we have simply to answer that those writers did not know this part of history, and that they are at variance, not only with Holy Scripture, but also with the most judicious and best informed authors of their nation, *such as Xenophon, Herodotus, Ptolemy, and others.*

Finally, the difficulty must be forever removed by this one plain consideration, that the Sacred Writers, having been nearer both in time and place to the great Eastern kingdoms, and moreover describing the history of a nation (the Jewish people) whose affairs were so closely interwoven with the transactions of these mighty empires, are of sufficient weight, even independently of divine inspiration, to silence those Greek and Latin authors who have given a different narrative.

This conclusion is the more exact, as the testimony of the latter, by not mentioning the second Assyrian empire, hardly amounts to any thing more than a mere omission or negative proof. Now, it is universally as well as justly agreed, that negative proofs are of no weight and no avail whatsoever, when they clash, concerning the same facts, with explicit evidences to the contrary.

§II. CLOSE OF XERXES' AND BEGINNING OF ARTAXERXES LONGIMANUS' REIGN.—Pp. 143-144.

XERXES was killed by Artabanus, the commander of his guards, whether this traitor intended to occupy his master's throne, or whether he feared for himself the severity of a prince whose cruel orders he had not executed.† The son of Xerxes, Artaxerxes Longimanus, commenced his reign, and shortly after, received a letter from Themistocles, who, being outlawed by his fellow-citizens, offered him his services against the Greeks (B. C., 478.) He knew how to set a proper value on the merits of so conspicuous a man, and, notwithstanding the jealousy of the Persian satraps, raised him to a high rank and fortune. The same magnanimous king protected the Jewish people, and in the 20th year of his reign, a year rendered most remarkable from the sequel, he authorized Nehemias to build up Jerusalem again with its walls.‡ This edict of Artaxerxes differed from another edict issued by Cyrus in behalf of the same Jews,§ in as much as the latter related to the temple, and the former to the city of Jerusalem. What is most deserving of notice, is that the commission which was given by Artax-

* Bossuet, *Discours sur l'histoire univ.*, Part i, epoch 7.

† Arist. *Polit.* v, 10.

‡ II Esdr. ch. 2.

§ I Esdr. i, 1-3.

xerxes, and had been foretold by the prophet Daniel, gives us the precise beginning of the *seventy weeks*, or four hundred and ninety years mentioned by the same prophet as being to elapse until the death of Christ for the redemption of mankind.*

This important date rests upon a solid foundation. The banishment of Themistocles is stated by the chronicle of Eusebius to have taken place in the 4th year of the 76th Olympiad, which is the same as the year of Rome 280 (B. C. 478.) Other chronologists believe it to have happened a little later; but the difference is small, and various reasons show the accuracy of the date set forth by Eusebius. In effect, Thucydides, a grave and very exact historian, who was a fellow-citizen and nearly coeval to Themistocles, asserts that the latter wrote his letter in the beginning of the reign of Artaxerxes.† Cornelius Nepos, an ancient and a judicious as well as elegant writer, looks upon this date as certain, on account of the authority of Thucydides:‡ an inference this, the more sound and reasonable, as another author, still more ancient than Thucydides himself, agrees with him on the subject. That author is Charo of Lampsacus, cited by Plutarch;§ and Plutarch adds, moreover, that the annals, namely, the Persian annals, agree with these two writers. He, it is true, entertains some doubt about their perfect accuracy; yet, he assigns no particular reasons for it, and the historians who think the reign of Artaxerxes to have begun nine or eight years later, are neither so ancient nor so weighty as those just mentioned. It seems therefore indubitable that its beginning must be referred to the end of the 76th Olympiad, or nearly the year 280th of Rome: whence the 20th year of that prince must have occurred about the end of the 281st Olympiad, or the year 300th of Rome (B. C. 453;) the more so, as the others who postpone the beginning of Artaxerxes' reign, are obliged, in order to reconcile ancient authors, to admit that his father had at least associated him with himself in the government, at the time when Themistocles wrote his letter. So that, whatever view may be taken of the matter, the date we have assigned appears indubitable.||

This being settled, nothing is easier than to complete the calculation. From the 20th of Artaxerxes, or the year B. C. 453, there were just 69 weeks of years, that is 483 years, to the baptism of our Lord, when he first began to preach, and to execute the office of the Messiah. Then he preached for 3 years and a half, or half a week, and died upon a cross in the middle of the 70th week; which was exactly the time foretold by the Prophet Daniel.

* Dan. ix. 25.

† Corn. Nep. in *Them.* ch. ix.

‡ Bossuet, *Op. Cit.*, P. i, epoch viii.

§ Thucyd. b. i.

§ Plut. in *Them.*

§ III. CONDUCT OF ANNIBAL IN THE BATTLE OF ZAMA. Pp. 290-300.

WHEN the momentous conflict which was to decide the fate of Rome and Carthage, could be no longer postponed, Annibal prepared himself for it in the following manner. He formed his army in three lines, with eighty elephants in front, with which he proposed to begin the action. His first line consisted of mercenary troops, Gauls, Ligurians and Spaniards; the second was composed of Africans and natives of Carthage, and in a third line he placed the veterans who had shared with himself all the dangers and honors of the Italian war. The Roman legionaries were drawn forth according to their usual divisions of *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* (see p. 464;) and finally, in both armies, the cavalry was placed at the two wings, the hostile squadrons exactly facing each other.

Here it may have easily occurred to the mind of the attentive reader, to ask why Annibal did not make the same array of his forces and adopt the same plan of attack at Zama, which he had so successfully employed at Cannæ (see p. 290.) Before giving a direct answer to this question, every one should certainly be inclined to pause, and conjecture within himself that so able and experienced a general as Annibal was, must have had excellent reasons for this difference of conduct; and, indeed, that such really was the case, not the least doubt can be entertained. The truth is, that the circumstances which attended these two great battles, were entirely different in almost every respect.

When Annibal prepared to fight against Scipio, he was not to cope, as before, with a presumptuous consul hurried on by the impetuosity of his courage into any danger and any snare that might be laid for him; but with a commander equally brave and prudent, perfectly acquainted with every part of his duty, and his equal or nearly his equal in military science. The field of battle was not left to the option of the Carthaginian leader; he had to abide by the choice, which it was not in his power to reverse, already made by his opponent. Above all, though he was yet at the head of a respectable army in point of number, (about fifty thousand men,) he could hardly place any reliance on the exertions of a great portion of his troops: he had no longer those numerous and indefatigable squadrons of Numidian cavalry, to which he owed so much of his former success, and was now in this respect inferior to the Romans, who had secured so great an advantage for themselves, by winning over King Massinissa to their side; nor had he many of those intrepid warriors that had accompanied him in his first campaigns, their number having been considerably reduced by previous battles: so that the greater part of his army consisted either of new levies or foreign auxiliaries, and soldiers who had reluctantly followed him from Italy.

Under these unfavorable circumstances, what could Annibal do better towards insuring success, than 1. to endeavor, by making his numerous elephants advance at once, to produce confusion and disorder

among the Roman infantry; 2. by directing successive charges to be made by his first and second line, to stop and weary the Roman soldier; and at last, when things would be in this condition, to make with the choicest men of his army a vigorous, and likely to prove, a decisive and successful effort? Now, this was exactly the admirable scheme contrived by Annibal, as plainly appears, not only from the order and formation of his troops as related above, but also from the concurrent testimony of the best historians in their description of this famous battle. What happy result could he not then have justly expected from this masterly disposition, had not a multitude of accidents which it was not in his power to control, combined, as it were, to thwart and defeat his very best measures?

In the first place, his elephants failed to produce much effect, and, owing to the prudent orders of Scipio and to the intervals left purposely between the divisions of the Roman troops, were in a short time driven out of the field of action. Next to this, and when the battle began to rage between the first lines of the two armies, the Carthaginian auxiliaries, not seeing themselves actually sustained by the rest of their army, imagined that they were altogether forsaken, and giving way to despondency, retraced their steps with much confusion, and a dreadful havoc which they suffered both from the Romans in front and their own troops behind. This unfortunate circumstance also contributed to the defeat of their second line; not, however, till after a very sharp conflict, and prodigies of valor performed on each side. In the interim, Scipio's cavalry, headed by Massinissa and Lælius, had sufficient time, not only to rout and drive far from the field the Carthaginian cavalry, but also to hasten back to the assistance of the legionaries.

Notwithstanding so many distressing accidents, so formidable still was the attitude of Annibal and his veterans, and so gallant their behavior in the conflict, that the charges of the Roman infantry were repeatedly repulsed, and Scipio entertained for a time serious apprehensions as to the final result of the battle. Indeed, his triumph was not achieved, till his victorious cavalry, being now returned from the pursuit of their opponents, attacked the enemy in rear and flank, and either cut them in pieces on the spot or scattered them in every direction. Annibal had resisted up to the last moment: he had truly done, whether before or after the action, whatever could be expected from a consummate general, and such was his conduct as justly to elicit the admiration and praise of Scipio himself; "*Omnia*," says Livy, "*et in prælio et antè aciem, priusquam excederet pugna, expertus, et confessione etiam Scipionis omniumque peritorum militiæ illam laudem adeptus, singulari arte aciem eo die instruxisse.*" (*Hist. b. xix, c. 85*).—See also Polybius, *b. xv, ext. 9-16*.

§IV. VICTORY OF MARIUS OVER THE TEUTONES, ACCORDING TO PLUTARCH.—Pp. 344-345.

THE two armies had reached the neighborhood of *Aquæ Sextiæ*, (now Aix in Provence), not far from the Alps, when the Ambrones, who were reputed the bravest among the invaders, encountered a portion of the Roman army on the banks of a small river. The legionaries ran to the assistance of their companions, and hence followed an engagement for which Marius, although the present occasion had been unforeseen, was well prepared; in effect, being now perfectly assured of the docility as well as the bravery of his troops, he was but waiting for a favorable opportunity to come up with the enemy and give them battle. The Ambrones, who had fearlessly crossed the stream to encounter the Romans, were repulsed with terrible slaughter, and the river was filled with dead bodies; nay, such as succeeded in reaching again the opposite bank, were cut off by the pursuers, while they fled to their camp and wagons, so that most of them perished on that day.

The Romans, after having destroyed so many of the Ambrones, retired as it grew dark; but they did not give way to joy and mirth, as might have been expected after so great a success; there were no songs of victory, no entertainments, nor, what is the most agreeable circumstance to the victorious and wearied soldier, any sound and refreshing sleep. On the contrary, the night was passed in the greatest perplexity and dread, because the Roman camp, as yet, had neither trench nor rampart, and there remained still many myriads of the barbarians unconquered. Besides these causes of alarm, the innumerable host of the Teutones, with whom the few surviving Ambrones had mixed, made the surrounding mountains, the banks of the river, and the whole plain, resound with their cries, which were not like the sighs and groans of men, but like the howling and bellowing of wild beasts. The Romans felt the impressions of terror, and Marius himself entertained apprehensions of a tumultuous night engagement. However, the barbarians did not attack them either that night or next day, but spent the time in consulting how to dispose and draw themselves up in battle array to the best advantage.

In the meantime, Marius observing the sloping hills and woody hollows that hang over the enemy's camp, despatched *Claudius Marcellus* with three thousand men, to lie in ambush there till the fight was begun, and then to fall upon the rear of the barbarians. The rest of his troops he ordered to take the necessary food and rest in good time. The next morning, at the dawn of day, he drew up his forces before the camp, and commanded the cavalry to march into the plain. The Teutones, seeing this, could not contain themselves, nor stay until all the Romans were come into the plain below, where they might fight them upon equal terms; but arming themselves hastily, advanced up to the hill. Marius despatched his officers through the various bodies of the army, with orders that they should stand still, and wait for the

enemy; but when the barbarians would be within reach, the Romans were to throw their javelins, then take sword in hand, and pressing upon the foes with their shields, push them with all their might; for he knew the place to be so slippery, that the enemy's blows could have no great force, nor could they preserve any close order, where the declivity of the ground rendered their steps unsteady and continually staggering. At the same time that he gave these directions, he was the first who set the example; for he was inferior to none in personal agility, and in resolution he far exceeded them all.

The Romans by their firmness and united charge, not only prevented the barbarians from ascending the hill, but also gradually forced them down into the plain. There the foremost battalions were beginning to form again, when the utmost confusion manifested itself in another part of the field; for Marcellus, who had watched this opportunity, as soon as he found, by the noise which reached the hills where he lay, that the battle was begun, with great impetuosity and loud shouts fell upon the enemy's rear, and destroyed a considerable number of them. Such as escaped death, being pushed upon those before, the whole army was soon put in disorder, and the Teutones thus attacked both in front and rear, could not stand the double shock, but forsook their ranks and fled. The Romans, pursuing them, either killed or took prisoners above a hundred thousand, and having made themselves masters of their tents, carriages and baggage, voted as many of them as were not plundered, a present to Marius. This indeed was a noble recompense; yet it was thought very inadequate to the service he had rendered in that great and imminent danger.

After the battle, Marius selected from among the arms and other spoils, such as were elegant and likely to make the greatest show in his triumph, and set them apart. The rest he piled together, for the purpose of offering them up as a religious sacrifice. The army, crowned with laurels, stood round the pile; and himself, arrayed in his purple robe and girt after the manner of the Romans, took a lighted torch. He had just lifted it up with both hands towards heaven, and was going to set the pile on fire, when some friends were seen galloping towards him. Great silence and expectation ensued. When these men were come near, they leaped from their horses, and saluted Marius consul the fifth time, delivering him letters to the same purpose. This crowned the solemnity of the occasion with an increase of joy, which the soldiers expressed by acclamations, and by clanking their arms; and while the officers were presenting Marius with new crowns of laurel, he set fire to the pile, and completed the sacrifice.—*Plutarch in C. Marium.*

§ V. OPINION OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE ON THE GREAT GENERALS OF ANTIQUITY.

IN one of his familiar conversations at St. Helena, Napoleon Bonaparte thus expressed his opinion on the merit of great generals and conquerors, especially those of ancient times :

"A succession of great exploits cannot be the effect of mere chance and fortune ; it always proceeds from the combined efforts of science and genius. Great men seldom fail, even in their most perilous undertakings. Call to mind Alexander, Cæsar, Annibal, and others of the same stamp : they were almost always successful. They did not become great men, because they had success ; but, because they were great men, they compelled success, as it were, to side with them. If we thoroughly examine the cause of their victories, we shall see with admiration that they were all owing to the efforts of their genius.

"Alexander, who was scarcely more than a youth, conquered with a handful of men a considerable portion of the globe. Was his expedition a mere inroad, a transient torrent ? No, indeed ; every thing in it was prepared with maturity, conducted with wisdom, and executed with boldness. Alexander showed himself at the same time a great warrior, a great politician, and a great law-giver ; unfortunately, when he reached the height of glory and success, his head became dizzy or his heart perverted. He had commenced his career in a manner worthy of Trajan ; he closed it in a manner worthy of Heliogabalus.

"Julius Cæsar, on the contrary, entered late upon the course of his public life, and after having been an idle and vicious youth, displayed in the end the qualities of a most active, generous and elevated soul. He stands indeed, as one of the most interesting and attractive figures among the public characters known in history. He conquered Gaul ; he obtained the upper hand at Rome. Could these have been achieved by mere chance and fortune ?

"But what shall I say of Annibal, the most daring, and perhaps the most astonishing of all ; so bold, so sagacious, so magnanimous in every part of his undertaking ; who, at the age of twenty-six years, contrived a scheme hardly conceivable, and executed what must have seemed impossible ; who, cutting off from himself every facility of communication with his own country, went forward across unknown and hostile tribes, whom he must attack and conquer ; who scaled those summits of the Pyrenees and Alps that were deemed impassable, and purchased the privilege of selecting his field of battle and fighting in Italy, at the cost of more than one-half of his troops ; who occupied that same Italy, crossed it in every direction, and ruled over it during the space of sixteen years ; who twice placed the formidable power of Rome on the brink of its ruin, and did not let go his prey, till the grand lesson he had taught of fighting an enemy in the enemy's country, was turned against himself ? Will any one believe that Annibal owed so many splendid feats and so much illustration to the mere caprices of blind chance and fortune ? Must not he have

been endowed with an uncommon mind, and fully conscious of the eminent degree of military science which he possessed, who being desired by his conqueror (Scipio Africanus) to manifest his opinion, did not hesitate to place himself, though vanquished, next to Alexander and Pyrrhus, to whom he gave the first rank among great generals?"*

As an illustration of the latter fact just mentioned by Napoleon, we shall observe that it is thought to have taken place at an interview between Annibal and Scipio, while the former resided at the court of Antiochus the Great, king of Syria, and shortly before the time when this prince declared war against the Romans.

§ VI. STATE OF LITERATURE AMONG THE ANCIENTS, ESPECIALLY THE GREEKS AND ROMANS.

OUR remarks on this subject will comprise *History*, *Poetry* and *Oratory or Eloquence*, as being the leading branches of polite literature, and will refer almost entirely to Greece and Rome, the two countries which produced the greatest number of conspicuous orators, poets and historians.

Poetry.—Of all the Greek poets who acquired a name for their poetical genius, Homer is unquestionably the first, not merely on account of the remote antiquity in which he lived, but chiefly for the intrinsic merit and value of his writings. Born in one of the Grecian colonies of Asia Minor, probably at Smyrna, he flourished towards the year B. C. 900, nearly six hundred years after Moses, the leader of the people of God, and upwards of a hundred years after King David, both of them the most sublime of poets in their sacred Canticles and Psalms. Homer wrote, on the subject of the Trojan war and its chief actors, two epic poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which are considered masterly productions, and have, from the beginning, elicited the admiration of all succeeding ages.

Not long after Homer, appeared Hesiod, who wrote a poem on Mythology, and another on agriculture, much praised by both ancient and modern scholars. A few centuries later, Simonides and Pindarus signalized themselves, the former by his elegiac songs, and the latter by his beautiful and sublime odes, composed in honor of the conquerors at the Olympic games; whilst, about the same time, Anacreon wrote elegant, though unfortunately too free, pieces of light poetry.

The age of Pericles was the most fruitful in great poets, as it was likewise in other great men of every description: during that period, the dramatical art, especially with regard to tragedies, attained among the ancients its highest degree of perfection. The celebrated Athenian poet, Æschylus, one of the heroes who so gloriously fought at Marathon, Platea and Salamis, had already much improved this art by a better selection of his subjects, a more appropriate and lofty style, and a more dignified appearance and deportment of the actors; when, in

* *Memorial de Ste Helene*, par le Comte de Las Cases, vol. vii, pp. 335-339.

his advanced age, he saw himself not only equalled, but even surpassed, by a much younger poet, called Sophocles. The latter composed, it is said, upwards of a hundred tragedies, of which seven only are extant; all of them, indeed, master-pieces, that have merited for their author the first rank among the dramatical poets of antiquity. Yet, Sophocles himself met a worthy competitor in the person of his cotemporary and friend Euripides, a native of Salamis, and the author of seventy-five tragedies, eighteen of which are extant. These two great poets excel each other in different points of view, and by a peculiar merit of their own; Sophocles being decidedly more tragical, lofty and sublime, and Euripides being more pathetic and moving: the preference, however, all things duly considered, is generally given to Sophocles. Another just praise due to them both, is this: that their writings contain a large number of useful maxims and instructions for the improvement of morals and the regulation of life. They died about the same time (B. C. 405 or 406), and after them the merit of dramatical compositions among the Greeks declined as rapidly as it had risen before: for, not only Aristophanes and Menander, although greatly spoken of as comic poets, contented themselves with this less dignified kind of writing: the former, besides, disgraced his talents by his obscenities, buffoneries and sarcastic style; and hardly any thing remains of the productions of the latter.

Whilst such was the state of literature among the Greeks, Rome, being far less advanced in this respect, hardly knew any thing else than to wield the sword and subdue her enemies. At length, the conquest of Greece and other enlightened countries inspired the Romans with a relish for the sciences, fine arts and literary productions; and that relish soon began to show itself by its effects. Towards the close of the Punic wars, Plautus and Terence distinguished themselves as dramatical poets, and acquired a great renown, the one for his wild energy of action and style, and the other for his elegance and refined taste. Shortly after, Lucilius rendered himself celebrated for his satires, a sort of composition which he either invented or at least considerably improved. These poets, and some others of the same period, made a great advance towards the perfection of Latin poetry, and had the merit to be the forerunners of those great poets of the Augustan age, Horace, Virgil, Ovid, etc., whose names are mentioned in the beginning of Modern History, (p. 15).

History.—If we except the Hebrews, whose sacred annals reach from the beginning of the world almost without interruption to the Christian era, history, among other nations, rose to a high position in literature much later than poetry. There lived, indeed, about the sixth century before the coming of Christ, men of great research and learning, who undertook to preserve and transmit to posterity the knowledge of those events which they could ascertain, such as Hecateus of Miletus, Charon of Lampsacus, and Xanthus of Sardis; but the real founder and father, as he is called, of profane history, was Herodotus, born at Halicarnassus, an Ionian city, about the year B. C. 485, five years after the celebrated battle of Marathon.

This great historian commenced his labors by travelling, for the sake of information, through Greece, Macedon, and several other countries of Europe, as well as of Asia and Africa. He, in fact, acquired by these travels, a very extensive knowledge, and was thus enabled to compose his history, which he divided into nine books, and the various parts of which he so well arranged and so skilfully connected together, as to make a work equally grand and interesting. If the author occasionally appears too credulous and superstitious, this should be viewed as the failing of his age rather than that of his mind, and be ascribed to the want of proper documents more than to any thing else; in the main, Herodotus is confessedly a grave and learned as well as most pleasing narrator. The chief object he had in view was to relate the great national struggle between the Persians and Greeks, the result of which was so glorious and favorable to the latter, particularly to the Athenians: hence, when he publicly read his work, both at the Olympic games, and, as is commonly thought, in Athens also, he was heard with extraordinary joy and applause, nay with a sort of enthusiasm which, among other manifestations, elicited the tears and roused the genius of an Athenian youth, himself destined to become one of the most conspicuous writers in history.

This young man was Thucydides, afterwards one of the chief actors in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. In the history which he soon undertook to write of this famous war, he did not pretend to imitate Herodotus, how much soever he had admired him, either as to the plan or manner of his narrative: he, on the contrary, resolved to relate the facts appertaining to his subject with the greatest possible precision and accuracy, and according to the strict order of time; so much so that, rather than deviate in the least from this order, he does not pursue the recital of any event beyond the space of six months, and hesitates not to interrupt it, for the sake of placing before his reader other events of exactly the same period. What renders this production immortal, is the depth and exactness of research, impartiality of views, energy of style, liveliness of description, and manly eloquence in the speeches of the leading personages.

Thucydides not having brought his history to the close of the Peloponnesian war, Xenophon, likewise an Athenian, carried on the narrative of the same and other Grecian affairs, as far inclusively as the battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas. This is also a truly valuable and important historical book, although it has neither the poetical arrangement and interest found in Herodotus, nor the admirable conciseness and impartiality of Thucydides; but a more celebrated work of Xenophon is the *Anabasis*, or Retreat of the Ten Thousand, in which he himself as a leader had the principal share. Finally, his chief and best production, according to general consent, is the *Cyropædia*, or history of the great Cyrus, a rich mine and most fruitful source of information equally for the general, the statesman, the moral philosopher, and the scholar.

Besides Herodotus, Xenophon and Thucydides, Greece and her colonies produced many other historians of great merit. Not to men-

tion Plutarch, so well known for his lives of remarkable men, and Arrianus, the best historian of Alexander the Great, both of whom flourished in the second century of the Christian era; the following writers are peculiarly worthy of notice: Polybius of Megalopolis, one of the most judicious authors of antiquity, who wrote a *Universal History* of his time, or nearly his own time, in forty books; most of which are unfortunately lost;—Diodorus Siculus, the author of a justly called *Historical Library* (the title of his work), or history of all the ancient nations, also in forty books, of which fifteen only are extant;—and Dionysius Halicarnassus, the compiler of a considerable and learned work on *Roman Antiquities*. Of these three writers, the first lived during the second century before the coming of Christ; the other two lived under Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus.

About this time, also, Rome and the Latin language could boast of a large number of excellent historians. Most of them, it is true, such as Livy, Paternulus, Trogus Pompeius with his abbreviator Justin, Quintus Curtius, Tacitus, etc., flourished only after the epoch by which we have closed Ancient History; yet, they may in some measure be referred to that epoch, since they closely followed it and are generally considered as belonging to the Augustan age; and besides, ancient Rome had already produced Julius Caesar, Sallust and Cornelius Nepos. The first of these placed himself in the first rank of historians by his *Commentarii de bello Gallico et bello Civili*; the second displayed his eminent talent in the same kind of writing by his two books on the war of Jugurtha and the conspiracy of Catiline; and the third, Cornelius Nepos, published his classical lives of illustrious generals, which, although they do not raise their author to a footing of equality with J. Caesar and Sallust, yet possess a real and great literary merit.

Oratory.—The Greeks and Romans were not less conspicuous for their proficiency in the art of oratory or eloquence, than for their poetical and historical productions. Indeed, from the nature of so decidedly democratical a form of government as was that of Athens, where all important questions were discussed and settled in the assemblies of the people, it may easily be conjectured that oratory must have exercised the greatest influence among them. Such really was the case: Solon, Themistocles, Aristides, and others who were successively placed at the head of the public administration, proved themselves to be truly able speakers; Pericles, in particular, was so excellent an orator, that the reign of eloquence is generally supposed to have commenced with him, and his friend Alcibiades showed likewise great talent in this respect.

Next to these famous men, appeared Lysias, Isocrates and Isæus, all of them greatly and justly renowned orators, either for gracefulness and purity of style (the peculiar quality of Lysias), or for elegance and harmony (Isocrates,) or for energy and strength (Isæus). In fine, came together these great rivals in oratory as well as politics, Demosthenes and Æschines, of whom we have spoken at some length in a separate chapter (pp. 221–224). The power and brilliancy of human

eloquence seemed to have been exhausted in them both ; nor could the splendid course of this art among the ancient Greeks have been better and more triumphantly closed than by these two powerful orators, especially by Demosthenes.

Oratory did not possess less importance, nor exercise less influence, in Rome than in Athens ; nay, it may justly be said to have, from the establishment of the Roman commonwealth, become one of the essential requisites of successful government, especially in reference to political discussions. Doubtless, in the frequent disputes which arose between the senate and the people, many eloquent harangues must have been delivered by the consuls or senators on the one hand, and by the plebeian tribunes or their abettors on the other, for the support of their respective claims ; but nobody thought of making a collection of them, and, although various speeches are ascribed by the Latin historians to the leading men of those times, yet it is hardly possible to judge from thence of the merit and talent of the supposed orators. For want, therefore, of safe documents, we will content ourselves with mentioning the names of those Romans of the latter times of the republic, who left behind them a great reputation for eloquence : they were Galba, Crassus and Mark Anthony (the triumvir's grand-father), at the bar ; and the two Gracchi, with Cato and Sylla, in the general assemblies of the senate or the people.

Under the following period, and just before the reign of Cæsar Augustus, the art of oratory shone forth in all its lustre, and was carried to its perfection by Cicero, besides J. Cæsar and Hortensius, his cotemporaries, and nearly his equals. Quintilian finds in Cæsar a great precision and strength, and so much natural talent, as to remove even the smallest signs of labor in the composition of his harangues. Nothing remains from Hortensius ; but it is well known that, in point of eloquence, he was with regard to Cicero what Æschines had been with regard to Demosthenes. As for Cicero himself, unquestionably the first of Latin orators, since much has been said of him in this history (pp. 370-373, and 409-410), it is unnecessary to speak any further here of his transcendent merit : there are certain names to which genius and talent of the highest order have attached so much renown, that the mere mention of them is enough to excite or revive universal admiration ; and such, in particular, is the case with Cicero.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF

MEMORABLE EVENTS

AND

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

N. B. The dates in the first column, denote the years in which the events happened;—those placed in the second column, generally mark the year of the death of the persons therein mentioned.

INTRODUCTION AND PART I.

B. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 4004 THE CREATION.
 3876 The first death, or the murder of Abel.
 2348 The Deluge.
 2247 Dispersion of the sons of Noe.
 2233 Beginning of astronomical observations at Babylon.
 From { About this time arose the mo-
 2245 { narchies of Babylon, Ninive,
 to { China and Egypt, likewise of
 2188 { Sidon and the Phenicians.
 2089 The kingdom of Sicyon, the ear-
 liest in Greece, established.
 2000 Elamites or Persians.
 1921 Vocation of Abraham.
 1912 His victory over four kings.
 1856 Rise of the kingdom of Argos.
 1682Athens.
 1519Thebes.
 1516Lacedæmon or Sparta.
 1506Troy.
 A little before or after the year
 { Alphabet brought into Greece
 by Cadmus.
 1500 { Deluge of Deucalion in Thes-
 saly.
 Amphictyonic council.
 1491 Departure of the Israelites from
 Egypt—Passage of the Red
 Sea—Promulgation of the An-
 cient Law upon Mt. Sina.
 1451 Israelites cross the Jordan and
 enter the land of promise.
 1376 Kingdom of Corinth.

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

- ADAM, the first man and father of all men, having lived 930 years, died in the year B. C. 3074—Mathusala, who lived 969 years, the longest life known, 2348.
 Nemrod, first conqueror—Menes or Mesraim, first king of Egypt. Noe, aged 950 years, died B. C. 1998.
 Sem, Cham and Japheth, the sons of Noe.—Sem died at the age of 600 years, B. C. 1846.
 Abraham, patriarch, 1821, aged 175 years. Isaac, patriarch, 1716, aged 180 years.
 Jacob or Israel, father of the twelve tribes, died B. C. 1689.
 Joseph, patriarch, and governor of Egypt, 1635.
 Towards the same time, Job, pa-
 triarch.
 Sesostris, the Egyptian conqueror, 1457.
 Aaron, first high priest of the Mosaic law, 1452—Moses, the inspired le-
 gislator of the Hebrews, 1451.
 Minos, legislator of the Cretans, 1406.

B. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 1348 Kingdom of Mycena.
Pelops the Phrygian reigns in Southern Greece, and gives it the name of Peloponnesus.
- 1153 Argonautic expedition.
Heroic times of Greece.
- 1252 Building of the celebrated city of Tyre.
- 1267 { Formation of the great and
1200 { first Assyrian empire.
- 1194 Beginning of the Trojan war.
- 1184 Taking and destruction of Troy.

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

Persus.
Jason.
Theseus, Hercules.
Orpheus, musician, 1250.
Gedeon, judge of Israel, died B. C. 1236.
Ninus and Semiramis.
Menelaus, Agamemnon, Achilles, Nestor, Diomedes, Ulysses, Ajax—Grecian chieftains.
Hector, Sarpedon, Æneas—Trojan warriors.

PART II.

- 1182 Æneas in Italy.
- 1152 Alba-longa built by Ascanius, the son of Æneas.
- 1104 The Dorians and Heraclidæ invade and occupy Peloponnesus. About this time, Grecian colonies in Asia Minor; Smyrna, Ephesus, Miletus, Halicarnassus, etc.
- 1095 Israelites wish to have a king. On the contrary, Athens and Thebes become republics.
- 1095 Victories of Saul over the Ammonites.
- 1093the Philistines.
- 1074the Amalecites.
His repeated disobedience to God's orders.
- 1055 His defeat and death.
Signal success of David against all his enemies, especially
- 1037 Against the Syrians.
- 1004 Dedication of Solomon's temple.
- 975 Schism of the ten tribes—Kingdoms of Israel and Juda.
- 971 Jerusalem taken and plundered by Sesac, king of Egypt.
- 957 Bloody battle between the Israelites and the Jews, in which the former lost five hundred thousand men.
- 941 Signal victory of Asa, king of Juda, over Zara, king of Ethiopia, and his million of soldiers.
- 914 { Prosperity of the Jews under the
889 { the reign of Josaphat.
- About 880 Foundation of Carthage.
- About 800 Rise of the Macedonian kingdom.
- 776 Beginning of the Olympiads.

Jephthe, judge of Israel, died B. C. 1181.

Samson, judge of Israel, 1117.

Samuel, last judge of Israel, resigned B. C. 1095.

Died B. C. 1057.

David, king, died B. C. 1014—Joas, his general, died the same year.

Solomon, king, 975.

Asa, king of Juda, 914.

Homer and Hesiod, poets, flourished about this time, that is, between the years B. C. 944 and 844.

Josaphat, king of Juda, 889.

Lycurgus, legislator of Sparta, 884.

PART III.

B. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 753 Building of Rome.
 747 Overthrow of the first, and rise of the second Assyrian empire.—Era of Nabonassar.
 743 { First Messenian war against the
 722 { Lacedæmonians.
 721 Samaria taken, and kingdom of Israel destroyed by the Assyrians.
 713 Miraculous defeat of the Assyrians under Sennacherib.
 From { Grecian colonies in Sicily and
 758 { Italy; Syracuse, Crotona, Sy-
 to { baris, Tarentum.
 707 {
 708 Foundation of the kingdom of Media.
 685 Twelve kings in Egypt.
 681 Asarhaddon, king of Assyria, takes possession of Babylon.
 677 Manasses, king of Juda, is taken prisoner and carried in chains to Babylon.
 Towards the same time or shortly after, siege of Bethulia, death of Holofernes and rout of the Assyrian army.
 684 { Second Messenian war; total
 670 { overthrow of the Messenians.
 669 Combat of the Horatii and Curiacii.
 667 The city of Alba destroyed.
 633 Scythian invasion in Upper Asia.
 626 Ninive destroyed, and the Assyrian empire transferred to Babylon.
 610 Battle of Mageddo, in which King Josias was mortally wounded.
 606 Beginning of the Babylonian captivity.
 572 The ancient city of Tyre taken by Nabuchodonosor II, after a siege of thirteen years. Egypt also, laid waste and subdued by the Babylonians.
 561 Pisistratus usurps the sovereign power in Athens.
 562 { Prosperity of the kingdom of
 548 { Lydia under Croesus.
 556 Successful campaign of Cyrus against the Assyrians.
 548 Decisive battle of Thybarra between Cyrus and Croesus.

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

- Kings of Rome.* *Kings of Ninive.*
 N. B. The years mark the beginning of each reign.
 B. C.
 752 Romulus.
 747Theglathphalasar.
 728Salmanassar.
 714 Numa Pompilius ..Sennacherib.
 710Asarhaddon.
 671 Tullus Hostilius.
 668Saosduchinus or Nabuchodonosor I.
 648Saracus.
 638 Ancus Martius.
 Ninive destroyed.
Kings of Babylon.
 626Nabopolassar.
 614 Tarquinius Priscus.
 605Nabuchodonosor II.
 578 Servius Tullius.
 562Evilmerodach.
 560Neriglissor.
 556Laborosochochord.
 555Labynit or Baltassar.

Other remarkable men during this period.

The pious kings of Juda, Ezechias, who died B. C. 698, and Josias, 610. The holy prophets Isaias, 698, and Jeremias, about 586.

Archilocus, the poet, flourished towards the year B. C. 664. Alcaeus and Sapho, poets, a little before the year 600. Nechao, king of Egypt, 616-600. Solon, the celebrated legislator of the Athenians, in 594.

The same epoch produced the six other Sages of Greece, viz: Thales, Cleobulus, Chilo, Pittacus, Bias and Periander (see p. 88, note); likewise Æsop the fabulist, Anacharsis the Scythian philosopher, and Epimenides, a Cretan poet.

B. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 538 Babylon taken by Cyrus. Fall of the Babylonian empire; and, by the accession of this prince to the throne in the year,
- 536 Rise of the Persian monarchy.

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

About 457; lived Anaximander, a disciple of Thales, and one of the greatest astronomers of antiquity.

PART IV.

- 536 Edict of Cyrus in favor of the Jews—return from the Babylonian captivity.
- 534 Murder of Servius Tullius, the sixth king of Rome.
- 529 Death of Cyrus—Cambyses succeeds him on the throne.
- 525 Cambyses conquers Egypt, but fails in his expedition against Ethiopia.
- 522 Usurpation of Smerdis.
- 521 Accession of Darius Hystaspes.
- 516 Revolt of the Babylonians suppressed.
- 513 Unsuccessful campaign of Darius against the Scythians.
- 509 The Tarquins expelled from Rome, and the Pisistratæ from Athens—Rome and Athens republics.
- 506 Darius invades and conquers India.
- 501 Burning of Sardis.
- 496 Battle of Lake Regillus, which crushed for ever the hopes of the Tarquins.
- 493 Rise of the Plebeian tribunes.
- 490 Persians invade Greece—are entirely defeated by the Athenians in the battle of Marathon.
- 480 Invasion of Greece under Xerxes. Battles at the Thermopylæ and Artemisium.
- Signal defeat of the Persians at Salamis, and of the Carthaginians in Sicily.
- 479 Persians defeated again at Plataea and Mycale.
- 470 { Decisive victories of Cimon over the same enemy both by land and by sea, near the river Eurymedon and the island of Cyprus.
- 460 {
- 449 Peace between the Greeks and the Persians.
- Laws of the XII tables.
- 451 { Tyranny and expulsion of the Decemviri.
- 449 {
- 449 { Splendor and prosperity of Athens under the administration of Pericles.
- 431 {

The celebrated legislators, Pythagoras, Zoroaster and Confucius flourished towards the end of the preceding and the beginning of this period.

Ezekiel, prophet, died B. C. towards 574.

Daniel, about 530.

Pisistrates, the Athenian ruler, in 528.

Anaximenes of Miletus, philosopher, towards the same time.

Brutus, the first consul of Rome, in 509.

Valerius Publicola, Roman consul and general, 503.

Titus Lartius, first dictator, in 498.

Aulus Posthumius, 2d dictator, and conqueror in the battle of Regillus, 496.

Miltiades, general, the conqueror at Marathon, died B. C. 489.—Marcus Coriolanus banished the same year from Rome.

Darius, king of Persia, died B. C. 485.

Leonidas, king of Sparta, 480.

Gelon, king of Syracuse, 473.—Xerxes, king of Persia, 473.—Aristides, general and statesman, about 472.—Simonides, poet, about 468.—Themistocles, general, 466.

Æschylus, poet, 456.—Cimon, general, 449.

About this time there flourished in Judea, Esdras and Nehemias; in Rome, Q. Cincinnatus; in Southern Italy, Zaleucus and Charondas, lawgivers; in Persia, King Artaxerxes-Longimanus; and in Greece, a multitude of distinguished artists and scholars, such as Phidias, Scopas, Calliocrates, Metagenes, architects; the same Phidias, Polycletes, Myron, sculptors; Polygnotus, Apollodoros, Zeuxis, Parrhasius, Timanthes, painters; Phrynis, Timothy, musicians; Aristophanes, poet; Lysias, orator; and Hippocrates, the ablest physician of antiquity.

B. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 431 Beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
- 430 Pestilence at Athens.
- 429 { Siege and destruction of the city
426 { of Plataea.
- 421 Peace of Nicias.
The hostilities soon recommence.
- 413 Entire defeat of the Athenian forces in Sicily.
- 406 Battle of the Arginusæ islands.
Manifest injustice of the Athenian people towards their victorious generals.
- 405 Battle of Ægos-Potamos, which put an end to the Peloponnesian war.
- 404 Surrender of Athens to the Spartans.
- 404 { Athens under the Thirty Ty-
403 { rants—rescued from their tyranny by Thrasybulus.
- 401 Expedition of Cyrus the Younger against his brother Artaxerxes Mnemon—Battle of Cunaxa.
- 400 Retreat of the Ten Thousand—Trial of Socrates.
- 410 Conquests of the Carthaginians in Sicily.
- 396 They are defeated by the Syracusans.
- 383 Defeat the Syracusans in their turn, and preserve their conquests.
- 396 { The cities of Veii and Falerii
384 { taken by the Romans.
- 395 League against Sparta.
- 394 Spartans victorious at Coronea, are vanquished at Onidos.
- 390 Rome taken by the Gauls.
- 387 Peace of Antalcidas.
- 378 Lacedæmonians driven from Thebes.
- 371defeated at Leuctra, and stripped of their preponderance in Greece.
- Prosperity of Thebes under Epaminondas and Pelopidas.
- 366 Consular dignity at Rome rendered common to the plebeians and patricians.
- 363 Battle of Mantinea; new defeat of the Lacedæmonians.
- 360 Accession of Philip to the Macedonian throne.
- 351 Ochus, king of Persia, subdues his revolted provinces.
- 343 First victories of the Romans over the Samnites.

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

We may mention with still greater precision as to the time, the following illustrious names: Herodotus, historian, who died about the year B. C. 440; Pindarus, 436; Pericles, general, orator and statesman, 429; Anaxagoras, philosopher, 428; Brasidas, general, 422; Nicias, general, 413; Sophocles, poet, 406; Callieratidas, general, 406; Euripides, poet, 405.

Alcibiades, general, died 404.

Socrates, moral philosopher, 400.

Lysander, general, 395.

Thucydides, historian, 391.

Conon, general, about 390.

Cleombrotus, king of Sparta, 371.

Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, 368.

In 365, died the great Camillus, who had been five times appointed dictator, and was considered the second founder of Rome, for having rescued that city from the Gauls.

Pelopidas, general, 364—Epaminondas, general, 363.

Xenophon, philosopher, general and historian, 360.

Agésilas, king of Sparta, 356.

Towards this time, Praxiteles, sculptor;—also three great Athenian

B. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 340 { Wild heroism of M. Torquatus
 338 { and D. Mus, consuls. Final
 subjection of the Latins to
 the Roman power.
 340 Seventy thousand Carthaginians
 defeated by six thousand men
 under Timoleon.
 333 Athenians and Thebans defeated
 by Philip at Chæronea.
 336 Alexander succeeds his father on
 the throne.
 335 Conquers the Thebans, and ruins
 their city.
 334 Defeats the Persians at the Gra-
 nicus.
 333at Issus.
 332 Visits Jerusalem—Subdues Tyre,
 Gaza and Egypt—Founds the
 city of Alexandria.
 331 Decisive battle of Arbëllæ.
 330 Fall of the Persian empire.
 Further conquests of Alexander.
 Battle against Porus.
 324 Return to Babylon, and death
 of Alexander.

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

- generals, Chabrias, Iphicrates and
 Timothy.
 Plato, philosopher, 348.
 Isæus and Isocrates, orators.
 Timoleon, general, 337.
 Philip, king of Macedon, 336.
 Memnon of Rhodes, general, 333.
 Darius Codomanus, last king of Per-
 sia, 330—Philotas and Parmenio,
 generals, 330.
 Callisthenes, philosopher, 327.
 About the same time, Lysippus, sculp-
 tor.
 Alexander the Great, 324.

PART V.

- 323 First partition of Alexander's
 empire.
 321 The Romans pass under the yoke
 at Caudium.
 320 { Repeated victories of the Ro-
 290 { mans over the Samnites, the
 Umbrians, the Etrurians and
 the Gauls.
 312 Era of the Selencidæ.
 310 Daring expedition of Agathocles
 in Africa.
 306 Great victory at sea of Demetrius
 Poliorcetes over the Egyptians.
 304 Siege of Rhodes.
 301 Decisive battle of Ipsus—Final
 partition of Alexander's em-
 pire.
 300 Foundation of Antioch.
 290 { Final subjugation of the Sam-
 284 { nites to the Roman power.
 280 Romans defeated by Pyrrhus.
 275 Pyrrhus defeated by the Romans.
 264 Beginning of the first Punic war.
 260 Naval battle of Mylæ.
 256of Ecnomus.
 255 Victories and subsequent defeat
 of Regulus.
 251 Achaean league under Aratus.
 250 Rise of the Parthian empire.

*Kings of Egypt.**Kings of Syria.*

N. B. The years mark the beginning of each reign.

- 323 Ptolemy Lagus.
 312Seleucus Nicaner.
 285 Ptolemy Philadelphus.
 280Antiochus Soter.
 261Antiochus Theus.
 247 Ptolemy Evergetes.
 246Seleucus Callimicus.
 226Seleucus Coraunus.
 223Antiochus the Great.
 221 Ptolemy Philopator.
 204 Ptolemy Epiphanes.
 187Seleucus Philopator.
 180 Ptolemy Philometor.
 175Antiochus Epiphanes.
 164Antiochus Eupator.
 162Demetrius Soter.
 150Alexander Balas.
 Most of the other sovereigns of these
 kingdoms are unworthy of notice.
 In other countries: Demosthenes, ora-
 tor, and Aristotle, philosopher, died
 B. C. 322—Antipater, general, 321—
 Phocion, general, 318—Eumenes,
 general, 315—Papirius Cursor, Ro-
 man dictator—Fabius Maximus Bul-
 lianus, consul—Antigonus, king of

R. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 250 { Siege of Lilybæum—Close of the
241 { first Punic war—Sicily, a Roman province.
225 Battle of Telamon between the Romans and the Gauls.
222of Sellasia between the Macedonians and Spartans.
217of Raphia between the Syrians and Egyptians.
218 Beginning of the second Punic war; and victories of Annibal at the rivers Ticinus and Trebia.
217at Thrasymenes.
216at Cannæ.
212-11 The Romans take Syracuse and Capua.
210-9 Success of P. Scipio in Spain.
207 Signal defeat of Asdrubal in Italy.
206 Spartans defeated at Mantinea by Philopœmen.
202 { Annibal recalled from Italy,
201 { and vanquished at Zama by Scipio—End of the second Punic war.
197 Victory of the Romans over King Philip at Cynoscephalæ.
190over Antiochus the Great at Magnesia.
168over Perseus at Pydna. Epirus and Illyria subdued by the Romans—Antiochus Epiphanes persecutes the Jews.
167 { Glorious achievements of Judas
158 { Machabeus and his brothers.
148 Macedon, a Roman province.
149 { Third Punic war, and destruction
146 { of Carthage.
146 End of Grecian independence, and destruction of Corinth.

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

- Western Asia, 301—Apelles, painter, about 300—Protagenes, painter—Æschines, orator—Theophrastes, philosopher—Euclides, mathematician—Demetrius Poliorcetes, general, 284—Berosus, historian.
Demetrius Phalereus, orator and statesman, about 283—Manlius Curius and Fabricius Luscinius, Roman consuls—Lysimachus, king of Thrace, 281—Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, 272—Zeno, philosopher, 264—Epicurus, philosopher, 261—Regulus, general, about 250—Arsaces, founder of the Parthian monarchy.
Agis, king of Sparta, 244—Antigonos Gonatas, king of Macedon, 243—Amilcar, general, 228—Antigonos Doto, king of Macedon, 220—Cleomenes, king of Sparta, 219—Hiero II, king of Syracuse, 215—Aratas, general, 214—Archimedes, geometrician, 212—Marcellus, Roman consul, 208—Asdrubal, general, 207.
Plautus, poet, 184—P. Scipio Africanus, Annibal and Philopœmen, generals, 183—Philip, king of Macedon, 178—Perseus, king of Macedon, 168—Judas Machabeus, 161—Paulus Æmilius, Roman consul, 160—Terence, poet, 159—Cato the Censor and Masinissa, king of Numidia, 148.

PART VI.

- 133 Destruction of Numantia.
112 { War against Jugurtha—Exploits
106 { of Metellus and Marius.
The Romans signally defeated
105 { by the Teutones and Cimbri.
102 { The Teutones and Cimbri utterly
101 { destroyed by the Romans under Marius.
90 The Confederate War.
88 Flight and adventures of Marius.
87 Return and cruelties of Marius in Rome—First war against Mithridates.
86 Battles of Chæronea and Orchomenus—Victories of Sylla.
84 Peace with Mithridates.

- Jonathan, prince of the Jews, died B. C. 143—Viriathus, the brave Lusitanian chieftain, 140—Simon, prince of the Jews, 135—Tiberius Gracchus, 133—Scipio the Younger or Æmilianus, 129—Caius Gracchus, 121—Hyrcan I, prince of the Jews, 114—Jugurtha, king of Numidia, 105.

- Marius, general and seven times consul, 86.

B. C. MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 83 { Return of Sylla to Italy—his
82 { success and terrible retaliation
upon the Marian party.
81-79 Dictatorship and resignation of
Sylla.
80-73 War against Sertorius.
73-71Spartacus.
66the pirates.
74-64 Second and third wars against
Mithridates—Splendid victo-
ries of Lucullus and Pompey.
65 Syria, a Roman province.
64 Disturbances in Judea—Decline
of the Jewish nation, and be-
ginning of its subjection to the
Romans.
63 Catiline's conspiracy detected
and suppressed.
60 First Triumvirate.
58 Beginning of the conquest of
Gaul.
53 Disastrous expedition of Crassus
against the Parthians.
52 The whole strength of Gaul van-
quished by J. Cæsar at Alesia.
49 Civil war between J. Cæsar and
Pompey.
Victories of Cæsar
48at Pharsalia.
47in Egypt and Pontus.
46at Thapsus in Africa.
45at Munda in Spain.
Cæsar declared perpetual dictator.
44 He is assassinated in the senate.
43 Second Triumvirate.
42 Battle of Philippi, and ruin of the
republican party.
40 Herod, an Idumean, made king
of Judea, by the Romans.
39 Power of Sextus Pompey.
38 Victories of Ventidius over the
Parthians.
36 Success of Octavius against Sex-
tus Pompey and Lepidus.
35 Antony fails in his expedition
against the Parthians.
Wisdom of Octavius—extra-
vagant conduct of Antony.
32 New civil war.
31 Battle of Actium.
Egypt, a Roman province.
Change of the Roman republic
into an empire

REMARKABLE PERSONAGES.

Sylla, dictator, 78—Sertorius, gene-
ral, 73—Spartacus, general, 71.

Mithridates, king of Pontus, 64.

Catiline, conspirator, 62.

Lucullus, general, 57.

Crassus, general, 53.

Vercingetorix, the brave Gaulish
leader.

Pompey the great, 48.

Cato the Younger, or Uticensis, 46—
Cneius Pompey, general, 45.

Julius Cæsar, the most famous and
talented man of ancient Rome, 44—
Tullius Cicero, philosopher, states-
man and the prince of Latin orators,
43—Brutus and Cassius, generals,
42.

Sextus Pompey, admiral, 35.

Mark Antony, the famous triumvir, 30
—Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, 30—
Sallust and Cornelius Nepos, histo-
rians—Varro, the most learned of
the Romans.

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